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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation examines the development of grassroots environmental 
organizations between 1970 and 2000 and the role they played in the larger 
American environmental movement and civil society during that period. Much 
has been written about growth in environmental values in the United States during 
the twentieth century and about the role of national environmental organizations 
in helping to pass landmark federal-level environmental laws during the 1960s 
and 1970s. This study illuminates a different story of how citizen activists worked 
to protect and improve the air, water, healthfulness and quality of life of where 
they lived. At the local level, activists looked much different than they did in 
Washington, D.C.—they tended to be volunteers without any formal training in 
environmental science or policy. They were also more likely to be women than at 
the national level. They tended to frame environmental issues and solutions in 
familiar ways that made sense to them. Rather than focusing on the science or 
economics of an environmental issue, they framed it in terms of fairness and 
justice and giving citizens a say in the decisions that affected their health and 
quality of life. And, as the regulatory, political, and social landscape changed 
around them, they adapted their strategies in their efforts to continue to affect 
environmental decision making. Over time, they often connected their local 
interests and issues with more sophisticated, globalized understandings of the 
economic and political systems that under laid environmental issues. This study 
examines three case studies in the rural Great Plains, urban Southwest, and small-
town Appalachia between 1970 and 2000 in an attempt to understand community-
  ii 
based environmental activism in the late twentieth century, how it related to the 
national environmental movement, the strategies local-level groups employed and 
when and why, the role of liberal democratic arguments in their work and in 
group identity formation, the limits of those arguments, and how the groups, their 
strategies, and the activists themselves changed overtime. These three groups 
were the Northern Plains Resource Council in Montana, Southwest 
Environmental Service in Southern Arizona, and Save Our Cumberland 
Mountains in Eastern Tennessee. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Before 1970, Circle, Montana, wheat farmer Helen Waller considered 
herself a conservative Republican, more active in her local church than politics. 
That all changed when mining companies leased the coal beneath her family’s 
land and threatened her family’s private property and livelihood.  The fight to 
save her farm transformed Waller into an impassioned activist.  In the 1980s, she 
ran for lieutenant governor of Montana as a Democrat; toured the country and 
Europe, inspiring diverse groups with her message of justice and self-
determination; attended the Democratic National Convention as a delegate for 
Jesse Jackson in 1988; and worked to preserve family farms and ranches across 
the country.
1
  While the scale of Waller’s activism is extraordinary, her 
experience is not.  Thousands of citizen activists across the United States have 
similar stories.
2
   
Whether they were ex-coal miners or schoolteachers fighting the 
importation of hazardous wastes from out of state in Appalachia, self-trained 
experts on air and water quality advocating for a clean environment in Tucson, or 
farmers and ranchers working to protect the Montana prairies, their stories offer 
an alternative to the traditional understanding of American environmentalism. 
                                                 
1
 Helen and Gordon Waller, interview by author, Waller ranch near Circle, Montana, 3 August 
2010. 
2
 Portions of this chapter of the dissertation also appear in the article “Power to the People: 
Grassroots Advocacy for Environmental Protection and Democratic Governance in the Late 20
th
 
Century,” co-authored with Paul Hirt and included in the forthcoming anthology, The Politics of 
Hope edited by Michael Eagan and Jeff Crane and published by the University of Colorado Press. 
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Although many of the developments in the environmental movement that attract 
popular attention happened on the national stage, scholars increasingly recognize 
that many ideas for addressing environmental issues and developments in the 
movement originated at the local and state levels.  At these levels, activists and 
the organizations they formed looked much different than they did in Washington, 
D.C.—they tended to be comprised of volunteers with little or no formal training 
in environmental science or policy.  They were also more likely to be women than 
at the national level.   As non-professionals in the environmental sciences, 
resource management, or governance they tended to frame environmental issues 
and solutions in familiar ways that made sense to them.  Rather than focusing on 
the science or economics of an environmental issue, they understood it in terms of 
fairness and justice and giving citizens the ability to participate in the decisions 
that affected their health and quality of life.  For some, these goals were on par 
with environmental objectives and often served as useful tools in achieving those 
ends.     
Some observers might employ the oft-quoted maxim “think global, act 
local,” to explain local environmental activism, implying a relationship between a 
national and global environmental consciousness and local activism in which 
ideas and values flow from the global to the local.  In many instances, however, 
activists began their involvement with environmental issues out of profoundly 
local and often personal interests.  Over time, they often connected their local 
interests and issues with more sophisticated, globalized understandings of the 
economic and political systems that under laid environmental degradation.     
  3 
Beginning with the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 and accelerating 
with National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and a wave of 
subsequent federal and state legislation in the following decade, environmental 
laws enshrined the principle that citizens should have a say in decisions that affect 
the commons, public health, and quality of life.  The laws codified the notion that 
environmental decision-making processes should be transparent, and that citizens 
had a right to know if they were being exposed to harmful pollution and the 
nature of that pollution.  These laws also required decision makers to be 
accountable to the citizenry. It is difficult to discern which came first, but 
coinciding with this new emphasis on democratizing environmental protection 
was the organic evolution and proliferation of new local-level, community-based 
conservation and environmental groups.   
 Exploring three of these organizations in the rural northern Great Plains, 
urban Southwest, and small town Appalachia reveals an environmental movement 
that resists the traditional dichotomies of left and right, urban and rural, white and 
non-white, elite and working class, male and female, when understanding citizen 
environmental protection efforts in the late-twentieth century. More than a late-
20th century innovation in values, the modern environmental movement at its 
grassroots is an extension of long-held American ideals of justice and democracy 
and a continuation of the increasing democratization of American society during 
the twentieth century. This study illuminates how common people, brought 
together by shared material interests and values, took action to protect the health 
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and livability of their communities and the world at large, advancing American 
democratic institutions in the process. 
As most pointedly argued by historian Samuel Hays and reaffirmed by 
such historians as Adam Rome, scholars have understood American 
environmentalism as a predominately urban phenomenon born out of the social 
and economic changes of the post-World War II era. Other historians have 
examined the evolution of environmentalism by focusing on certain key figures 
such as John Muir and Gifford Pinchot, groups like the Sierra Club and the 
Wilderness Society, and the passage of environmental policies including the 
National Wilderness Preservation Act.  Much attention has been paid to the 
environmental impact assessments and environmental protection mandates 
required by the environmental laws passed during the late 1960s and 1970s in 
which governance reforms played a critical role.  However, little work has been 
done examining the relationship between these laws and the evolution of 
grassroots environmental groups during this period. Environmental controversies 
at the local level, such as the Santa Barbara oil spill and toxic pollution at Love 
Canal, spawned national debates over the principles of environmental protection, 
public participation, and citizens’ right-to-know.  Most of the problems that 
spurred activists and motivated reform originated at the local level.
3
  
Groups such as the Northern Plains Resource Council in Montana, 
Southwest Environmental Service in Arizona, and Save Our Cumberland 
                                                 
3
 See Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United 
States, 1955-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Adam Rome, Bulldozer in 
the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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Mountains in Tennessee organized to address perceived threats to community 
interests. But within their activities and arguments lie deeper convictions about 
fairness, justice, and a belief that in a democratic society, people have a right to 
participate in the decisions that affect their destinies.  Conservation organizations 
lobbied to insert public participation procedures into the nation’s bedrock 
environmental laws and used them as rallying points around which to organize 
their members to make their voices heard. Likewise, they voluntarily assumed 
responsibility as citizens to ensure these new laws were faithfully implemented. In 
the process, they became not only the guardians of environmental protection, but 
also of good government and of democratic ideals. Historians have touched on 
aspects of this kind of activism but have yet to explore it fully and set it within the 
context of American reform.  
Reform is never easy. Vested interests resisted any loss of privileged 
access and influence, while government agencies slowly and uncomfortably 
embraced the procedural and cultural changes these environmental protection and 
public participation laws demanded.  Between the Progressive Era and the 1960s, 
environmental decision-making was guided by what historian Samuel Hays had 
called the “Gospel of Efficiency” and was largely the purview of technocratic 
resource managers dictating the management of natural resources from within 
state and federal agencies.  As early as the 1930s, groups like the Wilderness 
Society and Sierra Club endeavored to influence the decisions of resource 
managers, but democratization of environmental decision-making required a 
generation’s persistent efforts to reform governance at all levels and in every 
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state. For some conservation groups including those studied here, the battle for 
participation and citizen empowerment was nearly as important as the 
environmental objective. Reflecting populist ideals, community-based 
environmental groups often adopted democratic processes in their own 
organizational structures. Decision making for public goods and common 
resources, they reasoned, reflected the interests and values of the community and 
therefore encouraged personal investment and commitment to action on behalf of 
the members. In their campaigns, groups like the Northern Plains Resource 
Council, Southwest Environmental Service, and Save Our Cumberland Mountains 
called for the equitable application and protection of laws across civil society. 
Editorials in their newsletters, internal communication, and interviews with 
people involved in each group reflected the opinion that corporate profits should 
not take precedence over citizens’ rights to a healthful environment or their ability 
to make a living.  Since corporations wielded enormous influence and enjoyed 
privileges not available to average Americans, citizens’ organizations demanded 
restraints on that power and argued that corporations be subject to the same rules 
as everyone else. This shared language of justice and fairness provided a common 
ground for divergent interests to work together toward common solutions.  
Sometimes, the process transformed the identity and political stance of the 
members themselves.
4 
 
                                                 
4
 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 3; Hays, Beauty, Health, and 
Permanence, 458-459; See Mark T. Harvey, Wilderness Forever: Howard Zahniser and the Path 
to the Wilderness Act (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005); These observations come 
from thorough research of the newsletters and private and public archives  and oral interviews 
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This study revises how scholars understand environmentalism.  Rather 
than something new that evolved out of the social and economic conditions of the 
postwar era and the cultural ferment of the 1960s, this study ties the movement to 
a long history of reform.  This is not to say that the unique circumstances of the 
era in which the modern environmental movement grew were not vital to its 
development.  But the arguments and strategies environmental groups used to 
respond to local problems rested on notions of liberal democracy that predate the 
mid-twentieth century.  From this perspective, environmentalism, at the local and 
community level, is a continuation of the gradual democratization of American 
society that has occurred since the nation’s inception.   
This dissertation examines the strategies local and community-based 
conservation and environmental organizations used to achieve their goals between 
1970 and 2000.  Citizens’ environmental groups used tactics as diverse as 
introducing legislation and lobbying policy makers, educational campaigns, filing 
lawsuits to hold government agencies accountable to the law and direct-action 
protests.  Many of their tactics were couched in the language of justice, 
demanding that citizens and communities not be unfairly burdened by the actions 
of corporations or governments. This study examines how and when and why 
citizens groups used these strategies and the role liberal democratic arguments 
played in the overall repertoire of intellectual arguments available to activists.  It 
also investigates the opportunities and limitations of democratic arguments, the 
                                                                                                                                     
with members of the Northern Plains Resource Council in Montana, Save Our Cumberland 
Mountains in Tennessee, and Southwest Environmental Service in Arizona and from working 
closely with such groups in a professional capacity from 2002 to 2005.   
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role of these arguments in the formation of group identity, and whether or how 
individual and group identities changed over time in relation to the democratic 
argument.   
 
Setting Citizens’ Environmental Activism in Context 
 
 Setting local, community-based environmental organizations and the 
activism of their members in historical context requires the weaving together of 
two strains of American history that are not usually considered in relation to one 
another.  The first is the evolution of the American environmental movement as a 
social and political phenomenon and the corresponding passage of environmental 
reforms during the twentieth century.  This history has grown in depth and 
complexity over the past several decades.  The second strain involves the history 
of American political ideology and activism and democratic reform that dates 
back to the days of the American Revolution and Early Republic and courses 
through the Populist and Progressive movements of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to the 1960s and 1970s.  To appreciate how environmental 
activists at the local level understood environmental issues and why they favored 
certain strategies to address them over others, it is necessary to understand the 
ideological context in which they confronted threats to land, water, air, and health.     
 In the decades following the Second World War, modern 
environmentalism made a dramatic entrance on the American political scene with 
lasting effects.  This movement injected American politics with new concerns 
about preserving wild places and animals, protecting the American quality of life, 
  9 
and human health.  Scholars studying the rise of environmental concern have 
explained the development of modern environmentalism as the result of 
economic, social and cultural changes that occurred in American society in the 
second half of the twentieth century including increased affluence, expanded 
leisure time and ease of travel by automobile, and movement of Americans from 
urban centers to the suburbs.  They have devoted much attention to the evolution 
of national organizations, their leaders, and policies.
5
  Building on these studies, 
some scholars have investigated the environmental movement from the 
perspective of the grassroots—from the bottom up.  Their studies have 
emphasized the importance of local issues and organizations in influencing the 
national movement and environmental policies at the state and federal level.
6
  
Scholars have yet to explore fully how these local and community-based groups 
relate to broader democratic reform efforts and the development of American civil 
society in general.
7
       
                                                 
5
 See Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence; Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside; Steven Stoll, 
U.S. Environmentalism since 1945: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St.Martin’s, 
2007); Mark T. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation 
Movement (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994); Harvey, Wilderness Forever; 
Byron E. Pearson, Still the Wild River Runs: Congress, the Sierra Club, and the Fight to Save 
Grand Canyon (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002); Michael E. Kraft,  Environmental 
Policy and Politics, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007); and Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of 
Environmental Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
6
 Stoll, 22; see also Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial 
Pollution in Gary, Indiana 1945-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); 
Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental 
Movement, rev. ed. (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2005); Chad Montrie, To Save The Land and 
People: A History of Opposition to Surface Coal Mining in Appalachia (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003); Stephen L. Fisher, ed., Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of 
Resistance and Change (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); Colman McCarthy, 
Disturbers of the Peace: Profiles in Nonadjustment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973);  
Darren Speece, “From Corporatism to Citizen Oversight: The Legal Fight Over California 
Redwoods, 1970-1996,” Environmental History 14 (October 2009): 705-736. 
7
 Historians including Rome, Hurley, Gottlieb, Montrie, Fisher, McCarthy, and Speece explore the 
relationship between the grassroots activism the environmental movement and social change in 
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In Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United 
States, 1955-1985, Samuel Hays argued that environmental concerns originated in 
the social and economic changes that occurred after World War II.  He posited 
that although the beginnings were evident earlier, “only after the war did they 
become widely shared social phenomena.”  He cited the growth in outdoor 
recreation in the 1950s, which expanded into an appreciation for and desire to 
protect natural environments and then became tied to attempts to control air and 
water pollution and later toxic chemicals. Hays posited a transition in American 
culture during the postwar era from the earlier Progressive-era emphasis on 
efficient use of natural resources to a new emphasis on quality of life. This 
transition took place in relation to the increasing prominence of a consumer 
culture in American society; the environment became part of the growing number 
of amenities that defined a middle-class quality of life after 1945.  Adam Rome 
builds on the work of Hays.  In Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl 
and the Rise of American Environmentalism, Rome locates the origins of modern 
American environmentalism in consumer culture but specifically in the migration 
                                                                                                                                     
general and how the environmental values at the grassroots often originate with local concerns 
about the healthy working and living conditions of working class people.  In an article in 2003, 
Rome places environmentalism in the larger context of the social movements of the 1960s, Adam 
Rome, “’Give Earth a Chance:’ The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” The Journal of 
American History 90 (September, 2003), 525-554. In addition, Gottlieb ties environmentalism to a 
larger history of social reform in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century 
while Montrie, Fisher, and McCarthy observe the activism of working class people in Appalachia 
as an extension of a tradition of dissent that came to include environmental issues.  Finally, Speece 
examines the relationship between grassroots environmentalism at the local level in northern 
California and the evolution of state-level and federal legal and regulatory frameworks that require 
citizen oversight over natural resource management decisions.  As of 2011, no one has expanded 
the examination of grassroots environmental groups to include how their work was a continuation 
of the tradition of American democratic reform, how the activists themselves saw their work in 
relation to their identities as citizens in American civil society, and how their strategies for 
affecting change reflected this. 
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of Americans to the suburbs between 1945-1970.  As Americans moved to the 
suburbs partly to get closer to nature they grew concerned about protecting their 
quality of life and local environmental amenities from the consequences of 
development.  As millions of acres quickly passed from open agricultural or wild 
land to suburban sprawl, Americans became alarmed and took action.
8
   
Other scholars observe changes in environmental values after WWII in 
relation to changes in the nature of environmental problems.  The postwar era 
ushered in what Riley Dunlap and Angela Mertig refer to as the “third wave” of 
environmentalism in which environmental problems tended to “(a) be more 
complex in origin, often stemming from new technologies; (b) have delayed, 
complex, and difficult-to-detect effects; and (c) have consequences for human 
health and well-being as well as for the natural environment.”  Part of this 
transition was the increased availability of scientific knowledge and media 
coverage of environmental problems and disasters such as the Santa Barbara oil 
spill in 1969.  In addition, they argue for the connection of 1960s and 1970s 
political activism in general to the rise of modern environmentalism.  In his 2003 
article “Give Earth a Chance: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” 
Adam Rome illustrates the connections between the social movements of the 
1960s—the civil rights movement, feminist movement, New Left, and counter 
culture—and the environmental movement.  Citizen activists, their values 
influenced by the changing conditions observed by Hays and increasingly 
                                                 
8
 Hays; Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside, xi, 89, 131-133, 4; also see Michael F. Logan, 
Fighting Sprawl and City Hall (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995).   
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identifying quality of life as a paramount American value, learned that they could 
affect change through direct action, lobbying and proposing legislation through 
legislatures or directly through citizen initiative processes.
 9
       
Coupled with the rise of environmental concern, the best-known 
scholarship of the last generation mainly focused on the formation and growth of 
national environmental organizations, their leadership, and passage of 
environmental policies during this era.  Hays’s informative A History of 
Environmental Politics Since 1945 provides a useful and succinct history of 
national environmental politics in the postwar era.  Mark Harvey outlines well the 
galvanizing Sierra Club battle to stop a dam from being constructed at the 
confluence of the Green and Yampa Rivers in Dinosaur National Monument and 
the work of Howard Zahniser and the Wilderness Society to pass the Wilderness 
Act in 1964.  Historians and writers including Roderick Nash, Michael Kraft, and 
Richard Lazarus, among others, have chronicled the history of the major national 
environmental organizations and their leadership in the great environmental 
battles of the 1950s through the 1980s.  These studies are vital in explaining the 
origins of the national environmental movement.  An examination of the local, 
grassroots level better addresses, however, how environmentalism is tied to larger 
reform movements and its place in American civil society. 
10
  
                                                 
9
 Riley E. Dunlap and Angela G. Mertig, eds., American Environmentalism: The U.S. 
Environmental Movement, 1970-1990 (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1992, 2, Rome, “Give 
Earth a Chance,” 525-554. 
10
 Samuel P. Hays, A History of Environmentalism Since 1945 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 186-187; Hays, Beauty, 4; See Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, Harvey, 
Wilderness Forever, Kraft, and Lazarus.  In addition, historian Byron Pearson examines the role of 
the Sierra Club in the fight against proposed damns in the Grand Canyon in the 1960s in Still the 
Wild River Runs: Congress, the Sierra Club, and the Fight to Save Grand Canyon.  See also the 
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Robert Gottlieb astutely argues in Forcing the Spring: The Transformation 
of the American Environmental Movement that “environmentalism is a complex 
set of movements with diverse roots, with the capacity to help facilitate profound 
social change.”   By the end of the 1970s, Gottlieb argued, a widening gap 
appeared between the national organizations that emphasized the maintenance of 
the environmental policy system and smaller groups working on local issues, 
often in more militant fashion.  While organizations such as the Wilderness 
Society, Sierra Club, and Audubon Society played an important role in the 
national environmental movement and passage and maintenance of the American 
environmental policy system, they represent only part of the story.
11
   
Examining the activities of local-level environmentalists reveals a 
continuity in American political ideology and participation that ties environmental 
reform to the long tradition of democratic reform in the United States.  At a very 
basic level, community-based environmental activists in the late 20
th
 century 
identified with what they understood as republican visions of society and the 
proper function of government that originated in Revolutionary America and the 
political philosophies of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.  Although the 
meanings of “citizen,” “citizenship,” “republican,” and “democracy,” changed in 
the almost two centuries between American Revolution and the mid-twentieth 
century, activists framed their experiences and argued for their rights to 
                                                                                                                                     
works of journalists including Michael Frome and Marc Reisner: Michael Frome, The Battle For 
the Wilderness, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The 
American West and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin Books, 1986).  
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participate based on their interpretation of American history and these terms.  
Some activists, in the northern Great Plains for example or in Eastern Tennessee, 
drew a direct ideological line from 1776 through the Populism of the late 19
th
 
century and asserted the virtue of rural and working class people and the 
inviolability of private property.  In general, members of local and community-
based environmental organizations based their understanding of environmental 
issues and proposed solutions on their loose understanding of republican ideology 
which asserted the equality of “citizens” and their right to participate in 
government decisions regarding the public good.  They argued for transparent 
government uncorrupted by private interests, the right to have a say in decisions 
that affected their lives and livelihoods, and they did so based on the assumptions 
that informed citizens are best able to make decisions regarding the public 
interest.
12
   
When members of local, community-based environmental organizations 
argued from their position as citizens, they maintained an expansive 
understanding of that identity and citizenship.  When activists talked about 
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“citizens” they meant individuals whom they argued had rights and 
responsibilities to participate in decisions regarding the public interest.  In their 
minds, women and people of color were “citizens” equal with white men.  Despite 
this inclusive understanding of citizenship, some “citizens” had more of a right to 
participate than others; community activists tended to privilege the interests and 
voices of “locals,” and, in the case of the Northern Plains Resource Council, 
landowners, over others in debates about environmental threats to their 
communities. 
Republican ideology, retaining remnants of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
ideals, percolated through American society in the nineteenth century into the 
agrarian Populist movement and eventually influenced the passage of Progressive 
democratic reforms in the early twentieth century.  Those reforms—including the 
initiative and referendum and recall at the state levels—altered Americans’ 
expectations of government.  Many of the reforms that made their way into the 
environmental laws of the 1960s and 1970s at the urgings of increasingly 
powerful national environmental groups like the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, 
National Wildlife Federation, and the Wilderness Society reflected a continuation 
of these Progressive ideals including the right to know, transparency in 
government decision making, and the ability of citizens to participate in 
government decisions.  Within this understanding of what constituted good, 
democratic government, Americans confronted environmental issues in the last 
decades of the twentieth century.  While toxic contamination of air, water and 
land by industry was largely a matter for a technocratic elite to solve, most 
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Americans interpreted environmental threats in terms of politics: holding polluters 
and government accountable to the health and well being of the people.  Thus, 
while environmental groups did advocate the passage of complex pollution 
control standards, they also strongly advocated for the ability of citizens to have a 
say in the decisions that affected their health, environment, and communities.
13
 
Exactly what constitutes a citizen, local, or  “grassroots” environmental or 
conservation organization or grassroots activism is open to interpretation and is 
complicated by the diversity in tactics and organizational structures of both 
national and local groups.  For example, the Sierra Club, potentially the most 
prominent national group, employs grassroots organizing tactics and emphasizes a 
degree of accountability to the membership in decision making uncommon for 
national organizations.  Conversely, some smaller local groups engaged primarily 
in litigation, did little to engage their membership beyond keeping them up to date 
through newsletters and alerts.  Members of these groups have relatively little 
oversight of their leaders.  Scholars, including Douglas Bevington, in The Rebirth 
of Environmentalism: Grassroots Activism From the Spotted Owl to the Polar 
Bear, have stressed the importance of membership, tactics, and funding in 
distinguishing between grassroots and national organizations but both types of 
groups participate in similar tactics at times and often have the same members.  
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Historically, citizens or “grassroots” groups derived part of their operating 
expenses from granting foundations and direct mail campaigns and incorporated 
litigation and degrees of professionalization and lobbying into their strategies.
14
   
Scholars also use the term “grassroots” to distinguish certain smaller 
groups comprised of locally-based memberships and participation.  Bevington 
describes “grassroots biodiversity groups” as relying more on membership 
donations and relatively small budgets to engage in primarily litigious strategies 
aiming to affect change by coercing agencies to enforce existing environmental 
laws through the courts.  Other scholars, including David del Mar, identify 
“grassroots” most closely with direct-action tactics and the environmental justice 
movement.  Often, an immediate threat to health or quality of life drives the 
groups to organize and find pragmatic solutions to a common problem.  In 
Environmental Politics: Domestic and Global Dimensions, political scientist 
Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer emphasizes the difference in tactics.  The national 
groups have favored lobbying and, after 1967 and the emergence of the 
Environmental Defense Fund and Natural Resource Defense Council, litigation.  
In contrast, grassroots groups have attempted to empower individuals to 
participate in the political system for change.  According to Hays, these groups 
often favored expediency over any sophisticated environmental philosophy.  
These grassroots, or “citizens” or “local, community-based” groups, as they are 
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called in this study varied in size of membership, budget, tactics, degrees of 
professionalization, and adherence to democratic principles.
15
 
   Citizens’ groups also differed from the national organizations in terms of 
their issues and membership.  Hays observes that most grassroots groups were 
organized locally to deal with a single issue and then faded away after their issue 
ended; the national groups, with more diverse agendas, tended to endure and grow 
in membership.  Despite the tendency of local groups to sprout, prosper, then 
shrivel, many did manage to diversify their activities and continued to grow after 
their initial issues passed.  Dunlap and Mertig observe that because their issues 
are more likely to involve threats to public health they are more likely than the 
national groups to draw members from the working class and minority 
communities “helping environmentalism overcome its elitist image.”  According 
to Dunlap and Mertig, the national groups work for general environmental 
protection; they tend to attract white and middle-class Americans while local, 
community-based groups attract more blue-collar workers and minorities; and the 
national groups are guided by larger ecological principles versus the local issues 
of grassroots organizations that can fall into the “not in my backyard” category 
(NIMBY).
16
   
By the 1990s, scholars including Dunlap and Mertig began to lab many of 
these local, community-based, working-class and minority groups “environmental 
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justice” organizations.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, scholars including Andrew 
Hurley, Robert Bullard, and Sylvia Washington revealed that minority and 
working class communities were disproportionately and systematically exposed to 
toxic pollution.  In the efforts of environmental justice scholars to illuminate 
systemic environmental racism and injustice, they rarely emphasized the 
similarities in membership and tactics between environmental justice 
organizations and other local, community-based environmental groups.  Although 
overshadowed by discussions of environmental justice, Dunlap and Mertig’s 
observations about local and grassroots environmental organizations were 
prescient; examining how citizen activists understood environmental problems 
illuminates connections between the mainstream environmental and the 
environmental justice movements.
17
  
Also common to local, community-based or grassroots environmental 
organizations, was the disproportionate membership and leadership of women 
compared with national organizations.   Vera Norwood writes that as the 
environmental movement professionalized in the second half of the twentieth 
century, women, who had been the crusaders of antivivisectionist, anti-hunting, 
city sanitation and beautification efforts, were pushed to the margins in the 
national organizations.  While it is debatable how involved women were in the 
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movement at the national level before it professionalized, historians recognize 
women’s tendency to gravitate toward environmental work.18   
In the twentieth century, women tended to be disproportionately interested in 
environmental issues compared with men.  In his Smokestacks and Progressives: 
Environmentalists, Engineers, and Air Quality in America, 1881-1951, David 
Stradling demonstrates the role of middle-class women reformers in east coast 
industrial cities in changing public discourse about coal smoke and its relation to 
progress and economic growth to legislate for cleaner air.  Historians tie women’s 
interest to their identities and experience as women.  Glenda Riley argues in 
Women and Nature: Saving the “Wild” West that “women approached nature 
with different perceptions and assumptions than men.”  She explained this 
difference as deriving from dominant Euro-American societal values that 
encouraged men to exploit the land and resources for the sake of progress but 
urged women “to save and protect their families, cultures, and surroundings.”  
“Female environmentalists seldom had to persuade other women of the wisdom of 
preserving western lands,” Riley writes, “The message already had a special 
female resonance.” Historians have generally argued that women’s activism in the 
twentieth century stemmed from their traditional roles as mothers and wives 
responsible for maintaining their homes and their primary concern with the health 
and safety of their families.  In Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 
1890-1915, Robyn Munch demonstrates how middle-class female reformers drew 
from their experiences in the Progressive movement and Victorian assumptions 
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about their innate nurturing qualities to take control of those aspects of social 
policy that pertained specifically to women, children and the poor.  In their work 
to address these issues, some women expanded their definition of the home to 
include the entire planet.  Vera Norwood supports this explanation and argues that 
American women mixed the gender ideology in the early twentieth century with 
their work in the public arena to protect home widely conceived.  In Made from 
this Earth: American Women and Nature, she writes that when women close to 
ecologist and author Rachael Carson talked about their responsibility to protect 
the home, “they referred, as had their mothers and grandmothers, to their 
community, their country, and, in their most expansive moments, the whole 
earth.”  For these scholars, concern for and activism in environmental issues was 
a logical extension of evolving western gender norms and ideology for middle and 
upper-class Anglo women in the twentieth century. Glenda Riley argues that 
women learned how to organize themselves, network and participate in the 
political system through their environmental work during the second half of the 
twentieth century.  Consciously or not, they widened their “sphere of activity and 
action.”  Andrew Hurley observes the same phenomenon amongst grassroots 
groups in Gary, Indiana from 1945-1980.  Although historians including Hurley, 
Elizabeth Blum, and Andrea Simpson demonstrate that women’s involvement in 
environmental activism tended to be contingent on their race and class, they show 
that working class and women of color were disproportionately active in 
environmental issues at the local level.  Working class and women of color did 
not share the same reform roots as the middle-class reformers of the early and 
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mid-twentieth century, but they often led community-level campaigns to protect 
their families and neighborhoods from toxic contamination and industrial 
pollution.  Women’s involvement in grassroots environmental organizations made 
the groups distinct from their national counterparts.
19
 
For this study, the definition of community-based (or “local” or “citizens”) 
environmental organizations draws partly from the definition of grassroots 
organizations maintained by Switzer and del Mar and emphasizes tactics and 
levels of membership participation.  Although the groups examined here are 
localized in a specific region, citizens’ environmental groups are not limited by 
this tendency or size.  Instead, they are defined as membership-based 
organizations in which the organizational structure of the groups is built on 
philosophies of democratic decision-making by the members.  In these groups, 
organizational funding comes from a combination of memberships or donations 
and often outside funding sources.  These groups incorporate a diversity of tactics, 
but tend to rely more on strategies that employ “people power”—as opposed to 
more capital-intensive tactics such as paid lobbying and paid media campaigns.  
These tactics include grassroots lobbying and direct-action, including 
demonstrations and sit-ins but also litigation. 
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The differences in size and tactics between grassroots and national groups are 
far from trivial.  Some scholars argue that as the national groups made their way 
into the mainstream of American politics, their effectiveness diminished.  
Bevington goes so far as to argue that the national organizations, entrenched in 
the existing political system, lost their ability to affect substantive solutions to 
biodiversity concerns.  According to Bevington, grassroots organizations 
represent the next necessary evolution in the movement if environmental issues 
are to be truly addressed.  Switzer cites a Brookings Institute study by Christopher 
H. Foreman Jr., which argues that environmental justice concerns including 
community empowerment, social justice, and public health are lost in the federal 
policy arena as national groups and federal officials have difficulty attaching 
these issues to the environmental “hook.”  Critics of the national environmental 
organizations argue that national groups may actually undermine public health in 
local communities by distracting attention from pressing local pollution issues 
with national campaigns unrelated to public health such as protecting remote wild 
places.  Andrew Hurley observes that the rise of mainstream environmentalism 
“coincides with the rise of environmental inequality.”  Although there is an 
attractive symmetry to this coincidence, correlation may not represent causation.  
The disparities of environmental amenities and harm, likely stem from a long 
history of race and class divisions in American society, which led to uneven 
protection across the landscape.  Instead of placing blame on the national 
environmental movement, Hurley cites unscrupulous capitalists, complicit 
politicians, and the legacy of racism and segregation policies for these 
  24 
inequalities.  A focus on local, community-based citizens’ organizations 
complicates simple understandings of environmentalism and holds the potential to 
recover the histories of those left out of the national narratives and reconcile the 
two sides of the movement. To create a fuller understanding of the environmental 
movement and to craft solutions to current and future problems, the grassroots 
must be central.
20
 
 
Methodology and Organization 
 
The groups examined here are three of only thousands of community-
based or grassroots citizens’ organizations that formed after the 1960s to address 
environmental issues, but their selection was not random nor arbitrary.  The case 
studies were chosen to provide diversity of geography, class, culture and 
environmental issues in the study, and to show how the strategies of citizens’ 
organizations evolved over time in relation to changing regulatory, political, and 
social conditions.   
The first group, the Northern Plains Resource Council (NPRC or Northern 
Plains), illustrates how rural landowners in eastern Montana confronted the threat 
of coal strip mining born from the energy crisis of the 1970s before the enactment 
of protective environmental and mining laws.  Because the members of this 
organization were property owners, they might be classified as middle-class, but 
their work and life experiences were vastly different than the middle-class 
urbanites and suburbanites that Hays and Rome argue made up the core of the 
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environmental movement during the postwar era.  They understood their labor on 
their farms and ranches and management of their businesses as inextricable parts 
of the agricultural way of life.  Northern Plains members valued productive land 
and clean water and air as essential elements in their ability to make a living but 
also as integral components of their culture and way of life.  Northern Plains 
illuminates how citizens understood environmental issues in democratic terms of 
fairness and justice, and how working to address threats to land, air, and water 
transformed many members into more engaged citizens.     
Southwest Environmental Services (SES) provides a very different 
example for this study.  Geographically, it pulls our focus from the energy crisis 
of the 1970s in the rural Great Plains to the booming sunbelt city and suburbs of 
Tucson, Arizona.  The organization formed in the mid-1970s to address a myriad 
of primarily urban environmental issues related to public health and quality of life 
in southern Arizona, including concerns over suburban sprawl, water quality, and 
clean air.  It was essentially a white, middle-class organization that drew support 
from college-educated Tucson residents.  This was reflected in its organizational 
structure, which relied on a paid executive director to help guide a volunteer 
board of directors to make decisions for the group and then used a combination of 
volunteer and paid staff members to implement its campaigns.  SES emphasized 
educating the public about environmental issues and encouraging citizen 
participation in environmental decisions based on a basic assumption that 
informed citizens were the people best qualified to make decisions regarding the 
public interest.  In examining two of the group’s major campaigns between the 
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late 1970s and 1987, this case study demonstrates how citizen activists adapted to 
the political, regulatory, and social realities that followed the passage of landmark 
environmental laws during the 1970s.  SES quickly learned that to be an effective 
voice for the public interest, it must learn how to use the new laws and engage in 
the technical aspects of regulation and environmental management to achieve its 
objectives.   
The final organization examined here, Save Our Cumberland Mountains 
(SOCM, pronounced “Sock ‘em”), formed in eastern Tennessee in the 1970s.  
This third case study departs from the West to illustrate how differences in 
geography, history, and culture affected how citizens understood and sought to 
address environmental issues.  Further, the SOCM study provides an example of 
how primarily working class people in a primarily rural region organized to fight 
threats to land, air, water, health, and quality of life.  Save Our Cumberland 
Mountains organized in 1972 to fight coal strip mining in Appalachia—the case 
study presented here examines their work two decades later after they had 
diversified geographically and in terms of members and issues.  In chapters 
showcasing their efforts to prevent the construction of massive toxic landfills in 
rural and working class parts of Tennessee and to save a beloved state park from 
coal strip mining, this study shows how a citizens’ group adapted to the regulatory 
and political climate of the 1990s and cultivated new tactics to affect 
environmental decision making and the continued potency of “people power” as 
environmental management became increasingly technical.  It also shows how 
Save Our Cumberland Mountains’ understanding of environmental issues in terms 
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of justice aligned the organization with the growing environmental justice 
movement in the 1990s.  .   
All three case studies involved archival research and oral interviews with 
leading members (and staff where applicable) of the three organizations and their 
environmental campaigns from the early 1970s through the turn of the twenty-
first century.  Archival research included documents pertaining to group advocacy 
such as meeting minutes, newsletters, correspondence, press releases, reports, 
memos, legislative testimonies and speeches, and newspaper articles. Through 
these sources, this study recovers the stories of the people actually involved in 
these organizations and balances their recollections with archival material from 
the period. In this way, the study assesses what members of these groups thought 
they were doing and what they actually achieved.   
Data was collected through oral interviews conducted from November 
2009 through September 2011 in Arizona, Tennessee, and Montana in person and 
by phone when necessary and reviewing documentary archives of each group and 
documents in publicly-held collections and legislative/congressional records in 
each area.  In Montana, this research included the archives at the Montana 
Historical Society in Helena and private collections of the Northern Plains 
Resource Council, in Billings.  In Arizona, research included viewing records in 
the University of Arizona Special Collections in Tucson and Arizona State 
University Special Collections in Tempe.  In Tennessee research included the 
records contained in private collections of Statewide Organizing for Community 
eMpowerment (formerly Save Our Cumberland Mountains) in Lake City, 
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archives at the University of Tennessee Special Collections in Knoxville, and the 
archives of the Tennessee State Library and Archives in Nashville.    
The narrative follows a chronology from the arrival of the coal boom in 
eastern Montana and the formation of the Northern Plains Resource Council in the 
early 1970s to the victory of Save Our Cumberland Mountains over a proposed 
strip mine in eastern Tennessee in 2000.  It is broken into three sections, each 
exploring the development and work of one group: first the Northern Plains 
Resource Council in Montana, followed by Southwest Environmental Service in 
Arizona, and lastly Save Our Cumberland Mountains in Tennessee.  The first 
section is devoted to citizens’ attempts to address proposals to build forty major 
coal-fired power plants and dozens of strip mines in the northern Great Plains 
during the 1970s. Central in this story was the visceral sense of ranchers and 
farmers that the proposals to industrialize their land and communities were unfair 
and unjust and that they had a right to participate in corporate and government 
decisions affecting their land, water, health, communities, and quality of life.  The 
work of women, who organized events and lobbied in the state legislature and in 
Washington, D.C. for stringent environmental and strip-mining laws, was vital to 
their campaigns.    
Chapter one explains the context from which the Northern Plains Resource 
Council emerges including the introduction of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s 
North Central Power Study which proposed to industrialize rural eastern Montana 
to provide electricity for the rest of the country in the face of predicted energy 
deficits and, later, the energy crisis.  It explores how socially and politically 
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conservative people overcame cultural barriers to work with environmentalists to 
oppose the strip mining of their land and industrialization of their communities.  
Chapter two examines the work of the new organization in its first two years of 
existence.  It tracks the work of the group as it proposed, advocated, and helped to 
pass state-level environmental laws built around ideals of citizen participation in 
environmental decision making.  It chronicles the quick evolution of the group 
from a volunteer grassroots organization with “a good deal of righteous 
indignation,” to a more sophisticated, professional group with a paid staff.  The 
third chapter in this section investigates the work of the group from the end of the 
1973 Montana legislative session to the passage of the federal Surface Mine 
Control and Reclamation Act in 1977 and how Northern Plains members 
attempted to extend their vision of environmental protection and good 
government to Washington, D.C. and neighboring states.  These three chapters 
provide a case study for examining the emergence of community-based 
environmental organizations and their strategies during the 1970s—a decade that 
witnessed the passage of landmark environmental laws.  The story of NPRC in the 
1970s is mostly one of an environmental group forming and then advocating for 
new laws to address environmental problems. 
 The second section considers the development and work of the Southwest 
Environmental Service from the late 1970s through 1987, when the group 
disbanded.  It describes how the group, originally formed around the loose goal of 
protecting and improving the environment of southern Arizona by educating 
citizens to take part in environmental decisions, adapted to the complex and 
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technical regulatory frameworks surrounding land use, water and air quality 
issues to protect the environment.  The first chapter in this section (chapter four), 
provides the history of SES’s formation and early work.  It shows how the work 
of the organization evolved from public education campaigns about land use and 
suburban sprawl to include work on water issues and eventually air quality.  It 
also introduces the group’s executive director Priscilla Robinson—a former 
lobbyist for Planned Parenthood and part-time water conservation advocate with a 
college degree in anthropology who eventually became one of the leading citizen 
experts on environmental issues in the Southwest.  The chapter also demonstrates 
how this citizen-expert quietly used the organization to advance women’s equality 
by hiring exclusively female staff members to participate in environmental 
decision-making at the city, county, and state levels.  Chapter five, looks 
specifically at SES’s attempts to address water issues in Arizona during late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  It shows how environmental activists’ strategies had to change 
in the years after the passage of the nation’s bedrock environmental laws and in 
the political climate of the 1980s.  SES first attempted to pass a water quality law 
using its traditional strategies of educating the public and encouraging citizens to 
speak at public hearings and lobby their elected officials.  When this failed, 
Robinson and SES were forced to become more politically savvy and make 
themselves into citizen experts on water quality.  As they did, they gained seats at 
decision-making tables within the halls of power, which ultimately enabled them 
to influence the passage of a stringent water quality law in Arizona in 1986.  The 
last chapter in this section, six, follows SES’s work to rein in the largest air 
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polluters in the Southwest to protect public health and clean air, and preserve the 
rule of law.  For more than eight years, SES fought to make the Phelps Dodge 
copper smelter in Douglas and the Magma Copper Company copper smelter in 
San Manuel comply with the federal Clean Air Act.  As in the water quality 
campaign, the clean air fight required SES to adapt its strategies and evolve.  It 
learned how to more effectively use the media to influence public opinion and 
politics.  When legislative and administrative avenues failed to produce results, 
however, SES asserted the right of citizens to hold government agencies and 
corporations accountable to the public interest and the law.  With two other 
groups, SES took the issue to court and won—a strategy increasingly adopted by 
citizens’ environmental organizations in the 1980s.   
 The last section explains the formation of Save Our Cumberland 
Mountains in the 1970s and then follows the group through the 1990s as it took 
on the threats of proposed “mega-landfills” in Tennessee’s rural and working 
class communities and a massive proposed strip mine on the Cumberland Plateau.  
Chapter seven, the first in the section, shows how retired coal miners, their wives, 
teachers and other residents of the coal fields of eastern Tennessee came together 
to defend their communities, land, water, and, in some cases, their lives, from 
strip mining in this mountainous country in the early 1970s.  It quickly charts the 
growth of the organization over the next two decades showing how by the early 
2000s, SOCM began to view itself as an “environmental justice” group.  This 
chapter ends by suggesting that the distance between most community-based 
environmental organizations and environmental justice organizations is not as far 
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as many assume; citizens’ tendency to understand environmental issues and 
solutions in terms of fairness and justice, as did members of SOCM and other 
groups, provides a common bridge between these wings of the environmental 
movement.   The next two chapters examine SOCM’s work from within this 
frame.  Chapter eight explores SOCM’s evolving campaign to address proposals 
for new and expanded landfills to house solid and toxic waste from out of state 
from 1990 to 1996.  It shows how, when the organization was unable to muster 
the political power to pass a state law banning these kinds of landfills, SOCM 
sought new opportunities for citizens to ban them at the county level and hold 
state regulators and waste management companies accountable to existing 
environmental protection laws.  The campaign against “mega landfills,” was the 
first time in which SOCM articulated its work as “environmental justice.”  In 
chapter nine, SOCM returns to its foundational issue: coal strip mining.  
However, the 1990s differed from the 1970s in important ways.  The political and 
regulatory landscape of the decade challenged SOCM to use the strip mining and 
environmental laws passed twenty years prior and creatively engage the media 
and politics at the local, state and national level to protect a scenic and popular 
state park on the Cumberland Plateau from strip mining on adjacent lands.  
Finally, a concluding chapter and epilogue analyzes how to fit these case studies 
in the larger history of the environmental movement and American civil society.   
A commitment to democratic processes, fuller public participation in 
decision making, government transparency, justice, and rule of law is a much 
more common component of citizens environmental advocacy than most scholars 
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have previously acknowledged. Indeed, extending these democratic principles 
was among the most important tools and accomplishments of post-1960s 
environmental advocates. It is at the local level that the relationship between 
environmental and democratic advocacy is most clearly revealed. Consequently, 
through its case studies of the Northern Plains Resource Council, Southwest 
Environmental Service, and Save Our Cumberland Mountains, this study 
illuminates this relationship.  While the three groups examined here diverged in 
their histories, issues, institutional arrangements, organizational philosophies, 
tactics and funding sources, they all sought to provide citizens a voice in the 
political process and ensure the rule of law in issues pertaining to environmental 
protection.  Their ends contained serious and substantive environmental 
components but their work was larger than just environmental protection.  They 
were the citizen-watchdogs of government and corporations protecting the 
interests of everyday people and the integrity of democratic processes. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
THE COAL BOOM COMES TO MONTANA 
 
 
When Boyd and Anne Charter and their alarmed neighbors heard from the 
Musselshell county attorney that Montana’s eminent domain laws allowed the 
condemnation of property for mining, and that they could do nothing to stop 
Consolidated Coal (“Consol”), a subsidiary of Continental Oil Company 
(CONOCO) from strip mining their ranches in the rolling Bull Mountains north of 
Billings in central eastern Montana in 1971, they fought off feelings of 
helplessness and hopelessness.  This group of “neighbors,” loosely tied together 
over the vast physical distances between their houses by common work and life 
experiences, had survived droughts, fires, hard winters that froze cows to death 
and low cattle prices, but now they faced a new threat.
21
   
The Bull Mountain ranchers had learned about the proposed mine slowly 
over the past few months.  Beginning in December of 1970, smartly dressed men 
in suits carrying brief cases had been spotted driving fancy cars over the country’s 
rutted roads.  These “land men,” hired by Consol, travelled door to door making 
offers to landowners either to buy their land outright or to lease it for strip mining, 
returning it when the mining was finished.  In many cases, the land men informed 
the ranchers that Consol owned or leased the minerals beneath their ranches and 
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had a legal right to mine whether the landowner consented or not.  Legally they 
were correct.  The building of the Northern Pacific Railroad had left the state with 
a “checkerboard” pattern of land and mineral ownership and a legacy of “split 
estates” in which land was owned by one party and the minerals beneath by 
another.  Northern Pacific had originally acquired about fourteen million acres of 
the public domain in Montana allotted in alternating sections stretching ten miles 
long on each side of its tracks adjacent to equal squares of land owned by the 
federal government in compensation for building the railroad linking the Great 
Lakes region with Puget Sound a century before.  As Northern Pacific sold off the 
land to eager emigrants, the company retained the mineral rights.  In addition, 
when the federal government made large portions of the land it retained in the 
West available for homesteading in the late 19
th
 century, it also retained the 
mineral rights.  The surface properties may have changed hands several times by 
the time that a coal company bought or leased the right to mine the old Northern 
Pacific or federal minerals beneath them. Landowners usually did not know who 
owned the minerals beneath their property.  Montana law, greatly influenced by 
mining interests in the late 19
th
 century, privileged mineral rights over surface 
ownership.
22
 
The land men were aggressive in their tactics, which combined flattery, 
subtle and sometimes overt intimidation, and, occasionally, outright lies.  They 
applied such tactics to Boyd and Anne.  The “lease hounds” told the Charters that 
all of their neighbors had sold or leased and that if they did not fall in line they 
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would be “an island of nothing in a sea of plenty.” To persuade Louise Pfister to 
sign a release of damages that would allow the company to drill core samples 
anywhere on her ranch in exchange for one dollar, they provided a list of people 
including the Charters and their neighbors Bob and Joan Tully and others who 
had signed.  Surprised and concerned, Louise Pfister called her neighbors.  The 
phone lines burned hot through the prairie wind that winter as ranchers called 
their neighbors to see if in fact they had “sold out” to the coal company.  They 
found out that some had signed the land men’s papers but that most had not.  “We 
all agreed that they were bastards and not to be trusted and we’d better find out 
what our rights were,” Anne remembered years later.  They began to pull together 
as they usually did to meet a communal threat, though this challenge was different 
from any range fire or blizzard they had ever encountered.  How it would be 
resolved, no one knew. 
23
         
Little did these ranchers know, but the coal boom of the 1970s was not 
confined to the Bull Mountains.  The Montana Power Company was planning to 
construct two giant coal-fired electrical generation plants in Colstrip, about one-
hundred fifty miles to the East in Rosebud County years before the Bull Mountain 
ranchers learned of Consol’s designs for their homes.  Colstrip 1 and 2, as these 
plants would come to be known, would supply electricity for more than half a 
million homes as far away as Chicago and Seattle.  Their insatiable appetite for 
low-sulfur coal would be fed by thick black seams beneath the prairie grass and 
hills—blasted and dug by the Peabody Coal Company, a subsidiary of Kennecott 
                                                 
23
 Charter, 135, 136. 
  37 
Copper, using machines so large they walked on large platform feet more like 
robotic dinosaurs than conventional bulldozers.  These “draglines” stripped 
roughly forty cubic yards of coal in a single bucketful—enough to fill a railroad  
car capable of carrying 100 tons of coal in four massive scoops.  The proposed 
power plants would devour that train car load of coal practically as fast as the 
dragline could fill it.
24
    Rosebud County ranchers, many from families that had 
homesteaded in the region in the 1880s and 1890s and had been on the ranches for 
three or four generations, faced a threat similar to that of their distant “neighbors” 
to the north (See Figure 1).  
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Unlike the Bull Mountain ranchers, the ranchers near Colstrip were more 
familiar with coal strip mining.  While there had been underground coal mining in 
the Bull Mountains near the town of Roundup in the twentieth century, it was 
mostly dormant by the 1970s.  The thick coal seams under the red scoria and 
bluffs of southeastern Montana had been mined by the Northern Pacific Railroad 
for decades before Montana Power set its sights on Colstrip.  Third generation 
rancher Wally McRae remembered that before anyone ever imagined a power 
plant, Colstrip was already a company town producing coal that was shipped by 
Northern Pacific (later Burlington Northern) all over the country.  For decades, 
McRae and his neighbors interacted with the mine and its employees when they 
traveled to town, and he remembered a general sense of cooperation and 
congeniality.  “They were very responsible,” said McRae, recounting how 
Northern Pacific paid to remodel the local school that serviced Colstrip and the 
surrounding area.  As a result, when Montana Power first came on the scene, 
McRae and the other Rosebud County ranchers were hardly alarmed.  Montana 
Power had a good reputation and initially gave them little reason to worry.  The 
company—the electricity-producing subsidiary of the powerful Anaconda Mining 
Company based in the western part of the state—bought the coal mines from 
Northern Pacific in 1958 when diesel replaced steam-powered locomotives.  
Montana Power delivered its first shipment of Colstrip coal to its 120 megawatt 
Billings power plant in 1966.  Little did area residents know, however, that 
Montana Power intended to increase its production capabilities by building a 
power plant near the mine.  As their plans developed during the 1960s, it became 
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quickly apparent, that whether or not the ranchers near Colstrip owned the 
minerals beneath their ranches—which sometimes measured in the thousands of 
acres—the Montana Power Company and the company it contracted with to 
supply coal from the mines to the new plant, Peabody Coal Company, were going 
to do everything in their power to get the coal under these privately owned 
ranches.
25
   
As did Consol’s agents in the Bull Mountains, Peabody Coal Company’s 
land men soon began showing up at ranch houses, telling landowners that their 
neighbors had already agreed to lease or sell their land and that they should do the 
same.  McRae and fellow rancher Don Bailey began to keep track of what 
Peabody’s agents were up to, alert other landowners to the company’s tactics, and 
organize to protect themselves.  “We said, ‘Don’t believe [what they tell you]’ 
and told them to make sure that what they tell you is true—to write down dates, 
write down times, write down the guy’s name and what he told you,” McRae 
remembered.  Bailey and McRae would then meet with their neighbors and check 
the “facts” against each other.  McRae, remembered his parents, who lived 
through the Great Depression, telling him, “’It was tough in the thirties; it was 
damn tough in the thirties.  The only reason we’re still here is that we were tough 
in the thirties.’”26  Now he faced his own crisis, and this time it was unclear 
whether resilience and tenacity, learned over generations of dealing with the 
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unpredictability of nature and agricultural markets, would save his and his 
neighbors’ ranches and way of life.   
While Consol was focusing its energy on the Bull Mountains north of 
Billings and Montana Power was working near Colstrip, ranchers along the 
Tongue River and Hanging Woman Creek near the tiny hamlet of Birney adjacent 
to the Northern Cheyenne Reservation were experiencing similar run-ins with 
land agents.  Ranchers Irving and Carolyn Alderson and Art “Bunny” Hayes, Jr., 
and his wife Marilyn, and Bill and Anne McKinney began to hear rumors about a 
proposed strip mine and power plant planned for the Decker area just south of 
their ranches, close to the Wyoming border.    In addition to a strip mine and the 
damage it posed to water and air quality and the land itself, and the disruption 
thousands of workers, trucks, and equipment travelling up the Tongue River Road 
would cause to agriculture, massive power lines and a railroad were proposed for 
the valley.  In some cases, this corridor threatened to cut ranches in half.  Like 
their neighbors in Colstrip and the ranchers in the Bull Mountains, landowners 
along the Tongue River found their land and way of life threatened by landscape-
scale industrial development.  As the Tongue River ranchers began to organize a 
defense, gossip floated across the prairies of another strip mine planned by the 
Westmoreland Company for Sarpy Creek, just northeast of Colstrip.  Cafes and 
bars across the border in Wyoming were abuzz with reports of proposed giant 
mines and power plants for the Gillette area.
27
  Like a summer storm that builds 
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slowly on the horizon throughout the day and then comes crashing down all at 
once, the coal boom of the 1970s arose as rumors and then poured like a deluge 
upon the region. 
 
 
Photograph No. 549141 (Photographer Norton Boyd); “Hay and alfalfa fields in 
Sarpy Basin.  The Westmoreland Coal Company wants to expand its strip mining 
operations in this area, 06/1973,” June 1973; Documerica Project, Records of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online 
version, www.archives.gov, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 
December 2011], National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.  
 
 
Energy Crisis and the Northern Great Plains 
 
The arrival of the coal boom on the prairies, hills, and badlands of the 
northern Great Plains during the early 1970s was prompted by two related 
developments at the national level—the emerging “energy crisis” of the 1970s 
and the ambitious attempt by the federal government and dozens of corporate 
partners to address it.  During the course of the twentieth century, American 
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economic growth, prosperity, and prestige on the world scene was tightly bound 
to its ability to produce energy.  Fueled by inexpensive and plentiful energy 
supplies, industrial development bound the continent connecting the resources of 
the American interior—gold, copper, silver, grass in the form of livestock, wheat 
and other crops and eventually oil and coal—to manufacturing centers and ports 
east and west and the world at large. The construction of massive federally-
funded hydro-electric projects in the West during the 1930s provided cheap 
electricity that attracted industry and immigrants to rural backwaters and played a 
vital role in powering wartime production during the 1940s.  Seemingly 
overnight, small towns and mid-sized cities grew to major metropolitan areas.  
Americans’ ideal standard of living increasingly emphasized life in clean, neat 
new houses, outfitted with all of the available electric amenities, in suburban 
developments only a short drive on new multi-lane highways, from the office.   
This ideal was encouraged and reinforced by a sticky amalgamation of housing 
developers, household appliance manufacturers, electric utility companies, 
automobile manufacturers and pop-culture in general and all underwritten by a 
booming economy and generous federal loan programs following World War II.  
As American homes became completely electrified including standard electric  
heat and air conditioning, electricity consumption jumped by a factor of seven to 
ten.  And as Americans travelled farther to work, shop and recreate in an 
increasing number of automobiles, oil consumption increased—by more than 
three hundred percent between 1920 and 1960.
 28
  By the 1960s, America 
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consumed energy like never before.  The American economy and quality of life 
depended on cheap and increasing supplies of energy.   
Some journalists, economists, and politicians maintained the optimism of 
the previous decades and forecast that the development of new oil reserves in 
Alaska would surpass increasing demand and, in the words of a U.S. News and 
World Report journalist in 1969, even “…turn the power politics of the world 
upside down” by undermining the growing power of the Arab countries in the 
ever-more volatile Middle East.
29
  For others, though, threats to the supply of 
Middle East oil presented a looming and material danger to the nation.  One way 
to minimize those threats, without inflicting the economically and politically 
painful shortages Americans had experienced during World War II was to 
increase domestic energy supply within the continental United States.  
For most, the “energy crisis” of the 1970s came suddenly and 
unexpectedly, but its underlying causes built for years before Americans felt its 
effects.  Although it is commonly associated with the embargo of American oil 
imports by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 in 
retaliation for U.S. support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the embargo simply 
exacerbated already rising foreign oil prices and fundamental and systemic 
problems in America’s ability to meet its growing thirst for energy in the postwar 
years.  In Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies, David E. 
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Nye describes the energy crisis as developing through a series of stages from the 
late 1960s through the early 1980s.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, economists 
and energy advisors to President Richard Nixon began warning of the potential 
danger of oil shortages.  Low prices for abundant imported oil during the 
economic boom of the 1960s, despite government import quotas that restricted 
importation of foreign oil, encouraged increased consumption but stifled private 
investment in domestic production.  The number of drilling rigs in the US 
declined from the mid-1950s and hit its lowest level by 1970.  The second stage of 
the crisis developed after OPEC imposed price increases and oil restrictions in 
1972 and an embargo in October 1973.  Fuel shortages, emblazoned on the 
collective memory by iconic images of cars backed up for blocks at gas stations in 
“gas lines” and trucks abandoned on the highways in protest of the government’s 
inability to deal with fuel prices that doubled over the course of a few months 
prompted Nixon to action.  In November of 1973, Nixon announced “Project 
Independence” which committed $10 billion to research and development of 
domestic energy supplies.  Modeled after a World War II program to produce 
synthetic rubber, “Project Independence” combined a variety of tactics.  It 
deregulated prices to discipline citizens to use energy more efficiently and adjust 
their consumption practices.  It promoted more domestic energy development, 
including more nuclear power plants, oil and gas leases on the continental shelf, 
research on fusion power and technologies to turn coal into gas, and accelerated 
oil drilling on federal lands.  Despite its name, “Project Independence,” 
administration officials quickly realized that the program could not achieve 
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complete energy self-sufficiency for the US.  It did, however, set the course for 
the federal government’s energy program for the remainder of the 1970s—a 
program that tied energy producers close to government and promised healthy 
corporate profits.  Although Nixon and Ford’s Democratic successor, Jimmy 
Carter, was less supportive of increased nuclear power, he remained steadfastly 
supportive of the development of large, centralized energy facilities and coal 
gasification plants that exploited federally-owned minerals.
30
   
Following the shock of the oil embargo, President Gerald Ford, built on 
Nixon’s “Project Independence,” and took it one step further.  Ford moved his 
sights beyond Nixon’s stated goal of energy self sufficiency toward increasing 
domestic production to the point that  the United States would dominate world 
energy markets by as it had earlier in the century.  Like Nixon, he ignored the 
issue of domestic demand and instead focused almost entirely on supply.  
Although his program called for the insulation of eighteen million homes and 
manufacturing of more fuel-efficient automobiles and trucks, its core was the 
construction of hundreds of new major power production facilities—200 new 
nuclear power plants, 250 new coal mines, 150 new coal-fired power-plants, thirty 
new oil refineries, twenty new synthetic fuel plants, and the drilling of thousands 
of new oil wells.  (To give some scale to this initiative, consider that only 132 
nuclear reactors were ever built and operated in the United States between 1953 
and 2008 and only 104 were operating in 2008).   The crisis shifted into another 
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stage when Iran cut off its oil from the United States during the Carter 
Administration.  The spike in energy prices fueled simultaneous economic 
inflation and stagnation and further embittered and angered the public.  Finally, 
during the first term of President Ronald Reagan, the crisis eased.  Oil prices fell 
as OPEC proved unable to keep some of its members from overproducing and 
selling to the United States, while new oil fields opened in Alaska, the North Sea, 
and Southeast Asia.
31
     
Before the energy shortage had reached full crisis in the late 1970s, 
President Nixon recognized a potential disaster in the making.  He instructed his 
secretary of the Interior, Walter J. Hickel to get ahead of the coming storm after 
entering office in 1969.  The Department of the Interior began organizing 
meetings of private and public power producers with the aim of creating 
comprehensive regional plans for increasing domestic energy production.  It was 
from these meetings that the North Central Power Study was born in 1971.  The 
Study sought to implement several of the major supply-side components of 
Nixon’s “Project Independence,” and became one of the foundational elements in 
federal energy planning during the 1970s.
32
   
The United States Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation 
issued the North Central Power Study in October of 1971.  When completed, it 
was a comprehensive plan drawing on the expertise of dozens of energy and 
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mining experts from government agencies and private industry.   Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior James R. Smith launched the study a year-and-a-half 
before on May 26, 1970, by bringing together in Omaha, Nebraska representatives 
from 19 investor-owned power plants, six cooperatively-owned plants, two public 
power districts, one federally-owned plant, and eight representatives from 
municipalities.  They were charged with coordinating an investigation of the 
energy needs and resources of the central United States through the year 2000.  
Their study area included parts or all of Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, 
Montana, North Dakota, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and 
Minnesota and small parts of Illinois, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  Their research 
indicated that U.S. domestic power demand would increase to 494,000 megawatts 
by 1980 and increase annually at a rate of about six and a half percent per year 
through 2000 to equal about 1.7 million megawatts by that year.  According to 
their predictions, without massive cooperative effort and investment between 
public and private entities in the construction of new energy production and 
transmission facilities, the nation was marching headlong into a crisis.  “Never 
before in the history of our Nation,” the committee wrote in a news release issued 
by the Department of the Interior following the May 26 meeting, “has there been 
as much need for broad, imaginative and sophisticated approaches to the task for 
providing adequate and reliable electric power for our citizens.”  For this group of 
energy moguls and bureaucrats, the most hopeful prospect for solving the 
country’s future energy needs lay just a short distance beneath the farms and 
prairies of the northern Great Plains.  With the passage new federal air quality 
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regulations in the 1960s and the likely passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970, coal 
companies had discovered the value of the cooler but cleaner burning low sulfur 
coal of the Fort Union formation, which lay beneath much of northeastern 
Wyoming, the western Dakotas, and eastern Montana in the late 1960s.  By the 
time the Study was released, chairman and chief executive officer of the 
Burlington Northern Railroad company who shipped coal east from Colstrip, 
already touted the region’s low sulfur coal as “the most exciting thing happening 
on the Burlington Northern.”  “All the mines in the area are running wide open,” 
he told a reporter for The Chicago Sun-Times, “and we have rights to an estimated 
11 billion tons of known reserves.”  The coal of the Great Plains was an obvious 
solution to the country’s energy needs.  “In order to provide for the future electric 
and other energy needs,” the Bureau of Reclamation wrote, “the further 
development of the vast coalfields of the North Central region of the United 
States is a certainty.”33     
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Map of U.S. coal reserves from Laura R. H. Biewick, United State Geological 
Survey, “Coal Fields and Federal Lands of the Coterminous United States,” 
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After months of research by engineers, scientists, and economists working 
for private energy suppliers and government, they issued their report on “Phase I” 
of the project in October 1971.  It proposed the construction of forty-two major 
coal-fired power plants in the eastern Montana, northeastern Wyoming, Colorado 
and western North Dakota—several would be the largest coal-fired plants ever 
constructed producing 10,000 megawatts (enough to power roughly 10 million 
homes). Twenty-one of these would be located in three rural counties of Eastern 
Montana, the balance in Wyoming and North Dakota.  These power plants would 
be “mine-mouth” generation stations built adjacent to gigantic coal strip mines.  
Unlike most coal-fired plants in the East and Midwest that were built near where 
their electricity would be consumed, these plants would generate electricity close 
to the mine and transport the energy over high-voltage power lines hundreds, even 
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thousands, of miles to where it would be used.  They would transport energy 
“over wire” rather than “over rail.”  Although the largest plants proposed for the 
Great Plains would be almost five times the size, the 2,040 megawatt coal-fired 
Four Corners power plant near Farmington, New Mexico would serve as a model 
for the kind of plants the Study proposed; Montana Power’s Colstrip plant would 
be the pilot project in the study area.
34
   
The feasibility of the plan was based on the economics of scale and the 
realities of geography.  Large power plants were expensive to build, but the price 
per kilowatt hour decreased as the size of the plants increased.  In reality, the 
economies of scale for large power generating facilities actually ended after the 
1970s.  Historian Richard Hirsch demonstrates that electricity prices outpaced 
consumers ability to pay them, consumers conserved electricity, undermining the 
extraordinary predictions of energy forecasters like those who wrote the North 
Central Power Study.  As demand dropped, so did the ability of power companies 
to pay for and justify the construction of massive power plants.  American 
electricity consumption grew roughly one and a half times between 1980 and 
2000, about half the rate predicted by the Study.  To provide for this increased 
demand, only sixty-two new nuclear plants were constructed—a fraction of the 
number envisioned by the Ford Administration.  Hundreds of coal-fired power 
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plants were built, but only eleven were the enormous facilities that produced more 
than one thousand megawatts called for in the Study.  But in 1971, energy 
forecasters could only imagine continued extraordinary growth.   
A second strategy the Study proposed to make the project economical was 
to burn coal close to the mine and then transport electricity to distant markets.  
Shipping coal “over wire” in the form of electricity was cheaper than sending it 
over rails.  This strategy had the added benefit of reducing air pollution in 
population centers.  Western coal, being much lower in sulfur than that in the 
anthracite coal mined in the East, burned cooler but cleaner and produced less 
pollution.  Long-distance transmission lines were very expensive to construct, 
however.  The cost of building hundreds of miles of high voltage lines—765 
kilovolt lines running to the East and 500 kilovolt lines to carry power the shorter 
distances to Western cities—was estimated in 1971 at between $44,000 and 
$230,000 a mile depending on the terrain the lines crossed.  This cost reflected not 
only the cost of materials and labor but the purchase of rights-of-way across 
private property.  Also, transporting electricity hundreds of miles meant the loss 
of energy as heat through transmission—between roughly 3 and 7% for electricity 
making the long trek East and 1 to 2% for electricity shipped West.   But, as with 
the coal-fired plants themselves, the larger the line—the more electricity it could 
carry and then sell—the more economically efficient it became.  Because they 
were proposed for rural, sparsely-populated areas, the power plants and 
transmission lines could be large.  If these massive plants produced millions of 
tons of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, other hydrocarbons, and particulate matter 
  52 
that polluted the air and came falling back to earth as acid rain, it would fall 
mostly on agricultural soil, cattle, wildlife, and open land rather than on dense 
human populations like those in the East or coastal West.  The plants would 
include smokestacks hundreds of feet tall to maximize the dispersal of pollutants 
high in the atmosphere away from local residents.  The sleepy rural towns of the 
Great Plains would be infused with high-paying construction jobs in the early 
years of the plan and a stable industrial economy for an estimated 35 years after 
the plants were constructed.  The land would be made productive and its people 
prosperous, argued the study’s authors, and millions of residents in Eastern, 
Midwestern, and Western cities would enjoy cheap, plentiful electricity with a 
minimal cost to their immediate environment.
35
    
But that was only part of the plan.  While coal was the key ingredient in 
the North Central Power Study, the possibilities of generating electricity through 
hydropower projects, and then tying the energy produced from new and enlarged 
dams into the proposed transmission system, was not lost on the Study’s planners.  
In Montana, the Study proposed a new dam designed to generate 400 megawatts 
of electricity on the Missouri River at Fort Benton and a 720 megawatt dam on 
Cow Creek a tributary of the Missouri both in the central part of the state, and a 
250 megawatt dam for the longest yet-undammed river in the nation, the 
Yellowstone, that flowed northeast out of Yellowstone National Park for nearly 
700 miles before meeting the Missouri.  It also proposed a 160 megawatt 
                                                 
35
 Richard F. Hirsch, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American 
Electric Utility System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 68-70; North Central Power Study, phase 
1, vol. 1, 34, 37, 49, 59; Parfit, 48, 50. 
  53 
expansion of the existing 400 megawatt generating capacity of Fort Peck Dam in 
northeastern Montana.
36
   
These dams would provide not only electricity—albeit a drop in the 
bucket compared to the almost 200,000 megawatts proposed in the Study—but 
also the second essential component in generating electricity from coal: water.  In 
these massive “mine-mouth” plants, coal would be burned to heat water to 
produce steam to turn giant turbines to create electricity.  Coal burning of the 
magnitude proposed in the Study was going to require a lot of water—
approximately 28 cubic feet—or about 210 gallons—per second for every 1,000 
kilowatts.  The proposed 10,000 kilowatt plant planned for Hanging Woman 
Creek near Birney, for instance, would require about 2,100 gallons of water every 
second, 125,000 gallons every minute, and 180 million gallons per day—a 
staggering amount in an arid region that averaged less than 15 inches of 
precipitation per year. Just one of these massive plants would require roughly 552 
acre feet per day—an acre-foot is a standard unit of measurement that equals the 
amount of water required to cover an acre of land to a depth of one foot.  Five 
hundred fifty two acre feet of water was equivalent to the amount of water 
required to satisfy the needs of almost 200,000 American family residences for an 
entire year.  Until the coal boom, agriculture was the largest user of water in 
Montana, using just over two billion gallons annually—if the Study was fully 
realized, coal production would require 391 billion gallons every year.   Planners 
estimated that the entire Colstrip-Gillette geographic region of southwestern 
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Montana and northeastern Wyoming, yielded 2.8 million usable acre-feet of water 
annually; the proposed power plants would consume about 43 percent (1.2 million 
acre-feet) of all the water in the region.  In addition to large reservoirs that would 
back up behind the new dams and expansions of hydropower generation on the 
Missouri and Yellowstone River systems, dams and reservoirs were proposed for 
the Powder, Tongue, Little Big Horn, and Little Missouri Rivers.
37
 
What the North Central Power Study proposed in strikingly understated 
fashion was an almost complete transformation of the economy and landscape of 
the Northern Great Plains.  Small towns like Birney, Montana (population: 15), at 
the intersection of two dirt roads an hour’s drive south of the slightly more 
bustling Colstrip and southeast of Lame Deer on the Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation, distinguished from other country crossroads only by a post office 
and a small store, were slated for the construction of the largest coal-fired power 
plants ever built in the United States.  Overnight, they would be transformed into 
boomtowns with thousands of new, mostly male, residents anxious to put down 
temporary roots during construction.  The ranches along Rosebud Creek, Hanging 
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Woman Creek, the Tongue River, Sarpy Creek, near Broadus, and in the Bull 
Mountains, if they were not going to be stripped to supply coal for the new 
massive plants would be adjacent to new strip mines.  The springs that 
undergirded their agricultural productivity would potentially be destroyed, as 
bulldozers and draglines fractured the fragile hydrologic balance upon which 
ranching depended.  The open land of this expansive region would be fragmented 
by strip mines, power plants, transmission towers, and new industrial corridors 
including busy two-lane highways, railroads that would run twenty-four hours a 
day, every day of the year, and power lines carrying off the energy stores from 
millions of years past to hungry consumers beyond the eastern and western 
horizons.  Verdant valleys that cradled small but vital streams—islands of 
abundance surrounded by the scrub and sage of the high desert—would become 
reservoirs to store water for the thirsty power plants.  The region’s few major 
rivers—the Missouri and the still-wild Yellowstone—would be dammed, their 
energy harnessed and added to the grid.  Behind those dams in Fort Benton and 
near Livingston—hundreds of miles from the proposed coal mines and power 
plants—tens of thousands of acres of productive land would be flooded.  
Although Montana Power promised in full-page ads in The Billings Gazette that 
its new power plants at Colstrip would meet “all federal and state air and water 
quality standards,” meeting standards did not ensure that air quality would not be 
degraded by the millions of tons of pollutants emitted by the plants.  The land and 
its waters, its air, the regional economy and society would be dramatically altered 
in the course of a few decades.  Though they tended to be conservative by nature, 
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ranchers had every reason to fear the changes presented by the North Central 
Power Study.  As far as they could make out, their livelihoods and way of life 
were being sacrificed.
38
        
 
Landowners Unite 
As they had with previous challenges, landowners bonded together for 
mutual assistance.  Boyd and Anne Charter, Bob Tully, the Pfisters and other 
ranchers in the Bull Mountains had been talking over the phone since the land 
men first showed up at their doorsteps in late 1970. They soon realized their 
common interest in combining their efforts to gather information about what was 
being proposed for their region if they were going to have any hope of defending 
themselves.  In 1971, Boyd Charter and Tully organized a meeting at Tully’s 
ranch.  “We decided we all had best work together and stick together and the best 
way to start was to become an organization,” Anne Charter remembered years 
later.  They called themselves the Bull Mountain Landowners Association and 
they quickly elected officers.  The group elected Bob Tully chairman and Anne 
Charter vice-chairman.
39
   
Because she was living part-time in Billings while her children were in 
school, as vice-chairman, Anne mostly conducted public relations for the new 
group.  Originally from St. Louis, Missouri, she had attended Wells College in 
New York and Washington University in St. Louis.  She had studied abroad in 
Germany, toured western Europe and lived in the East before meeting Boyd.  She 
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was worldly and well-travelled  but her experience did little to prepare her for this 
new challenge.  “The only thing I could think of doing was to call the Billings 
Gazette and give them the news that we had formed an organization, what our 
purpose was, and the names of our officers,” she remembered.  She was referred 
to Gazette reporter Dave Earley, who proved to be a valuable ally in the group’s 
first battles.  The ranchers’ story attracted Earley, who eagerly covered the issue 
and wrote numerous articles about the group’s efforts to protect their land during 
the early 1970s.
40
    
The Bull Mountain Landowners Association (BMLA) also benefitted from 
the professional expertise within its ranks.  One of its greatest assets in its early 
life was Ellen Pfister Withers, the daughter of Louise Pfister, the widowed owner 
of a large ranch in the Bulls.  Although her husband never thought that women 
had any business running a ranch, he had no sons, and his death in 1966 had left 
Louise and her eldest daughter in charge of the place.
41
  Consolidated Coal, in 
their search for an opening into the Bull Mountains ranchers’ community, thought 
they had found a “weak link” in Louise, inviting her to come to their office for a 
consultation.  Without informing Consol, she brought along Boyd and Anne 
Charter.  When Boyd proceeded to accuse the Consol representatives of trying to 
take advantage of an elderly woman, they grew frazzled.  Consol’s western 
district vice-president, Del Adams emerged from a closet with a tape recorder he 
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apparently planned to use secretly to record the conversation.  According to Boyd, 
Adams “was going to record this stuff, so that they caught the old woman in a 
weak moment,” and have recorded proof that she had consented to sell her 
ranch.
42
  Experiences like these galvanized daughter Ellen, who was attending law 
school in Mississippi at the time.  Ellen’s experience with coal mining extended 
back to her childhood in the 1950s, when she would visit her great grandfather’s 
farm in Pennsylvania.  Coal mining, she remembered, had left nothing of the farm 
but piles of tailings.  “When I looked at the land,” she recounted, “I couldn’t think 
how anyone could do that to their land.”43  When the land men first came to the 
region, Ellen used her legal education to untangle the rights of her family and 
their neighbors.  When she finished her degree, she returned to the Bulls and 
immediately put her expertise to work.  In the fight against the coal companies, 
having an effectively pro-bono lawyer on retainer proved essential to the young 
organization. 
Over the next year or so, BMLA’s members spoke to anyone they thought 
could help them with their cause and let no opportunity pass them by to publicize 
the situation in the Bull Mountains.  Anne Charter kept in close contact with 
journalists at the Billings Gazette.  In one instance, while Anne was updating her 
neighbors the Burchells in Billings about the latest developments in the Bulls, she 
was overheard by young curious Janice Burchell.  Janice had spent time at the 
Charter ranch and was inspired to spread the word of what was going on up there 
with her sixth grade class at Billings’s Grand Avenue School.  The next day, 
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Janice presented Anne with more than thirty “priceless” letters that BMLA used 
locally to publicize the issue and in correspondence with Senators and 
Congressmen in Washington DC  Janice Burchell also helped organize her 
classmates to turn out attendees for one of Billings’s first “Earth Day” 
celebrations, and BMLA capitalized on the event.  The organization presented a 
slide show of the Bull Mountains narrated “vivaciously” by Bull Mountain 
rancher Vera Beth Johnson.  At the event, the BMLA caught the local chamber of 
commerce—one of the community organizations that most ardently supported the 
strip mining proposals—off guard.  The Chamber had come armed only with 
grass seeds to give away to anyone who would participate in their effort to plant 
grass along highway right-of-ways.  Without facts to substantiate their support for 
strip mining in the Bull Mountains or to repudiate the claims of BMLA, they were 
effectively nullified, at least for the short time being.
44
   
BMLA also made sure to organize its members to attend every public 
meeting concerning mining in the Bull Mountains whether it was organized by the 
state, Consolidated Coal, or local business interests.  A June, 1971 hearing in 
Roundup conducted by the Montana State Lands Commissioner Ted Schwinden 
regarding Consol’s proposal to mine a fifteen acre test pit, was typical.  About 
twenty five people presented testimony—about half were ranchers skeptical of 
Consol’s promises to reclaim its proposed mine.  According to The Great Falls 
Tribune which covered the hearing, “each side had its cheering section and 
applause was frequent.”  William Clancy, representing the United Mine Workers 
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of America and a veteran Roundup-area coal miner, spoke in support of the mine, 
as did Roundup attorney Charles Maris, who cited the potential economic benefits 
the mine would bring to Musselshell County.  Consol’s spokesman Larry Fuller 
reassured the crowd that it was the company’s policy to restore all the land it 
mined in Montana to a useful, productive condition.  BMLA president Bob Tully 
countered by reading a letter from H. Cochran, public relations director of the 
coal company in which Cochran wrote that the land in question Montana would 
“be richer for having been strip mined.”   BMLA’s members, led by Tully, 
Johnson, and Boyd Charter, became well known for peppering government 
bureaucrats and mining representatives with questions and comments.
45
   
Beyond simply publicizing the threat of strip mining in the Bulls, BMLA 
learned quickly that their success in defending their land from Consol’s “divide-
and-conquer” techniques would depend on building broad public support that 
could translate into political power and hanging together and speaking with a 
clear consistent voice.  Toward this end, they built on the public relations 
successes they had in the Billings Gazette, at Earth Day, or in public meetings and 
actively recruited new members.  They set up informational and recruitment 
booths manned by members at county fairs and rodeos.  It was at one of these 
fairs that a sometimes cantankerous, usually amiable, and ever-persuasive Boyd 
Charter confronted an old acquaintance named Wally McRae and asked him to 
join Bull Mountain ranchers’ effort.   
                                                 
45
 “Strip mine hearing set,” The Billings Gazette, 30 May 1971; John Kuglin, “Divided Roundup 
Area Argues Strip Mining,” The Great Falls Tribune, 19 June 1971. 
  61 
McRae was reluctant to get involved with the BMLA.  After all, his ranch 
was near Colstrip, more than one-hundred and fifty miles east of the land that 
Consol wanted to mine, and his fight was with different companies.  Montana 
Power and Peabody Coal threatened his land, not Consol.  Moreover, although 
McRae worked in the same “business” as the Charters, the culture of the Rosebud 
County ranchers differed from that of the Bull Mountain ranchers in subtle, but 
important ways.   
Unlike most of the landowners in the Bull Mountains whose roots in the 
area dated back to the early and mid 1900s, most of the ranchers near Colstrip 
were the descendants of pioneers who had homesteaded in the region in the 1880s 
or 1890s.  If anyone fit the romantic ideal of western rugged individualism, it was 
these people.  They lived far from town, travelling occasionally into tiny Colstrip 
for provisions or for a school sporting event, but only making the trip to the 
regional hubs of Miles City, Billings, or Sheridan, Wyoming once or twice a 
season to sell their cows or to attend a fair or rodeo.  Their ranches were large, 
some measuring in the tens of thousands of acres; the most enduring operations 
had water, either in the form of springs or perennial streams or rivers to which the 
operators had senior water rights dating back to the late 19
th
 century.    Wealth 
was measured in the agricultural country of eastern Montana by acres and heads 
of cattle; to ask a rancher how much land he owned or how many cows he ran was 
as impolite and unthinkable as asking a businessman about his income or savings.  
The importance of land to the Colstrip ranchers contributed to an almost visceral 
defense of private property.  “All of my life I can remember that the ranch was the 
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most important thing,” McRae told Michael Parfit for his 1980 book on the 
Colstrip power plant controversy Last Stand at Rosebud Creek.  “It was more 
important than comfort or happiness or anything.  It was more important than 
family.  It was more important than marriage.  It was more important than 
religion.  It was absolutely the only important thing in the world.” [emphasis in 
original]  To protect their ranches, whether from fire, drought, blizzards or low 
cattle-prices, they relied on their own ingenuity and toughness, and called on 
neighbors only when absolutely necessary.  Years later, in his history of rural 
activism Raising Less Corn and More Hell: Midwestern Farmers Speak Out, Jim 
Schwab writes that this rugged individualism, despite evidence undermining its 
actual validity, became the “philosophic cornerstone of rural culture.” It tended to 
leave rural people unable to admit their need for collective political action; to do 
so, he observed, would be to suggest that one was weak or a failure.  Schwab 
noted that this unwillingness to ask for help continued until an issue erupted into a 
full-blown crisis.  Though the situation along Rosebud Creek had not yet reached 
a crisis for McRae and his neighbors in the late 1960s and early 1970s and they 
addressed this new threat the ways they knew how.
46
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Photograph No. 549156 (Photographer Norton Boyd); “Ranch lands in the 
Powder River Basin near Colstrip long-range plans call for massive strip-mining 
of the area and the construction of huge power plants capable of producing 
200,000 megawatts of power.  The power plants would emit more minute separate 
particles than New York City and Los Angeles combined, 06/1973,” June 1973; 
Documerica Project, Records of the Environmental Protection Agency, 1944-
1006, Record Group 412; [Online version, www.archives.gov, National Archives 
and Records Administration, 5 December 2011], National Archives at College 
Park, College Park, MD. 
 
        
When Peabody Coal Company’s land men knocked on McRae’s door in 
1968 to survey his ranch, McRae addressed the issue as he did most affairs on the 
Rocker Six Cattle Company ranch.  McRae owned almost 30,000 acres of land—
at least the surface of it—which he had bought from his father a few years before.  
But the mineral rights beneath the range belonged to the Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company (Burlington Northern after 1970).  His ranch was a “split-
estate.”  His great grandfather had bought portions of what was now McRae’s 
ranch from the Northern Pacific railroad, who had acquired millions of acres in 
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compensation from the federal government to build a transcontinental rail line.  
McRae’s grandfather got the land; the railroad retained whatever mineral wealth 
lay beneath it.  In 1968, Peabody leased the mineral rights beneath the Rocker 
Six.  Wally McRae had never owned the coal beneath his land, but before 1968 he 
had never had to confront the possibility that someone might strip mine through 
his property to get to it.  He began to search for solutions.
47
 
Like most of the ranchers in Rosebud County in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, McRae was a conservative Republican.  His politics was deeply tied to 
protecting his property, family, and way of life and the three were tightly 
interwoven.  Although his livelihood was tied to global markets and national 
policies regarding international trade, farm subsidies, meat inspection, monopoly 
and anti-trust regulation, and issues of interstate transportation and energy prices, 
his politics and those of most of his ranching neighbors near Colstrip were 
predominantly local.  When they sought a solution to an issue that seemed beyond 
their immediate local ability to resolve, eastern Montana ranchers often looked to 
the conservative and powerful Montana Stockgrowers Association, which, since 
1884, had provided a voice and political clout for ranchers at the capital in 
Helena.   McRae looked to the Stockgrowers to address what he saw as a 
fundamentally agricultural and private property rights issue.  At the 1969 annual 
meeting of the Stockgrowers, McRae successfully ran for director and was able to 
persuade the Association to pass a resolution that urged the Montana legislature to 
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regulate strip mining.
48
  But, despite the historic power of the Stockgrowers, its 
political clout was in decline by the 1960s, while Montana Power’s political 
influence in the Montana legislature was approaching its apogee.  Ranching’s 
supposed hegemony in eastern Montana was dissolving in the face of energy 
development. Peabody’s lease hounds did not relent, and Montana Power 
continued its plans to build the power plant at Colstrip.   
 During 1970 and 1971, McRae and his neighbor in Rosebud County, Don 
Bailey, continued their efforts to inform landowners about Peabody’s and 
Montana Power’s activities and tactics and to strategize how to fight the 
companies during 1970 and 1971.  Though they had not formed an organization, 
the ranchers near Colstrip were organizing themselves and McRae and Bailey, 
assumed a leadership role.  In early 1971, they decided to form an official group 
and called themselves the Rosebud Protective Association (RPA).  Described by 
area newspapers as a “landowner’s” group, RPA, in addition to wanting to protect 
their ranches and water, also voiced concerns about the effects of rapid 
industrialization on area schools, disorganized and ramshackle boomtown 
residential development, and the introduction of hard drugs into the community 
by construction workers in Colstrip.
49
  RPA, like the BMLA to the north, began 
seeking the ear of anyone who would listen or might be able to help.  They 
recruited members, drawing other ranchers like Nick Golder from the countryside 
as well as residents of Colstrip, who were equally concerned about the social costs 
of building two 350-megawatt power plants in the town.  The confusing system of 
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mineral ownership and leasing and the tangled mat of property, environmental, 
and health laws and regulations provided a formidable obstacle to RPA’s efforts.  
When Peabody first showed up on the Rocker Six ranch in 1968, McRae thought 
he could get a handle on the situation by pushing the Stockgrowers to pass a 
resolution.  Between 1968 and 1971, McRae made a name for himself as a 
passionate and articulate opponent of the proposed power plant and strip mines, 
leading the opposition at countless public meetings in Colstrip, Forsyth, Billings, 
and Miles City and in the local newspapers.  What has been described as his 
“Marlboro Man” image made an attractive symbol of the last defense of a dying 
way of life in an evolving narrative portrayed by local newspapers and 
occasionally picked up by the national press. But, a little more than two years 
later, he and his neighbors were caught in a dizzying situation; generations of 
experience dealing with and, at times, prospering in the harsh environment of 
southeastern Montana provided little preparation for battle against determined 
corporations, their lawyers, and the federal government, all of whom seemed to 
have the law on their side.  The situation grew into a crisis.
50
   
While the members of BMLA were putting pressure on Consol and 
looking for help anywhere they could find it, they heard rumors and read 
newspaper articles about what was going on in Rosebud County.  Boyd Charter 
had appealed to McRae to share his experience with the Bull Mountain ranchers 
and possibly even combine their efforts.  The Charters, who raised a few bucking 
horses that made appearances at local rodeos every year, were familiar with 
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McRae, who often served as a popular rodeo announcer.  McRae remembered an 
almost exasperated Boyd Charter calling him one day and asking him to come to 
the Bull Mountains and explain to the new BMLA what had been happening in 
Rosebud County and how the Rosebud Protective Association had been fighting 
back.  “Boyd, I can’t do it,” McRae responded, “I’m just involved with so many 
things here.”  McRae empathized with what the Charters, Tullys and Pfisters 
faced in the north, but he had his own issue and he was determined to resolve it 
himself.  Besides, he thought, who was he to meddle in the affairs of others?  
RPA was very different from BMLA.  RPA reflected the independence and 
tendency toward local politics and mutual assistance typical of the ranchers in that 
part of the state.  Although membership in RPA typically implied family 
membership, male heads of households usually attended the meetings and acted as 
spokespersons for the group.  BMLA elected women not only as officers, but 
encouraged them to serve as spokespersons for the organization in the newspapers 
and at public events.  While Bob Tully was elected as the first president of BMLA 
in 1971, Anne Charter served as vice-president and, spending most of her time in 
Billings that first year, served as its primary spokesperson.  BMLA also differed 
from RPA in where it sought help.  McRae and RPA looked to the group that they 
thought best represented their interests as ranchers and landowners—the Montana 
Stockgrowers Association.  BMLA was willing to accept help from anyone who 
would lend it and nurtured alliances with a new group on the Montana political 
scene that still had little experience working with agricultural people—
environmentalists.  To call the Bull Mountain ranchers radicals or liberals would 
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be a gross exaggeration, but to the conservative ranchers of Rosebud County, 
members of the Stockgrowers, an organization that just a few years prior had 
passed resolutions condemning student activism on college campuses, the BMLA 
seemed a little too liberal for comfort.
 51  
 As daunting as the challenge from 
Peabody and Montana Power seemed, McRae and RPA would go it alone—at 
least for the time being. 
 
A “Resource Council” is born 
While RPA was doing its best to keep track of what the land agents were 
up to in Rosebud County and Montana Power’s activities in Colstrip, BMLA’s 
campaign to save the ranches in the Bulls started down a different path.  One of 
the early goals the group identified was to take part in a coal symposium to be 
held in Billings in April 1972.  The symposium was purported to represent all 
sides of the controversy and the BMLA hoped that it would attract other 
landowners facing the threats of condemnation, degraded air and water quality 
and quality of life in other parts of the state.  Anne Charter remembered that they 
knew that land agents had approached other ranchers across eastern Montana, and 
they even got some to sign away their property or allow the coal companies to 
lease their land for mining.  Feeling isolated in the Bull Mountains and in need of 
allies, BMLA’s members sought out meetings with other landowners to share 
their fears and discuss strategy.  As the symposium came together, BMLA got 
word from Billie Hicks, a member of the Audubon Society who was on the 
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planning board for the event, that the “environmentalist” on the panel was from 
North Dakota’s Knife River Coal Company.  Despite reports that the meeting 
would include representatives from all sides, the symposium appeared to be 
dominated by industry.  Hicks told the BMLA to find their own environmentalist 
and she would make sure that he or she had a seat on the panel.  Not knowing 
exactly where to turn, BMLA invited Cecil Garland, one of the founding members 
of the Montana Wilderness Association and a veteran environmental activist in 
the state, to serve as their “environmentalist.”52   
Garland, the owner of a sporting goods store in the small logging town of 
Lincoln, Montana, about 270 miles east of the Bull Mountains, was, like most 
members of BMLA, a citizen activist.  He became politicized during the 
campaign to pass the Wilderness Act in the 1960s and worked to have millions of 
acres in the Northern Rockies included in the Act, and in 1972 was leading the 
ultimately successful campaign to designate the first “citizen-designated” 
wilderness area in the nation, the Lincoln-Scapegoat along Montana’s Continental 
Divide north of his hometown.  Garland accepted BMLA the invitation.  When 
Anne Charter later called to tell him that the panel was full and that planners of 
the symposium would not allow the addition of Garland, he decided to come 
anyway.   He would come to Billings a day early and, if BMLA would gather 
together a few interested people, help the group plot their strategy.  About eleven 
people met at Anne’s home in Billings on April 21, the evening before the 
symposium.  They included the Charters, Tullys, Louise Pfister and her daughter 
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Ellen Pfister Withers, a young school teacher at Billings Senior High School 
named Dick Colberg and his friend, Billings-native Pat Sweeney, John Redding 
from Sarpy Creek, and Lainie Hicks from the Wyoming Sierra Club.  Garland 
conducted the strategy session.
53
   
At the strategy meeting the idea for a larger “umbrella organization” arose 
repeatedly.  The participants worried that it was too much work just to fight one 
coal company—what if other companies had leased the right to mine coal in the 
Bull Mountains and began to move toward developing those leases?  The BMLA 
needed more information, and the ranchers of the Bulls had no idea how or where 
to get it.  They also recognized that the fight in the Bulls was not an isolated issue.  
Their “neighbors” across the region—connected through common work and life 
experiences, meetings at livestock auctions, fairs and rodeos, and in some cases, 
blood—were facing similar threats.  The coal boom endangered not just their land 
and ways of life but the rural character and agricultural viability of the entire 
region.  They all realized that the situation in Bulls was not an isolated 
development. To address it, they needed to a larger organization to gather 
information about what was happening in other parts of the state and to combine 
the experiences and resources of all Montanans concerned about strip mining to 
fight the coal boom.  Garland finally asked, “Why don’t you just form one?”  The 
group retorted: “How?”  Garland told them, “All you need is a name, officers, 
membership dues and a letterhead.”  The group discussed the possibility for a 
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long time—would the group be confined to working only on coal issues or 
defending ranching, land, air and water quality in general?  Geographically, where 
would it cover?  Who would the members be?  Finally, the normally reserved 
Louise Pfister made a proposal.  She said that the Northern Plains would be the 
new group’s territory and if they called the group a “resource council,” they 
wouldn’t have to be confined to just coal.  The group voted unanimously to form 
the Northern Plains Resource Council.  Each person present paid the five dollars 
dues to become a charter member, and elected officers including Dick Colberg as 
president.  A new, regional organization was born.  The next day, the Northern 
Plains Resource Council showed up to the symposium.  Charter remembered that 
little was accomplished—Northern Plains members and others in the crowd 
interrupted and peppered the panel with questions—but that the group “generated 
a lot of righteous indignation.”  Generating righteous indignation passed as a 
significant part of the new group’s strategy in its early days.54   
A few months later, while taking some time away from the developing 
crisis south of Colstrip, McRae ran across the Charters at a fair in Forsyth.  
McRae remembered Boyd Charter hollering from behind the Northern Plains 
informational and recruitment booth he was manning, “Wally, come over here 
and join this organization.”  McRae responded, “Ah, I don’t think I want to, I 
think I’m doing OK on my own.  I think I have more credibility as a martyr—a 
lonely individual out there battling the giants of industry.”  Charter retorted that 
McRae was just comfortable because he had received a lot of publicity.  “You’re 
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right about everything,” Charter told him, “but we’re going to have a staff, we’re 
putting together a staff now, and they’re going to do research, you don’t have time 
to do research.”  Then, playing to McRae’s pride and independence, Charter told 
him, “you can still be a spokesperson, you can still be a lonely put-upon martyr if 
you want to be, but you need staff organization and research.”  McRae considered 
this proposition for a few minutes.  What Charter said made a lot of sense.  He 
could still fight for his ranch, but maybe the Resource Council could help with the 
legal wrangling and research that he and his ranching neighbors in the Rosebud 
Protective Association had neither the time nor training for.  McRae had read 
newspaper stories about this new group and was unsure that he wanted to be 
associated with these “environmentalists” but the Montana Stockgrowers were 
proving useless in his fight.  He signed up.
55
   
 
Conclusion 
With the inclusion of McRae and the Rosebud Protective Association, and 
the recruiting of concerned landowners along the Tongue River and near Sarpy 
Creek and environmentally concerned residents from the rest of the state, 
Northern Plains quickly grew into a statewide group.  When the group’s board 
identified the construction of Montana Power’s Colstrip power plants as its top 
priority, McRae and the other ranchers of Rosebud County finally found the 
assistance they had been searching for.  As 1972 came to a close, the new 
organization found itself on the leading edge of a growing local environmental 
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movement.  Looking forward to the 1973 Montana legislative session and the 
possibility of passing a law to protect landowners from strip mining or outlawing 
the activity altogether, NPRC leaders realized that it was going to take a lot more 
than righteous indignation to stop the strip mines and power plants.  To enter fully 
the political and legal arenas where they hoped to find a solution to the issues of 
the coal boom, they needed a crack, energetic staff to do research, recruit and 
organize members, and lobby.  They set out to find it.   
  74 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE NORTHERN PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL 
 
 
 
In their efforts to address the threats posed by the coal boom, the Northern 
Plains Resource Council intuitively stumbled into basic strategies for stopping the 
strip-mining of the Bull Mountains, Rosebud County and the Tongue River 
region.  When first confronted with the threat of having their property condemned 
or mined against their wishes, the Charters, Tullys, and Pfisters in the North, 
McRaes, Baileys, and Golders near Colstrip, and Aldersons, McKinneys, and 
Hayes near Tongue River quickly learned that they needed to know more about 
what was being proposed.  Their early experience also convinced them that 
despite traditions of self-reliance and cultural barriers to seeking assistance from 
outside of their immediate communities, they were going to need help.  And they 
learned that, in addition to reaching out to others in similar situations—Boyd 
Charter contacting Wally McRae, for instance—they needed the support and 
sympathy of the larger public.  To gain that sympathy, they learned to use 
whatever means they could conjure to inform the public of the situation in their 
parts of the state.  They also learned that to solidify that sympathy and turn it into 
financial and political support and power that would influence politicians to 
protect their homes and the environment, they needed good information.  
Gathering information, informing the public, recruiting new members and 
lobbying decision makers became central, general strategies of the new NPRC.  
The ultimate goal of their efforts was to pass laws to prevent or at least temper the 
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devastating effects of strip mining and coal-fired power production in Eastern 
Montana. Their proposed legislation included a moratorium on strip mining, a law 
that would remove the ability of coal mines to use “eminent domain” to condemn 
ranches for strip mining, a law that provided landowners living in “split estate” 
situations more rights to determine what happened on and to their property, and a 
law that stringently regulated strip mining and required the reclamation of lands it 
disturbed so that agriculture could at least continue after the boom.  Although the 
reclamation issues proved to be very technical, the laws they advocated greatly 
mirrored much of the group’s rhetoric.  They sought  legislative solutions aimed 
primarily at giving citizens a say in the decisions that affected their land, water, 
quality of life, and livelihoods.  They favored democratic reforms that provided 
citizens access to information and environmental decision-making processes 
rather than technical, science-based prescriptions to the problems of the coal 
boom.     
 
Montana’s Shifting Political Landscape in the early 1970s 
Montana’s political landscape was uncertain for the eastern Montana 
ranchers and farmers who made up the base of Northern Plains as they looked 
forward to the 1973 legislative session.  Prior to 1965, rural landowners in the 
eastern part of the state held have disproportionate power in state politics. (It was 
said that cows in Eastern Montana had more of a vote than residents of Missoula.)  
In the 1962, however, the US Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr decision mandated 
legislative reapportionment to meet the “one-man, one-vote” requirements of the 
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15
th
 amendment of the US Constitution. When the state’s legislative districts were 
adjusted in 1965, voters in the rural parts of the state, and especially in the east, 
lost voting clout. Companies like Anaconda and its subsidiary, the Montana 
Power Company, maintained an inordinate amount of influence in the legislature. 
Executives of the powerful Anaconda Mining Company had written the state’s 
Constitution in 1889 with the immediate and long-term interests of the mining 
industry in mind.  Anaconda continued to wield incredible power through 
lobbying and financing political campaigns. Legislative reapportionment, 
however, had a silver lining for activists fighting the coal boom in the early 
1970s.  It combined with other overlapping developments to rearrange the playing 
field in the state capital in the early 1970s. While reapportionment altered the 
make-up of the legislature and shifted power away from its traditional rural 
locales to more populous areas in the central and western part of the state, this 
now more fully-enfranchised electorate tended to be more urban and 
environmentally aware.
56
   
The shift in political power toward Montana’s cities and the West, and the 
increasing importance of environmental issues are evidenced by the passage of a 
number of protective environmental measures within the state during the early 
1970s.  The Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), sponsored by 
Republican State Senator George Darrow of Billings, passed by nearly unanimous 
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votes in 1971.  Like its federal-level counterpart, the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), it required environmental review and analysis of 
state actions that could negatively affect the environment, and required the state to 
solicit citizen participation and input in environmental decisions.  In addition, 
MEPA created an “Environmental Quality Council” to review and research 
environmental issues in the state and recommend policies to the legislature.  
Journalists identified an especially strong “cowboy lobby,” from eastern Montana 
that counterbalanced the typical lobbying goliaths Anaconda Mining and Montana 
Power companies during the 1971 session, but Northern Plains was just one of 
many environmental organizations that emerged during the era.  The new group 
added its voice to those of the Montana Wilderness Association, Montana Chapter 
of the Sierra Club, Montana Audubon Society, Montana League of Women 
Voters, and eventually the Montana Environmental Information Center.  In this 
new political climate, environmentalists persuaded the Montana legislature to pass 
a weak law requiring coal companies to reclaim strip mines in 1971, though the 
new law was never fully implemented due to lack of funding.
57
     
Another important development was the state Constitutional Convention 
of 1971-1972 which re-wrote the state constitution and included significant new 
environmental and public participation mandates. Lauded nationally as a model of 
“participatory democracy” because of its inclusion of people normally shut out of 
the halls of power, Montanans produced a new Constitution that reorganized state 
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government. Many of the participants in the convention—nineteen of whom were 
women—had never held any elected political office and were largely independent 
of entrenched special interests. Montana’s new state constitution for the first time 
entitled each resident an inalienable right to a “clean and healthful environment,” 
and required that all lands “disturbed by the taking of natural resources” be 
reclaimed to a productive condition. Importantly, the 1972 Constitution mandated 
an unprecedented amount of citizen participation in the legislative process 
through public hearings, open meetings rules, and citizen right-to-know 
provisions. What historians have referred to as Montana’s “environmental 
decade” was in full swing by the spring of 1972 and the affects of 
environmentalism were rippling through the state.  With these new favorable 
conditions in place, the members of the NPRC set their sights on passing state to 
reform the coal mining and protect their lands in 1973.
58
  To put these goals into 
action, the young organization quickly recruited a staff in 1972. 
 
“Wild-eyed and fuzzy-headed environmentalists”: the Northern Plains Staff 
 
 The staff of the young Northern Plains Resource Council reflected the 
nature of the conflict between the coal companies and the ranchers.  Some of 
staffers were ranch kids themselves—Bob and Joan Tully’s son Tom and Boyd 
and Anne Charter’s son Steve, for instance—who had a stake in the fight.  Others 
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were educated young people from Montana’s cities who had come of age 
intellectually in the late 1960s.  They were refugees of the counterculture, 
Students for a Democratic Society, and the New Left who had finished college in 
Missoula or out-of-state and then returned home to Montana to consider what they 
might do next.  They were critical of the war in Vietnam and worried seriously 
about the real possibility of being drafted.  Years later, early staff member Pat 
Sweeney still remembered his draft lottery number.  “I felt like the whole time I 
was in college, I had a bull’s eye on my back,” he recalled; he was almost certain 
that he would be drafted as soon as he graduated from the University of Montana 
in 1972.  The young staff members, all of whom worked on a volunteer basis until 
the summer of 1972, were idealistic and energetic, and offered a peculiar contrast 
to NPRC’s conservative ranching members.  To Wally McRae they were a bunch 
of “wild-eyed, fuzzy-headed environmentalists.”59 
If McRae and the rancher members of Northern Plains looked with 
apprehension at this collection of “hippy” volunteers, it was not without reason.  
As volunteers, Kit Muller, Pat Sweeney, Tom Tully, Paul Hawks and Steve 
Charter had to stretch every penny to clothe, feed, and shelter themselves as they 
worked to organize the new group and mount a defense against the coal boom.  
They depended on donations of beef and other food from rancher members.  As 
natives to the area—Kit Muller and Pat Sweeney were both from Billings and the 
other early staff members came from ranches near the city—they could depend on 
the charity of friends and family.  For housing, the five volunteers lived 
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collectively in a house just west of downtown Billings within walking distance of 
the organization’s first office; it soon became known as “Bozo Villa.”  During the 
1970s, Bozo Villa sometimes housed up to seven men and women, though it was 
not exactly a commune.  Regardless, the conservative rancher members of NPRC 
did not know quite what to make of the staff and their housing arrangement.
60
 
Whether they grew up on farms or ranches or in town, the young staff 
interpreted the threats represented by the coal boom and the North Central Power 
Study through a lens of Montana history that tied mineral extraction to 
exploitation.  Both Sweeney and Charlie Yarger, a rancher from near Circle, 
Montana, who joined the organization in 1974, graduated from the University of 
Montana—a regional hotbed of the counter culture and New Left politics during 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Both cited Montana historian K. Ross Toole’s interpretation 
of Montana’s “Copper Kings” as influencing how they understood the current 
threat.  Toole was a notoriously popular lecturer and professor of Montana history 
in Missoula who described the history of the copper-mining country of western 
Montana and Montana politics from the late 1800s to the mid-twentieth century as 
one of “rape” and exploitation of the land and people by the Anaconda Mining 
Company.   Historian Dan Flores has referred to an “anti-corporate zeitgeist,” 
which conflated the Anaconda Mining Company’s abuses to the environment and 
people, as a pervasive element in Montana political culture in the postwar era.  
The early volunteer staff members, all educated in Montana except Kit Muller 
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who graduated from Harvard in 1972, came of age in this intellectual milieu.  The 
intellectual, political, and cultural environment of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
with its protests against the Vietnam War and critiques of industrialized 
capitalism combined with their experiences growing up in Montana in the postwar 
era led them to be almost instinctively suspicious of corporations and to interpret 
the coal boom in terms of corporate greed and excess.
61
 
 When Northern Plains first formed, it was organized loosely around a 
board led by chair Dick Colberg.  It met at least monthly between April and the 
summer of 1972 at Kit Muller’s house in Billings.  Although NPRC had a board, 
all members were encouraged to attend the monthly meetings where they updated 
the group on developments in their areas and discussed strategy.  Over the course 
of this few months, the staff moved into Colberg’s unused pottery studio on the 
third floor of the Stapleton Building in downtown Billings across the street from 
Montana Power Company’s imposing office.  A skilled novelist could not have 
better orchestrated the “David and Goliath” symbolism explicit in the situation.  
Beneath the gaze of this regional corporate giant, the five staff members worked 
feverishly tracking down coal leases, reading environmental assessments and 
impact statements, and brainstorming legal, legislative, and organizing strategy.
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While the staff researched state, county, and Bureau of Land Management 
mineral leasing records and developments with the North Central Power Study, 
the ranchers—the leadership of the organization—slowly began to institutionalize 
the structure of the group.  At the first meeting at Muller’s home, the group voted 
to write by-laws for the organization.  The lines between the volunteer staff and 
members were fuzzy at best during the first few months.  Member and State 
Senator George Darrow encouraged Pat Sweeney to join the ad hoc by-laws 
committee with Darrow to research federal requirements for official not-for-profit 
organizations and write the group’s new by-laws.  Ellen Pfister Withers returned 
from Mississippi in the summer of 1972 a newly-minted lawyer and assumed the 
responsibility of over-seeing the new Billings office and staff.  By that summer, 
the board had approved by-laws giving the NPRC an organizational structure that 
included a board of directors made up of members.   The by-laws clearly 
delineated roles for  members and staff: members were to make decisions 
regarding issue positions and strategies for the organization through democratic 
processes and serve as leaders and spokespeople for the group; the staff were to 
serve as researchers and organizers and provide information and strategy 
suggestions to the board, and implement the board’s decision.  Under the new by-
laws, the staff would be paid two hundred dollars a month each paid for by dues 
and whatever other money the group could raise.  When Colberg resigned his 
chairmanship to run for the 1973 session of the Montana State House soon after, 
Withers was elected chair.
63
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Putting out brush fires and telling the Plains Truth 
 Understanding the dual needs of research and winning converts, Withers 
and the staff went to work in the summer of 1972.  One of their first activities was 
to frame the issue for public information materials and then communicate it to 
their members and the general public.  Before forming Northern Plains, BMLA 
and RPA members found it easy to organize members over a relatively small 
geographic area through word of mouth and personal meetings.  Northern Plains 
organized an entire region of the state that stretched hundreds of miles and 
included thousands of people, usually living in sparsely populated communities or 
counties.  They had phones (although some, like those in the tiny village of 
Birney along the Tongue River, were still “party-lines” in which residents could 
listen in on their neighbors’ conversations) but other forms of communication 
were difficult.  To bridge the gap, Ellen Pfister Withers and Anne Charter 
produced the group’s first newsletter in the summer of 1972.64   
Typewritten on four 8.5 by11-inch pages, the austere form of the first 
newsletter of the Northern Plains Resource Council followed its practical 
function.  In straight-forward terms, it explained what was at issue, 
unambiguously defined the sides in the conflict, and informed readers how to 
defend themselves.  It maintained a stark sense of “Us” Montanans versus 
“Them” coal companies.  “Did Anybody Ask You If ‘They’ Could Do This to 
Montana?” asked the headline.  The first issue described the North Central Power 
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Study and the coal boom. It took statistics directly from the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s Study and interpreted them for the readers, tying the coal boom to 
the national energy crisis and explaining that oil companies were acquiring coal 
companies due to shortfalls in oil production.  Finally, the newsletter informed 
readers about developments in Congress and  explained legislative proposals to 
expand surface owner rights to defend their land from strip mining and to reclaim 
strip-mined land so that it could be returned to productive use.
65
   
After explaining the situation in eastern Montana as they understood it, 
Withers and Charter implored the readership to take action—a strategy that 
became standard for the organization.  An “ACTION NEEDED” section 
encouraged members to write or wire their Senators immediately and encourage 
them to support West Virginia Senator Ken Hechler’s strip mine reclamation bill 
in Congress.  The National Coal Association, the authors wrote, “has a full time 
lobbyist who does nothing but go from one Congressmen’s office to the next back 
there, so we have to keep in there pitching, too.”  Part of the newsletter informed 
readers about activities within the organization including updates on members’ 
trips to Washington, DC to lobby or Appalachia to meet with anti-strip mining 
groups.  Through its language and reporting, the newsletter imparted a vigorous 
right to participate in the decision-making process, despite the challenges of 
wealth, power, and distance presented to the Northern Plains ranchers.
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In the last two pages of the newsletter, the authors outlined the tactics coal 
companies used against surface owners, what they called “BATTLE TACTICS.”  
They described these tactics as “psychological warfare” and then offered advice 
on how to combat them.  They warned, “DON’T lease for any reason,” and 
provided questions landowners should ask of coal company representatives—
“land men”—if they should visit the readers’ homes.  Landowners should inquire 
of the land men whether and how ranching would continue during mining and 
what the land owner was supposed to do if their land could not be restored to 
agricultural productivity.  They should ask if there was a plan to reclaim the land 
and what would happen to the landowner’s subsurface water table and springs: 
“Who will drill you new deeper wells in case yours are ruined?”  Lastly, they 
instructed landowners to ask who would reclaim their land or pay them if the coal 
companies fail to reclaim it?  The newsletter advised landowners to find legal 
representation independent of the coal companies.  They warned members not to 
talk to land men without witnesses present and not to sign anything “without 
competent legal counsel.” Northern Plains members who had experience dealing 
with coal company land agents argued that the companies sought to exploit the 
unwritten “code of the West” that neighbors did not meddle in each other’s 
business.  They had learned firsthand in the Bull Mountains and Rosebud Country 
that the only way to combat this was to step outside of the comfort of tradition.  
“DO NOT BE PROUD ABOUT ASKING,” the newsletter instructed landowners, 
when they were told by land men that their neighbors had already agreed to sell or 
lease.  In their list of “BATTLE ALLIES,” they named the Northern Plains 
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Resource Council, BMLA and RPA, new affiliate Birney Land Protection 
Association, the League of Women Voters, and handful of environmental groups 
including the Montana Chapter of the Sierra Club and Montana Wilderness 
Association.  They also listed political allies including Senators Mike Mansfield 
and Lee Metcalf and Representatives John Melcher and Dick Shoup, as well as 
Wyoming’s congressional delegation.  Lastly, they made a pitch for membership.  
Five dollars a year would guarantee one’s membership in the organization and 
receipt of the newsletter, which they described as a “clearing house for spreading 
information and getting the right people in touch with each other.”  “Only by 
standing together,” Wither and Charter wrote, “can we live in an unpolluted and 
beautiful land.”67 
By the following January and the beginning of the 1973 Montana 
Legislative session, the newsletter had become a regular publication and source of 
information for people concerned about the coal boom.  Its name was changed to 
the Plains Truth and it incorporated a homey hand-drawn masthead portraying a 
bright sun rising behind hardscrabble hills divided by a winding river.  As the new 
title implied, it carried the organization’s claims to a superior degree of veracity 
regarding issues in the Northern Great Plains.  It was published almost monthly 
and followed the model set out by the first edition of informing the reader about 
the issues and developments within the organization and its campaigns and then 
calling members to action—“COME!! To the Reclamation Hearing [in 
Helena]…STAY!! For the COAL FORUM” and “Call, write, telegram your 
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legislators, or better yet, make a trip to Helena.”  The early editions of the Plains 
Truth maintained the first newsletter’s matter-of-fact style but ballooned in its 
length and content.  Reflecting an acceleration of the coal boom, the centrality of 
coal and environmental issues in the 1973 Montana legislature, the concerns of an 
expanding membership, and the revelations from the research of a busy staff, the 
Plains Truth doubled in size from four or five pages to nine or more.  It became a 
valuable source of information for landowners facing the threats of strip mining in 
places far-removed from the centers of power—Birney, Decker, Colstrip, Forsyth. 
In an editorial in The Billings Gazette in October of 1973, Duane Bowler opined 
that the newsletter was “a bundle of information about what is going on in the 
energy field, especially in these parts.” It taught landowners how to defend 
themselves and turn information and concern into political action.  All of these 
functions complemented an evolving campaign that early staff-member Steve 
Charter likened to putting out brush fires—desperately rushing to put out 
whatever flared up, never knowing where the next blaze would ignite.
68
      
 
The fire on the roof: Colstrip 
 
The brushfire analogy was apt, but at least the cause of one of the most 
immediate conflagrations was clear.  Montana Power Company’s plan to build a 
mine-mouth coal-fired power plant at Colstrip was moving ahead despite rancher 
protests—the juggernaut of capital and bureaucracy cared little about the 
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formation of a coalition of ranchers and environmentalists.  Although the early 
impetus for forming the organization had come from landowners in the Bull 
Mountains and Birney, the proposed Colstrip power plant was the first tangible 
project to be built in Montana under the North Central Power Study.  If they could 
stop Colstrip, NPRC members reasoned, maybe they could stop the others.   
 But Colstrip was moving ahead full steam in the summer of 1972.  As 
landowners struggled to keep track of Peabody’s land men and understand who 
was leasing land and coal where, the Montana Power Company moved ahead with 
its plans for the Colstrip power plants.  With its partner, the Seattle-based Puget 
Sound Power and Light Company, it began construction that year.  The state had 
passed a series of laws between 1967 and 1972 regulating construction of such 
plants: the Montana Clean Air Act in 1967 required the builders of all new 
industrial projects that might produce air pollution to obtain a permit from the 
state Department of Health and Environment before construction; the Montana 
Environmental Policy Act in 1971 required that the builder and state agency 
responsible for permitting the project complete an environmental impact 
statement and draw up mitigation measures; and a newly ratified state 
Constitution in the spring of 1972 articulated the principle that each Montanan 
had an inalienable right to a “clean and healthful environment.”  Despite these 
new measures, state regulators had little practical experience applying these laws 
in 1972.  Montana Power, together with its parent Anaconda Mining Company, 
had enjoyed almost hegemonic power in state politics in the twentieth century.  
Aware of the regulatory uncertainty posed by these new laws but confident of its 
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continued ability to influence state regulators and politics, Montana Power moved 
forward on its plan to build its coal-fired plants without applying for the permits 
now required by law. Perhaps the company leaders believed that once they had 
their shovels in the ground and foundations poured, the state would issue the 
necessary construction permits under the new laws.  The state of Montana had 
rarely stood in their way.  By the summer of 1972, hundreds of construction 
workers were on the ground preparing the foundations for the construction and 
installation of the boilers and turbines for two 350 megawatt power plants.
69
 
 
 
 
The remnants of historic coal strip mining in Colstrip with the construction of the 
Colstrip 1 and 2 power plants underway in the left-center of the photo.  
Photograph No. 549175 (Photographer Norton Boyd); “Power plant under 
construction alongside old spoil piles left by Burlington-Northern strip mining 
operation 20 to 30 years ago, 06/1973,” June 1973; Documerica Project, Records 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, 1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online 
version, www.archives.gov, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 
December 2011], National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.  
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Photograph No. 549126 (Photographer Norton Boyd); “Peabody Coal Company 
strip mine, south of Colstrip, 06/1973,” June 1973; Documerica Project, Records 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, 1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online 
version, www.archives.gov, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 
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 As construction commenced, Northern Plains members were starting to 
understand the state regulatory framework that had been created in the previous 
three years and began to test what it meant.  In the late spring of 1972, they 
protested to the Department of Health’s Air Pollution Control Division that it was 
failing to follow the Montana Clean Air Act and Environmental Policy Act.  In 
response, Montana’s Air Pollution Control Division scheduled a public hearing on 
the matter in Colstrip on July 18.  An angry crowd of ranchers, “ecologists,” and 
local residents filled the hearing room on that Tuesday night to hear from the 
Division’s director that Montana Power had in fact not applied for a permit and 
that the state had failed to require one.  Division director Benjamin Wake told the 
crowd that Montana Power had given him “assurances” that the new Colstrip 
plant would meet or exceed Montana’s air quality standards.  When rancher Don 
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Bailey asked him how he knew that Montana Power would follow through on 
these assurances, Wake responded, “I don’t know why they would lie to me.”  
Bailey voiced the pressing issue in the minds of many in the crowd: if Montana 
Power’s plant failed to meet state air quality standards, would the Division have 
the power to shut it down?  “I don’t think it will come to that,” Wake responded 
and promised the crowd that Montana Power would apply for a permit in the next 
two weeks.  Wake explained that by not requiring a permit he was allowing 
Montana Power to take advantage of developing pollution abatement technologies 
that would result in a cleaner power plant—an justification that made little sense 
to the crowd.
70
   
 While Wake may have thought that this was a reasonable explanation, 
Northern Plains members were not satisfied.  A little more than two months later, 
they filed a lawsuit in Yellowstone County against the Montana Power Company 
to stop construction of the Colstrip plan until it obtained a construction permit as 
required by the Montana Clean Air Act. Wake, as head of the Air Pollution 
Control Division, and John S. Anderson, director of the State Department of 
Health were named as defendants.  As part of the permitting process, the suit 
asked that Wake’s Division complete an environmental impact statement as 
required by the Montana Environmental Policy Act.  Dick Colberg, president of 
Northern Plains, defended the NPRC suit on the grounds that “People have the 
right to know if their air is going to be polluted” before the plant was constructed, 
and he insisted that the group was just trying to force compliance with existing 
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state law.  Montana Power responded that because it was not yet ready install the 
parts of the plant that would create air pollution—the boilers and turbines—it did 
not need to apply for a permit.  The Air Pollution Control Division, took a middle 
ground, agreeing with Montana Power that it technically did not need to apply for 
a permit until it began installing the polluting components of the project, but 
assuring the public that Montana Power was in the process of applying for a 
permit and that an environmental impact statement was underway.  But although 
the lawsuit would not be decided for several months, it produced the desired 
effect in prompting action by the state.  By beginning the permitting and 
environmental review processes, the state hoped to be dropped from the suit.  
Indeed, by the late fall of 1972, the state and Montana Power were in the process 
of completing the required environmental impact statement.  By November, the 
draft was completed and ready to be reviewed by the public in accordance with 
the Montana Environmental Policy Act.
71
  
       What followed in the final months of 1972 and early 1973 was a case 
study in what Karl Brooks illuminates as the messy process of making 
environmental law.  In November of 1972, the Department of Health announced 
that a hearing would be held on the draft environmental impact statement for the 
Colstrip plant on January 5 at the Custer County High School in Miles City 
beginning at eight in the morning.  The Department had reportedly received more 
than 750 letters in response to the project, most of them critical of coal 
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development and the proposed plants.  According to the Montana Environmental 
Policy Act, an essential part of the environmental review process was soliciting 
public comments about the proposed plant.  Meanwhile, the Yellowstone County 
district court transferred the case to the 16
th
 Judicial District Court in Rosebud 
County at Forsyth, north of Colstrip where the presiding judge, Alfred B. Coate, 
rejected Montana Power’s argument that it did not need to apply for a permit until 
it installed the plant’s boilers and turbines. The judge also ruled that the members 
of the Northern Plains Resource Council had standing to sue.  At the same time, 
the state legislature’s  Environmental Quality Council demanded that the 
Department of Health rewrite its draft environmental impact statement because it 
found it inadequate.  Northern Plains echoed this demand and carried it into the 
January 1973 hearing in Miles City.  As the 1973 Montana legislative session got 
underway, the future of Colstrip remained uncertain; how the court would 
interpret the Montana Clean Air Act and Montana Environmental Policy Act and 
how the state would regulate new polluters remained unknown.
72
   
 
Building alliances 
 
 In the weeks and months between agency and judicial action on the 
Colstrip lawsuit and environmental impact statement, Northern Plains staff 
focused their attention on other issues.  From its inception, NPRC’s members had 
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realized the importance of finding and working with allies.  BMLA had relied on 
help from Lainie Hicks of the Wyoming Sierra Club and the Montana Wilderness 
Association’s Cecil Garland to organize the young group and BMLA members 
had worked extensively with new allies at the Environmental Policy Center in 
Washington DC and citizens’ organizations from Appalachia in opposing strip 
mining at the federal level.  In the last months of 1972, in advance of the 1973 
legislative session, NPRC members and staff made trips out of state to rally the 
support of others sympathetic to their cause.  In his last days as chair of the 
nascent organization before resigning to run for the Montana state house, Richard 
Colberg traveled to Washington DC to attend a forum on the North Central 
Power Study and coal strip mining in the West sponsored by the Conservation 
Foundation.  Although this meeting included a handful of federal and state agency 
personnel, professional and citizen activists from the Rocky Mountain Center on 
the Environment, Appalachian Strip Mining Information Service, the Ford 
Foundation’s Energy Policy Project, the U.S. Water Resources Council, and High 
Country News also took part.  Colberg stood in common cause with these other 
groups in imparting to representatives from the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency, Department of the Interior, and Montana state lands commission that a 
comprehensive environmental review of the North Central Power Study was 
absolutely necessary before any further development should be allowed.  In the 
process, he made lasting relationships with these other activists that proved useful 
in gathering information about the coal boom and ideas about how to fight it.
73
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 In the next few months, Carolyn Alderson and Anne McKinney, ranchers 
near Hanging Woman Creek where the North Central Power Study proposed 
a10,000 megawatt power plant, busily worked with allies to lobby their cases.  
Alderson traveled with a group of ranchers facing similar issues just across the 
border in Wyoming to Washington, DC to lobby for the defeat of a weak Senate 
surface mining bill and in support of a stronger House bill.  Unfortunately, 
Congress adjourned before it could take action on either bill, leaving the issue in 
the air until the following year.  McKinney traveled to the state capital, Helena, to 
lobby the members of the Montana Stock Growers Association to adopt some of 
the Northern Plains positions regarding strip mining.  On October 6, the 
traditionally conservative ranching organization voted to call for stronger 
regulations of strip mining, including requiring that mining companies re-
establish forage plants on the lands they disturbed during mining and post a bond 
of $1000 an acre to pay for reclamation of mined lands. The association also 
called for a prohibition of mining in lands that were impossible to reclaim and 
lands that were of historical and archeological interest.  Not long after the 
Stockgrowers adopted this position, Alderson travelled to an energy conference in 
Sheridan, Wyoming, where she warned officials from a collection of oil, gas, 
coal, and power companies, to “not underestimate the people of this area.”  She 
told them, “Do not make the mistake of lumping us and the land altogether as 
‘overburden’ and dispense with us as nuisance.”  With a somewhat ironic 
reference to the native Americans who had inhabited the land owned by ranchers, 
she told the meeting, “We are the descendants, spiritually, if not actually, of those 
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who fought for this land once, and we are prepared to do it again…We intend to 
win.”74    
The group took this energy and momentum into the final months of 1972 
before the start of the 1973 legislative session.  Staffer Kit Muller and member 
Bill Bryan travelled to San Francisco in late November to meet with allies and 
potential funders and held a press conference including a film on strip mining in 
Wyoming in hopes of attracting political and financial support outside the region.  
In early December, representatives from the Environmental Defense Fund and 
Natural Resources Defense Council met with NPRC staff and members in 
Billings for three days to discuss legal strategies and possible policy issues and 
prescriptions.  Representatives from the state Environmental Quality Council and 
Montana Wildlife Federation met with Northern Plains members on December 12 
to advise the group on legislative strategy. The Montana Wilderness Association 
passed a resolution calling for a four-year moratorium on strip mining.  With the 
support of their allies both in Montana and out of state, NPRC prepared for the 
1973 legislative session.
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The 1973 Montana Legislative Session 
 
As Northern Plains began its legislative work in 1973, all of their work to 
elevate the coal boom issue paid off.  Compared to the previous session in 1971, 
coal strip mining was a well-publicized issue in the press and in state politics by 
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1973.  The threats that the coal boom posed to the lands and waters of eastern 
Montana played a central role in the writing of the natural resources section of the 
new state constitution in 1972.  Indeed, the chair of the Constitutional Convention 
Natural Resource Committee, Louise Cross of Glendive, a region in eastern 
Montana slated for strip mining, identified the environmental problems associated 
with the coal boom as her primary concern in advocating for a strong 
environmental section of the constitution.  Delegates to the convention in 1972 
were familiar with debates over coal mining and reclamation in the 1971 
legislative session and had read the dozens of articles that had run in state 
newspapers illuminating the prospects of strip mining in the region.  By the time 
the 1973 legislative session got underway, both political parties had taken critical 
positions on strip mining.  In the fall of 1972, the Montana Democratic party 
adopted a conservation and environment plank which called for a moratorium on 
any further strip mining until: the legislature passed a land reclamation bill that 
would guarantee restoration of mined lands to their original or higher use with the 
establishment of self-sustaining vegetation; passage of a legislative guarantee of 
water rights and the protection of water quality from mining pollution; 
amendment of the state’s eminent domain laws so that coal companies could not 
condemn private land under the guise that coal mining was a necessary public 
good; legislative regulation of air quality; and a commitment by the state and 
nation to an energy policy reliant on “clean alternative energy supply.”  The 
Montana Republican Party, at the instigation of Billings Senator George Darrow 
and with testimony from Bob Tully, passed a resolution that called for 
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reclamation and “adequate protections” for surface and groundwater and air 
quality.  The Republican resolution also recommended that the legislature give 
landowners a better ability to protect their private property in “split estate” 
situations where the property rights of surface and mineral owners came into 
conflict.  With the official support of both parties for their general legislative 
aims, it appeared that Northern Plains was in a strong position to affect the 
passage of meaningful legislation.
76
     
 One of the immediate threats landowners faced from the proposed strip-
mining was the ability of coal companies to “condemn” their land under old 
“eminent domain” laws.  Originating under English common law to allow for the 
condemnation of private land for construction of public (or royal) necessities or 
amenities, eminent domain had been used in the United States since the nation’s 
inception for the building of roads, railroads, dams, and public buildings.  During 
the energy crisis and coal boom of the 1970s, coal companies like Consol and 
Peabody attempted to use this same legal power of the state to remove landowners 
whose property overlaid the coal beds by arguing that it was in the public’s 
interest to remove the ranchers and mine the coal.  Landowners faced an 
untenable position in trying to retain their property: either agree to the coal 
company’s terms or be condemned, removed, and accept what the courts 
considered fair compensation.  In 1973, state-Representative Richard Colberg, 
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Democrat from Billings, who had run for the legislature on a platform of reining 
in what he called the abuses and injustices of the coal industry, introduced House 
Bill 238 which removed coal strip mining from the definition of “public use” 
under Montana’s eminent domain law.  Northern Plains members and Montana 
legislators operating under the new structure provided by the 1972 Constitution 
argued that it was unjust to allow a private company to use the power of the state 
to deprive citizens of their property.  The apparent injustice of the situation 
resonated with legislators who removed coal strip mining from the definition of 
“public use” in Montana’s eminent domain law by a hefty margin—86-11 in the 
House and concurred to by voice vote in the Senate.  On March 17, 1973, 
Governor Thomas Judge signed the bill into law, affirming that the state would 
not help coal companies condemn farmers and ranchers to facilitate coal 
extraction.
77
    
Northern Plains’ members had to make difficult decisions regarding their 
public position on coal strip-mining itself.  Some proposed to ban strip-mining 
altogether.  The coal in the northern Great Plains was low-sulfur lignite that 
burned cleaner and was closer to the surface than the coal that underlay the 
Midwest and Appalachia, but because of high transportation costs it was only 
profitable for export out of the state if it was strip-mined. A ban on strip mining 
could possibly end large-scale coal mining in Montana.  Thus, a ban, if they could 
finesse it through the legislature, would perhaps solve their problems.  Families 
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like the Charters and Pfisters near the Bull Mountains and the McRaes, Baileys, 
Golders and others near Colstrip and the Hayes, McKinneys, and Aldersons near 
Birney would be perfectly happy never to see the rolling hills and coulees of their 
regions torn up by strip mining.  The environmental devastation in the 
Appalachian coalfields provided a vivid illustration of what could happen to 
Montana if large-scale, unregulated strip mining were allowed in the state.  In a 
letter to the editor of The Billings Gazette powerful and popular Montana Senator 
Mike Mansfield recommended a ban until protective environmental laws were in 
place.  But what if a ban bill failed? Would they go home empty-handed and have 
to wait another two years to try to convince a new legislature to rein in strip 
mining?  The bulldozers were practically at their doorsteps.
78
  
The decision they made proved definitive for how the organization 
addressed strip mining and other environmental problems in the future, and 
crucial to maintaining their ability to support meaningful legislation during the 
1970s.  While most of their members opposed strip mining outright and supported 
the spirit of a ban, the organization itself assumed a middle ground.  The NPRC 
proposed a bill sponsored by Democratic Representative Dorothy Bradley of 
Bozeman that would enact a three-year moratorium on strip mining to give the 
state and federal agencies time to study strip mining and reclamation and enact 
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regulations to protect the environment and people.  Bradley’s HB 492 came 
within one vote of passing in the House.  Encouraged by the close vote, the group 
redoubled its efforts to pass a revised bill, lobbying hard for provisions that 
expanded citizen participation rules and gave landowners the power to negotiate 
terms to protect their property. Over the course of one long night in early 1973, 
determined Northern Plains members Ellen Pfister Withers, Bob Tully, staff 
member Kit Muller, and young lobbyist Pat Sweeney hammered out the draft of 
what would become Montana’s first coal-mine reclamation bill, HB 555, 
sponsored by Colberg.  They studied recent national and state-level environmental 
laws, including NEPA and the Montana Environmental Policy Act and the 
recently passed state constitution, from which they borrowed public notice and 
participation provisions. House Bill 555 was eventually merged with Senate Bill 
94, sponsored by Democratic Senator William Bertsche of Great Falls to become 
the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act passed by a near 
unanimous vote and signed into law by Governor Judge in mid-March 1973. The 
law required that before strip mining could commence, companies had to prepare 
a mining plan that included detailed prescriptions for restoring the land to its pre-
mining condition including native vegetation and the “approximate original 
contour” of the landscape, obtain a permit from the state—a process that provided 
for citizen oversight and appeal—and complete necessary environmental impact 
statements under both the National Environmental Policy Act and the Montana 
Environmental Policy Act. To pay for post-mining reclamation, the state required 
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that companies purchase bonds to ensure the reclamation would be completed and 
stipulated that its costs could not be shifted to the residents of the state.
79
   
Pushing reforms further, Northern Plains worked with other environmental 
organizations and concerned citizens to help pass a Utilities Siting Act.  House 
Bill 127, sponsored by Fort Benton Democratic Senator Francis Bardanouve, 
aimed at creating a permitting process to regulate power plant and power line 
construction.  Supporters included representatives from the Department of Health 
and Environmental Sciences who advocated for its passage to prevent the kind of 
situation they faced with the construction of the Colstrip plants.  Don Bailey 
seconded their support, as did Jim Murray, representative of the Montana chapter 
of the American Federation of Labor—Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO).  Regulation, it appeared, served multiple purposes for the different 
interests.  While Bailey, a stalwart opponent of the Colstrip plant along with 
McRae and other members of RPA and NPRC from the Colstrip area, hoped that 
the Utility Siting Act would force Montana Power and Puget Sound Power and 
Light to follow new environmental laws and possibly even prevent the plant’s 
construction, state regulators and union leadership hoped the law would provide 
needed regulatory consistency and certainty to prevent the kinds of lawsuits 
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Northern Plains was currently pursuing against the state and Montana Power.  
Montana Dakota Utilities did introduce amendments to the proposed legislation 
but, like its fellow power companies, likely understood the bill in terms similar to 
that of organized labor and state regulators.  Once the bill had the state’s support, 
it was likely to pass; utilities possibly felt that they could operate within the 
regulatory structure it created based on their continued close relationships with 
state regulators.   No one opposed the legislation.  Representatives from the 
Montana Farmers Union, a historically progressive farmers’ organization, and the 
American Association of University Women, supported the bill because its 
provisions increased public involvement in the power plant permitting process.  
The Utilities Siting Act was passed by the Montana legislature in 1973 to address 
environmental and social issues associated with the construction of electric power 
plants, including those fired by coal, and the transmission lines they needed to 
move their product to consumers. In the next few years, it provided Northern 
Plains with a powerful tool to challenge the construction of additional plants at 
Colstrip and in other parts of the state and their transmission lines, which were 
proposed to march east to west across Montana to the Pacific Northwest.
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A bill to ban all strip mining by 1977 was introduced during the 1973 
legislative session and its hearing drew a sizeable and enthusiastic crowd, 
including ranchers from Eastern Montana, representatives from Montana’s small 
environmental lobby and the League of Women Voters, a handful of concerned 
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voters, and J. W. Bradley the president of a newly-formed anti-strip mining group 
from Tennessee, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, who brought warnings of 
what might be in store for Montana.  The hearing did not include any self-
identified representatives of the Northern Plains Resource Council.  The strip-
mine ban bill, House Bill 391, sponsored by Representative Barbara Bennetts, 
Democrat from Helena, may have provided a strategically more radical alternative 
to the NPRC-backed reclamation bill, but the organization remained silent on the 
issue.  The strip mine ban was never enacted, but it added to the calls for banning 
strip-mining springing up all over the coal mining regions of the U.S. at the time.  
As the 1973 legislative session wound to a close, Northern Plains, a nascent and 
wily collection of roughly 300 families from agricultural and urban backgrounds, 
could claim a large degree of victory.  Landowners could no longer be condemned 
for coal strip mining under Montana’s eminent domain law, coal strip mining was 
regulated and mining companies had to reclaim the lands they disturbed, and the 
construction of major power plants and their transmission lines was regulated and 
the permitting process opened to public scrutiny.  NPRC had not stopped strip 
mining, but their efforts had helped ensure that it would be heavily regulated and 
that mining companies, not the citizens of Montana, would bear the external costs 
of strip mining and coal-fired power production.
81
        
While Northern Plains members and staff were busy at work in Helena, 
they were also trying to address one of most daunting aspects of the coal boom 
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and the North Central Power Study: the complicated matrix of land and mineral 
ownership in Montana, who owned what and where and where development was 
planned next.  The confusion surrounding landownership caused by split estate 
legacy of the 19
th
 century was a major obstacle to organizing effective opposition 
to the coal boom.  When confronted by coal company “lease hounds,” landowners 
were usually ignorant beyond the information provided by the coal company land 
agents, leaving them at a serious disadvantage in negotiating either terms of 
selling or leasing their surface property for mining or trying to fight the deal.  In 
addition, without knowing who owned which coal tracts, who was leasing what, 
and what had already been leased, Northern Plains could not anticipate where the 
coal companies would go next.  If they could figure out which tracts were being 
leased, they might be able to predict the coal companies’  subsequent moves; they 
could inform the landowners ranching over those leases and begin to organize a 
pre-emptive defense against the lease-hounds’ divide-and-conquer strategies.  But 
no one exactly knew how to find this information.  Neither the federal 
government nor any other governmental entity kept mineral leasing information in 
a form easily accessed by citizens and there was no centralized record of leases of 
private minerals.  There was no single place the staff could go to find 
information.
82
   
Youth, creativity, and tenacity provided the answer.  For several months 
during the fall of 1972 and winter of 1972-1973, Muller, Sweeney, Tom Tully, 
Bill Donald, and Steve Charter travelled to every county courthouse in eastern 
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Montana and combed records and maps sometimes dating back to the late 19
th
 
century to glean the information they needed.  In small county seats like Sidney, 
Glendive, Terry, and Wibaux, they would camp out in teams of two for a couple 
of days and compile lists of recorded leases of all private, state, and federal 
minerals in that county.  They then produced a document recording the state of 
mineral leasing in Eastern Montana complete with maps that they hand-colored-in 
to give a visual representation of the situation.  The completed document was 
impressive.  Sweeney remembered that Northern Plains’ sometimes-adversary at 
the regional office of the Bureau of Land Management in eastern Montana, Ed 
Sliditz commented that not even his paid staff had any idea how much of their 
minerals or land were leased for coal mining.
83
   
However remarkable the compilation of all of this information was, its 
findings were even more striking.  On the morning of March 9, 1973, residents of 
eastern Montana read in The Billings Gazette that more than a million acres in 
their region had been leased for strip mining, and that applications to lease 
another 427,000 acres were underway.  In total, they read, about one and a half 
million acres or 2,400 square miles were slated for strip mining.  At least eighty-
seven companies had leased coal lands in Montana and Wyoming.  Kit Muller 
informed the newspaper that he intended to give the results of the study to state 
agencies involved in permitting and regulating coal development.  He insisted that 
“People in Montana have a right to know what’s going on in this state.”  The 
leasing study was vital in helping the group understand the scope of the coal 
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companies’ mining ambitions in eastern Montana and to plan where to focus its 
efforts.  It was also effective in communicating the information to the wider 
public and provided an added impetus for the legislature to regulate strip mining 
during the 1973 session.  The leasing study further woke Montanans up to just 
how big an issue strip mining was in the state.
84
     
 By the end of the 1973 legislative session, Northern Plains had 
successfully catapulted the issue of strip mining in eastern Montana to the 
forefront of state public discourse and policy making.  In a little less than two 
years, what seemed like a very localized issue affecting a few landowners in the 
Bull Mountains north of Billings or a handful of ranchers near Colstrip had turned 
into the one of the state’s biggest political issues.  By mid-1973, articles on coal 
strip mining or coal-fired energy production occurred almost daily in the Billings 
Gazette and other state newspapers.  Its trajectory as an increasingly hot topic was 
possibly aided by a collective recognition of the potential scope and meaning of 
the North Central Power Study by Montana newspapers and policymakers.  It 
may have just taken a few years for the numbers—twenty one coal-fired power 
plants dotting the landscape and polluting the air, new dams and power lines and 
dozens of new strip mines—really to sink in and for the public to react. 
 
Conclusion 
In a little more than a year since their organization, this modest collection 
of ranchers, farmers and environmentalists helped advance new state laws that 
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enhanced the ability of landowners to protect their property rights, increased state 
regulation and oversight of strip mining and power plant construction, and 
required coal companies to reclaim their strip mines so that agriculture could 
continue after the coal boom.  In the 1973 legislative session, Northern Plains 
members and other Montanans concerned about the environmental degradation 
associated with strip mining and coal-fired power production triumphed over the 
entrenched and powerful forces of the Montana Power Company and the coal 
mining industry.  The elevation of the coal issue in the public mind and passage of 
new state-level laws to regulate strip mining and coal-fired energy production 
slowed the boom.  Initial earth works on the site of the Colstrip power plant did 
proceed after the 1971 legislative session passed its first, weak, and unfunded 
strip mine reclamation law, and Consolidated Coal began experimenting with 
“test pits” in the Bull Mountains, but the wholesale eviction landowners feared 
did not occur.   At Hanging Woman Creek near Birney and Broadus, proposed 
sites for giant 5,000 and 10,000 megawatt power plants remained quiet.   
Although the coal boom was by nature very technical and heavy with 
scientific considerations requiring engineers, energy economists, and lawyers to 
navigate a complicated maze of geology, chemistry, physics, national and global 
energy markets, state and federal property and environmental laws, Northern 
Plains member interpreted it in simple terms.  To them, it represented a violation 
of their sovereignty as landowners and citizens, a threat to their livelihoods and 
quality of life, and a subversion of democracy.  They understood the hazards strip 
mining and coal-fired power production posed to water and air quality, the land 
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and wildlife, but they articulated their opposition in terms of justice and fairness 
and property ownership.  Logically, when they sought solutions from the Montana 
legislature, they advocated for laws that would give citizens the ability to more 
fully participate in the decisions that affected their lives and livelihoods.  Thus, 
they lobbied for the reform of the state’s eminent domain laws so that private 
corporations could not use the power of the state to condemn private property.  
They attempted to balance the rights of landowners with those of mineral owners.  
Although two of the most important pieces of legislation that came out of the 
1973 session, the Surface Mine and Reclamation Act, and the Utility Siting Act, 
were highly technical, Northern Plains members framed their support for these 
bills in terms of creating transparent permitting and regulatory processes for strip 
mines and power facilities in which citizens had access to information and could 
participate in environmental decision making and challenge agency decisions.  In 
the years after their passage, they organized citizens play an active role in the 
environmental decision making processes created by these laws and fought to 
protect their ability to participate.  Although Northern Plains staff  and some of its 
members delved into the technical and scientific elements of environmental 
protection and resource management associated with coal mining and power 
production, most members continued to understood environmental issues in 
democratic terms—environmental and democratic reforms were welded tightly 
together.   
By mid-1973, Northern Plains counted approximately 300 people in its 
membership.  Over the next few years it would grow both in numbers and 
  110 
geographically as landowners across the state learned of the extent to which the 
coal under their land had been leased or that enormous electrical transmission 
lines were planned for their property. Growth offered new political power as the 
group learned how to use the laws it helped to pass to address the coal boom and 
considered the possibility of passing national legislation to avoid shifting coal 
development south or east into Wyoming or the Dakotas.   The linking of 
environmental reform with advancing participatory democracy characterized 
Northern Plains and its work for the remainder of the 1970s and guided its 
strategies as the group encountered new challenges.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
NORTHERN PLAINS COMES OF AGE 
 
 
 Wally McRae probably had ten other things to do as he walked into the 
Northern Plains office one morning in 1973.  He fed the cows before he drove the 
two hours from his ranch up to Billings; barring some unforeseen emergency, 
they should be fine until he returned that evening.  There was still the seemingly 
unending list of chores—checking and fixing fences, servicing the tractor and 
other equipment, making sure the cattle watering tanks were free of ice—that 
nags at a person’s brain when they leave the ranch for a day to do something not 
directly related to their business.  The disheveled austerity of the Northern Plains 
Resource Council office in the Stapleton building, with its filing cabinets, stacks 
of papers and files and maps strewn across tables and a few of the room’s walls 
starkly illuminated by buzzing fluorescent light tubes overhead, was a world away 
from the rolling hills, grass and cottonwoods of Rosebud Creek—where he ought 
to be today, working.  He hoped this meeting was worth it. 
 Wally was joined by other Northern Plains stalwarts—activists who had 
quickly turned into veterans in the organization like Anne Charter, Ellen Pfister 
Withers, Jeanne Hjermstad, Nick Golder, Carolyn Alderson, and staff members 
Pat Sweeney, Kit Muller, and Paul Hawks.  A tenth activist sat in the circle as the 
meeting got underway, though he was not a member of Northern Plains.  He was 
Wade Rathke, the social and economic justice activist who had begun his work on 
welfare rights in Arkansas in the 1960s and founded the Association of 
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Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) in 1970.  Northern Plains 
paid to bring Rathke to Billings to hear what he had to say about community 
organizing, building grassroots “people power,” and how the group could increase 
its effectiveness, strength and resilience in its fight against the coal boom.  
 Rathke sat each board member in a chair in front of a television camera 
and proceeded to ask each about their role in Northern Plains and what they 
thought about its future: “What is your contribution to this organization?  Is it 
time? Is it money?  Is it education?  Where do you see this organization in five 
years?  Where do you see yourself in this organization in five years?  What are the 
strengths of the organization?  What are its weaknesses?”  When it was McRae’s 
turn, he looked into the camera.  In his typically skeptical fashion, he told the 
machine and Rathke, “I think this organization won’t exist in five years…I hope it 
doesn’t exist in five years.  There’s a need right now.  There’s a real need.  But I 
hope there’s no need in five years.”  Rathke’s exercise was intended to encourage 
introspection on the part of each leader and the board as a whole and to provide a 
little practice in public speaking and presenting the group’s message to the media 
and public.  This special meeting of the board and staff held in 1973 was the first 
time that McRae remembered the group considering its long-term goals and 
individual leaders interrogating their motivations, hopes, and fears in continuing 
to participate.  Instead of racing from brush fire to brush fire, Northern Plains was 
taking the time to talk about what it meant to fight the blazes and then to consider 
how to build a force capable of anticipating them and fighting the entire 
conflagration over the long term.  Their instincts about being a grassroots 
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organization led by their volunteer members had proven successful—now they 
considered ways to further institutionalize the decision-making and organizing 
structure of the group to maximize its strength and longevity.  McRae and the 
other landowners may have hoped that within five years the proposals to 
industrialize eastern Montana articulated by North Central Power Study would 
disappear, that Montana Power, Puget Power and Light, Peabody and Western 
Energy would pull up stakes and leave their part of the state, but the group was 
quickly learning that victory would not come so easily.  The energy crisis would 
ebb and flow with changes in global supply and demand and the political winds, 
but demand for coal was not going away.  The little pragmatic consortium they 
had formed to fight the coal boom would need to become larger and more 
permanent if they were going to protect their home.
86
  
 Nineteen seventy-three was a banner year for the young organization and 
for environmental protection in Montana in general.  The Montana legislature met 
every other year and in the 1969 and 1971 sessions the state house and senate 
passed foundational laws protecting water quality and creating a system of 
government and public oversight to help prevent unwanted environmental impacts 
of proposed industrial projects.  In 1973, the legislature built on the momentum 
from those sessions and the 1972 state Constitutional Convention which gave 
every resident the right to a “clean and healthful environment” to pass 
environmental regulations for strip mining and reclamation and the siting of 
power plants and transmission lines.  In a related action, it also removed the 
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possibility of the state granting condemnation of private property for strip mining 
under eminent domain. Although state politics were firmly controlled by the 
Democratic party, all of these laws passed with bi-partisan support by large 
margins.   Concern for protecting the “big sky country” was broad and deeply 
held by many in the state, and Northern Plains was at the forefront of the 
movement to preserve the qualities that made the state exceptional—open space, 
unspoiled water and air, and the ability for common people to make a living on 
the land.  But although the state had taken steps to protect these values, these new 
laws did not stop the coal boom.  The strip mine permitting system and 
reclamation requirements created by the strip mine reclamation law were 
theoretical at best in 1973.  What it meant for land to be “reclaimable” or returned 
to its “approximate original contour” would be vigorously contested in state 
agency offices, courtrooms, and on the land by both environmentalists and 
industry for years to come.  Although the coal mining and power companies had 
new regulatory obstacles to negotiate, they were not dissuaded from their goals.  
The environmentalist and “cowboy” lobby had had great success in the policy 
arena.  Now they were going to have to figure out how to ensure enforcement of 
those policies and translate legislative triumphs into on-the-ground victories.   
 In the remaining years of the decade, the coal boom and Northern Plains 
developed along complementary trajectories and the relationship between the two 
came to resemble a perverse dance over the landscape.  Northern Plains staff 
would hear reports of coal company land men in a new part of eastern Montana, 
or concerned residents of a remote agricultural hamlet would come to the 
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organization with information about a company leasing large parcels of minerals 
under the surrounding farms or with reports of proposals from the Bureau of 
Reclamation to build dams on tributaries of the Missouri or Yellowstone Rivers.  
The group would then send their young organizers into the communities to assess 
the threat and begin organizing residents into local groups that could defend 
themselves—with the researching and organizing resources of the larger group—
against the proposed mine or power plant (or both). Meanwhile, they kept their 
gaze firmly fixed on developments in Colstrip, near Birney, and in the Bull 
Mountains, their copy of the newest edition of the Montana Code Annotated with 
its recently-added environmental and landowner protection laws within arm’s 
reach.  As the dance continued, Northern Plains members considered larger 
questions about the function and permanence of the organization and the need for 
a national solution to coal strip mining to prevent the practice from simply being 
shifted across state borders to Montana’s neighbors.  Further, with each new 
proposed mine, power plant or dam, they began to understand the coal boom not 
as a series of isolated issues but as a purposeful and wholesale assault on their 
agrarian culture, economy, and landscape perpetrated by the U.S. government and 
private corporations that sought to sacrifice their homes for the energy needs of 
urban America and investor dividends.   In the process, the group’s members 
moved beyond the simple, self-interested motives that caused them to organize in 
the first place—saving their land from coal mining—to understand themselves as 
part of a movement and their struggle to protect air, water, land, and their way of 
life as related to the struggles of others.   
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Wrangling Power Plants 
 While Northern Plains may have taken a small moment to relish in their 
apparent legislative successes in Helena during the spring of 1973, Montana 
Power and Puget Power and Light were still at work constructing the two 350 
megawatt coal-fired steam power plants in Colstrip.  Northern Plains had sued 
Montana Power and the State Department of Health in the fall of 1972 for failing 
to complete an environmental review of the proposed plant under the state’s new 
Clean Air and Environmental Policy acts.  The defendants scrambled to address 
the lawsuit’s claims in an attempt to have the case thrown out.  The Department of 
Health quickly produced an environmental impact statement in an attempt to have 
itself removed from the list of defendants and Montana Power challenged whether 
Northern Plains actually had standing to sue.  The group was buoyed in December 
when the Rosebud County district judge Alfred Coate rejected Montana Power’s 
challenge and allowed the suit to continue.
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A month later, however, Judge Alfred Coate tempered the group’s 
optimism.  In early January 1973, he suggested that to enjoin the construction of 
the Colstrip plant would require that Northern Plains provide an enormous forty-
five million dollar bond to cover the costs to Montana Power of stopping 
construction if the case was decided in the company’s favor.  Northern Plains’ 
attorney, D. Frank Kampfe argued against bond, insisting that that the group was 
suing in the public’s interest.  “The public is asking,” he said, “that they be 
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allowed to be part of the decision-making process and…that the plant not be built 
before all of the ramifications have been thoroughly examined.”  A little more 
than a week later, Coate dashed the group’s hopes of quickly stopping the 
construction of the Colstrip plants until the state Department of Health completed 
the environmental impact statement and issued Montana Power its air quality 
permit when he ruled that Northern Plains had sustained no injury from the 
construction of the plants, and that because Montana Power had applied for a 
permit, it had violated no laws or regulations.  Judge Coate ruled that if the 
district court ordered the halting of construction, it would be overstepping the 
constitutional separation between the judicial and legislative branches of 
government—the issue lay with the legislature and state administrative agencies.  
Northern Plains’ case rested on yet unproven legal grounds: the power plant 
would eventually emit air pollution and thus needed to be regulated under 
Montana’s Clean Air Act as soon as construction on the project began.  Coate was 
unconvinced.  He upheld the position of the state Department of Health and 
Montana Power, which argued that until the power company began to install the 
parts of the plant that would actually produce pollution, the company’s actions did 
not trigger any kind of review by the state required under the Clean Air Act.  In 
Coate’s view, Montana Power did not need to apply for an air quality permit until 
it began to install the boilers and generators.  And, because it had applied for a 
permit in the fall of the previous year, the case was doubly moot.  In this first 
round of testing Montana’s new environmental laws, industry prevailed.88   
                                                 
88
 Ronald Schleyer, “Brief says MPC ignoring law,” The Billings Gazette, 7 January 1973; 
  118 
Less than a month later in February, Montana Power revealed that, with a 
consortium of other for-profit, investor-owned power companies from the Pacific 
Northwest, including Puget Sound Power and Light, Portland General Electric, 
and Spokane’s Washington Water Power, it was planning to build two additional 
two—each one twice the size of those already under construction.  The proposed 
plants would export even more electricity to Northwest while Montanans endured 
more land degradation and air pollution.  The Colstrip issue took on a new 
urgency, and more ranchers from the area joined the conflict.  By the end of the 
year, Northern Plains would grow to include eight affiliated community 
organizations like the Rosebud Protective Association and Bull Mountain 
Landowners Association.
89
    
Although the district court in Forsyth was vague on whether Montana 
Power even needed apply for a permit, the fact remained that the company had 
applied and that the Department of Health had begun the environmental analysis 
process required under the Montana Clean Air Act and Montana Environmental 
Policy Act.  In early 1973, construction of the plant continued as the state was still 
trying to assess the project’s environmental impacts.   The department scheduled a 
hearing to collect public comment on an environmental impact statement that 
critics and the legislative Environmental Quality Council (EQC)—formed by the 
1971 Montana Environmental Policy Act—claimed was inadequate.   Despite the 
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criticisms of the EQC and environmental groups including Northern Plains, the 
hearing was held on January 5.
90
   
The temperature hovered at twenty below zero as concerned residents, 
landowners, state regulators, and power company executives shuffled into the 
gymnasium of the Custer County High School in Miles City for the 8 a.m. hearing 
on January 5.  One-by-one, each stood at the podium and voiced their hopes for 
and fears about the project.  Colstrip locals like Wally McRae and Don Bailey, 
together with chair Ellen Pfister Withers and staffer Pat Sweeney, led the charge 
for Northern Plains, which joined forces with the Montana Wilderness 
Association, Montana Audubon Society, and a student group from the University 
of Montana to oppose the department’s proposed permitting of the Colstrip 
project.  Supporters of the coal mines and power plants included representatives 
from Montana Power, the Billings Chamber of Commerce, and a handful of 
individual supporters representing themselves as workers.  In March, the 
department issued its final environmental impact statement.  Northern Plains 
members were dismayed to learn that, despite the fact that public comments 
opposed to the power plant outnumbered comments for its construction by a ratio 
of almost 30 to 1 (2,867 to 130), the Department had recommended that the 
politically-appointed Board of Health approve the permit.  On April 24, the state 
issued Montana Power its air quality permit for the two 350 megawatt power 
plants under construction at Colstrip.  During the hearings, opponents had argued 
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that as inadequate and rushed as they considered the draft impact statement to be, 
it still indicated that the plant would produce tons of air pollution each day and 
that its draws of nearly one-eighth of the annual flow of the Yellowstone River 
would seriously affect the water supply of the arid region.  The outcome caused 
them to question the value of participating in the hearings at all and democracy 
itself.  To Northern Plains members, it appeared that Wally McRae’s prediction 
from his January 5 hearing testimony that the “power company’s money will win” 
had come to pass.  Lawyers and lawmakers seeking to justify this decision that 
favored Montana Power over popular sentiment and environmental concerns 
argued that the environmental review process required under Montana law was 
not a “popularity contest” or “voting process.” This argument became a virtual 
cliché as more and more unpopular, environmentally damaging proposals were 
approved by state authorities.
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Despite this setback, Northern Plains did not give up on the democratic 
process.  In June of that year, the electric utility consortium proposing to build the 
two new, larger plants, referred to as “Units 3 and 4” or “Colstrip 3 and 4,” began 
the process of applying for new permits under several state and federal regulatory 
laws, including Montana’s new Utility Siting Act passed that year, the Montana 
Air Quality Act, and the federal Clean Air Act.  New permits required new 
environmental reviews and hearings to gather public comment from 1973 to 1975.  
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Responding to growing concern surrounding strip mining, the state Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) announced that it would make an 
unprecedented effort to gather public comment before it made its 
recommendations to the politically-appointed Board of Natural Resources and 
Conservation, which would decide the fate of the proposed plants.  Beginning in 
November, the DNRC began a round of hearings in nineteen Montana 
communities, ranging from the state’s major cities of Missoula and Billings to 
small agricultural towns like Plains and Ovando in the west and Ashland, Hardin, 
and Forsyth in the east.  At each hearing, the DNRC presented a slideshow 
summarizing the draft environmental impact statement for the proposed Colstrip 3 
and 4 plants and then opened the meeting for public comments.  The agency did 
not entertain questions from the public about the project or questioning between 
those providing comment but it recorded the statement of every speaker and 
promised to address their concerns in the final environmental impact statement.
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 Northern Plains made every effort to turn out as many members and 
concerned residents to the hearings as possible.  In its newsletter, it implored 
members “don’t be bashful!” about attending the hearings.  It then provided 
detailed descriptions of the likely arguments members would encounter from 
supporters of the proposed plants and offered points to counter those arguments.  
In the months between the issuance of the air quality permit for Colstrip 1 and 2 
by the Department of Health and the announcement of Montana Power’s intent to 
build two more larger plants, Northern Plains had refined its strategies for fighting 
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the power plant.  In the process, they developed new arguments against the 
Colstrip project and incorporated those into their critiques of the proposed 
building of units 3 and 4 during the DNRC hearings.
93
   
The first front which Northern Plains sought to attack was the issue of 
electricity transmission.  The entire Colstrip proposal was designed with the intent 
of shipping “coal over wire” in the form of electricity for sale to the Pacific 
Northwest.  To transport the electricity to Spokane, Seattle, and Portland, 
Montana Power proposed to build two 500 kilovolt transmission lines.  Each 
would be carried by giant steel towers that marched side by side for hundreds of 
miles from Colstrip over the Continental Divide to Hot Springs, Montana, and 
then from there into Idaho, Washington, and Oregon—cutting through public and 
private land along the way.  The company proposed to negotiate use of the right-
of-ways with landowners but if farmers and ranchers refused to allow the lines to 
cross their land, Montana Power could use the power of eminent domain to force 
their way across.  Northern Plains understood that if they could cut off the means 
of transporting the electricity to market, they would remove the impetus for 
building the plants.  In addition, they understood that the eminent domain issue 
associated with powerlines had the potential to attract new members and allies to 
their cause and increase their political power in the state numerically and 
geographically.  As early as late 1973, they set out organizing landowners and 
concerned residents along the proposed line from Rosebud County to Missoula.  
By December of 1974, several new affiliate groups were organized and 
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confronting Montana Power about its transmission plans including the Central 
Yellowstone Valley Association east of Billings and the Broadview Landowners 
Association forty miles northwest and new members were joining weekly 
bringing with them stories of Montana Power’s land agents, United Field 
Services, who were threatening to use eminent domain against landowners 
reluctant to allow power lines on their properties.
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Map produced by the Northern Plains Staff from the April-May, 1973 edition of 
The Plains Truth showing the transmission line routes from Colstrip to Hot 
Springs, Montana.  “Federal Legislation,” The Plains Truth, Vol. 2, No. 4, April-
May, 1973. 
 
As new members came into the organization, and the board and staff 
began more fully to understand what was being proposed at Colstrip, they 
expanded their critique beyond simply protecting the land and water of those 
living adjacent to the proposed facilities—mines, plants, or power lines—to a 
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critique of the economics of the project and its long-term costs to what members 
abstractly referred to as “community”—the social fabric of the state.  They argued 
that although Montana Power and Peabody had promised that the Colstrip project 
would be an economic boon for the region, it was already placing increasing 
demand on local police, highway maintenance and construction, health care 
agencies, county governments and especially school districts.  “If the benefits 
from increased population and employment, ‘increased county tax base,’ and 
increased tax revenue from the Energy companies are to be derived from the 
development of coal, they are not coming quickly enough to balance the drain 
upon the county by service delivery,” the group wrote in its January 1974 
newsletter.  As an example, they pointed to the Forsyth elementary school, 
located in the Rosebud countyseat thirty miles north of Colstrip, which witnessed 
an increased enrollment of eleven percent during the 1972-1973 school year due 
to an influx of construction and railroad workers moving into the community; the 
high school grew almost twenty percent in the same year.  As a result, the town 
had to apply for $35,000 worth of emergency appropriations from the state’s 
general fund to cover increased costs associated with the new students.
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Additionally, Northern Plains members increasingly questioned the impact 
that Colstrip 3 and 4, in conjunction with the previous plants and mine-mouth 
generation and coal gasification projects proposed for Birney, Decker, and Sarpy 
Creek and their associated strip mines would have on water resources in the 
region.  As early as July 1973, the group warned its members that the US Bureau 
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of Reclamation had already received requests for more than two and a half million 
acre-feet of Yellowstone River water a year from strip mine and energy 
companies.  Of that amount, Montana Power requested almost 200,000 acre-feet 
for Colstrip 1 and 2.  This prompted a group of agricultural and recreational water 
users, including the Tongue-Yellowstone Sugarbeetgowers, Buffalo Rapids 
Irrigation Project, the Custer Rod and Gun Club, and Trout Unlimited, to petition 
the Federal Power Commission to accept jurisdiction over regulating water use by 
the proposed plant.  The groups feared what the appropriation of so much water 
by the power plants would mean for downstream water users with long-held water 
rights and for fish habitat.  In late 1973 and January of 1974, energy companies 
applied to appropriate an additional half-million acre feet of Yellowstone basin 
water bringing the total to 3.3 million acre feet per year from a river whose flow 
dropped below 2.6 million acre feet per year one out of every four years In an 
attempt to address the potential shortfalls, the federal Bureau of Reclamation 
proposed to build a series of dams that would store water during high flow 
seasons for use during periods of low flow.  In the September 1973 report of its 
water work group as part of the Bureau’s Northern Great Plains Resource 
Program, the descendant of the North Central Power Study, which was abandoned 
by the Bureau in 1972 due to harsh criticism from congressmen from western 
states, emphasized that “it is not correct to state that the area is water short…there 
are seasonal surpluses to all existing uses within each tributary basin.”  The 
agency’s report forecast that increased federal funding for future irrigation 
projects was unlikely, and that the lands of the Northern Plains region were in a 
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transition from agricultural to industrial use.  “There is now a flourish of strip 
mining for export and planning is progressing on new generation stations,” it 
wrote.  “Water filings are being made, and older irrigation water rights are being 
purchased for conversion to industrial uses.”  Reflecting a conservation ideology 
of resource maximization, documented by historian Paul Hirt as part of a 
bureaucratic “conspiracy of optimism” that dominated federal resource 
management during the 1940s and 1950s but began to disintegrate by the 1970s, 
the Bureau reiterated the plans of the North Central Power Study to dam portions 
of every major river and tributary in the region, to maximize use of the region’s 
water supplies.  Residents did not share the Bureau’s optimism.  The Yellowstone 
Basin Water Use Association—organized from many of the water user groups 
who had petitioned the Federal Energy Commission the previous year—worked 
with Northern Plains to advocate a three year moratorium on appropriating any 
more water in the basin for future energy projects (excluding Colstrip 1 and 2, but 
including units 3 and 4) in the legislature in 1974.  With predictions of the life 
blood of the region drying up, the legislature passed the moratorium by huge 
margins—65-18 in the House and unanimously in the Senate.96    
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Finally, Northern Plains’ arguments against the proposed Colstrip power 
plants reflected a growing recognition that the project needed to be considered in 
view of other industrial developments within the region.  Although the outcome 
left them unsatisfied, they had successfully pushed the Department of Health to 
conduct an environmental review for Colstrip 1 and 2 but a comprehensive 
examination of how the coal boom would transform the region had yet to be 
conceived.  In June of 1973, the group joined the Montana League of 
Conservation Voters, the League of Women Voters of both Montana and South 
Dakota, the Montana Wilderness Association, the National Wildlife Federation, 
and the Sierra Club in a lawsuit to enjoin the US Department of the Interior and 
various agencies within it from any further activities related to coal development 
in the region until a comprehensive regional environmental impact statement was 
completed as required by the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act.  Without 
such an environmental analysis, which would include examination of the social 
and economic impacts of the entire Northern Plains coal boom, citizens and state 
regulators would be left to assess the impacts of individual projects in isolation.  
Considering the cumulative impacts of several projects at once—a power plant 
and strip mine on Hanging Woman Creek near Birney, another at Decker, both 
using water from the Tongue River as well as the roads and services of that tiny 
agricultural town—would be essential to preventing a classic “tragedy of the 
commons” like that predicted for the Yellowstone River if all the energy 
companies received their water appropriations.
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In addition to seeking a comprehensive, coordinated environmental review 
to provide the basis for decision making that would conserve the region’s natural 
resources and quality of life for the long-term benefit of its residents and 
environment, Northern Plains sensed that a national legislative program to address 
issues of mine permitting and reclamation was necessary.  Otherwise, it would be 
possible for mining companies to play one state off another—for Peabody and 
Westmoreland simply to cross the border into Wyoming or use the threat of 
leaving the state to leverage legislators and regulators to relax Montana’s strip 
mine reclamation and utility siting laws.  On the heels of their legislative victories 
in 1973, Northern Plains began working with similar organizations in other coal 
mining states and the national Environmental Policy Center in Washington DC to 
advance a national reclamation law.  All of this—issues of transmission, air and 
water pollution, economic effects, threats to the region’s social fabric, water 
supply, and the need for a comprehensive regional, and even national legislation, 
informed their arguments as they prepared for the hearings on Colstrip 3 and 4.   
By the time this second round of Colstrip hearings got underway in 1975, 
both opponents and proponents had grown skilled at turning out speakers and 
lining up testimony.  In addition to its company executives and engineers, 
Montana Power recruited construction workers to talk about their hopes that the 
project would mean good-paying stable jobs in the region.  Representatives from 
the statewide and local Chambers of Commerce would also testify about their 
hopes that Colstrip 3 and 4 would expand the “economic base” of the region and 
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espouse the needs of Montana businesses for more electricity.  Before, after, and 
in between, Northern Plains members and concerned residents would testify about 
the threats of the project to land, air, water, their communities and private 
property, and quality of life in the region.  Many of them stressed that the state, 
power companies, and chambers of commerce ought to take into consideration 
that ranches and farms were small-businesses that made up the base of a 
sustainable rural economy in the region and that agriculture should not be 
sacrificed for the benefit of another industry.  Pat Hayworth from near Colstrip 
told the DNRC, “I have grown up and lived on ranches all my life, and I believe I 
have contributed as much to a community as has anyone employed in any other 
type of employment.”  Wally McRae’s niece, Patricia argued for the rights of 
individuals over corporations and warned of possible environmental effects.  “We 
do not know what the plants will do,” she warned the attendees, “We can all make 
our guesses, and the only sure conclusion is that there will be a deterioration of 
the quality of life, our air, our land.”  Brother Ted Cramer from the St. Labre 
Indian School in Ashland echoed McRae and insisted that the rights of 
individuals—ranchers and other landowners—must not be trampled for the 
supposed good of the many.  Wally McRae articulated the issue in terms of the 
“code of the West” and what it meant to be a good neighbor and member of civil 
society and asserted that the power companies were riding roughshod over their 
neighbors.  His brother, Duke, framed the fight against the construction of 
Colstrip 3 and 4 as a battle for his way of life.  This became a typical scene at the 
hearings during their duration in 1975.  After a hearing in Forsyth, author Michael 
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Parfit commented that the ranchers learned the routine so well, they sometimes 
“made the whole exercise seem too much like a game.”  Despite their differences, 
in these early years of the conflict, the landowners and company officials 
sometimes even carpooled with each other to the hearings.  This changed as the 
battle morphed into a prolonged war of attrition that lasted to the end of the 
decade.
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 Over the next four years, Montanans navigated through a contentious and 
confusing political landscape as various state and federal agencies and the courts 
considered the fate of Colstrip 3 and 4. Statewide public opinion, which had been 
more or less split on the issue of the first two, smaller, plants swung widely when 
the expansion was proposed.  The promise of jobs and state tax revenues initially 
wowed the business communities and politicians of cities like Billings, Miles 
City, Helena and Missoula.  But the threats that the plants, in conjunction with the 
other projects in the state, could dry up the free-flowing Yellowstone river 
combined with dire predictions of air pollution, degraded groundwater, and 
industrialization of rural landscapes and communities swung public opinion in 
opposition.  In addition to attempting to undermine Colstrip 3 and 4 through 
organizing along the transmission line routes that would carry energy to their 
customers, Northern Plains began to challenge the economics of the proposal.  As 
they waded into the complicated technicalities of how much electricity Montana 
actually needed, how much Colstrip electricity would be sold to out-of-state 
                                                 
98“Colstrip Hearings: DON’T BE BASHFUL!,” The Plains Truth, vol. 3, no. 12, December 1974; 
“Hearings to open on Colstrip complex,” The Tri City Herald (Kennewick, Washington), 20 May 
1975; Parfit, 6, 88-90, 155-165.  
  131 
buyers and how much Montana Power was going to have to increase the rates 
paid by Montana customers to subsidize the construction of Colstrip 3 and 4, the 
issue was thrust before the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) which was 
responsible for regulating “public utilities” like electric power, telephone, water, 
and gas companies.  This added yet another layer of government bureaucracy, 
public oversight, and a potential venue for Northern Plains to flex its newfound 
power.  At the same time that the publicly elected commissioners of the PSC were 
considering the issue, Northern Plains and its allies, including the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe, successfully sued Montana Power and the state for violating the 
Clean Air Act.  As a result, Montana Power was required to install “scrubbers” in 
the power plants to reduce air pollution. The battle continued until September 
1979 when, despite many victories for the Northern Plains Resource Council in 
the courts, the EPA and state approved the construction of the plants.
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The Coal Boom Moves North 
 
 While the fight over Colstrip continued, reports trickled into the little 
office in the Stapleton Building in Billings of land men canvassing a new part of 
the state.  But this time, they were not targeting the ranch county of rolling pine 
and juniper covered Bull Mountains or hardscrabble draws and scoria bluffs of 
Rosebud, Hanging Woman, or Sarpy Creeks.  In 1974, the new objective was coal 
underlying the rolling wheat country of McCone County, in central-eastern 
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Montana between the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers.  In the spring of 1974, 
representatives of the coal exploration company Norseworthy and Reeger, based 
In Billings, began the process of organizing the construction of a strip mine and 
power plant near Circle, Montana.
100
    
Although the threat was similar—the destruction of private property by 
strip mining, reduction in the water supply and degradation of water quality and 
industrialization of the region’s rural farming landscape and communities—the 
situation differed from those in the Bull Mountains or the southeastern part of the 
state.  McCone County was predominantly wheat country characterized by 
enormous farms that measured in the tens of thousands of acres.  It was possible 
to drive for hours on dirt roads in straight lines surrounded by a sea of green or 
golden wheat interrupted only by the occasional mail box, crossroads, or tractor.  
Houses, outbuildings, and combines floated like distant atolls on the crests of 
giant, slowly undulating swells of earth.  Many wheat farmers also engaged in 
ranching, raising cattle and sheep intermittently or in addition to their farming 
operations, but farming was their primary occupation.   
Unlike their distant neighbors in Rosebud county, the wheat farming 
families of McCone County farmed on homesteads that dated back only to the 
1910s or 1920s, decades  later then the ranchers in the south.  Homesteading 
federal land or farming on land purchased over the years from the Northern 
Pacific Railroad (later Burlington Northern), almost none of them owned the 
minerals beneath their farms.  Their families—with names like Yarger, Waller, 
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Quick, and Breitbach—had migrated into the state from the farming communities 
of the upper Midwest and carried with them religious and cultural traditions from 
that rural region and northern Europe.  In the late 19
th
 century, their ancestors had 
been the leaders of the populist farm/labor movement—the Grange and the 
People’s Party.  In the early twentieth century, they organized cooperative 
farming and agricultural marketing institutions that drew accusations of socialism 
and communism.  The ones who weathered the Depression did so by relying on 
tight networks of family, kin, and community.  In issues of family and religion, 
they were steadfastly conservative, but they often sought communal solutions to 
threats posed by a fluctuating global agricultural market and what they viewed as 
unfair practices by the railroad and grain companies that transported and marketed 
their produce.  In the 1960s, Circle-area farmers—Helen Waller and Bob 
Breitbach—helped form the Montana auxiliary of the National Farmers 
Organization to create cooperative elevators to withhold grain until prices reached 
a point that it was beneficial for the community to sell.  The “code of the West” 
that made Wally McRae and his neighbors so uncomfortable in organizing against 
Peabody and Montana Power in Rosebud County had a much lighter hold on the 
wheat country of the northeast.
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One spring day in 1974, Helen and Gordon Waller who farmed a large 
wheat ranch northwest of Circle, were visited by one of the coal company land 
men of Norseworthy and Reeger.  The land man had done his research.  He knew 
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the boundaries of the Waller’s land and he knew the invisible boundaries of the 
thousands of acres of mineral estate that lay beneath it and that those minerals 
were owned by the Burlington Northern Railroad or the federal government.  He 
explained this to Helen and Gordon and asked for permission to “use” their 
surface property to mine the coal.  Helen remembered years later her instincts 
about the proposition, “it was real troubling to me, after having farmed for as 
many years as we had, to think that we would not continue to preserve the land 
for agricultural use.”  About the same time, land men approached Tom Breitbach, 
who farmed and ran cattle and a cattle feed plant southwest of Circle along with 
his two brothers, who lived on adjacent farms.  Helen’s cousin, Lyle Quick, was 
also approached, as were their neighbors to the south, the Yargers.  They had read 
in the newspapers over the past few years about the struggles of the Charters, 
Pfisters, and Tullys in the Bull Mountains and the McRaes, Aldersons, Hayes, 
McKinneys, and Reddings along Rosebud, Hanging Woman, and Sarpy creeks in 
the southern part of the state.  Now it appeared that the coal boom had drifted 
north.  Burlington Northern planned to mine tracts of coal underlying their 
ranches west of Circle to provide fuel for a new coal-fired power plant.  They 
promised hundreds of construction and mining jobs, a boom for the local tax base, 
and, to sweeten the proposition for area farmers and ranchers, reliable irrigation 
water piped in from the dammed Missouri River to the north.  The coal plant 
would need to build a pipeline to provide water from Fort Peck Lake to turn into 
steam to turn its turbines—they would build the pipeline large enough to transport 
extra water into the area for dryland farmers who eked by on less than 14 inches 
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of precipitation a year.  Irrigation was a dream for many farmers, whose families 
had weathered periodic droughts during their half-century on the land, but was it 
worth the cost?
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The Wallers, Breitbachs, Quicks and Yargers were suspicious.  Helen and 
Gordon were not particularly political.  Helen had served as chair and local 
representative of the Republican Central Committee but had been more involved 
in volunteering and singing for her church than in state politics.   They had been 
loosely following the events in the southeastern part of the state—they identified 
with the Charters and McRaes.  Irrigation water or not, they were suspicious that 
the proposed Circle power plant was another Colstrip, and they feared what that 
might mean for their home.  To understand what was being proposed, Gordon and 
a few other farmers from Circle travelled to Colstrip and met with Wally McRae.  
They were appalled by the scale of the strip mines, what appeared to their minds 
as the destruction of productive agricultural land, and what was still proposed for 
the region.  They learned from McRae that ranchers had organized a new group to 
fight Colstrip and how to get in touch with Northern Plains.  The Wallers had seen 
the group’s newsletter but had not considered joining until that point.  When the 
Circle farmers returned home, they organized a meeting in town and decided to 
send a representative to the next meeting of the Northern Plains board.  After 
hearing McRae’s stories about Colstrip and reading about what was happening in 
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the Bull Mountains in the newspaper, the Circle farmers reasoned that the only 
defense to the coal company tactics of divide and conquer was to unite their 
efforts.  “We knew we were going to be picked off if we were just lone rangers 
out here,” Helen remembered.  They quickly formed the McCone Agricultural 
Protective Association and petitioned the Northern Plains board to affiliate with 
the larger organization.
103
  
McCone County became another theater in to the prolonged battle against 
the coal boom, leading to the geographic and numeric expansion of the Northern 
Plains membership base.  Helen Waller, Charlie Yarger, Lyle Quick and Tom 
Breitbach joined the growing cadre of leaders and spokespeople able to bring new 
pressure on legislators from the northeastern and central parts of the state.  Along 
with the new affiliate in McCone County, wheat ranchers and concerned residents 
around Glendive, east of Circle at the confluence of the Yellowstone and Missouri 
rivers where coal and power companies proposed yet more mines and a power 
plant, formed another affiliate. From the Glendive area came stalwart critics of the 
coal boom Louise Cross, Irene Moffett, and Dena Hoff.  To better track and 
organize opposition to new proposals in far-eastern Montana, Northern Plains 
opened a second office in Glendive in November of 1975.  The expansion of 
Northern Plains to include the majority of eastern Montana and a line of members 
in affiliate organizations along the Colstrip transmission route catapulted the 
regional organization to one of the leading conservation groups in the state in very 
short amount of time and bolstering its credibility with the legislature and 
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governor and also with the state’s congressmen.  This growth laid the path for 
federal legislation.
104
 
 
“Cowgirls [and Cowboys] in the Capitol”: The Campaign for a 
Federal Strip Mining Bill 
 
The Circle proposal added to the rising concern within the region about 
the threats posed by the coal boom and added impetus to calls for a 
comprehensive study and federal legislation.  Montana’s congressional delegation 
was made up of the powerful Democratic senators Mike Mansfield and Lee 
Metcalf and Montana’s sole-congressman, Democrat John Melcher.  They were 
sensitive to what was going on in the state.  Mansfield, Metcalf and Melcher, like 
their Democratic colleagues in the state capitol, drew support from the state’s 
powerful mining unions and could hardly resist pressure from the Anaconda and 
Montana Power Companies.  But the dramatic changes proposed in the North 
Central Power Study alarmed the congressmen like other politicians in the state.  
The threats the coal boom posed Montana’s agricultural economy and quality of 
life attracted Mansfield, Metcalf, and Melcher to new articulations of value for the 
natural environment—an essential element of “the last best place.”  In October of 
1972, railing from congressional criticism of the North Central Power Study, the 
Department of the Interior shelved the document and morphed its findings and 
proposals into a regional study process titled the Northern Great Plains Resource 
Program (NGPRP). Like the North Central Power Study,  the NGPRP proposed 
bringing together stake-holders and experts from the coal mining industry, federal 
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and state agencies, environmentalists, and landowners.  Unlike the conventional 
environmental impact statement requested by Montana environmentalists the 
following year, which was meant to inform agency decision making of 
environmental impacts before the damage was done, the NGPRP would attempt to 
study future impacts while strip mines, power plants, dams and all necessary 
infrastructure were being built.  Representative Melcher slammed the proposal a 
day after it was introduced.  He called the study a farce if Congress failed first to 
pass strong provisions for strip-mine reclamation before mining commenced.   In 
December 1972, Mansfield and Metcalf joined other Senators in voting for a 
resolution calling for a moratorium on expanded strip mining in Montana until a 
comprehensive study was completed.  When the Department of Interior and 
Nixon administration dismissed the resolution on the grounds that current laws 
adequately addressed the issues the senators were concerned with, the senators 
cited a recent study from the General Accounting Office, which found that 
supervision and enforcement of coal leasing was lax at best.  By early 1973, 
Montana’s congressional delegation understood that despite their protests, the 
Department of the Interior planned to allow extensive development of coal mining 
without conducting any kind of meaningful comprehensive study of the 
environmental impacts of the coal boom.  Directed by President Nixon to increase 
domestic coal production , the Department ignored their calls for a moratorium on 
leasing and mining until a study was completed.  Mansfield, Metcalf, and Melcher 
joined the growing group of congressmen led by delegations from Appalachia 
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who had been fighting strip mining since the late 1960s, believing that passing 
federal legislation to regulate the boom was the only solution.
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Northern Plains members and staff had entertained the idea of federal 
legislation from their very early beginnings.  The group had experience lobbying 
in Washington from its earliest involvement with the coal issue.  In 1971, Bull 
Mountain ranchers Anne Charter, Ellen Pfister Withers, and Vera Beth Johnson, 
traveled to Washington, DC, to testify at a House hearing on strip mining 
regulation aided Senator Metcalf and Wyoming Senator Cliff Hansen—a 
supporter of the coal industry, but long-time friend of Anne’s husband Boyd.  In 
her autobiography, Charter referred to the trip as “Cowgirls in the Capitol,” and 
area newspapers reporting on the trip remarked on the uniqueness of the women’s 
trip to Washington.  As unconventional lobbyists as the women may have been, 
they made an impression and laid the ground for a lasting relationship between 
the organization, Montana’s congressional delegation, and congressmen and 
senators from other states who would prove invaluable in promoting a federal 
strip mining reclamation and regulation law.  Perhaps equally important as 
creating personal relationships with powerful members of important committees, 
Charter, Pfister and Johnson connected with the Washington-based 
Environmental Policy Center, headed by Louise Dunlap, who was organizing 
opponents of strip mining across the country into the Coalition Against Strip 
Mining.  As part of their trip back east, the women attended the National 
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Conference on Strip Mining sponsored by Democratic congressmen Fred Harris 
of West Virginia in Middleboro, Kentucky.  At the meeting, they came in direct 
contact with the ravages of strip mining in Appalachia and with miners who had 
come to the conference with the intent of breaking it up.  No disturbances ensued, 
and the women returned to Montana emboldened as members of a growing 
national movement for strong federal strip mine regulation.
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Over the next two years, Dunlap, the Environmental Policy Center, and 
the Coalition Against Strip Mining continued to organize advocates for federal 
strip mine regulation and reclamation from Washington, DC  Throughout 1972 
and 1973, they recruited Northern Plains members to return to the Capitol to 
lobby congressmen.  Charter made several more trips accompanied by Pfister, 
Wally McRae, and Carolyn and Irving Alderson.  After the successful passage of 
the Montana Surface Mine Reclamation Act in the Montana State Legislature in 
1973, Northern Plains decided to focus more of its efforts on passing national 
legislation.  In the summer of 1973, the group elected to send staffer Pat Sweeney 
to the national capital on a semi-permanent basis to work as Northern Plains’s 
lobbyist to work with Dunlap and the Environmental Policy Center to promote a 
federal bill.  Sweeney took the newly passed Montana act with him.
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Sweeney arrived in Washington at a time when coal strip mining politics 
was shifting decidedly toward the West and away from a ban on strip mining and 
toward stricter regulation and reclamation.  It is important to note that large-scale 
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strip mining began in Appalachia a decade before it was proposed in the West.  
Because of land ownership patterns, geography, rainfall, and a century-long 
history of coal extraction, the issues surrounding coal strip mining in West 
Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio and Pennsylvania were very 
different from those in the West, and so were the politics.  Most of the people 
living in the areas proposed for strip mining in Appalachia had long-ties to 
underground coal mining.  They were workingclass people who often lived on 
land owned by coal companies—they owned neither their houses, nor the land 
they sat on, or the coal beneath them.  Living in the valleys below the mines, they 
were the backbone of the United Mine Workers in the region, and they were 
Democrats.  The transition to strip mining spurred by increased demand and 
higher prices for coal and enabled by new earth-moving technologies presented 
real threats to the environment and worker health, livelihood, and lives.  Strip 
mining removed coal more efficiently with far fewer workers than underground 
mining and those workers were usually non-union.  When the “overburden” of the 
mines—the topsoil and rock overlying coal seams—was removed, it was placed 
below the mine on steep slopes clear cut of all timber prior to mining. On multiple 
occasions, prolonged periods of rain or heavy storms—typical in this moist 
climate—saturated the overburden which burst through hastily built earthen 
retaining dams and cascaded down the mountainsides into the valleys below 
regardless of  what or who was in its way.  This prompted Representative Ken 
Hechler of West Virginia to introduce a ban on strip mining in 1971, which 
garnered seventy three cosponsors in the House from twenty four states but failed 
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to pass.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Appalachian state legislatures and 
governors, closely tied to both coal mining companies and the United Mine 
Workers, struggled to pass strip mining regulations to prevent such destruction 
while allowing mining to proceed.  Strip mining regulation and reclamation laws 
were passed in some of the Appalachian states, but they were weak, their 
enforcement programs underfunded and subject to political whims and pressure 
from coal companies.  Despite these state-level laws, the problems remained.  The 
introduction of the North Central Power Study, with its emphasis on coal 
development in the West, added the new issues associated with split surface and 
mineral estate ownership and reclamation, new advocates for legislation and new 
congressional leadership to the debate.  By 1973, Montana Senator Mansfield was 
majority leader of the Senate and Senator Metcalf was chair of the Senate Mining 
Committee, while Representative Melcher sat on the House Natural Resources 
Committee.  Sweeney and Northern Plains, along with the membership of the 
newly-formed Powder River Basin Resource Council in Wyoming found 
themselves at the forefront of this expanded strip mining issue.
108
  
                                                 
108
 “Strip mining expands as prices move up,” The Sun (Baltimore, Maryland), 6 September 1975; 
Chad Montrie chronicles the transition in the coal mining industry from underground mining to 
strip mining from the 1940s to the 1970s, growing opposition to strip mining, the passage of state 
laws to address the environmental, economic, and social issues associated with strip mining in 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky, and attempts by the federal government to address these 
issues.  He demonstrates that in these three states, and also in Tennessee, the attempts of state 
legislatures to regulate strip mining and to enforce regulations was rarely effective and heavily 
influenced by the coal mining industry, partly prompting opponents to purse federal legislation; 
See Chad Montrie, To Save The Land and People: A History of Opposition to Surface Coal 
Mining in Appalachia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 128, 138-153, 187; 
Stephen L. Fisher, ed., Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of Resistance and Change 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 20. 
  143 
From their shared offices on C-Street near Pennsylvania Avenue in 
Washington, Dunlap and Sweeney, along with lobbyists John McCormick of the 
Environmental Policy Center and Brock Evans of the Sierra Club, wrote the first 
draft of the Surface Control and Reclamation Act in late 1973.  On Northern 
Plains’ behalf, Sweeney introduced three objectives for the legislation, two of 
which were integral in the Montana legislation.  The first was meant to address 
the issue of surface owner consent—giving landowners a say in how, when, and if 
coal mines operated on their property when they were extracting minerals owned 
by someone other than the surface owner.  This profoundly western issue echoed 
a primary concern for Northern Plains’ ranching and farming members—losing 
control of their property and livelihood.  The second objective was providing a 
regulation and reclamation process that would require the creation of transparent 
and publicly accessible permitting program in which the public (including 
environmental organizations) had the opportunity to review the details of the 
proposed project, its scope and environmental impacts, and then provide 
comments on the proposal and appeal the agency permitting decisions.  
Reclamation, with standards concerning to what degree of agricultural 
productivity the land must be returned including returning the land to its 
“approximate original contour” and restoring the “hydrologic balance” of area 
water resources, was to be required as part of the mining plan.  Lastly, Sweeney 
introduced a new provision that was specific to the Montana situation but would 
be used extensively by citizens in other regions to protect “special places” from 
coal mining.  The “lands unsuitable for mining” provision was meant to ban 
  144 
mining in the Custer National Forest, the only national forest in the eastern part of 
the state and a favorite recreation site for many residents, an area in which many 
Northern Plains members either had leases to graze cattle or adjacent property.
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 As the ink from Governor Thomas Judge’s pen was drying on Montana 
Surface Mine Reclamation Act back in Helena, the U.S. Senate and House were 
considering national versions of the legislation in Washington.  The 
Environmental Policy Center had been working with a collection of citizens 
groups from Kentucky, West Virginia, and Tennessee, in addition to the 
newcomers from the West, to identify sponsors who could work a strong bill 
through congress to the President’s desk.  Their priority sponsors were senators 
and representatives from western states that possessed substantial coal reserves 
who sat on the House or Senate committees that would serve as the primary venue 
for considering mining bills.  In the House, this included Representative Morris 
Udall from Arizona, site of the expanding Black Mesa Coal mine and proposed 
giant Navajo generating station.  In the Senate, they fostered a relationship with 
Montana Senator Lee Metcalf  and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, also 
of Montana, both of whom had criticized the coal boom.  They ultimately tied 
their fate, however, to powerful senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson from Washington 
State who sat on the Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs and had 
championed landmark environmental laws including the National Environmental 
Policy Act. Meanwhile, the Nixon Administration, which increasingly promoted 
coal as central component of its energy agenda, realized that strip mining was a 
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growing national environmental concern for the public.  If coal strip mining was 
going to make the United States energy independent, then it would have to be at 
least minimally regulated or, as Ken Hechler’s narrowly defeated attempts to 
prohibit strip mining had shown, public opinion might be sufficient to ban it 
altogether.  With this in mind, the Administration introduced its own language 
and also recruited Jackson to carry it.  In the House, strip mining opponents 
recruited Republican Representative John Saylor from Pennsylvania to introduce 
and carry a version of their strip mine regulation and reclamation bill.
110
     
 The bills introduced by Senator Jackson, the Administration, and 
Representative Saylor in 1973 represented three general positions in the national 
debate over strip mining and how to regulate and mitigate its effects.  The process 
of passing federal strip mining legislation moved between these three poles.   The 
first, represented by Saylor’s H.R. 5988 in 1973, was the environmentalists’ 
option with specific and stringent requirements for permitting, regulation, 
reclamation, and coal company bonding for damages and opportunities for citizen 
participation and enforcement of the law and standards through citizen suits.  
Under this option, the law would be implemented by the states under the watchful 
eye of an agency within the US Department of Interior.  Saylor’s bill also 
included Northern Plains’ highest priority provisions including requiring consent 
of the surface owner in split-estate situations, citizen participation and right to sue 
during the permitting, mining, and reclamation process, and a provision allowing 
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the Secretary of the Interior to ban strip mining on lands deemed “unsuitable for 
mining.”111   
At the other end of the spectrum was the Administration’s bill, introduced 
as S. 923 and sponsored by Sen. Jackson in the Senate and as H.R. 3 in the House.  
The Administration bill left enforcement of permitting and reclamation standards 
up to the states except where the federal government controlled both the surface 
and underground property (i.e. certain tracts of public land such as national forest 
or those managed by the Bureau of Land Management).  The bill did not required 
a permit from mine operators until an acceptable state or federal program was 
created allowing mining companies to operate for  up to even seven and a half 
years largely without the government and citizen oversight and review.  The 
Administration bill solved this potential problem by requiring a permit for 
prospecting and mining that was good for the life of the mining operation but 
provided no specific application requirements.  In contrast to the Saylor bill, the 
performance standards contained in the bill were ambiguous and general.  Perhaps 
most disturbing to environmentalists, the Administration bill contained no 
provisions requiring the states to carry out reviews or provide public notices of 
permitting decisions or hearings.  It provided no language to address the issue of 
landowner consent and no provisions providing for citizen lawsuits against coal 
mine operators or state and federal agencies for failure to comply with the law.  
Lastly, it included no language providing for the reclamation of unreclaimed or 
abandoned mines—an important issue for coal mining communities in 
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Appalachia—except to allow mine operators to depart from certain reclamation 
performance standards if the cost of reclaiming an area mined before the passage 
of the act was financially impractical.
112
   
The final proposal,  the “Surface Mining Reclamation Act of 1973,” S. 
425, also sponsored by Senator Jackson, lay somewhere between the two 
extremes.  Similar to the Administration bill, it left primary enforcement of 
mining and reclamation permitting and regulations with the state but with federal 
oversight by an agency within the Department of the Interior.  It also required 
permits within 15 months of the bill’s enactment instead of four and a half to 
seven and a half years.  Until that time, the bill enacted a moratorium on all new 
surface coal mining unless the mines were the only sources of coal for electric or 
metallurgical plants or if a contract to supply coal was made before enactment.  
Unlike the Administration bill, it provided detailed requirements for the 
permitting process and a performance bond to pay for reclamation.  Its 
reclamation requirements were similar to Saylor’s bill except that it allowed for 
the retention of highwalls, spoilbanks, and water impoundments at the end of the 
mining operations if they were deemed stable—a point of contention for citizens 
in Appalachia and the West.  Like Saylor’s bill, it included provisions to remove 
lands deemed unsuitable for mining and required the written consent of surface 
owners in split-estate situations before mining could commence.  The Surface 
Mine Reclamation Act of 1973included provisions requiring public participation 
equivalent to those in Saylor’s bill but it lacked a provision allowing citizens to 
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sue to enforce the law.  In the House, the Coalition Against Strip Mining, 
Environmental Policy Center, Northern Plains, and Sierra Club worked with 
Arizona Representative Morris Udall to sponsor a comparable bill in H.R. 11500. 
In addition to these four bills, at least eight more were introduced in the House 
and Senate in 1973 and 1974 that fell somewhere within the spectrum
 
.
113
 
By the end of the 93
rd
 Congress in the spring of 1974, various parts of 
many of these bills were amended in to Jackson’s S. 425 and Udall’s H.R. 11500 
as it became clear that these were the pieces of legislation with the best chance of 
passage.  Northern Plains and the Environmental Policy Center continued to lobby 
for provisions that would create an effective permitting and reclamation program 
that protected surface owners in split estate situations, required transparency and 
citizen participation in decision making,  and preserved the ability of the 
Department of Interior to prohibit mining in areas of special concern like 
Montana’s Custer National Forest and were able to get all of them into these bills 
in some form.  They then threw their support and all of their professional and 
citizen lobbying power behind both measures.  Their efforts paid off in the fall of 
1974.  During the floor debates, Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate 
Majority leader, who had been invited to tour the ranches of Rosebud County and 
Birney, and whom the Charters, Pfisters, McRaes, and Aldersons had lobbied 
personally and through countless letters and telegrams, brought Northern Plains’ 
position to the Senate floor in the debate over S. 425.  Employing romantic 
rhetoric that conjured up the mythic Western frontier, the senior Senator from 
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Montana told the body, “I rise to speak not only about the coal situation in 
general, but also about a minority of the population in the state which I have the 
honor and the privilege to represent, a minority also in the Dakotas and in the 
state of Wyoming, a minority which usually votes Republican, a minority which 
is entitled to consideration, and a minority which, in many respects, comprises the 
last of the rugged individuals in this country.”  He stressed that the cattle ranchers 
and wheat farmers of the Northern Plains had homesteaded the land before, 
during, and after the era of the railroads and that their investment in the land 
should not be sacrificed for coal development.  He then went on state the case of 
these “last of the rugged individuals” again drawing on frontier themes.  “They 
want the fresh air to remain.  They want to have a say about whether the 
subsurface rights on the land which they occupied and developed is or is not 
going to be subject to some…force outside the families which developed this 
land.”  Mansfield’s leadership helped carry the issue through the Senate.  
Meanwhile, Udall’s H.R. 11500 passed through the House and the two were 
reconciled through a conference committee in the fall of 1974 and combined as a 
single bill under S 425.  Almost two years after its introduction, the Surface 
Mining Reclamation Act of 1973 passed out of both the Senate and House in mid-
December, 1974 and was on its way to the White House for President Gerald 
Ford’s signature.  The administration, however, heeded the protestations of 
groups like the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association which 
described the bill as death to their industry by “slow strangulations.” Despite the 
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hundreds of phone calls and telegrams from concerned citizens across the county, 
on December 30, the President quietly killed the bill through a pocket veto.
114
  
 Ford’s veto was disappointing to members of the Coalition and Northern 
Plains.  However disillusioning it was, the language of the bill itself, reflecting 
months of compromise between sponsors and stakeholders and hundreds of hours 
of research by the Environmental Policy Center, Coalition, Sierra Club, and 
Northern Plains, remained intact.  The mechanisms that had been created to turn 
out phone calls and telegrams from citizens to members of Congress and the 
President remained in place.  The paid lobbyists of the organizations were more 
seasoned and the citizen lobbyists emerged in early 1975 energized and 
committed to pass the legislation again.  The acceleration of the Colstrip issue and 
organization of citizens along the Colstrip transmission routes in Montana and the 
proposed mine and power plant in Circle, and the organization by Northern Plains 
of a similar organization in Wyoming provided even more citizen activists 
representing a broader portion of the region’s constituency to pressure politicians.  
President Ford announced an expanded version of his predecessor’s “Project 
Independence,” including the construction of 200 new nuclear power plants, 250 
new coal mines, 150 new coal-fired power plants, 20 new synthetic fuel plants 
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which would convert coal to gasoline, and 30 new oil refineries as part of his 
State of the Union Message in January, 1975.  Northern Plains responded by 
ramping up its efforts.
115
  
  When the new Congress began in January 1975, with substantially larger 
Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate, Northern Plains and its allies 
in the Coalition Against Strip Mining (now cleverly referring to themselves as the 
“COALition”) debated strategy.  The groups, and their allies in Congress, decided 
to reintroduce the bill.  Attesting to the support for regulating strip mining and 
creating a system of reclamation, twenty-two bills were introduced in the 94
th
 
session of Congress.   Of these, the two that emerged as the most promising were 
Representative Morris Udall’s “Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,” 
H.R. 25 and a Senate version of the same bill again sponsored by Senator Henry 
Jackson of Washington, S. 7.  Both were quickly passed by early March of 1975, 
and Jackson’s bill was morphed into Udall’s H.R. 25.  It passed the Senate by 
voice vote and by the House by two votes more than the two-thirds majority 
required to override a presidential veto.  Understanding that he might not be able 
to veto the legislation, President Ford employed Frank Zarb of the Federal Energy 
Administration to lobby against the bill while its two versions were being 
considered in conference committee.  Between the bill’s passage and President 
Ford’s threatened veto, Zarb and the coal-utility industry lobby were able to turn 
five votes.  The House vote to override Fords’ veto failed, 273 to 143, just three 
votes shy of the necessary two-thirds needed.  For a second time, federal strip 
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mining regulation and reclamation legislation languished on the President’s desk.  
It appeared that passage of federal legislation would have to wait for a change in 
the White House.
116
      
 That change came in November 1976, when Georgia’s Democratic 
Governor, James Earl Carter, successfully beat incumbent President Ford in the 
race for President.  The election of 1976 also increased the Democrat’s share of 
seats in the House and Senate resulting in a two-thirds majority in the House and 
a filibuster-proof 61-seat majority in the Senate.  Representative Morris Udall, 
who had championed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act in the 
previous two sessions of Congress and had lost the Democratic presidential 
nomination to Carter, became chair of the House Interior and Insular Affairs 
committee—a prime position from which to control the crafting and passing of 
the strip mining bill through the House.  On January 4, 1977, as the new session 
of Congress opened, Udall reintroduced the language that been agreed upon and 
passed through both houses in 1975.  The COALition and Northern Plains turned 
out hundreds of phone calls and telegrams in support. By April, a large majority 
in the House passed the Udall bill and by mid-May, it was merged with its 
companion bill in the Senate, S. 7, sponsored again by Senator Jackson, and 
passed out of the Senate.  On July 25, it was ready for the President’s signature.  
A little more than a week later, Northern Plains members Carolyn Alderson and 
Art and Marilynn Hays, Jr. of Birney, Gordon and Helen Waller of Circle, and 
                                                 
116
 “Strip Mine Bill,” The Plains Truth, vol. 4, no. 3, May 1975; Helen Thomas, “Ford to Veto 
Mining Bill,” The St. Joseph News-Press, 19 May 1975; “Ford Blocks Strip Mine Bill,” The 
Plains Truth, vol. 4, no. 5, June 1975; “NEWS from WASHINGTON…,” The Plains Truth, vol. 
4, no. 8, October 1975; “Strip Mine Bill Alive!,” The Plains Truth, vol. 4, no. 10, December 1975. 
  153 
now-staff director Pat Sweeney joined members of the COALition, Louise 
Dunlap, sponsors Representative Morris K. Udall and Senator Henry Jackson in 
witnessing President Carter sign the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977 (SMCRA, pronounced “smack-ra”) into law. Now coal mining states, 
mining companies and the citizen memberships and staffs of Northern Plains and 
other similar organizations around the country would have to figure out what it all 
meant.
117
         
 
After SMCRA: 1977-1980 
 At the end of the 1970s, this still relatively young coalition of ranchers, 
farmers and environmentalists, had a lot to reflect upon and a lot to be proud of.  
By the end of 1979, they had fully engaged the coal boom, organizing residents 
around the state in fifteen community-based affiliate organizations and 
maintaining two staffed field offices in Billings and Glendive.  While their 
membership had grown to several thousand, their work was still largely dependent 
on the volunteer work of members.  The staff, which included a paid lobbyist in 
Washington, DC, from late 1973 through mid-1977, had only grown to eleven.  
The rest of the work—turning out members for hearings, comments for 
environmental impact statements and other agency studies, and citizen lobbyists, 
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phone calls, and telegrams to pressure politicians was still largely done by 
volunteers.
118
   
 The group’s tactics in the fight against the coal boom had quickly 
diversified in the early years of their existence from organizing citizens to refuse 
to lease or sell their land for coal development, to demanding state public hearings 
on mine and power plant proposals and  turning out opposition to those meetings, 
to generating letters to the editor in the region’s newspapers, to researching the 
coal leasing situation and educating the public about the scope of the proposed 
boom.  Passing legislation to address issues of split-estate, surface owner 
condemnation, and  reclamation and regulation of power plants, and then 
bolstering those laws, was a primary objective and activity for the organization.  
Like Wally McRae in that 1973 meeting with Wade Rathke, most members 
seemed to think that if they could just pass a good law, the problem would be 
solved.  They soon learned that passing laws was only one part of the solution.  
Making the laws work required persistent citizen oversight and participation in 
permitting and rule-making processes and occasional lawsuits.  Northern Plains 
members instinctively understood that preventing the damages associated with 
massive coal and power developments depended on the ability of citizens to 
review proposed projects and have a say in whether they were allowed to go 
forward and how.  They wrote these provisions into the laws they advocated in 
the 1973 Montana legislative session.  Their experience with these laws informed 
their future thinking regarding how to solve the problems posed by the energy 
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boom and they continued to argue for the ability of citizens to participate.  This 
extended to the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act that was 
finally passed in 1977.   
 In the process of learning the scope of the coal boom and inventing ways 
to fight it, their work brought them into contact with other Montanans facing 
aspects of the boom but also other environmental issues.  They applied the lessons 
they learned and attracted new members to the organization.  In 1975, the first 
affiliate not associated directly with coal development joined the group.  The 
Stillwater Protective Association, hailing from a handful of small towns along the 
Stillwater River, which flowed out of the Beartooth Plateau south to the 
Yellowstone about one hundred miles West of Billings, formed to fight a proposal 
to expand hard rock mining in the mountains of the region and its associated 
social, economic, and environmental impacts.  For Northern Plains, the issues 
were the same—split-estate, water degradation, boom-and-bust growth and 
impacts in the small towns—and the new group brought new members which 
increased their “people power” to affect decision-makers at every level.  By the 
late 1970s, the board included new members and leadership from more farming-
oriented north-central and central-eastern part of the state.  Helen Waller, Charlie 
Yarger and Tom Breitbach chaired the organization in the latter part of the 
decade.  They elevated new issues within the organization, arguing that ultimately 
the group was concerned with protecting family-based agriculture as the most 
sustainable use of the land and water in the region.  They pressured the group to 
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take on other agricultural issues including price-gouging of wheat farmers by the 
railroads and eventually bank-foreclosures.
119
   
At the same time this group was testing the waters of working on these 
complicated agricultural issues based on the principles of citizen activism and 
participation that were evolving in the coal struggle, some members in the south 
central and western parts of the state began pressuring the organization to work on 
more traditional environmental issues.  Many of these members, from cities cities 
and rural areas, initially joined to fight the Colstrip transmission corridor or hard 
rock mining.  In 1974, members increasingly concerned with finding alternative, 
sustainable, solutions to the energy crisis, started a new affiliate, the Alternative 
Energy Resources Organization (AERO) to work specifically on promoting 
alternative, or “soft path,” energy production and conservation and to complement 
the anti-coal boom work of the larger group.  In 1978, the board elected to support 
Initiative-80, which would require direct voter approval before any nuclear power 
facility could be sited in Montana.  At that point, there were no nuclear facilities 
within the state.  They also parted with most traditional agricultural groups and 
voted to support the designation of the Absaroka-Beartooth Wilderness.  Northern 
Plains members used their skills acquired in other fights to organize comments 
and participation in the wilderness designation process, which resulted in 
Congress establishing more than 920,000 acres of wilderness bordering 
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Yellowstone National Park and protecting a significant portion of the headwaters 
of the Yellowstone River in that same year.
120
 
The group also began to grow beyond its borders, seeking to spread its 
apparently successful brand of activism to other states caught up in the coal boom.  
In 1973, Northern Plains members and staff helped form a sister organization in 
Wyoming’s Powder River Basin, a region that was similarly slated for massive 
coal mines and power plants and contained the headwaters of the Powder and 
Tongue Rivers, which flowed north into Montana. Initially, Northern Plains 
included the Powder River Basin Resource Council in its newsletter, and provided 
staff services for the new group but by the mid-1970s the Wyoming group stood 
on its own.  In 1978, Northern Plains helped form a similar group in North 
Dakota, the Dakota Resources Council.  By 1979, the now-seasoned lobbyist and 
organizer, but still youthful, Pat Sweeney organized the three groups, with the 
interest of similar groups that had formed in Colorado, into a regional 
organization, the Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC), to 
provide a regional voice in Washington for issues that concerned all the groups or 
crossed state boundaries and as a clearing house for information and resources for 
the groups.  WORC institutionalized the “people power” tactics that had evolved 
in Montana and Wyoming since the early 1970s and sought to spread them to 
citizens in other states with the aims empowering citizens to environmental and 
community problems.  Like Northern Plains, WORC insisted on solutions that  
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realized the participatory democracy ideals of the 1960s and the organization 
increasingly incorporated the organizing ideas of labor and civil rights 
organizations represented by Saul Alinsky, Martin Luther King, Jr., César 
Chavez, and taught by institutions like the Highland Center in Kentucky and 
Rathke’s ACORN.121   
 
Conclusion: Northern Plains as a Citizens “Environmental” Group 
 
By the end of the 1970s, geographic, numeric, and issue expansion caused 
the Northern Plains Resource Council to reflect on just exactly what it was.  Was 
it an environmental organization?  Was it an agricultural organization?  In 
September 1978, Northern Plains chair Bill McKay, Jr., a rancher from the 
southeastern part of the state, addressed this question.  In his monthly letter from 
the chair that opened that edition of the newsletter, he wrote: 
Northern Plains Resource Council is unique.  Our primary direction comes from 
the rural sector, and most of the membership consider NPRC to be an agricultural 
organization.  Yet, we are not a trade association in the mold of the Montana 
Stockgrowers or the Montana Woolgrowers.  However, we are the only 
organization in Montana that stands up for agriculture in the face of massive 
industrial development…Much of our work deals with the basic essentials for 
Montana agriculture: land, air, and water.  But this doesn’t make us 
environmentalists.  We’re still ranchers and farmers.122 
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And yet, a quick survey of the group’s issues—coal mine regulation and 
reclamation, power plant siting and regulation, alternative energy, opposition to 
nuclear power, support for wilderness designation—and their emphasis on passing 
legislation to require government-led solutions to these problems, even if viewed 
in relation to the issues of surface owner rights and the promotion of family 
agriculture, supports solid arguments for calling Northern Plains an environmental 
organization.  The resistance of members at being called environmentalists, 
however, is instructive and reveals something about the American environmental 
movement in the postwar era.    
It is safe to assume that their reaction to the term was partially rooted in 
the culture wars of the era.  By the late 1970s, “environmentalism” was already 
being linked to the socially-liberal politics many conservative rural people 
associated with the anti-war movement and social and political upheaval of the 
1960s.  If environmentalism could be confined to the people Wally McRae called 
“wild eyed, and fuzzy-headed” then Northern Plains members were indeed not 
environmentalists.   The ranchers and farmers of Northern Plains distinguished 
themselves from “environmentalists” because their activism was rooted in the 
protection of private property and their ability to continue to farm and ranch and 
preserve their rural, agricultural heritage from industrialization.  They saw these 
values as “conservative” in the culture wars of the era.  They understood their 
activism as profoundly “American.”  What they were slow to realize, however, 
was how similar their activism was to what most “environmentalists” were doing 
as well.  Whether they knew it or not, their tactics, based on the basic assumption 
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that citizens ought to have access to information affecting their environment and a 
say in decisions that affect their health, that of their families and their 
communities, and their ability to make a living were central tenets of the 
environmental reform movement in the late twentieth century.
 123
  Their activism 
more closely aligned Northern Plains members with other environmental 
organizations than the agricultural trade organizations with which they also 
associated.  Activism to solve environmental public goods problems tended to 
reflect Progressive ideals about democratic participation and emphasized the 
ability of citizens to participate in government decisions.  Northern Plains 
members—farmers, ranchers or city-dwellers—organized or joined because they 
perceived outside actors unjustly threatening their land and way of life.  It 
violated their sense of rights and democracy.  The solution: ensure that citizens 
had the right to participate in and appeal the decisions surrounding these 
proposals based on the idea that an informed citizenry would make the best 
decisions concerning public health, the environment.  Northern Plains members 
worked on environmental issues but it was their understanding of the energy 
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boom and remedies to it as fundamentally about  justice and democracy that 
aligned them with the environmental movement. 
In its organization and work during the 1970s, Northern Plains Resource 
Council provides an example of the kinds of community-based environmental 
organizations that formed in the United States in the last decades of the twentieth 
century to address environmental issues.  Although details varied from 
community to community, state to state, and issue to issue and depended on the 
class and race of the activists, NPRC’s experience demonstrates a general 
trajectory of citizen environmental activism typical during th1970s.  People react 
to a perceived threat to their self interests—their property, their ability to make a 
living, their health or that of their families.  They find others who also percieve 
the threat in an attempt to address it.  Although environmental threats are often 
scientific and technical in nature, these activists typically understand the issue in 
terms of fairness and justice.  In the Northern Plains example, the North Central 
Power Study proposed to industrialize a vast swath of rural, agricultural land 
destroying ranchers’ private property and the streams they depended on, and to 
alter their communities.  The ranchers were not consulted and had no means of 
appealing the proposals.  They felt that their sovereignty over their private 
property and lives and rights as citizens were violated.  From this understanding 
of the issue, they argued for their right to take part in the environmental decisions 
that affected their property, health, quality of life, or livelihoods.   
There are a variety of ways in which citizens can gain access to 
environmental decision making.  During the 1970s, passing new laws that 
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required agency transparency and citizen input, and provided citizens with the 
ability to appeal agency decisions often stood out as the most expedient way of 
achieving their goals.  In the process of addressing their local issues, they often 
realized how similar their issues were to those of others.  Slowly, these activists 
citizens became globalized in their thinking; they began to understand their issue 
as part of larger systems of environmental, economic, or social injustice.  In the 
process, they became more “environmentalist” whether they associated 
themselves with the label or not.  If their primary issue was resolved—to their 
satisfaction or not—they often refocused their attention and efforts on other 
issues, sometimes in other communities.  As their involvement with 
environmental issues and their groups matured, they become more sophisticated.  
The organizations professionalized institutionalizing tactics and strategy while the 
staff and some members began to embrace the technical, scientific, and legal 
aspects of their work and developed new tactics to engage other aspects of 
environmental decision making.   
This was the trajectory that Northern Plains followed from its inception in 
the early 1970s and continues to follow to the present day.  Another community-
based organization which formed in Tucson, Arizona, just three years after 
Northern Plains, followed a similar, albeit different, path.  Though its membership 
tended to be predominantly urban and college-educated members of Tucson’s 
middle class, the Southwest Environmental Service’s efforts to educate citizens 
about land use, water, and air quality issues issues to enable them more fully to 
participate in environmental decisions, reflected many of democratic goals shared 
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by Northern Plains.  The story of the Southwest Environmental Service 
demonstrates the variety of strategies available to citizens groups and challenges 
community-based environmental organizations faced during the 1980s.      
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CHAPTER 5 
CITIZEN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN THE SOUTHWEST: 
TUCSON’S SOUTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE 
 
 After a nearly eight year battle to force the Phelps Dodge Company to 
bring its Douglas copper smelter into compliance with the emission standards of 
the Clean Air Act, environmental activists in southern Arizona claimed victory in 
1987.  In the midst of a lawsuit and negotiations with regulators, the multinational 
mining giant abruptly and indefinitely shut down the smelter.  Referred to by 
workers and Phelps Dodge executives as “Old Reliable,” and as “Old Smoky” 
citizens who lived near the facility, the smelter operated for seventy-four years 
with few significant upgrades in pollution abatement technology.  As a result, it 
was one of the largest single sources of air pollution in the U.S., graying the sky 
almost daily with thousands of tons of acid-rain producing sulfur dioxide and 
other pollutants.  The closure resulted from prolonged campaigns by national 
environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club and Greenpeace and by 
local grassroots groups.  The final blow came from a legal action brought by three 
environmental organizations—two local, southern Arizona-based groups and one 
national—against the federal government to force it to enforce the Clean Air Act.  
A second smelter that failed to meet air quality standards, Magma Copper 
Company’s smelter in San Manuel, also closed its doors to retrofit its facility to 
comply with the law.   
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A little more than a year later, however, one of the groups that led the 
charge in the fight for clean air, Tucson’s Southwest Environmental Service 
(SES), met the same fate as the Douglas smelter.  Despite fourteen years of 
success protecting environmental amenities and quality of life in southern 
Arizona—including multiple public education campaigns about urban growth, air 
and water quality, and water use, orchestrating the creation of Catalina State Park 
north of Tucson, advocating Arizona’s Environmental Quality Act, which 
regulated water quality, and enforcing smelter compliance with the Clean Air 
Act—the organization closed its doors in March of 1988.  Of the group’s impact 
in the state, executive director Priscilla Robinson told reporters in 1988, “The 
difference now from the old days is that legislators have to care…[t]hey can’t 
afford to ignore environmental issues if they want to get elected, because 99 
percent of the people care about air and water quality.”  Nevertheless, Robinson 
explained that the organization was shutting down because it had always focused 
on “major issues with specific tasks.” According to Robinson, SES existed 
primarily to solve specific environmental problems related to air and water 
pollution and poorly regulated urban sprawl. They had a membership of dedicated 
volunteers in the Tucson area, but mostly local foundation grants paid the major 
share of staff salaries and expenses. Those grants funded specific campaigns, such 
as drinking water pollution in South Tucson and the Phelps Dodge smelter battle 
in Douglas. When SES  accomplished an environmental objective, its funds for 
that campaign dried up and the group’s board had to decide whether to disband or 
take on new issues and try to secure new grants. After the Clean Air Act victory 
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over Phelps Dodge in 1988, the board and Executive Director Robinson decided 
that SES’s work was done. In many ways, she said, the organization was a victim 
of its own success.
124
 
 
Priscilla Robinson closing the Southwest Environmental Service office in Tucson 
after fourteen years.  Source: Kevinne Moran, “Environmentalist out of service,” 
Tucson Citizen 31 March 1988. 
 
 The kinds of groups that could be classified as “citizens environmental 
organizations” in the late twentieth century were as diverse as the members of 
environmental organizations themselves.  Southwest Environmental Service 
formed in southern Arizona at the same time that the Northern Plains Resource 
Council (NPRC) was celebrating the passage of coal strip mining reforms in 
Montana and learning what those victories meant.  SES, however, bore little 
                                                 
124
 Kevin Moran, “Environmentalist out of service,” The Tucson Citizen, 31 March 1988; 
Joe Burchell, “Group that helped in smelter fight is shutting down,” The Arizona Daily 
Star (Tucson), 30 March 1988. 
  167 
resemblance in terms of its membership, geographical area of activity, 
organizational structure, or issues to its loosely related cousin to the north.   
To begin with, SES was primarily an urban and suburban-based 
organization interested in addressing environmental issues related to urban quality 
of life.  Unlike NPRC, which fought to protect private property and the air and 
water that supported an agricultural economy and rural quality of life, SES’s 
members tended to be concerned with what historians, including Samuel Hays, 
have described as more traditional environmental issues having to do with an 
increasing interest in quality of life among Americans following the second world 
war.  These included  urban air and water quality and the creation and protection 
of public parks.  SES maintained a primarily urban constituency, and its 
“members”—a collection of people who attended hearings, wrote letters, lobbied 
decision makers, and donated money to the organization from time to time—
tended to be educated and “environmentally aware” members of Tucson’s middle 
class.  Unlike NPRC, whose members came to understand environmental issues 
through their experience fighting the threat of coal strip mining and power 
production, many SES members were self-conscious environmentalists before 
becoming involved with the organization.   
SES also formed differently than Northern Plains.  It was organized in 
1974 after receiving a grant from the Wilson Foundation, a local institution 
created in the mid-1960s by Richard and Jean Wilson with the aims of addressing 
environmental and land-use issues in the Tucson area.  NPRC was primarily a 
member-funded organization and did not receive its first foundation grants until a 
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few years into its existence.  Receiving foundation funding from the onset, SES 
travelled a different path in terms of its issues and activities.  Because it was not 
dependent on membership dues for financial support, SES did not emphasize 
membership recruitment to the degree of Northern Plains.  Like Northern Plains, 
it incorporated democratic principles in organizational decision making but 
lodged that decision making exclusively in a more professional and expert board 
of directors that met monthly and was closely guided by a paid executive director.  
It rarely solicited input from its members outside the board on organizational 
policy and strategy, and did not hold membership-wide annual meetings.  Within 
the social and environmental community, SES might be referred to as an 
“advocacy” group or a “service” organization due to its primary strategies of 
using experts and professionals to advocate positions on behalf of its membership 
and providing expert services to environmental decision makers and governing 
agencies.
125
   
Despite these differences with Northern Plains, Southwest Environmental 
Service was indeed a community-based, citizens environmental organization 
similar in many ways to NPRC.  Although it worked on many issues using a 
variety of strategies, its efforts were undergirded by the same conviction that 
informed citizens are the people best equipped to make environmental decisions 
affecting the health, communities, and quality of life of the people living in 
Arizona.  Likewise, SES members and staff understood and articulated 
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environmental issues in terms of justice, fairness and democracy, arguing for the 
ability of citizens to participate in environmental decision making processes and 
for industry to be held accountable to “the people.”  Whereas Northern Plains 
primarily engaged in building political support for legislative solutions to the 
threats of strip mining that included an expanded role for citizens in regulating the 
activity, SES focused on educating citizens on air and water quality issues and 
then encouraging them to become involved politically to affect positive 
environmental change. It served as an informer and advocate for citizens in 
various decision-making venues regarding air, water, and quality of life in the 
region.  These differences in strategy reflect divergences in organizational 
structure between SES and Northern Plains but also the changing political and 
regulatory landscape in the late 1970s and 1980s that influenced the group to 
engage in other tactics.   
SES also resembles Northern Plains and other citizens environmental 
organizations during this period in terms of its leadership.  Women held a greater 
number of leadership positions in SES compared to national organizations and 
most of the group’s on-the-ground work. And, while the board of directors tended 
to contain academics and professionals that brought some expertise to the 
organization’s work, the women who did the work and really shaped SES were 
not trained professionals or experts—they learned the skills and acquired the 
knowledge they realized they needed on the job.  They were concerned about the 
environment, but initially they were no better equipped to address the complicated 
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issues of land use, air and water quality and water conservation than most 
members of Tucson’s middle class.126   
SES provides an example of a different kind of multi-issue, community-
based environmental organization operating in the United States in the last 
decades of the twentieth century.  Their work during the 1980s demonstrates 
many of the strategies grassroots groups pursued in their attempts to improve the 
environment in the decade following the passing of the nation’s bedrock 
environmental laws.  Public education campaigns aimed at assisting citizens to 
engage in more environmentally responsible behavior, advocating  new protective 
environmental regulations, and enforcing existing air and water quality laws 
passed in the previous decade were the three primary activities SES employed in 
their mission to protect and improve the environment in Southern Arizona.  Its 
successes and failures during the 1980s demonstrate the possibilities and 
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challenges inherent to the organization of citizens environmental groups while 
illuminating a degree of continuity in the way citizens understand environmental 
issues and reform. 
  
The Rise of an Environmental Movement in Southern Arizona 
 
 In the last decades of the twentieth century, economic, demographic, and 
cultural  changes in southern Arizona conditioned how humans understood and 
related to the region’s physical environment.  Changes in the regional, national, 
and international economy altered the power landscape in southern Arizona and 
opened the way for new voices in debates over the development of natural 
resources and quality of life in the region.   
From its territorial days following the United States’ purchase of the 
region from Mexico in 1854 until World War II, southern Arizona served as a sort 
of colonial outpost providing raw materials for America’s industrialization.  
Prospectors and then mining companies backed by eastern and European capital 
extracted enormous quantities of silver and copper from the rugged mountains, 
and made mining towns such as Tombstone and Bisbee world-famous.  
Technological innovations in mining and smelting, along with the 
communications and energy revolutions in the telegraph, telephone, and 
electrification soon provided the means and the demand to make the industrial 
extraction of copper economically profitable.  With the discovery and 
development of the “Copper Queen” and “Atlanta” lodes by Phelps Dodge, the 
“copper collar” was yoked to the southern Arizona economy. Meanwhile, folklore 
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and medical science combined to convince tuberculosis-stricken tourists of the 
healing qualities of the region’s dry climate.  Thousands of those suffering from 
the disease descended upon Tucson and Phoenix in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Into the mid-twentieth century, health-seekers, including 
World War I veterans, continued to flock especially to Tucson shaping the 
foundations of institutionalized healthcare in Arizona and firmly establishing an 
appreciation for the state’s “healthful” environment to the region’s reputation for 
mineral riches.
127
 
The clear, dry climate was equally attractive to a new constituency with 
the entrance of the United States into World War II in 1941.  To the military men 
interested in training Army pilots and industrialists committed to building planes 
for the war effort, the year-round flying season and cheap and sparsely populated 
land provided a perfect place for military bases and wartime manufacturing.  
Outside Phoenix, the War Department opened Luke Williams Air Field—the 
largest advanced flying school in the world, training more than 13,500 pilots 
during World War II.  In Tucson, the federal government took over the Davis-
Monthan municipal airport, built Ryan Field to the west, and Marana Air Base 
northwest of the city, which together trained thousands of pilots.  Consolidated 
Vultee Aircraft attracted thousands of civilian employees to Tucson.  While 
Phoenix was able to attract and retain more manufacturing industries during and 
after the war, Tucson was able to capture the enormous Hughes Aircraft missile 
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plant in 1951 and its population experienced a proportionally similar demographic 
surge to that of its exploding neighbor to the north (from under 50,000 in 1950 to 
more than 200,000 in 1960).  While the copper industry continued to prosper, the 
manufacturing and service industry in southern Arizona quickly challenged its 
dominance in the economy of this part of the state.  Diversification of the 
economy of southern Arizona brought with it a new population with new values, 
as thousands of returning veterans and their families, G.I. benefits in hand, chose 
the opportunities that the cheap land, plentiful jobs, and mild climate of the region 
provided.
128
 
By the 1960s, new voices reflecting the evolving values of a growing 
population entered the regional conversation about how southern Arizonans 
should relate to their environment.  Whereas the economy of the region was still 
of pivotal importance to most residents, many began to emphasize the importance 
of quality of life.  Residents of southern Arizona, concentrated primarily in 
Tucson, organized themselves to address what they perceived as important 
community issues having to do with air, water, land and health.  Citizens formed 
and joined local chapters of national groups, including the Sierra Club, Audubon 
Society, Nature Conservancy and Friends of the Earth and such recreational clubs 
as the Southern Arizona Hiking Club and various hunting and fishing 
organizations.  In addition, Tucson residents formed their own local groups the 
1960s and 1970s to address issues of specific interest to urban southern 
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Arizonans: Arizonans for Quality Environment, Southern Arizona Environmental 
Council, and the Southwest Environmental Service. These three collaborated with 
the others to advocate for the protection of air and water, planned urban and 
suburban growth, and the preservation of public lands and creation of parks 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  Environmentally-concerned citizens often belonged 
to and led many of these organizations at the same time.  
 Arizonans for Quality Environment was the first of these groups to form.  
In 1966, it was chartered as Arizonans for Water Without Waste (AWWW) to 
fight proposals to build Bridge and Marble Canyon Dams on the Colorado River 
on both sides of Grand Canyon National Park.  The dams were proposed to 
generate revenues to pay for the Central Arizona Project (CAP), which was 
designed to transport water uphill two hundred seventy miles from the Colorado 
River to Phoenix and Tucson.  The group found itself in a precarious position.  It 
was unable to oppose the regionally-sacred CAP, which promised to deliver 
millions of acre-feet of water to the state’s growing metropolises but it was in 
absolute opposition to the building of the two Grand Canyon “cash register” dams 
to subsidize the project.  With the removal of the objectionable dams from the 
CAP project authorization in 1968, AWWW was left without its original 
foundational issue.  It therefore branched out to other natural resource issues 
concerning southern Arizona.  By 1969, AWWW had created five new 
committees covering air pollution, water, wilderness, wildlife, and conservation 
education, and considered several name changes: “Arizonans for Water, 
Wilderness, and Wildlife,” “Arizonans for a Clean Environment,” or “The Grand 
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Canyon Society.”  By February of 1970, they had changed their name to 
Arizonans for Quality Environment (but retained the familiar AWWW acronym 
for a while).
129
 
 From its inception in 1966 as a single-issue group through its development 
into a multi-issue grassroots advocacy organization, AWWW was led primarily 
by a vanguard of citizen activists, many of whom were active in the other two 
organizations too.  Responding to national as well as local controversies, it took 
on issues as they arose in the Tucson-area so long as members were interested and 
willing to work on them.  In October of 1969, AWWW responded to the national 
fervor surrounding the publishing of Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb earlier 
that year by declaring population the group’s top priority and creating a 
committee to study the issue led by Priscilla Robinson.  Likewise, in response to 
the oil embargo and energy crisis of 1973-74, AWWW elected to focus on energy 
issues, including conservation, energy mineral extraction, and alternative energy.  
The group’s other issues reflected local and national concerns in an era that 
witnessed the passage of the nation’s most protective environmental laws, 
including the Wilderness Act of 1964, National Environmental Policy Act of 
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1969, the Clean Air Act of 1970, Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973.  Correspondingly, AWWW maintained committees 
dedicated to wilderness, water, and wildlife issues.  Echoing specifically local 
concerns, they committed resources to transportation issues, the Grand Canyon, 
urban environment, land use, and eventually mining.
130
 
 Southern Arizona Environmental Council (SAEC) was a second 
community-based environmental organization that formed in the region during 
this period.  Founded in mid-1971, the SAEC’s stated purpose was “[t]o provide 
an effective and continuing coordinating structure to increase individual and 
organization ability to understand and respond to environmental problems in 
southern Arizona.”  Consisting of representatives of “any non-profit or volunteer 
Arizonan organization or association with some stated concern for environmental 
quality,” the SAEC was unique among environmental organizations in the region 
during the period for its attempt to bring divergent interests together.  Reflecting 
this effort, the organization’s semi-monthly and later quarterly Bulletin included 
articles from Paulette Dryden, mining chair of Arizonans for Quality 
Environment, who argued against expanded mining in southern Arizona, and 
articles by Ted Eyde of the Southwest Minerals Exploration Association 
supporting mining as a “Necessary and Desirable Green Belt Use in Pima 
County.” Although the SAEC was essentially an organization of organizations, it 
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maintained a membership of individuals and attempted to engage the general 
public and encourage public participation.
131
 
 
“Catalyst For Action”: the Southwest Environmental Service132 
 
 In 1974, a third community-based environmental organization formed in 
Tucson.  The Southwest Environmental Service (SES) was chartered under the 
direction of David Hoyt, a local newspaperman, with funding from the Arizona-
based Wilson Foundation to address regional environmental issues that had so far 
fallen outside the purview of the region’s other environmental organizations.  
Although Richard and Jean Wilson, who formed the Foundation, charged the 
group with working for general environmental protection, the wealthy couple—
Richard, a Yale and Stanford trained geologist, was heir of a Texas oil fortune—
was particularly concerned with the affects of suburban sprawl in and around 
Tucson.  Thus, much of SES’s early work had to do issues of land use and 
population growth.   Hoyt organized a board of directors drawing from folks who 
had been active in AWWW and SAEC during the early 1970s.  In its first year, 
SES began work on land-use planning in the Tucson metropolitan area, urban 
water quality and use, and Catalina State Park, a nature park north of Tucson on 
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the western flanks of the Santa Catalina Mountains designated by the Arizona 
legislature in 1974 but left unfunded by the state.  In early 1975, however, Hoyt 
resigned, and Priscilla Robinson took over as executive director.
133
  
 Robinson brought to the nascent SES a degree of organization and 
professionalism that characterized the group throughout its tenure.  By 1974, she 
was an experienced activist and was familiar with organizing information and 
people to work on environmental issues.  Like many activists during the twentieth 
century, Robinson was not “trained” in the profession; she learned the trade on the 
job in pursuit of what she perceived as justice.  She held a degree in anthropology 
from the University of Arizona and had completed some graduate work by the 
early 1970s when the issue of abortion and women’s right to choose pulled her 
into activism.  In the tumultuous years before the United States Supreme Court 
handed down the Roe v. Wade decision, Robinson worked as a lobbyist for 
Planned Parenthood, promoting and protecting women’s reproductive rights.  
Through trial by fire, she learned valuable lessons in forming “unlikely” 
coalitions and compromise.  In an interview in 2011, she explained that she was 
fascinated with how people solved problems and by creating effective ways of 
achieving an organization’s goals.  She cared passionately about the issues she 
worked on, but she seemed almost equally attracted to the democratic process of 
influencing environmental governance—with creating and experimenting with 
strategies to achieve success.  Before going to work for SES she had applied this 
ardor in working for the city of Tucson promoting more sustainable groundwater 
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management in the region.  This initiative was ultimately unsuccessful, but she 
drew from her experience and put the same energy into building SES into an 
active player in environmental issues in the Tucson area and statewide.  Within 
weeks of taking over as executive director, she had identified the group’s basic 
administrative needs and moved to address them.  In a report to the board dated 
April 18, 1975, after only a few weeks on the job, she reported that she had found 
the organization a suitable office—a 670 square foot, three-room office on West 
Washington Street in downtown Tucson.  Taking into account the organization’s 
new office expenses, she prepared a revised budget and completed the paperwork 
to make SES an official tax-exempt, 501 (c)(3) non-profit organization with the 
Internal Revenue Service.  In short order, Robinson put the group on solid 
administrative ground.
134
   
Once she addressed brick and mortar considerations, Robinson turned her 
aim to the heart of the organization: its work and niche in Tucson’s growing 
environmental community.  In the same April 1975 report, she illuminated for the 
board some possible issues for the group to engage.  Although many of the 
options were technical, she proposed a variety of activities intended to educate 
citizens and encourage their participation in local environmental decisions.   She 
briefly explained progress in two Tucson city-planning and zoning processes and 
offered her thoughts on possible functions for the organization—primarily serving 
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in coalitions with other groups, organizing citizen comments in government 
agency decision making processes, and gathering information and distributing it 
to stakeholders.  She then explained some possible ways in which SES could 
contribute to the land use planning process and ideas about environmental 
legislation the group might promote.  She also offered a list of possible future 
projects for the group including promoting Tucson’s “Natural Areas System”—a 
new program designed to designate new nature preserves and parks around the 
city—creating school-based environmental education programs, conducting 
research for interim legislative committees considering water and land use 
reforms, and monitoring the transfer of EPA’s water quality discharge permit 
system to the state.  Within a month, she had prepared a detailed proposal for an 
“experimental community education project in land use planning” complete with 
identified objectives, methods and a budget of $1500.  In the document she 
proposed to bring together citizens living primarily in the northwest section of 
Tucson to “study, discuss, and evaluate” Tucson’s Tortolita Area Plan in a series 
of “structured workshops” to educate participants about the residential and 
commercial land-use plan so they could influence its direction “if they choose to 
do so.”  In the proposal, Robinson also emphasized that she understood the 
project as an experiment with “innovative educational techniques in implementing 
community participation in land use planning.”  From the beginning, Robinson 
proved to be a powerful force shaping the agenda and activities of the 
organization according to her philosophy of affecting positive environmental 
change through education, serving the community, and working “within the 
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system” to facilitate greater public participation in environmental decision 
making.
135
 
Within a year, Robinson led the board in building SES into a multi-issue 
organization active in trying to address a variety of environmental problems in 
Tucson.  As the group expanded and intensified its work on land-use planning and 
Catalina State Park, Robinson’s vision of the organization became more apparent. 
She envisioned making SES into an invaluable resource for natural resource 
managers and environmental decision makers in southern Arizona.  Even if she 
did not know exactly what role SES would play, she aimed to make sure the 
group was at the decision-making table.  She also understood that achieving such 
a position would require additional help and resources.  This reflects a transition 
that occurred in the environmental movement in the 1970s and 1980s as 
environmental issues and regulation became more technical and required a new 
level of activist expertise.  In this shifting reality, citizens had less ability to affect 
environmental decision making through the strategies they had created in the 
previous decades.  Many groups attempted to compensate for changes in the 
political and regulatory landscape by trying to recruit more members in hopes of 
increasing the organization’s political clout through “people power.”  Robinson 
realized the need for citizens to engage the scientific and technical aspects of 
environmental issues to influence policy and governance.  She was an early 
adopter of this strategy that would become prominent in the next decade.  She 
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guided the board to identify potential new members who could bring particular 
expertise to the organization—legal and accounting skills, for instance, or a 
background in water quality or other environmental sciences—and she proposed 
hiring part-time employees to assist her in managing SES’s various activities.136 
In its first years, the SES board included men and women who were 
dedicated to, and could help further, Robinson’s philosophy of educating the 
public and working “within the system” using “reason and science” to address 
environmental issues.  Leadership passed between president Suzanne Wilson and 
Thomas Pew with Mary Peace Douglas serving as Vice President and Colonel 
John Rice serving as treasurer.  Other board members included Bernard Fontana, 
William Franklin, and Sol Resnick.  Many members were academics associated 
with the University of Arizona who contributed their expertise to SES’s work.  
Wilson was a professor of archeology at the university; Fontana was an 
ethnologist working with the University and the Arizona State Museum; Resnick, 
a water resource professional associated with the university, served as the group’s 
resident expert on hydrologic issues; Pew was a horticulturalist and served as an 
expert on various environmental issues.  When it became apparent to the 
organization that it needed the expertise of an attorney to negotiate the various 
intricacies of planning and other environmental laws, Colonel Rice suggested that 
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they recruit a lawyer.  Within a month in 1977, they had recruited Tucson attorney 
Richard Duffield to join the board, fulfilling this need.
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 While the board always included a significant number of women, it did 
recruit more male board members, which probably reflected the need to recruit 
experts from professional fields dominated by men rather than any kind of overt 
preference. In contrast, the paid staff was almost exclusively female throughout 
the life of the organization.  After Robinson was hired as full time executive 
director in 1975 for the meager salary of roughly ten thousand dollars a year, she 
recommended that the group hire other part time employees to organize and 
administer portions of the group’s campaigns and administrative work.  In 1976, 
she proposed, and the board agreed, to hire Victoria Dahl to help with its urban 
planning projects and to organize the group’s “water workshops”—a campaign to 
educate the public and decision-makers about water issues in southern Arizona. 
Robinson then employed her to organize a follow-up workshop of hydrologists.  
In March of 1977, she hired Betsy Rieke part-time to organize the group’s 
growing library and files with the board’s approval.  The library organizing work 
soon shifted to another part-time employee, Barbara Winters, and Robinson 
drafted Rieke to assist with monitoring the state’s process of deciding water 
quality standards for the Gila and San Pedro Rivers and for Sabino Creek north of 
Tucson.  Within a few months, Rieke was travelling with Robinson to Phoenix to 
meet with state officials at the State Bureau of Water Quality and State Parks 
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Department.  A year later, Rieke made a presentation on surface mining and 
reclamation on behalf of the organization before the National Research 
Council.
138
   
Although the board may have been dominated by men, Robinson’s 
preference for hiring female employees had the effect of giving the organization a 
profoundly feminine public face.  As the group grew in terms of members, issues, 
and clout in local and state-level decisions regarding land use planning, water, and 
air quality, the women of SES—Dahl, Rieke, and especially Robinson—became 
the recognized spokespeople for the organization.  Barbara Tellman, who worked 
for the organization during the 1980s, remembers that the hiring of only women 
was sheer practicality—“we had the time,” she explained.  The group could not 
afford to pay wages necessary to hire full-time professionals and it was easier to 
find women who could learn on the job and work part-time.  Robinson 
acknowledged this rationale but, whether explicitly or implicitly, understood 
hiring women as part of a larger movement to promote gender equality.  Two 
decades later, she relished the memory of watching Dahl, Rieke, Tellman and the 
others, grow in confidence and skills as they were propelled into the public 
spotlight while seeking to shape the environmental regulatory system.  She 
recruited the women, many of whom, like herself, had college degrees but no 
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formal training or professional experience in environmental advocacy, out of the 
League of Women Voters.  Many were empowered by the work and continued 
some form of advocacy or activism after they left the organization: Rieke 
completed law school and pursued a career as an attorney; Tellman served on the 
city of Tucson water board, the county wastewater board, and went on to work on 
various political campaigns for primarily Democratic environmentalist candidates 
for office.
139
       
Robinson understood that she and members of her all-female staff were in 
a unique position within the environmental decision making system they strove to 
influence.  On various advisory committees from the city to the state level and in 
meetings of regulators and environmental managers, they were typically the only 
women participants.  Robinson remembers that she was aware of this fact and 
deliberately conducted herself to maximize her effectiveness.  “I intentionally 
dressed so as not to stand out,” she said, “[m]y rule was that I wanted people to 
remember what I said, not what I wore…[n]eat, becoming, but nothing worth 
noticing.”  Perhaps hardened by her previous experiences working as a lobbyist 
for Planned Parenthood, she did not expect any special consideration on account 
of her gender.  “Discussions can get heated, and that’s part of the process,” she 
explains, “you can’t expect any change in tone just because you showed up.”  In 
her work, she attributed the resentment toward women in professional settings to 
stereotypes about women’s emotionality.  “You can deal with this by playing fair 
and not getting emotional,” she said, “[i]t’s o.k. to raise your voice to me, even 
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yell a little…a sense of humor is essential.”  In her experience, the men in the 
committees or meetings she took part in—often lawyers and other technical 
professionals—were typically better educated or more experienced.  Instead of 
being intimidated by this situation, Robinson saw it as an opportunity to learn and 
to engage the men.  She remembers, “I did have experience and insight that many 
of them did not have,” including in politics and the media, “so that part usually 
worked out.”  For Robinson, working past the potential challenges of gender 
differences seemed to be just one more interesting challenge to be overcome.
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 In its first five years, SES’s expert-led board and female staff embarked on 
a series of campaigns based on its philosophy of educating the public to make 
positive decisions to protect and enhance the environment and to provide expert 
advice to environmental decision makers to encourage them to use “reason and 
science” to address environmental issues in southern Arizona. The group 
accelerated its participation in urban and suburban land use and planning issues 
around Tucson, continued its work to secure the future of the newly designated 
but unfunded Catalina State Park, and created a land trust to facilitate the 
acquisition of environmentally valuable land in the Tucson region to preserve 
open space from suburban development and shape how the city grew.  In addition, 
it drew on popular and policy-maker interest in water issues in and around 
Tucson—a desert city that was at that time the largest metropolitan area in the 
United States entirely dependent on groundwater.  Water—its quality and use—
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became a primary issue for the organization, especially because the groundwater 
aquifer that supported Tucson had been steadily and dramatically declining since 
the post-war population boom. Moreover, that limited and precious water supply 
was being poisoned by industrial chemicals associated with the military and 
manufacturing enterprises and by municipal and wildcat waste dumps scattered 
along the ephemeral Santa Cruz and Rillito Rivers that flowed through the center 
of Tucson.
141
    These issues,  which SES often worked on simultaneously, and the 
strategies the group pursued to address them, shaped its agenda for the duration of 
its institutional life and molded how Robinson and the board addressed the 
group’s most important work in the 1980s.    
 By mid-1976, SES was in the thick of a land use planning debate.  Despite 
a sluggish national economy during the decade, southern Arizona was in the 
throes of a population explosion experienced throughout the Sunbelt.  Tucson 
grew from a population of about 263,000 in 1970 to more than 330,000 in 1980; 
Pima County as a whole grew at a faster rate from about 352,000 to more than 
530,000.  Of the roughly 180,000 new residents in Pima County, almost two-
thirds lived outside the city limits.  As was the pattern in other Sunbelt 
metropolitan regions, that growth tended to radiate from Tucson in low-density 
residential developments sprawling onto former agricultural land and raw 
Sonoran desert, straining city and county road, water, and sewer infrastructure, 
and converting open land into residential neighborhoods.  Less tangibly, rapid 
suburban sprawl threatened some of the amenities that many Tucson residents 
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valued as vitally important to their distinctive quality of life in the region—air 
free of the smog and highways clear of the congestion that characterized Los 
Angeles to the west and Greater Phoenix to the north.  SES joined other groups 
including the Southern Arizona Environmental Council in arguing that urban 
planning, transportation, and air pollution were intricately connected and central 
to the quality of life in Tucson.  Additionally, population growth elevated 
concerns about water supply in Tucson—whether the metropolitan area could 
secure enough water to sustain its growth and whether that water would be safe to 
drink.
142
   
 
 
Suburban sprawl was one of the major concerns of Tucson-area environmentalists 
in the 1970s.  Photograph No. 555346 (Photographer Norton Boyd); “Piece of 
bulldozed desert on the edge of Tucson, Arizona.  The Saguaro cactus are left 
standing near what will be a housing development.  The fate of other saguaros is 
left uncertain.  Many are dying in less disturbed parts of the desert in the area, 
04/1974,” April 1974; Documerica Project, Records of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online version, 
www.archives.gov, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 December 
2011], National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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In its attempts to influence the direction of this rapid growth, SES found 
itself monitoring, gathering research, and organizing citizens on at least eight 
different planning issues in the Tucson-area between 1975 and 1980.  To bolster 
its position, SES also employed the expertise of Gerald Swanson, an economist at 
the University of Arizona, to research the economic impact of growth.  In one 
instance, SES advocated an ordinance before the Pima County Planning and 
Zoning Commission and the Board of Supervisors to promote environmentally-
responsible growth.  In another, it advocated an ordinance meant to prevent 
“wildcat subdividing”—unplanned suburban and ex-urban residential 
development—in rural Pima County northwest of Tucson as part of the Tortolita 
Area Plan.  SES also monitored proposals for the sewage facility to service the 
Tortolita area development.  With other groups, it feared that pro-growth 
developers and planning officials would promote a sewage processing plant much 
larger than was necessary for the development, thus encouraging additional 
growth despite the work of SES, SAEC, the League of Women Voters and other 
organizations to slow population growth and control rapid, unplanned suburban 
development of the rural areas of the county.  Other planning work included 
monitoring proposals to expand city streets, improve the Sahuarita Road south of 
Tucson to serve new suburban developments in the upper Santa Cruz Valley near 
the growing retirement community of Green Valley, a proposed city ordinance to 
restrict building in floodplains, and the continuing Tucson and Pima County 
Comprehensive Planning Process.  Land use planning also provided one of SES’s 
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first inroads into its legislative work—in 1978, working with Jerry Cannon, 
Robinson and SES developed a bill to give counties more power in land-use 
planning.  Planning and land use in the Tucson-area became such a dominant 
issue, that Robinson recruited Victoria Dahl to work on a paid, part-time basis to 
help her keep track of new developments throughout the region and to attend the 
many county commission and city and county planning board meetings that 
evaluated these various suburban developments.
143
 
 To preserve elements of the regional landscape from the developer’s 
bulldozers and to maintain open space where Tucson’s growing population might 
recreate, SES continued its efforts to advance development of Catalina State Park 
and investigated the possibilities of creating a new land trust organization to buy 
existing open land and save it from development.  Catalina State Park, which 
encompassed roughly 5,000 acres on the southwestern flanks of the Santa 
Catalina Mountains north of Tucson, was designated as a nature park by the 
Legislature in 1974, but as of 1976, no money had been appropriated for its 
maintenance or development as a recreational site.  As a result, it had no 
facilities—no campgrounds or parking areas, no marked and maintained trails, no 
drinking water and wastewater facilities, no entry station to collect visitor fees, 
and no staff.  The land was protected but, without funding or planning, the 
character was in question.  Environmentalists lobbied the legislature and state 
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agencies and battled pro-development forces over what kind of park it would be.  
Would it be an urban-like park or a more primitive nature park?  What would be 
the size and nature of its facilities?  How would wastewater be handled?  How 
would traffic to the park be mitigated on the smaller communities north of Tucson 
near the park?  Robinson and SES led a coalition of groups supporting the park on 
a prolonged campaign to obtain funding through the state legislature and affect a 
series of land exchanges that expanded the park and secured its borders.  Its work 
on Catalina State Park resembled its work on urban planning requiring Robinson 
and her staff to attend and testify at numerous city- and county-level meetings but 
it also required them to negotiate personally and outside the public spotlight with 
landowners whose property bordered the park.  The park issues also pulled them 
into the legislative arena.  In 1978, SES supported the state parks department’s 
request for a nine hundred thousand dollar appropriation from the legislature to 
buy private lands in the northern part of the park and helped further negotiations 
for the land exchange between the state and the private land owner, John Ratliff, 
and Rancho Vistoso, who leased Ratliff’s land.  The issue was central to the 
group’s legislative agenda until it finally secured funding for the park in 1983.  
Robinson cited this as one of her and SES’s proudest achievements.144   
SES’s other strategy for preserving open space in the face of Tucson’s 
population boom, creating a land trust, was a marked departure from the 
organization’s philosophy of educating the public and providing expertise to 
decision makers. In early 1977, the board elected to enlist the expertise of Ben 
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Carter from the Colorado Open Land Foundation in advising SES on the benefits 
of creating a trust in Tucson.  In August of that year, board member Tom Pew 
visited the Maine Coast Heritage Land Trust and SES recruited University of 
Arizona professor Michael McCarthy and his students to research the prospects of 
starting such an organization.  Unlike its other campaigns that worked with 
government policy makers, forming a land trust was like forming a new nonprofit 
corporation that bought or accepted gifts of land from private individuals and then 
protected the land through property rights law and contracts rather than regulatory 
law.  After more than a year and a half of research, the SES board adopted the 
articles of incorporation of the “Arizona Open Land Trust” and chartered the new 
land institution as part of the organization.
145
  The land trust added one more tool 
to SES expanding repertoire of strategies to protecting land, air, and water in 
southern Arizona.  The addition of this strategy, which used private property and 
market forces to protect land, added to what was evolving into a sophisticated 
suite of activities including public education and promoting citizen participation, 
and using science and expertise to influence regulatory agencies and policy 
makers.   
By the end of the 1970s, SES’s work on land use and water and air quality 
issues had created a pattern that came to characterize the organization and 
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continued to influence its work until it closed its doors in 1987.  The board 
recognized as early as 1978 that it was too dependent on funding from only one 
granting organization—Arizona’s Wilson Foundation—and needed to develop 
other sources of revenue.  Toward that end, it proposed to expand the board that 
year with the aim of recruiting new members who could identify additional 
sources of funding for the group—primarily new grants and thus new activities or 
services SES could provide to leverage foundation and government money.  They 
discussed developing other sources of income that were typical for grassroots 
environmental organizations—individual contributions and membership dues—
but the board members were reluctant to rely on new member recruitment as a 
way to raise revenue.  During its fourteen years, several private benefactors made 
generous donations to the organization. Robinson reported that by the time it 
closed, SES had 600 individual contributors and claimed that SES could operate 
on their contributions alone. But it remained primarily dependent on outside 
grants for its campaigns.  Although this was different than other citizens groups 
like the Northern Plains Resource Council, which were primarily funded by dues 
and smaller donations, it was not necessarily a problem or handicap.  Although 
board members raised concerns about the situation, there is little evidence that 
they ruminated much on its effects on SES’s work or viewed the condition 
negatively.  However, from a historian’s perspective, it is reasonable to judge 
SES’s dependency on grants as the one of the primary factors in its closing after a 
very successful, but relatively short, life.  This reliance on foundation and 
government funding also appeared to influence its work.  Decades later, Robinson 
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insisted that her own personal interest in an issue or campaign was a more 
important influence on what the group chose to work on, but she acknowledged 
that the group consciously considered and sought opportunities to provide 
services to government agencies as a source of revenue.  One of the clearest 
examples of this was SES’s official entrance into the issue of air quality in 1978 
after receiving a grant from the EPA to produce a citizen’s workshop to educate 
the public on changes to the Clean Air Act in 1977 and the prospect of receiving 
grants from the National Science Foundation and Shalan Foundation to enlarge its 
public education campaign and produce a citizen’s guide to air pollution.  This 
marked the beginning of one of SES’s biggest and most definitive campaigns 
during the 1980s: the fight for clean air in southern Arizona.
146
       
 
Conclusion 
 
Although SES worked on a variety of issues during the 1980s, the air 
quality campaign, which expanded far beyond public education, combined with 
an enlarged and more focused drive to protect water quality to form the major 
thrusts of SES’s work during the decade. These campaigns grew directly from the 
SES’s work in its first five years. They reflected strategies and activities the group 
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developed while working on land use planning, Catalina State Park, and various 
public education campaigns.  Its efforts during the 1980s mirrored those of other 
citizens environmental organizations across the country in the decade following 
the revolution in environmental and democratic reforms embodied in the laws 
passed at the state and federal level to protect air, water, land, and to advance 
citizen participation in environmental decision making during the 1970s.  Their 
work on water and air quality demonstrates some of the challenges and 
possibilities for community-based environmental activism during the 1980s—a 
decade characterized by a popular conservative backlash to the environmentalism 
of the previous decade.   
In response to the changing political landscape, SES plied a different path 
than the Northern Plains Resource Council and other groups during the same era.  
It concentrated on obtaining a seat alongside technocrats and environmental 
managers in influencing how environmental laws passed during the 1970s would 
be interpreted and enacted.  SES was unique in that it recognized the changing 
political and regulatory landscape of environmental decision making, and that if 
citizens were going to have a say in those decisions, they would have going to 
have to engage different strategies than what had worked in the past.  Robinson 
guided SES in writing legislation and attempting to influence its passage; she 
increasingly believed that what was required to pass laws and what was required 
to make sure they were enforced were fundamentally different.  From her point of 
view, making sure laws were implemented correctly and that water and air were 
protected was highly technical and required activists to understand the law and 
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complexities of environmental science and management.  She strove to acquire 
for herself and SES the knowledge and political capital necessary to take part in 
important environmental decisions that often took place out of the public’s sight 
behind closed doors.  As a result, Robinson, a self-trained expert on water and air 
quality issues by the mid-1980s, was often the only non-professional (and female) 
citizen serving on technical environmental rule-making committees in the state.  
As such, she represented the interests of citizens that might have otherwise been 
ignored in environmental decision-making.
147
 
In working for improvements to water and air quality in Arizona, SES 
serves as a case study of a citizens environmental group which formed and came 
of age in the era following the passage of landmark environmental laws.  
Although the strategies SES pursued to address water and air quality issues 
differed from those of Northern Plains during the 1970s, they were representative 
of a trend in citizen activism during the 1980s as groups adapted to the changing  
political and regulatory climate of that decade.  Through public education, 
encouraging citizens to take part in decision procedures, and eventually gaining 
seat at the decision-making tables, SES displayed a continued understanding of 
environmental issues as intimately connected with issues of democracy and 
governance.   
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CHAPTER 6 
PROTECTING WATER IN AN DRY STATE: SES’S WATER CAMPAIGN 
AND THE PASSAGE OF THE ARIZONA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
ACT OF 1986 
 
Between Southwest Environmental Service’s “Water Workshops” in mid-
1976 and early 1979, water issues slowly trickled from tangential concerns for the 
organization to a multi-tiered campaign requiring the group’s engagement at the 
municipal, county, and state levels.  In response to increasing public awareness 
and concern about water issues in southern Arizona and federal and state 
implementation of the Clean Water Act, SES devoted more time and resources to 
water.  By the end of the 1970s, it had grown from part of the group’s land use 
planning work into its own campaign.  As SES’s work on water accelerated, it 
evolved.  Public education remained an important component of the campaign as 
did encouraging citizens to attend government-sponsored hearings regarding 
water issues, but staff members became increasingly involved in the technical 
aspects of resource protection and management.  Much of their work included 
researching water quality standards, contaminants, urban planning and state and 
federal water and environmental laws.  With this newly-acquired knowledge, 
Priscilla Robinson asserted SES’s identity as a source for credible information 
and a service to environmental decision-makers and residents of Tucson 
concerned about water.  By the beginning of the 1980s, Robinson and staff 
member Barbara Tellman found themselves representing the public interest on a 
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variety of boards and committees considering water quality standards.  From this 
position, they asserted the rights of citizens to hold government agencies 
accountable for enforcing existing water conservation and quality laws and 
successfully pushed for the passage of new laws.   
SES’s work on water issues provides an example of how local, 
community-based environmental organizations responded to public opinion and 
changing political, legal, and funding landscapes during the late 1970s and 1980s.  
In many ways, its goals and strategies in affecting positive change with regard to 
water quality and use were specific to the organization, but they also reflected 
many tactics and ideals common to similar groups operating across the United 
States during this era.  SES’s work stemmed from its articulated philosophy of 
educating citizens and then encouraging them to take part in the environmental 
decisions that affected their lives, health, and quality of life, and of using reason 
and science to address environmental issues. At its core, its actions resembled 
those of other community-based groups—organized around a commitment to 
increasing democratic participation in hopes of positively affecting decisions 
regarding the environment and natural resources that benefitted the whole 
community.  However, as its work on the issue progressed, SES realized that 
addressing water quality and water supply issues required an understanding of 
very technical laws, regulations, and standards and the practical mechanics of 
politics.  As the decade progressed, SES found itself increasingly engaging the 
issue from the technical standpoint, often alongside academics, environmental 
managers, and politicians and spending less time educating the public and 
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encouraging citizens to make their voices heard in decisions regarding water in 
Southern Arizona.  Although SES worked to help draft and pass Arizona’s 
landmark groundwater quality law in 1986—the Arizona Environmental Quality 
Act—much of its work was in the murky realm of influencing rule-making and 
implementation of laws already passed.
148
    
Southwest Environmental Service’s work on water issues from the late 
1970s leading to the passage of the Arizona Water Quality Act in 1986 
demonstrates how the strategies and activities of citizens environmental groups 
changed during the first decade after the passage of the nation’s landmark 
environmental laws.  SES continued to promote citizen participation in 
environmental decision-making based on its assumption that people had a right to 
take part in the decisions that affected their environment, health, and quality of 
life, however, as the group became more involved in the issue, Robinson and 
Tellman spent more of their time in meetings working behind closed doors seated 
at decision-making tables.  Possibly as a result of Robinson’s interests, SES 
entered this realm of citizen-led activism earlier than did many community-based 
groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Ultimately, its ability to adapt to and 
engage the complexities of environmental protection and natural resource 
decision-making and politics proved key to its success.  SES’s water campaign 
exhibits another way in which citizens environmental organizations served as 
“watchdogs” of government agencies and industry to promote the public interest 
by using citizen participation provisions in existing environmental laws and 
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expanding opportunities for the public to become involved in environmental 
decision-making.  
 
Lessons in the Limits of Citizen Participation: the CAP and Groundwater 
Management Act of 1980 
 
From the time humans first arrived in the region nearly 20,000 years ago, 
water has preoccupied their minds.  The remnants of an extensive irrigation 
system in the Salt River Valley, which included hundreds of miles of canals built 
entirely by human labor, enabled several hundred thousand Hohokam people to 
inhabit the Salt and Gila River Valleys north of Tucson more than a millennium 
ago—a population threshold not equaled again until the mid-twentieth century. 
This accomplishment testifies to the importance of water in the Sonoran Desert.  
In the twentieth century, Anglo-Americans in the Arizona Territory realized that 
any hope for future population and economic growth would be predicated upon 
obtaining a consistent supply of water.  With help from the federal government, 
the Salt River Project succeeded in damming that river in 1911, providing a 
dependable supply of water to the burgeoning citrus and cotton industry in central 
Arizona.  By the 1920s, residents of the new state were setting their sights much 
higher.  Originally conceived of as a “mad man’s dream,” the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP), which proposed to transport water more than 270 miles east and 
over 1,000 feet uphill across the desert from the Colorado River to the Phoenix 
Valley and Tucson, became the state’s “holy grail” by the 1940s.149 
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By the latter-half of the century, and in the decades leading up to its 
completion in 1993, the CAP was a defining issue in Arizona’s politics and 
culture.  The intoxicating prospect of sparkling waters nourishing agricultural, 
urban and industrial growth was enough to coax unwavering support from the 
state’s politicians, regardless of party.  The allure of CAP convinced avowed 
environmentalist and Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and his brother 
Morris, both Democrats, and Republican Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, to 
support building dams in the Grand Canyon to fund the project.  While 
conservationists in later decades would grimace at the idea of cultivating 
unprecedented and “irresponsible” growth in Arizona with the waters of the 
already-taxed lower Colorado River, many of their Arizonan counterparts in the 
1960s did not oppose the project.  Arizonans for a Quality Environment, 
originally organized in 1966 as Arizonans for Water Without Waste, understood 
the broad public support for CAP.  In 1966, even though many of their members 
were personally opposed to the proposal, they chose not to oppose the building of 
the CAP canal, but oppose only the dams connected to the project.  It was not 
until 1973 that they publicly began to question the logic and environmental 
consequences of the CAP and openly oppose it.  Both reflecting and reinforcing 
the importance of CAP to the Arizona public, in the years before the project made 
its first delivery of water to the Phoenix Valley in 1986, the state’s major 
newspapers included articles on the issue almost daily.
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The public popularity and fascination with the Central Arizona Project, 
and opposition to it among environmentally-aware Tucsonans, were not lost on 
Robinson and Southwest Environmental Service; CAP was one of the matters that 
first pulled SES into issues of water use and conservation.  Barbara Tellman 
remembers that among environmentalists in Tucson in the 1970s, everyone she 
knew opposed the CAP.  By March of 1977, Congressman Morris Udall, who 
represented Tucson and southern Arizona, was familiar with the grumblings of 
this essential part of his base constituency.  Typical of his consensus-style 
politics, Udall endeavored to pacify the opponents of the CAP as he sought to 
save the project from the chopping block of recently inaugurated President Jimmy 
Carter.  By the mid-1970s, the golden days of America’s reclamation projects 
were fading in the face of escalating construction costs, a stagnating economy, 
and ballooning federal deficits from the prolonged war in Vietnam and expensive 
social welfare programs.  Carter, a trained engineer, who as governor had come to 
blows with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers over their plans to build an 
environmentally disastrous water project in Georgia, was suspicious of massive 
federal reclamation projects.  He agreed with the findings of agricultural 
economists like William Martin and Robert Young from the University of 
Arizona, who predicted in 1967 that farmers would never be able to afford CAP 
water once they paid for the smaller canals that carried the water from the main 
canal to their farms, thus leaving taxpayers to foot the bill.  Once elected, he 
promised to end the waste of taxpayer money and damage to the environment 
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caused by ten reclamation projects he identified as “boondoggles.”  The CAP—
the most expensive of federal reclamation projects at the time—was at the top of 
his list.  If Udall and other water boosters were going to preserve Arizona’s holy 
grail, its delegation would need all the help it could get.  Threats by the federal 
government to the future of the precious, and half-completed CAP, forced water 
boosters to confront opponents within the state and begin a dialogue about water 
conservation.  Robinson’s experience researching issues of water use surrounding 
the CAP, as well as SES’s involvement in water issues, attracted the attention of 
Udall’s staff.  Robinson had run as a candidate for Tucson’s Central Arizona 
Water Conservation District in 1976 endorsed by Arizonans for Water Without 
Waste, and SES had organized public “Water Workshops” to build public and 
political support for groundwater management legislation in the early 1970s.   The 
congressman’s office enlisted SES to organize meetings of Tucson-area 
environmentalists to see if it might be possible to carve out some areas of 
compromise.
 151
   
Ultimately, all of SES’s work to bring together the Tucson environmental 
community toward some kind of consensus, in addition to their research into the 
CAP and how it would affect growth in Tucson, was in vain.  The Carter 
administration, barraged with resounding bipartisan opposition to ending federal 
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support for the CAP from the delegation of western states, was forced to 
compromise.  The deal it struck, however, accelerated movement to address water 
conservation and the threat of Arizona’s growing population and sprawling 
communities over-pumping finite groundwater resources.  Arizona water boosters 
understood that to ensure completion of the CAP, they would need to address the 
issue of groundwater depletion.  In 1977, the legislature formed a Groundwater 
Management Study Commission to create legislation to address the issue.  Before 
taking over as executive director of SES, Robinson had worked for the City of 
Tucson with the City Attorney to help write and lobby for legislation to prevent 
overdraft of Arizona’s aquifers, but the bill failed to move in the legislature.  
However, the Groundwater Management Study Commission gave the issue a 
boost.  For the next two years, Robinson and SES monitored the progress of the 
Commission and tried to interject the organizations’  ideas—many from 
Robinson’s experience working with the City of Tucson—into its deliberations.  
She served on the Pima County Advisory Committee on Water Law, formed by 
then-State Senator Jim Kolbe, to recommend policy ideas for regulating 
groundwater pumping to the Commission.  After a year and a half, the Advisory 
Committee submitted its recommendations—which attempted to balance the 
water needs of agriculture with those of southern Arizona municipalities and 
mines to reach a level of sustainable pumping—to the Commission at a meeting at 
Castle Hot Springs on May 2, 1979.
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Ultimately, the Pima County Advisory Committee’s recommendations and 
the Commission’s legislative proposals fell victim to political expediency. In 
December 1979, when the Commission appeared to be moving too slowly for the 
Carter administration, Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus informed Arizona’s 
Democratic Governor Bruce Babbitt that the state must pass a groundwater 
management law that would address the issue of overdraft before Carter would 
support funding for the CAP.  Arizonans were depending on the 1.4 million acre-
feet of CAP water, slightly more than the amount of groundwater over-drafted in 
the Phoenix Valley annually in the late 1970s, to solve the depletion problem.  
Babbitt and the legislature acted quickly, forming a “rump group” including 
lobbyists from each of the three major interest groups—mining, agriculture, and 
cities—and privately negotiated a bill.  It was delivered to the legislature, passed 
by both houses in an hour and fifteen minutes and was signed into law on June 12, 
1980, as the Arizona Groundwater Management Act (GMA).  In the end, SES did 
not much influence the passage of what was hailed as one of the most innovative 
groundwater management reforms in the nation, but, as Robinson would remark 
years later, “[f]ailure is a better teacher than success.”  The Central Arizona 
Project and resulting Groundwater Management Act pulled SES fully into water 
issues at a level beyond its public education campaigns and land-use work of the 
mid-1970s and taught Robinson and the organization valuable lessons about how 
politics worked.  Through increasing its research of environmental issues and 
making itself a valuable source of information for decision-makers, SES 
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endeavored to gain greater access to, and power in, the environmental policy 
arena to influence better legislation in the future.
153
    
 
SES Wades into Water Quality 
 
The national and local debate surrounding the construction of the Central 
Arizona Project to Phoenix and passage of meaningful groundwater management 
reform in 1980 illuminated the enduring salience of water as a political issue in 
Arizona.  Securing a dependable supply of this essential resource for a growing 
population was not enough—it had to be potable.  While government bureaucrats 
from Washington, DC to Pima County and Tucson environmentalists focused 
primarily water use and conservation, water quality was never far from their sight.  
As SES navigated the legislative process and politics of the Central Arizona 
Project and groundwater management, it could hardly ignore other issues 
pertaining to water quality within southern Arizona and the state at large.  
Developments at the local, state, and federal levels prompted their involvement in 
water quality.  Most pressing for SES were proposals for new residential and 
commercial developments that would strain groundwater supply and water 
treatment infrastructure and threaten to pollute water sources and the discovery of 
groundwater contamination in Tucson.  Although the federal government passed 
the Clean Water Act in 1972, SES realized that just because a law was passed did 
not mean that water quality was protected.  It recognized that the law’s 
enforcement in Arizona was still inadequate to protect water quality, and that 
citizens would have to pressure the state to protect this vital resource.  Thus, SES 
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asserted its position as an advocate for the public interest, and encouraged 
concerned residents to participate in the development of standards and hold state 
agencies accountable for keeping the water clean.  In proposals by the state Health 
Department for new or revised water quality standards for streams in southern 
Arizona to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act, they saw opportunities 
for citizens to ensure the protection of water quality from residential, agricultural, 
and industrial developments in the future.  SES’s work on water quality during 
this period existed within this pull and push between local issues and state and 
national regulations.   
SES first became involved in water quality issues in a limited way during 
early 1977.  The organization became aware that the Arizona Department of 
Health Services and Arizona Water Quality Control Council were considering 
revisions of water quality standards for the Gila and San Pedro rivers in the 
southern part of the state as part of a review required by the federal Clean Water 
Act.  The state was supposed to review these standards every three years.  The 
deadline was July 1977—Robinson observed their progress and reported to the 
board in May of that year that it was unlikely that the state would complete the 
review in time.   The Gila flowed east from western New Mexico across eastern 
Arizona to emerge in the southeast corner of the Phoenix Valley.  Before the 
construction of large irrigation diversions in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, it flowed all the way across the state to the Colorado River.  In 
the late 1970s, due to irrigation diversions and groundwater pumping, it rarely 
flowed its entire course but still provided water to irrigate hundreds of thousands 
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of acres in Arizona and percolated down into the aquifers that provided water for 
millions of residents in the Phoenix Valley.  The San Pedro flowed north from the 
Mexican border, draining the broad valley between Tombstone and Sierra Vista 
before babbling into the Gila River near Winkleman.  The San Pedro was one of 
the last free-flowing perennial streams in the American Southwest and was 
cherished for its ecological importance as vital riparian habitat supporting 
hundreds of species of birds and mammals.  When considering water quality 
standards on the San Pedro and Gila, state’s could exceed the standards of the 
federal government’s Environmental Protection Agency, who enforced the law, 
but they could not be weaker.
154
   
To influence the revision of water quality standards for the Gila and San 
Pedro and other Arizona rivers, SES used the organizing capacities it had 
developed during its “Water Workshops” in 1976.  It drew from lists it had 
created from the workshops of concerned residents to turn out as many people as 
possible to a public hearing held by the Arizona Water Quality Council on 
January 12.  Barbara Rieke conducted most of the research on the rivers and 
proposed standards and organized the turn out.  SES and their supporters 
submitted testimony opposing any lowering of standards for both rivers.  The 
group also submitted their written comments to the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Robinson assured the SES board in her monthly 
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report that she felt confident that the EPA would overrule any lowering of the 
standards by the State of Arizona “if there is support within the state”—SES 
would make sure EPA knew there was support for stringent and protective water 
quality standards for the state’s few, precious rivers.  Robinson and Rieke 
understood that under the Clean Water Act, the EPA would review Arizona’s 
proposed standards and that citizens would have the opportunity to comment on 
its decisions.  Despite concerns by the organization that the Water Quality Control 
Council would lower standards, SES was pleased when the Council issued its 
final decision in Phoenix in April 1977, recommending that standards be 
maintained at their protective levels.  SES understood this as a victory for the 
organization.  “We believe our participation both directly and through 
encouraging others to participate was important in the final outcome,” Robinson 
reported to the board.
155
    
As Robinson, Rieke and the board were working to influence water quality 
standards for the Gila and San Pedro River, another local water quality issue came 
to light.  At the February 1977 meeting, board member Richard Duffield raised 
his concerns about plans for a new wastewater facility near Summerhaven on 
Mount Lemmon in the Santa Catalina Mountains north of Tucson.  At over 9,000 
feet in elevation, Mount Lemmon provided a cool, recreational sanctuary for 
Tucson-area residents and second-home owners from the dry, but intense heat, of 
the Sonoran summers and, in wet winters, the opportunity to snow ski within an 
hour’s drive of the city.  A new wastewater facility was proposed to deal with the 
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waste produced by the growing number of cabins and recreational users on the 
mountain but it threatened to dump contaminated effluent into Sabino Creek, a 
perennial stream flowing out of the mountains and through a very popular 
recreation area on the north side of Tucson.  The board directed Robinson and her 
staff to investigate the issue.
156
    
Robinson delegated the issue to Betsy Rieke.  Rieke found that Duffield’s 
concern was warranted—the issue arose at a time when Pima County was 
developing a plan to bring its wastewater facility on Upper Sabino Creek into 
compliance with EPA regulations and faced fines from the federal agency if they 
failed to do so within three months.  SES pounced on this opportunity to influence 
the plan and asserted the role of citizens and local organizations to influence 
decisions regarding this important water source.  It scheduled a “meeting for 
interested parties” on April 6 at its office in downtown Tucson.  It contacted about 
twenty-five people from a list of concerned residents it had been compiling since 
the Water Workshops who it thought would be interested in meeting to come up 
with a solution.  The group included representatives from the Southern Arizona 
Hiking Club, Sierra Club, and Southern Arizona Environmental Council.  
Furthermore, it sent a representative to the Pima County Sanitation Department 
Steering Committee, which had invited the group’s participation and planned to 
ask the Committee for a permanent seat for SES.  From the twenty-five people it 
contacted, a “small but committed group” was formed to vet proposals from the 
county and make recommendations, correspond with the EPA about the county’s 
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proposals, inform the public about proposals, and turn out concerned residents to 
public hearings held by the county during May and June of that year.  The 
proposals that surfaced called for either building a treatment plant that would 
discharge some amount of treated effluent to Sabino Creek or to develop a 
solution utilizing a combination of techniques to eliminate any discharge to the 
creek.  Hoping to limit residential growth on Mount Lemmon, SES advocated the 
construction of the most minimal facility that could treat the wastewater from 
existing buildings and not encourage additional developments.
157
 
Despite the efforts of SES and environmentalists’ hopes for a speedy 
resolution, the Mount Lemmon-Sabino Creek issue stalled by late 1977.  To the 
angst of SES and other groups, the Pima County Sanitation Department Steering 
Committee opted to propose a plan to the county and EPA that called for a larger 
and more expensive wastewater management facility than recommended by 
citizens and environmental groups.  Environmentalists countered by requesting 
that the county delay making a final decision to allow for more research.  The 
county was already running behind schedule and the Board of Supervisors had 
requested an extension from the EPA to avoid fines.  SES and the other groups 
also wrote to the EPA supporting the extension.  Delaying the project was not 
their only objective, however.  As the Mt. Lemmon-Sabino Creek issue 
progressed, two developments at the state level regarding the regulation of water 
quality made a delay a logical and reasonable course of action.  By mid-1977, the 
state was negotiating with the EPA to transfer the National Pollution Discharge 
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Elimination System (NPDES) from the federal agency to Arizona Department of 
Health Services and it was unclear what ramifications this would have for water 
quality standards and enforcement on the state’s rivers and streams and how it 
would affect projects like the one on Mount Lemmon.  Second, the Pima 
Association of Governments was in the process of developing its regional water 
quality plan under section 208 of the federal Clean Water Act.  The Mount 
Lemmon-Sabino Creek wastewater issue, along with every other water quality 
issue in Southern Arizona, was quickly framed within these regulatory activities 
at the county, state and federal level.  When the state Department of Health 
Services and Water Quality Bureau began to develop groundwater quality 
standards for the state in early 1979, it added yet another frame to the 
discussion.
158
 
The problem of the wastewater treatment on Mount Lemmon drew SES 
into this larger debate over water quality fomenting in Arizona in the late 1970s, 
and propelled the group’s work on water issues.  The group was already adept at 
educating the public about environmental issues and encouraging citizens to take 
part in decisions regarding land use, air and water, and quality of life, but water 
quality opened further opportunities for citizens to be heard.  Robinson 
recognized that the public participation provisions within the Clean Water Act 
increased citizens’ capacities to affect environmental decision-making.  She 
explained to the board in April 1977 that she envisioned an expanded role for SES 
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in water quality issues, “primarily because water quality has an important bearing 
on land use and because the existence of a? powerful federal law [the Clean Water 
Act] gives us the standing we do not have in issues that are controlled entirely by 
local officials.”  In only a few months, water quality grew from one of the group’s 
minor concerns brought to the board’s attention by a single board member, to part 
of a much larger campaign.
159
   
 
SES Tackles Water Pollution at it Source 
 
In its attempts to improve and protect water quality in southern Arizona, 
SES joined other groups successfully to pressure state agencies to enforce existing 
laws and allow citizens living downstream to participate in decisions regarding 
water quality.  Citizens and environmentalists understood that clean water was 
essential to the sustainability of Tucson and the health of its residents, and that 
population growth, agriculture, and industry posed numerous threats to southern 
Arizona’s water quality.  By the late 1970s, they also understood that industry and 
government agencies had done a poor job of protecting the quality of rare streams 
and groundwater, despite the passage of the powerful Clean Water Act earlier that 
decade.  For Clean Water Act to be effective, SES and other groups realized, 
citizens would have to ensure that state and federal regulators implemented and 
enforced the law.  As the group and others became aware of processes underway 
by the state to review and create new water quality standards on local streams or 
renew water pollution permits, they became increasingly involved in these 
decision-making procedures.  They soon learned that issues of water quality and 
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enforcement were incredibly technical; in order to participate, citizen activists 
quickly had to learn the science and laws involved in protecting clean water.  
Robinson and her staff recognized this necessity—if they were effectively going 
to influence environmental decisions on behalf of public health and the 
environment and counter the paid professional lobbyists of polluting industries, 
they fully would have to engage the technical aspects of clean water.  As they 
learned the science and law of clean water, they continued to use the citizen 
participation provisions of the Clean Water Act to insert the public interest into 
water quality decisions.  SES used several tools to promote effective democratic 
participation in environmental governance.  It gathered information about threats 
to water quality made available by public disclosure requirements in the Clean 
Water Act, identified opportunities for public involvement in decision-making 
processes, and organized informed citizens to take part.  It learned the details of 
the law, including what was required of state and federal agencies and what was 
discretionary, so that it could monitor agency actions and advocate the law.  As it 
did so, it justified its positions and participation based on principles of justice and 
democratic participation, rather than on just personal preferences.  As SES began 
to realize its niche in the water quality issue, other local water issues attracted its 
attention. 
  In October of 1978, SES became aware that Kennecott Copper Company 
was seeking a renewal of its permit from the State Department of Health Services 
to discharge water from its mining operations near Hayden into the Gila River 
near where it was met by the San Pedro north of Tucson.  SES was concerned that 
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mining could degrade the quality of the Gila water.  The group hoped that by 
taking part in the permit renewal, it could affect more protective pollutant 
limitations in the revised permit and elevate the issue as part of its campaign for a 
comprehensive water quality monitor program.  Increasingly familiar with the 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System created under the Clean Water 
Act, under which Kennecott’s permit fell, SES set out to influence the state’s 
decision.  With other organizations, it successfully pressured the State Department 
of Health Services for a public hearing so that citizens could make their voices 
heard in the decision-making process.  The hearing was held January 11, 1979, 
and SES and other Tucson-area environmental organizations turned out members 
and representatives to testify.  The state and the EPA then deliberated several 
months while SES, other environmental groups, and Kennecott waited for its 
decision.  In the mean time, Robinson and Rieke accepted an invitation from Ken 
Vance, Kennecott’s superintendant at the mine in question to tour its wastewater 
management facilities.  They used the trip as an opportunity to add to their 
knowledge of mining and water quality issues as well as to network.  “[A]n added 
bonus,” of the tour, Robinson reported to the board,  “is that Ken Vance is a likely 
candidate for a vacancy on the Water Quality Control Board.” Robinson was 
already contemplating how to influence this regulatory board in her larger vision 
for how the organization would affect state-level reforms in water quality 
regulations.
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While SES awaited the EPA decision on Kennecott’s discharge permit, 
things began to move on the Mt. Lemmon-Sabino Creek issue.  During the late-
winter and spring of 1979, flooding creeks near the proposed wastewater 
management site in Summerhaven, the highest residential settlement on Mount 
Lemmon, destroyed part of the site proposed for the plant and, with it, the 
county’s and EPA’s plans.  The floods revealed to both entities the inadequacy of 
the proposed site for the facility, but to move it elsewhere would significantly 
increase its cost—an increase the EPA refused to support.  By the summer of 
1979, the SES board and concerned homeowners near Summerhaven were fed up 
with the impasse.  Robinson, Rieke, and Barbara Tellman recruited Jane Kay, a 
reporter for the Arizona Daily Star, to travel with them to Summerhaven and write 
an expose about the issue of wastewater management and pollution to Sabino 
Creek in the newspaper.  The women also took advantage of the fact that the 
county’s NPDES discharge permit for the existing facility had expired and needed 
to be renewed.  “The public has a right to request a public hearing on renewal of 
permits,” Robinson reported to the board, “and we have requested such a 
hearing.”  They then contacted about two hundred concerned individuals on their 
mailing list and implored them either to attend the hearing or submit comments to 
protest what they saw as “the slow action by the county in cleaning up the stream” 
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and to request that the new permit include a specific timeline for the completion 
of the new wastewater management facility.
161
   
The matter became further complicated in September of that year, when 
the county proposed a new land-use plan for Mount Lemmon that would increase 
commercial uses in Summerhaven without addressing the inadequacy of the 
existing wastewater facility and the possible lack of capacity of the proposed 
plant.  Tellman organized people from the group’s mailing list to attend the 
county hearing on the new land use plan and testified on the organization’s behalf.  
Ultimately, SES’s work—raising the issue in the press, organizing residents and 
working with other groups, including the Southern Arizona Hiking Club to apply 
pressure to Pima County and EPA officials—paid off.  The EPA was convinced to 
rewrite Pima County’s NPDES permit with a schedule of compliance that 
mandated the completion of an adequate wastewater management facility to 
prevent the degradation of Sabino Creek by the end of the summer in 1980.  
Additionally, the agency agreed with SES’s recommendation that the new facility 
should only be large enough to serve the existing community and not allow for 
increased residential and commercial developments.  However, when the EPA 
made it clear to the county that it would only fund this smaller facility, progress 
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once again lurched to a halt.  While it waited for resolution to yet another water 
quality issue, other local developments caught the group’s attention.162    
In the course of following events on Mount Lemmon, SES became aware 
in the late 1979 and early 1980 of other wastewater management issues in 
northeastern Tucson where a mobile home park was planned along Pantano Wash 
and near the tiny town of Patagonia sixty miles south of the city where a four-
hundred home development was proposed along Sonoita Creek.  In both cases, 
Robinson and SES feared that allowing the construction of large residential 
developments without adequate infrastructure planning could threaten water 
quality and set a dangerous precedent for land use in Pima and Santa Cruz 
counties.  In her view, the counties, had failed to plan for growth adequately.  In 
the mobile home park case, the developer proposed to build its own wastewater 
facility.  Robinson feared that if Pima County allowed private developers to 
install ad hoc wastewater treatment plants instead of planning for regional growth 
and building adequate infrastructure, the county would open a Pandora’s Box and 
subvert one of the few areas in which the county and concerned citizens could 
manage growth.  Before building the sewage treatment plant, the owner of the 
Rincon Country Mobile Home Park Village had to obtain a discharge permit from 
the EPA under the federal Clean Water Act.  In Patagonia, the developer proposed 
to have the new development annexed by the city of Patagonia and use the town’s 
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existing wastewater facility.  Patagonia’s wastewater facility did not have the 
capacity to handle waste from four hundred new residences; if it was overloaded,  
it could flood Sonoita Creek with raw sewage.  Robinson understood that in both 
cases, permitting processes or approval by the Patagonia City Council provided 
opportunities for citizen participation and a more complete review of the issue 
than provided for by county building permit processes.  In the mobile home park 
issue, they requested a hearing and organized interested residents to testify and 
submit comments.  Soon after, they began to organize concerned residents to 
lobby the Patagonia City Council.
163
    
  In both issues, forces outside SES’s control intervened.  In February 1980, 
the Patagonia Town Council rejected the developer’s proposal to annex the 
development, effectively ending that controversy.  Within a month, the owner of 
the mobile home development, dissuaded either by agency red tape or public 
interest surrounding his application for a discharge permit, removed his 
application.  The hearing on the mobile home park’s discharge permit application 
was held anyway on March 13 and SES, the League of Women Voters, Southern 
Arizona Environmental Council, the Pima County Environmental Planning 
Advisory Committee, as well as the City of Tucson took the opportunity to testify 
on the need for a moratorium on all discharges into the Santa Cruz River and 
Avra Valley basins until groundwater standards were established.  SES and clean 
water advocates realized that any real solution to the seemingly endless list of 
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proposals for new discharges to the waterways of Southern Arizona needed to be 
dealt with at the regional and state level.  The temporary small victories in the 
trailer park and Patagonia issues gave SES time to re-focus its campaign on the 
administrative processes already underway.  For the next six years, they used the 
citizen participation provisions within the Clean Water Act and asserted their role 
as an advocate of the publics’ interest, to influence the enactment of stringent 
water quality standards for the surface and ground waters of Southern Arizona.
164
 
 
SES Seeks New Solutions to Water Quality Issues 
 
SES first became aware of the proposed transfer of administration of the 
federal government’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
from the federal to the state level in April 1977.  The program was created under 
the Clean Water Act in 1972 to regulate the introduction of pollution into the 
nation’s waters.  The law, substantially revised in 1977, mandated that the 
administration of the permitting system be eventually transferred to the states so 
long as the standards for pollution created by the law were not lessened by the 
state’s administering agencies.  In early 1977, Arizona and the EPA began 
working toward transferring administration of the program to the state.  As with 
the state’s review of state water quality standards, SES was primarily concerned 
with making sure that as the state took increased control of policing water quality 
in Arizona, it maintained, at a minimum, the federal standards for introducing 
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pollutants to the state’s rare surface waters.  The group was also interested in 
evaluating existing standards in Arizona to judge whether they were adequate or if 
some needed to be more stringent.
165
 
Like the review of state water quality standards, the transfer of the 
permitting system from the federal government to Arizona required the agencies 
involved in making decisions to provide opportunities for citizen participation.  
For its part, SES strove to inform interested residents and organize them to take 
part in public hearings and submit comments to the agencies throughout the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  Betsy Rieke led the campaign by researching the issues 
and writing materials used to inform SES supporters and other groups and their 
members.  Robinson researched, wrote, and testified where she was needed.  
While they attempted to encourage citizen participation, the process became 
increasingly technical and Rieke and Robinson found themselves devoting more 
time to attending Water Quality Control Council and Bureau of Water Quality 
meetings and corresponding directly with state agencies and the EPA than 
organizing citizens.
166
   
In the NPDES transfer issue, SES was challenged to review the federal 
Clean Water Act and state water quality laws to identify where they were 
consistent and where state laws needed to be adjusted to comply with federal 
standards.  These included not only differences in pollution standards, but also 
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problems in administration such as conflict of interest issues with members of the 
state Water Quality Control Council which would be charged with reviewing and 
approving discharge permit applications.  SES argued that the Council should 
include more seats for citizens and fewer for representatives from industry and 
agriculture who had a direct financial interest in the un-enforcement of water 
quality laws and standards.  At meetings sponsored by the Arizona Department of 
Health Services (ADHS), Rieke and Robinson joined representatives from other 
parties interested in the transfer—primarily mining companies and irrigation 
districts—in reviewing draft proposals from the state and arguing for the 
maintenance of the federal standards.  They continued to take part in these 
meetings and negotiations with state officials and irrigation and mine 
representatives, reviewing and commenting on the Department of Health 
Services’ proposed legislation to affect the transfer until the department 
introduced its bill in February 1979.  Rieke and Robinson felt that the bill, S.B. 
1156 sponsored by State Senator Bob Usdane, a Republican from Scottsdale who 
was sympathetic to agricultural and mining lobbyists and their calls to 
“streamline” regulations, would dramatically weaken the ability of the 
Department to control pollution from non-point sources—seepage from mine 
tailings ponds, pesticide-laden or polluted run-off from farms or landfills—into 
adjacent streams.  They focused their efforts on lobbying Usdane and other 
legislators to strengthen the bill.  Meanwhile, SES reviewed proposed revisions to 
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the state water quality standards by ADHS in expectation of turning out 
concerned residents at a public hearing on the revisions in mid-1979.
167
 
The NPDES transfer bill deadlocked in the Arizona legislature.  The EPA 
informed the Department of Health Services what SES had been telling the 
department since the bill was introduced: S.B. 1156 was unacceptable because it 
represented a lessening in water pollution standards below what was required by 
federal law due to the bill’s failure to address non-point source pollution from 
agricultural runoff, mines, and landfills adequately.  After some deliberation, 
ADHS requested that the sponsor pull the plug on the bill so that the department 
could start over in February of 1979.  Robinson did not expect that it would make 
any progress until the next summer.  In fact, no progress was made on the transfer 
issue until well into the late 1980s.  Following the NPDES transfer debacle in 
1979, SES’s work on water quality changed course.168  
 
Citizen Water Quality Experts Get a Seat At The Table 
 
After mid-1979, SES continued to monitor local water quality issues, 
including progress with the Mount Lemmon-Sabino Creek wastewater treatment 
facility, but focused more of its attention on proposals from the state to create new 
regulations to protect Arizona’s precious groundwater from contamination.  Once 
surface water quality standards were adopted, the group shifted its focus from the 
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NPDES transfer issue to this new issue as a way of preventing degradation to 
water quality from the seemingly endless proposals of new residential, 
commercial, and industrial developments in southern Arizona.  Due to her 
experience in working with water quality issues, Robinson was appointed to the 
state Water Quality Control Council Advisory Committee, giving SES and the 
Tucson-area environmental community a voice in creating the new regulations.
 169
   
This shift may have reflected frustrations on behalf of Robinson, her 
employees, and the board at the apparent lack of movement on their primary 
water quality concerns.  In an interview decades later, Robinson explained that 
one of her primary motivations in her work was achieving success—“I truly like 
to win…I like the sensation of winning.”  The sluggishly slow pace at which the 
local water quality campaigns and the NPDES transfer process moved may have 
simply lost her attention and she moved onto the next issue in which she thought 
the group could realistically achieve success.  An anthropologist by training, she 
viewed her work researching, writing, organizing, and lobbying as a kind of 
experiment.  “I never used the same strategy twice,” she remembered years later.  
The experiment in trying to influence the NPDES transfer may have been just 
that.  When it stalled, she put the issue behind her and moved onto the next 
challenge.  Even though SES eventually intervened on the side of the EPA in a 
lawsuit against Pima County for its failure to enforce adequate water quality 
standards on Sabino Creek in 1981, the Mt. Lemmon wastewater issue attracted 
significantly less attention from Robinson or her staff.  By 1980, Robinson and 
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SES shifted their work on water quality almost exclusively to working on creating 
standards for groundwater quality and regulations to protect it.  Because of the 
highly scientific nature of the Clean Water Act, which stipulated acceptable and 
hazardous levels of pollutants in water and state standards and regulations used to 
meet its requirements, SES’s work tended to involve Robinson and her staff 
almost exclusively in researching, writing, and meeting with state officials and 
other parties interested in groundwater quality to craft regulations.  Organizing 
citizen participation to influence decision makers when opportunities arose 
remained an important component of their campaign, but in order to counter the 
arguments of industrial and agricultural lobbyists who sought to streamline or 
weaken water quality standards, the group had to become experts on the law and 
science of water quality.  This was a necessary reality for many environmental 
organizations during this era including local, community-based groups.  For SES, 
this professionalization was another tool for inserting the public interest in 
environmental decision-making.
170
         
During her early work on the Water Quality Control Council Advisory 
Committee, Robinson was pleased to find that the Department of Health Services’ 
Bureau of Water Quality had adopted interim non-degradation policy for 
groundwater throughout the state as SES and other environmental groups had 
recommended at the March 13, 1979 public hearing over the Rincon Country 
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Mobile Home Village discharge permit.  However, she acknowledged that 
creating new regulations was going to be difficult and would probably not happen 
quickly.  While the process of writing new regulations slowly progressed, she and 
Tellman took the opportunity to advance public participation in the process.   
Throughout 1981 and 1982, SES organized a series of meetings with the Tucson 
Mountain Association, League of Women voters, and the Pima Association of 
Homeowners Federation in Tucson to provide concerned Tucson residents a link 
to the inner-workings of the Water Quality Control Council and Department of 
Health Services as they drafted proposed standards and regulations.  These 
augmented Department-sponsored “workshops” and public hearings giving 
citizens valuable opportunities to create broadly-supported recommendations 
which they interjected into the Department’s  decision-making process.  The 
meetings continued alongside the Department’s hearings and workshops until 
ADHS issued its draft regulations to the Attorney General’s office for review in 
1982.  The Attorney General would judge whether the Department had the 
authority to enact the new standards and implement the new regulations.  
Although it was a lengthy process, Robinson was pleased that many of the 
recommendations that came out of SES and the Tucson environmental and city 
and county government community were adopted by the Council and the 
Department.  In February of 1982, she reported to the board, “[w]e feel that SES’ 
[sic] participation was instrumental in these actions,” referring to the Committee 
adopting SES’s recommendations that Robinson believed would result in more 
stringent standards.  Finally, in June 1982, the regulations were ready.  More than 
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seventy-five people attended a public workshop on the proposal in Tucson—well 
beyond the announced limit of fifty—and Robinson reported that there was 
“considerable support” for stringent regulations.  The Water Quality Control 
Council still had to approve the guidelines at its July meeting and would likely 
take into account the comments from the workshop, but the draft regulations were 
practically finished.
171
 
As long and occasionally tedious as the groundwater quality project was, it 
seemed to follow a neat and positive progression from its inception in late 1980 
through mid-1982.  The exchange between the public, stakeholders, and decision 
makers produced proposed protective standards, regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms that were supported by all involved.  This consensus began to 
unravel, however, after the Department revealed its final proposal in June 1982.  
At its July meeting, the Water Quality Control Council postponed any further 
action on the draft regulations due to extensive comments from the mining 
industry on the Department’s proposal.  In the hopes of putting the process back 
on track, Robinson and Tellman increased their lobbying of council members and 
recruited media attention to the issue.  By the end of August, due to pressure from 
the mining industry, agricultural groups and the state Chamber Commerce, the 
Council considered introducing a weaker, watered-down version of the draft 
regulations.  The process—with SES as part of it—was drawn into a slow and 
                                                 
171
 Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 13 May 1980, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 4; 
Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 10 June 1980, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 4; 
Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 8 July 1980, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 4; 
Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 9 February 1982, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 5; 
Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 8 March 1982, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 5; 
Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 13 April 1982, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 5; 
Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s Report,” 9 June 1982, SES Records, MS 269, Box 1, Folder 5.  
  229 
debilitating series of committee and subcommittee meetings that pointed toward 
the eventual dismantling of most of the stringent standards and regulations both 
environmentalists and other concerned citizens had supported.  Although there 
were still opportunities for public input, the prospects of achieving meaningful 
standards and regulations were sinking.  Updating the board in December 1982, 
Robinson reported “[w]e are making little progress…and still hope for a final 
package we can support.”172   
The group’s hopes were revived somewhat by the high turnout at the 
public hearing in January 1983 and strong support for stringent regulations among 
the crowd.  SES’s experience informing citizens and organizing them to attend 
hearings paid off.  Members of the Junior League of Tucson and the Southern 
Arizona Water Resources Association, a recently formed group, appeared as a 
result of SES’s recent work with both groups and the hearing were well-covered 
by the press.  “It is important to have all of these views included in the hearing 
record, even though we may not succeed in getting the standards changed,” 
Robinson reported to the board.  She sounded optimistic as she gauged the value 
of SES’s participation and the hearing: “Support for a strong system should 
transfer to the ongoing discussion…Tracking this process is expensive but 
important.”  The Water Quality Control Council considered citizen input from the 
hearing and a follow-up workshop held in May and finalized the draft standards 
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and regulations in July 1983.  While Robinson and Tellman still found parts of the 
Council’s proposal to be problematic, it was their opinion that they should be 
adopted so that the program could begin.  In its previous session, the legislature 
had authorized the creation of nineteen new staff positions within the ADHS’s 
Bureau of Water Quality to execute the new regulations—they just needed to be 
finalized so that the Bureau could get to work.  On July 13, at its meeting in 
Flagstaff, the Water Quality Control Council voted to approve the draft standards.  
The mining industry made a last-ditch but futile effort to delay the Council’s 
decision to give it more time to further influence the standards in its favor.   After 
almost three years, it appeared that Arizona could begin to implement controls on 
groundwater quality.
173
 
However, just as Robinson, Tellman, the SES board, the members of the 
Water Quality Control Council and staff of the Arizona Department of Health 
Services began to celebrate and prepare for the enactment of the new regulations, 
the process ran into trouble again.  The Water Quality Control Council approved 
the draft standards in July, but it was still unclear whether the Department of 
Health Services had the authority to approve the new water quality regulations 
that accompanied them.  That question awaited a review and opinion by the office 
of the state Attorney General.  On October 14, Attorney General Bob Corbin 
issued a vague opinion that raised as many questions as it answered.  He ruled that 
the department had the authority to execute some of the regulations and approve 
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some of the standards but not others—the issue would only be resolved by 
introducing and passing legislation changing the standards and regulations, 
authorizing the Department to act, and directing it to do so.  In understated 
fashion, Robinson summed up the development for the board: “This action is 
something of a setback for the program.”  The issue of creating protective 
standards for groundwater quality and regulations and mechanisms to enforce 
them was thrust from the administrative level into the legislature, which tended to 
favor economic development and growth over environmental protection.
 
The 
department began work implementing the parts of the regulations and standards 
that the attorney general affirmed were within their purview.
174
 
Robinson, together with ally David Baron from the Center for Law in the 
Public Interest, with whom SES worked throughout the process, began to meet 
with Pima County legislators, members of Governor Bruce Babbitt’s staff, and 
Department staff to prepare to introduce legislation in the upcoming 1984 session.  
They received a commitment from Republican Tucson State Senator Greg Lunn 
to meet with House Majority Leader Burton Barr on the issue.  Lunn took the lead 
in putting together legislation including organizing meetings of interested parties 
in the Tucson area in late 1983 and early 1984.  At SES, Barbara Tellman left the 
organization after working for SES on a contractual basis for four years to work 
full time for the Pima Association of Governments.  Her work was turned over to 
a new staff member, Lois Kulakowski and an intern from the University of 
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Arizona named Jim Albert.  Kulakowski took the lead on the issue pressing for 
effective means of protecting groundwater from “non-point source” pollution—
seepage from mine tailings ponds and agricultural pesticides into aquifers.  By 
February 1984, four bills were introduced.  The bills represented positions across 
the spectrum reflecting the demands of environmentalists and municipalities on 
one side, the mining industry and agriculture on the other, and the administrative 
concerns of the Department of Health Services somewhere in the middle.  Over 
the course of the next two months, all four bills died—victims of the complicated, 
technical nature of the issue and entrenched positions on all sides with 
environmentalists and cities arguing for stringent standards that would prevent 
any degradation of groundwater and industry and state and local chambers of 
commerce arguing that new regulations would destroy business.  The legislature 
adjourned in May and the issue remained on the table.  Governor Babbitt, citing 
the recent discovery of groundwater contamination in Tucson water wells, 
instructed the department to begin implementing the draft regulations and 
standards regardless of the attorney general’s opinion—an order that would likely 
land the department and governor’s office in court.  “We have some of the worst 
and most ineffective laws for controlling water quality,” he told a press 
conference at his Phoenix home in May 1984.  SES weighed the costs and 
benefits of Babbitt’s actions against a possible legislative interim committee that 
would continue to study the issue with the goal of passing legislation during the 
next session.  For their purposes, Robinson hoped the publicity surrounding a 
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possible court battle would elevate the issue in the public mind and give it the 
boost it needed to break any legislative blockade in the next session.
175
   
Help came from an unfortunate and unforeseen source.  The public 
discourse about water in southern Arizona was changing dramatically leading into 
1984.  Major flooding of the Santa Cruz and Rillito Rivers and other streams in 
southern Arizona during an epic El Niño event in October 1983 raised the issue of 
flood plain management, erosion, and sedimentation in urban areas.  For the SES, 
Southern Arizona Environmental Council and other environmental groups, the 
floods, and pending state legislation on water regulation, elevated water to the top 
of their priority list.  The issue was made more salient when the carcinogenic 
chemical trichloroethylene (TCE), left over from the heyday of production by 
Hughes Aircraft decades before, was found to be contaminating the aquifer 
underlying central Tucson in 1984.  The threat this posed to the health of an urban 
population dependent on its aquifers for drinking water thrust the issue to the fore 
of public and political concern.
176
 
The detection of TCE in twenty six wells in the Flowing Wells area of 
Tucson in 1984 raised serious questions in the minds of southern Arizonans about 
the regulation of hazardous substances and who should be held accountable for 
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paying for contamination from irresponsible industry actions taken decades before 
federal pollution-control laws.  Local newspapers illuminated a lack of regulatory 
protection from groundwater contamination and warned of the pernicious nature 
of industrial pollution, further provoking this conversation.  In April 1984, The 
Arizona Daily Star reported: “Study finds EPA rules don’t protect groundwater.”  
In October, the same paper ran an Associated Press article warning that 
groundwater pollution potentially threatened the drinking water of half the 
population of the United States.  Two months later, the Tucson Citizen warned, 
“Chemicals in groundwater soak through faster than suspected.”  In the following 
year, The Arizona Republic reported that the U.S. Geologic Survey’s second 
annual National Water Summary found that fourteen percent of the 4,164 wells 
the agency tested in Arizona exceeded EPA standards for nitrates.  This was more 
than double the national average.  Local newspapers also revealed a change in the 
public mood with regard to pollution and quality of life.  In a national poll 
conducted in 1984 as reported by The Arizona Daily Star, Americans considered 
pollution a worse crime than some homicides.  Politicians could not ignore the 
public fervor surrounding water quality after the discovery of TCE in Tucson’s 
drinking water aquifer.
177
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The Citizens’ Water Quality Initiative and the Arizona Environmental 
Quality Act of 1986 
 
Feeling exasperated at the Arizona legislature’s inaction on the issue of 
groundwater pollution in 1984 and 1985, the city of Tucson joined eleven 
environmental groups in fall 1985 to propose a citizen’s initiative.  The language 
of the initiative was initially drawn up by David Baron of the Center for Law in 
the Public Interest, but SES, Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, and 
Sierra Club supported the effort.  The initiative was not finalized until after the 
November 1984 election, so supporters worked throughout 1985 to collect the 
necessary 72,000 signatures to get it onto the ballot that year.  Finally, in 1986, 
the Arizona Clean Water and Pesticide Control Act of 1986 was put to the 
electorate for a vote.
178
   
In the meantime, as the water quality initiative was being written, the 
Arizona House and Senate named an interim committee to study the issue chaired 
by Representative Hawke and Senator Lunn.  It met three times throughout the 
late summer and early fall 1984.  Lois Kulakowski testified before the committee 
on behalf of SES, along with a number of other witnesses who spoke in favor of a 
strong groundwater quality program for the state.  The interim committee 
deliberated on the issue but failed to come up with any proposed legislation 
before the 1985 legislative session.  In the meantime, the state Chamber of 
Commerce sued the Department of Health Services in Maricopa County Superior 
Court, questioning its authority to enact and enforce the new water quality 
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standards.  However, citing the public interest in continuing the protection of 
groundwater quality and stressing that the Chamber failed to show how its 
members would suffer irreparable harm from implementation of the regulations, 
Judge Bernard Dougherty did not grant the business group’s request for a stay to 
prevent the Department from carrying out the new regulations.  The court’s 
decision all but ended the Chamber’s suit.  Robinson testified as a witness in the 
case.  As the 1985 legislative session opened, a variety of bills aimed at 
addressing the issue were introduced, but only one piece of legislation drew 
SES’s support, a bill written by the department to clarify its authority to enforce 
some of the regulations in question.  As in the previous session, all measures 
failed.
179
      
As the initiative got underway, Republican and Democratic politicians 
alike in city government and representing Tucson in the legislature endorsed the 
statewide initiative even though it would mean the expansion of the Arizona 
Department of Health and Attorney General’s responsibilities to pursue stricter 
regulation and enforcement at the cost of almost ten million dollars.  Democratic 
Governor Bruce Babbitt, frustrated with the inaction on the issue by the 
legislature, considered making the issue the subject of a special legislative 
session.  He also lent his backing to the initiative and urged “all Arizonans to 
support this effort to ensure that our water supply will be clean today and in the 
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future.”  In fall 1985, The Arizona Daily Star editorialized on the proposition: 
“Citizens are stepping in where Legislature has failed.”  Although the public and 
political fervor behind the initiative was prompted by the discovery of chemical 
poisons in Tucson’s water supply resulting from historic industrial manufacturing, 
the mining industry fought more viciously to defeat the initiative than any other 
group.
180
 
Within a month of the announcement of the clean water initiative, the 
mining industry began an effective campaign of “confuse and conquer.”  Included 
in their tactics were claims that if the law passed, Arizonans would not be able to 
flush their toilets.  Additionally, they claimed that the law could result in mining 
companies being fined a million dollars a day for violating regulations of which 
they had no knowledge.  The mining industry had succeeded in combining such 
tactics with unwillingness to compromise in order to defeat a proposal by Tucson-
area Republican legislators to toughen water-quality laws during the 1985 and 
previous legislative sessions.  By the end of 1985, however, the tide of public 
opinion was too strong for the industry.  In October, once initiative supporters 
began gathering signatures, the threat of the voter-passed initiative forced the 
mining industry and others to the negotiating table.  Unlike a conventional 
legislative proposal, opponents realized that with an initiative, they would have no 
ability to influence the final outcome through their lobbyists—if it passed, they 
would be forced to comply, regardless of how detrimental it might be to their 
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businesses.  In interim meetings organized by Jack Pfister of the Salt River 
Project and by Senator Lunn and Representative Hawke in 1984 and 1985, 
representatives from the mining industry, agriculture, and the Chamber of 
Commerce were recalcitrant and unyielding in their opposition to new standards 
and regulations for non-point source discharges to groundwater.  Now they began 
to cooperate with other stakeholders in these meetings by fall 1985.  Representing 
SES, Robinson took part in these meetings.  She had recommended that SES 
purposely limit its involvement with the initiative so that its resources could be 
devoted to continuing to work on legislation.  From her years of working in 
Arizona natural resource politics, she hoped that the initiative would alter the 
political dynamics surrounding the issue and force the opponents of stringent 
water quality standards to compromise.  She had made an informed gamble and it 
seemed to be working.
181
 
The timing of the initiative, certified October 1 with public support 
running from county boards of supervisors and city councils all the way to the 
Governor’s office, could not have been more opportune for advocates of passing 
meaningful groundwater quality legislation.  The campaign for the Arizona Clean 
Water and Pesticide Control Act of 1986 spanned the entirety of the 1986 
legislative session, looming over lawmakers and opponents, silently pressing 
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them into negotiations.  If they failed to act, the public was watching and would 
likely act for them in November.  Furthermore, the initiative provided a 
mechanism for organizing the public debate over the issue and influenced the 
political campaigns of candidates running for Governor.  As a result, Republican 
and Democratic gubernatorial candidates alike made water quality a central issue 
in their campaigns.  State Senator Lunn voiced his optimism in fall 1985 that the 
election for governor would force the water quality debate into the larger 
statewide political conversation.  Lunn believed that Republican candidate Burton 
Barr of Phoenix, who had been an impediment to legislative attempts at pollution 
control in the past, would have to appeal to a wider audience and consider water 
quality legislation more seriously.  On the Democratic ticket, incumbent Bruce 
Babbitt continued his tough stance on protecting groundwater and made it one of 
the top priorities of his campaign platform.  At an Arizona Town Hall meeting at 
the Grand Canyon in late October 1985, he vowed that he would not compromise 
on groundwater protection and that he was supporting the clean water initiative 
proposed for the 1986 ballot.  He said that he would not allow the Arizona 
Chamber of Commerce and mining industry to influence legislation in a way that 
would undermine the state’s ability to protect water quality.  He was especially 
suspicious of proposals by industry to put control of water quality in the hands of 
the Arizona Water Quality Control Council within the Arizona Department of 
Water Resources, a body that met only quarterly and was not designed to enforce 
water quality regulations—a move he viewed as tantamount to giving the industry 
the ability to police itself.  “The public health cannot be put in charge of the 
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industries discharging the waste,” he told the Town Hall.  As the 1986 legislative 
session began, Robinson joined the governor’s water quality task force which met 
weekly and through her lobbying and advising, SES found itself in a position to 
profoundly influence any new law that passed.
182
   
 
 
Governor Babbitt’s water quality task force, 1986.  Robinson, the only woman on 
the task force, sits facing away from the camera across from Babbitt.  Private 
collection, Priscilla Robinson, Tucson, Arizona. 
 
Governor Babbitt charged on the legislature from day one.  He devoted 
half of his state of the state address on January 13, 1986 to environmental issues 
and water quality.  He told legislators, “[p]olluters must be stopped without regard 
to the size of their assets, the clout of their lobbyists or the skill of their 
attorneys.”  Although he drew criticism from Republican lawmakers for his 
seeming unwillingness to compromise, leaders from both parties agreed that 
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passing groundwater legislation was a top goal of the session. His likely opponent 
in the upcoming election from the Republican Party, House Majority Leader 
Burton Barr, who had fought tough water quality legislation a year before, 
realized that he could not ignore the issue and made strides to avoid being painted 
as the “dirty water candidate.”  Barr conceded that there was a good chance of 
something passing during the session, so long as the governor was willing to 
compromise.  However, Babbitt promised that if the legislature failed to send him 
a “strong bill,” he would support the citizen’s initiative scheduled for the ballot in 
November.  Understanding that opponents were pressured by the threat of the 
initiative to compromise, he staked out a strong position proposing the protective 
standards and regulations produced by the ADHS in 1983 and refused to consider 
the transfer of regulation and enforcement from the Health Department to the 
industry-dominated Water Quality Control Council.
183
   
The governor’s water quality task force met throughout early 1986, 
drawing on the experience, expertise, and opinions of water quality experts, 
stakeholders, environmentalists, and the public.  It weighed the costs of restricting 
the use of nitrate-based fertilizers on Arizona farms because of the deleterious 
effect they had on groundwater.  The sides paired off with farming and business 
representatives, arguing that the task force should balance the economic costs to 
their activities with the benefits to society.  Environmentalists and representatives 
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from Tucson on the task force characterized this point of view as “sort-sighted 
and costly.”  Reflecting the fundamental differences among task force members, 
lawyer Jim Bush of the Arizona Mining Association argued that “it may be in the 
state’s advantage to allow degradation,” for example, “of an aquifer that’s 
eventually going to be pumped out.”  Robinson appealed to the group to think 
beyond the dichotomy of the environment and human health versus the economy, 
stressing that mines and farms can find ways to profitably continue business 
without degrading water quality.  If a mining company was not willing to make 
the extra expenditure to clean up its operation, she told the group, the 
environment would be degraded and “he’s the last guy to make a buck up there.”  
Despite the often-heated debate, the task force agreed to use a bill drafted by 
Representative Hawke as a starting point for negotiations. Robinson reported to 
the board that the process was incredibly time consuming—she had met with the 
task force or one of its subcommittees a total of sixteen times between mid-
February and mid-March.  She reported that they were making progress on many 
of the lesser issues, but that the major issues still required substantial work.
184
 
After more than four months of intense negotiations, the task force 
finalized the language of its bill on April 18.  It retained the protective standards 
and regulations carved out by the Department of Health Services, presumed that 
all groundwater supplies were for drinking and must not be degraded without a 
compelling reason, and required that polluters be held liable for the cost of 
cleaning up pollution even if it occurred years before.  It created a state fund, 
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funded by the legislature at the level of five million dollars a year, to pay for 
cleanup when the polluter could not be identified, had gone out of business, or 
was disputing the issue in court.  Lastly, it located wide-ranging regulatory 
authority in a new state agency, the Department of Environmental Quality.
185
   
The Arizona Environmental Quality Act was sent to the legislature within a week.  
Robinson and other members of the task force and the public testified on behalf of 
the bill before the House Natural Resources Committee and lobbied lawmakers 
extensively.  Although there were some questions among legislators about 
funding mechanisms within the bill and disagreements among environmentalists 
about its effectiveness, it was passed by both houses by large margins without 
amendment.  With much media fanfare, Governor Babbitt signed it on May 13.  
The Arizona Daily Star called it a “landmark bill” and John Andersen, director of 
Arizona Common Cause who was spearheading the citizen water quality 
initiative, remarked that it was “probably stronger than the initiative.”  Andersen 
said that a few of the initiative supporters were dissatisfied with the final product, 
but that the coalition backing the effort would probably end its activities and 
allow the proposition to die.  The Los Angeles Times characterized it as one of the 
toughest groundwater protection laws in the nation.  The law, the paper reported, 
reflected a growing environmental consciousness within the state in sight of the 
rapidly diminishing power of its traditional economic base—mining and 
agriculture.  A recent poll, the Times reported, found that “quality of life” ranked 
first for residents of Pima County in Southern Arizona.  This change marked “part 
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of a fundamental transition of Arizona from a cow town to a sophisticated urban 
area.”  Robinson reported her pleasure in the bill’s success to SES’s board: “It is a 
good bill and I am very pleased with it.”186  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The passage of the Arizona Environmental Quality Act marked an 
enormous victory for environmentalists in Arizona and for the Southwest 
Environmental Service in particular. It marked the evolution in the political skill 
and technical knowledge of Robinson and the clout of the organization within 
Arizona politics and environmental community.  This was reflected by a 1985 
publication by several scholars of land and water use in Tucson from the 
University of Arizona, citing SES as one of the “two most influential groups” in 
the regional environmental movement, alongside the Center for Law in the Public 
Interest.  Underscoring this honor, Robinson was named to the Ground Water 
Users Advisory Council under the Arizona Department of Water Resources by 
Governor Babbitt.  In just over a decade, the group had grown from an experiment 
of its financial benefactors, wealthy Tucson locals with a concern for the 
environment, to an important organizer of citizen involvement in environmental 
and natural resource politics at both the local and state levels.  Led by Robinson, 
it had learned how effectively to influence decision makers and gain a seat at the 
table in deciding environmental issues.  Unfortunately, Robinson and SES barely 
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had time to relish this achievement or to even catch their breath.  At the same time 
as they ramped up work on water quality, air quality became an equally important 
and daunting issue for the organization.
187
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CHAPTER 7 
REINING IN THE SMELTERS: CITIZEN ACTIVISM FOR CLEAN AIR IN 
SOUTHERN ARIZONA, 1978-1987 
 
By the end of the 1970s, Americans were more environmentally conscious 
than ever before.  In addition to a popular environmental consciousness 
demonstrated in events such as Earth Day and the growth and proliferation of 
environmental organizations, the federal government enacted a series of laws that 
gave unprecedented power to new federal agencies to protect the nation’s air, 
water, and land and the health of its citizens from pollution.  These were joined by 
hundreds of similar laws at the state level that required agency and public review 
of proposed projects that might adversely affect the environment or public health.  
Arizonans—organized in a handful of community-based environmental groups 
like Southwest Environmental Service and Grand Canyon Chapter of the Sierra 
Club and others—were caught up in the movement.   
In the last years of the 1970s, however, environmentalists learned that 
environmental problems were not solved just because Congress or the state passed 
a law.  Implementation of environmental laws required the persistent attention of 
citizens to monitor government agencies and industry and hold both accountable 
to the public.  In Arizona, this was most evident in the fight for clean air.  In 1978, 
eight years after the passage of the Clean Air Act and an EPA mandate that the 
sixteen U.S. copper smelters—seven of which were in Arizona—remove ninety 
percent of the sulfur dioxide from their emissions little had changed.  In addition, 
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Arizona had yet to create plans to control the pollution from its smelters as 
directed by the federal government.  Arizona environmentalists were focused on 
urban air pollution created by automobiles, but copper smelters were the largest 
sources of pollution in the state and the largest emitters of acid-rain-causing sulfur 
dioxide west of the Mississippi river.  From smokestacks hundreds of feet high, 
they pumped more than four thousand tons of sulfur dioxide, heavy metals and 
other pollutants into the air every day that drifted over rural Arizona communities, 
farms and ranches and into Mexico causing respiratory problems and damaging 
crops.  By 1978, five of the Arizona smelters had begun to upgrade their facilities 
to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act and avoid costly fines from the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  Two—the massive Douglas Reduction Works 
on the Mexican border owned by the mining giant Phelps Dodge Corporation, 
which emitted roughly one-quarter of the total smelter pollution in the state, and 
the Magma Copper Company’s smelter in San Manuel—remained out of 
compliance and showed no sign of trying to meet the terms of the law.  Phelps 
Dodge in particular appeared intent on using its political clout and the skill of its 
lobbyists and attorneys in Arizona and Washington, DC, to obtain exemptions for 
the Douglas smelter to avoid fines and continue to operate rather than invest 
millions to upgrade its almost seventy year old facility.  The company reluctantly 
acknowledged the damage the roughly one thousand tons of sulfur dioxide its 
smelter emitted every day did to the land surrounding its smelter—between the 
1930s and 1971 it bought “smoke rights” paying farmers and ranchers owning 
112,000 acres in the valley north of Douglas and to the south in Mexico not to sue 
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the company for acid rain damage to their properties.   But “Old Reliable,” as 
Phelps Dodge executives and workers called the smelter, dependably turned a 
healthy profit even if at the expense of the environment and health of thousands of 
people living around Douglas.  If it was forced to spend hundreds of millions of 
dollars to install pollution controls, Douglas would not be profitable again for 
many years.  Phelps Dodge’s plan was to subvert the intent of the Clean Air Act 
to the detriment of public health and the environment for as long as elected 
officials and regulators would allow.  As it did, it would  smelt copper with a 
competitive advantage over the region’s other smelters, which were investing 
millions of dollars in pollution abatement technologies.  When it could no longer 
get its way with state politicians and regulators, Phelps Dodge would close the 
archaic smelter, leaving hundreds of southern Arizonans out of work.  It was a 
ruthless, but economically rational, strategy for a company with a history of 
ironfisted corporate behavior.
188
  The Phelps Dodge smelter had killed crops, 
choked residents, and ignored or perverted the rule of law of the region for 
decades; unless someone intervened to thwart its plans, the company would 
continue undermine public health, the environment, and the law in southern 
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Arizona for decades to come.  When government failed to act, citizens, 
emboldened by new environmental laws, which gave them a say in and the right 
to appeal environmental decisions, stepped in.  SES formed part of the vanguard 
of this movement in Arizona to hold the smelters and government accountable to 
the laws, health, and environment of the people. 
 
 
Phelps Dodge’s Douglas Reduction Works smelter in 1972.  The Douglas smelter 
pumped thousands of tons of sulfur dioxide and other pollutants into the 
atmosphere which polluted the air and land for miles around the smelter.   
Photograph No. 543989 (Photographer Cornelius M. Keyes); “Phelps Dodge 
Corp. smelter in Background, 06/1972,” June 1972; Documerica Project, Records 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, 1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online 
version, www.archives.gov, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 
December 2011], National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.  
 
 At almost the same time that the Southwest Environmental Service began 
to work in earnest on water issues in Southern Arizona, the group also began to 
venture into the arena of air quality.  As with the issues surrounding water in the 
region, the organization initially understood air quality in relation to their over-
arching concerns about booming population growth and land use planning.  But 
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like its water work, SES’s air quality campaign quickly evolved in relation to a 
variety of developments outside the organization’s control.  Financial concerns 
prompted the organization to pursue campaign elements that could attract 
foundation and grant money.  This caused the group to compartmentalize air 
quality into its own campaign, related to but separate from the group’s work on 
land use planning.  A larger catalyst, however, resulted from changes in federal 
air quality laws during the 1970s and requirements for Arizona, Pima County, and 
Tucson to create new air quality standards to bring the region into compliance 
with the federal Clean Air Act.  In response to the processes created by the 1977 
revisions to the Clean Air Act by Congress, SES’s air quality campaign grew 
from public education initiative aimed at building awareness about the value of 
and threats to clean air and how to protect it in Tucson, to a focused and 
sophisticated effort to rein in some of the largest polluters in the country.   
SES’s air quality campaign—beginning with public education and 
empowering citizens to participate in local and national decisions regarding air 
quality and ending with a very technical political and legal battle which resulted 
in the closure of America’s dirtiest copper smelters—illustrates the complexity 
and trajectory of many local, community-based environmental campaigns during 
the 1980s.  Like other environmental organizations during this era, SES set out 
ensure implementation and enforcement of existing laws and use citizen 
participation to influence decision-makers to rein in polluters.  When this strategy 
failed to produce the desired results, SES was forced to adapt.  Its campaign grew 
more sophisticated and technical.  SES actively recruited media coverage to build 
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their case for closing the offending smelters and looked to other decision-making 
bodies for solutions.  Ultimately, their campaign to clean up southern Arizona’s 
air was won  through use of the courts and administrative processes established 
under the federal Clean Air Act.  SES’s air quality campaign demonstrates the 
relationship between environmental laws and citizen participation, the role of the 
media and politics in influencing environmental decisions, and how citizens 
environmental groups adapted to changing regulatory and political landscapes and 
creatively used all means at their disposal to affect change.     
 
From Smog to Smelters: SES’s Air Quality Campaign, 1977-1981 
 
For Southwest Environmental Service, air quality was simply a subset of 
its larger work on land use planning until December of 1977.  But while the 
organization busily monitored various proposals for new suburban developments 
and attempted to influence county- and state- level regulations regarding growth, 
events in Washington, DC changed the context of its work on air quality.  In 
1970, Congress had passed the Clean Air Act with bipartisan support and 
Republican President Richard Nixon signed it into law.  This success came after 
more than five years of persistent lobbying by environmental organizations and 
out of general frustration by certain members of Congress at the failure of 
previous federal-level remedies to air pollution.  Political scientist Walter 
Rosenbaum argues that federal environmental laws before 1970s—the Water 
Quality Act of 1965 for instance or the Air Quality Act of 1967—were 
Congressional experiments in incrementalism.  Instead of Congress legislating a 
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primary role for the federal government in setting standards for environmental 
quality and then enforcing those standards, it treated pollution as a “uniquely local 
problem” which could best be solved by a “partnership” between state and local 
governments.  The deference of the federal governments to the states was a 
“prescription for inaction,” as few states cooperated and voluntarily created and 
enforced pollution abatement regulations.  The rapid growth in the political 
strength of the environmental movement during the 1960s, the increasing public 
awareness of the severity of environmental degradation, and the leadership of 
veteran conservationists in Congress created the impetus for the passage of a new 
generation of federal environmental laws.  The Clean Air Act of 1970, along with 
the landmark National Environmental Policy Act, was one of the first of many 
laws that mandated a new role and responsibility of the federal government in 
rectifying environmental problems.  It made air quality a national priority, created 
a new national framework for setting standards for pollutants, and established 
strict deadlines for compliance.  Under the law, which Rosenbaum identifies as 
“one of the longest, most complex, and most technically detailed regulatory 
programs ever enacted on a federal level,” the federal government was to 
establish national standards for air quality for major pollutants harmful to human 
health and the environment.  The Act then directed the states to administer the 
program within guidelines laid out by Congress and the Environmental Protection 
Agency.  The federal government and states were to share enforcement of the 
standards.
189
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After six years, Congress reviewed the law and revised it in 1977 through 
a series of amendments.  Significantly, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments 
created mechanisms for Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of air 
quality in areas meeting the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
enacted by the 1970 law and established new penalties for noncompliance with 
standards.  But, because many states failed to meet the standards set in the law, 
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments granted extensions on standards including 
for pollutants emitted from automobiles under the stipulation that standards of 
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons would be further tightened after 1980.  In an 
attempt to make coal strip mining and power production more palatable to 
environmentalists in the midst of the energy crisis, Congress and President Carter 
also wrote into the amendments the New Source Review Program which required 
that operators of large industrial facilities—namely coal-fired power plants and oil 
refineries—install modern pollution control technology in new plants and when 
retrofitting old facilities.  Due to pressures from the copper lobby and 
congressmen representing copper producing states, however, this provision did 
not extend to Arizona’s copper smelters.  Instead, Congress created the Primary 
Nonferrous Smelter Order (NSO) system which created a process by which 
copper smelters built before August 7, 1977, could be exempted from complying 
with pollution standards in the Act as late as 1988.
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The Southwest Environmental Service monitored these amendments from 
afar for most of 1977.  In December, however, when Robinson caught wind of 
rumors that under the amendments the federal government could withhold 
funding for highway and wastewater projects around Tucson—of primary concern 
to the organization’s land use work at the time—if the state did not enforce air 
quality standards, the group took notice.  At that month’s meeting of the board, 
Robinson told the members about the amendments to the Clean Air Act.  She 
reported her understanding that the general thrust of the amendments was that the 
federal government was requiring more action by the states, and that for the first 
time federal funding for other programs would be tied to whether states enforced 
federal air quality standards.  She explained that each state, and regions within 
each state, were required to prepare a plan to achieve federal air quality standards 
by January 1979 and that public hearings and citizen participation were required 
in the crafting of the plans which ultimately would have to be approved by the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  “Because this is an area where important 
decisions will be made within the next year,” she told the group, “and because 
extensive citizen participation is possible, it is an area where we need to become 
expert.”  She requested that five hundred dollars be allocated from the budget to 
hire a part-time researcher to study the recent changes and how they might affect 
SES’s work.  The board approved the request.191 
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From early 1978 until 1979, SES’s clean air work consisted primarily of 
studying the recent changes to federal law and identifying how the group might 
positively affect air quality in Southern Arizona.  Specifically, Robinson and 
Betsy Rieke, whom she hired on an hourly basis, sought to understand what was 
required of the State of Arizona in terms of creating new regulations or programs 
to meet the new federal mandates and determine how SES might influence state 
agency decisions when they were made.  Following its organizational philosophy, 
it embarked on a campaign to educate the public about air quality issues and 
encourage citizens to participate in any environmental decision-making process 
that might emerge.
192
   
Like other environmental groups in Tucson, SES’s principal concerns had 
to do with urban air quality.  In February, SES formed a “working group” made 
up representatives from the Southern Arizona Environmental Council, Arizona 
Lung Association, League of Women Voters, Sierra Club, as well as a handful of 
other interested individuals.  Robinson also travelled to Phoenix that month to 
meet with representatives from other groups interested in air quality to network 
and strategize.  By March, the working group had eighteen members representing 
seven different organizations and was focused on addressing air quality issues 
associated with transportation planning.  In June, SES partnered with the Arizona 
Lung Association and, with a small amount of funding from the EPA, organized a 
“Clean Air Workshop” in Phoenix modeled on the successful “Water Workshops” 
two years prior.  It drew seventy concerned attendees.  Three months later, SES 
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helped organize a community-wide “Clean Air Day” at a shopping mall in Tucson 
sponsored by the Southern Arizona Environmental Council, Pima County Air 
Quality Council, and the Sierra Club.  In announcing the event, SAEC’s 
newsletter told readers that it was organizing the event because “the 
environmental well being of Tucson may well depend on Tucson’s ability to meet 
the new federal clean air standards.”  The event emphasized the effect of 
automobile emissions on Tucson’s air quality and taught residents how to reduce 
their emissions.
193
    
As SES became more involved in its air quality public education 
campaign, it was challenged to understand the scientific and technical aspects of 
air pollution, and of air quality laws and their enforcement.  On the heels of the 
“Clean Air Workshop” and in the midst of internal conversations about the 
financial future of SES, the organization SES succeeded in getting a small grant 
from the EPA for a public education campaign to produce  the citizens clean air 
handbook in conjunction with a smaller publication about smelter pollution to be 
produced by the Arizona Lung Association.  The project required the group to 
delve deeper into the details of air quality.  Understanding the Clean Air Act, its 
1977 revisions, the standards it created and how the state and local governing 
bodies were implicated in their enforcement was a challenge even for technocrats 
trained and practiced in law, environmental management, and governance.  The 
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SES staff had to decipher the meanings of “attainment” and “non-attainment” 
areas, “stationary” and “mobile” sources of pollution, and particulates, 
photochemical oxidants, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and other pollutants.  
In addition, they had to navigate a seemingly ever deepening pool of acronyms—
NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standards, pronounced “knacks”), 
NESHAPs (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants—
ironically, there is no record of this being pronounced “kneeshaps”), SIPs (State 
Implementation Plans), and NSPSs (New Source Performance Standards).  If this 
were not enough, they had to unpack the differences between Class I, Class II, 
and Class III air quality areas and where the EPA had located each in the state.  
Their research drew them into meetings concerning the Pima County Air Quality 
Regulations, hearings on the EPA’s proposed boundaries for “non-attainment 
areas”—areas that did not meet the agency’s NAAQS and thus had to be managed 
differently under the Clean Air Act.  They reviewed the potential impact on land 
use and transportation planning in Tucson of zoning Saguaro National Monument 
a Class I air shed, and of proposed state air quality regulations.  Amidst all of this, 
one acronym came to stand out more than the others: “NSOs.”194 
 In January of 1979, SES was notified that the EPA was holding a series of 
hearings in Tucson concerning rule-making for something called “Nonferrous 
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Smelter Orders.”  Nonferrous Smelter Orders, or “NSOs,” were a form of 
exemption written into the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 to shield existing 
copper smelters from penalties resulting from their inability (or unwillingness) to 
meet the sulfur dioxide standards established in the Act and by the EPA after 
1970.  Much of the popular fervor surrounding new air quality standards and 
enforcement mechanisms for “stationary” (industrial) sources of pollution in the 
Amendments revolved around emissions from new coal-fired power plants and oil 
refineries—a response to the plans of government and the power industry to build 
dozens of new major coal-fired electrical generating plants and oil refineries to 
combat the energy crisis.  As a result, Congress created the New Source Review 
Program, which required new plants and refineries to incorporate the latest 
pollution abatement technology in their facilities.  Copper industry lobbyists and 
politicians from copper-producing states, including Arizona’s Democratic 
Congressman representing Tucson and southern Arizona, Morris Udall, worked to 
protect the industry from new air quality regulations as the Amendments took 
form.  Copper lobbyists from international mining corporations like Phelps 
Dodge, Magma, Asarco, and Kennecott argued that if they were forced to comply 
with the Clean Air Act standards, they could not compete with government-
owned foreign competition like that of the recently nationalized mines in Chile.  
Fearing a loss of jobs, Udall and the Arizona delegation pushed for the 
exemptions.  NSOs created a process that made official what had been a de facto 
exemption of certain copper smelters from the requirements of the Clean Air Act 
by the EPA’s inability to compel states to force facilities into compliance.  But in 
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April of 1978, the EPA told the state that, after eight years of failing to comply 
with the Clean Air Act, it must create a plan to bring the smelters into 
compliance.  If Arizona failed to do so, the federal government would step in.  For 
smelters to continue to receive the exemptions, they had to apply for a Nonferrous 
Smelter Order by demonstrating that pollution abatement technology was either 
not available or too expensive.  The regulations for the NSO program were 
promulgated by the EPA, which oversaw the states as they administered the 
program.  If granted, the smelter could continue to operate, exempt from air 
quality standards, until a designated date.  In 1979, the two most polluting 
smelters in Arizona—and potentially the entire United States—Phelps Dodge’s 
facility at Douglas on the Mexican border about one hundred twenty miles 
southeast of Tucson, and Magma’s facility at San Manuel approximately fifty 
miles northeast of the city—applied for NSOs.  If they were granted the smelters 
would receive an exemption until January 1, 1983, at which time they could re-
apply for a second NSO that would extend the exemption to January 1, 1988.  As 
required by the Clean Air Act, the EPA scheduled hearings to gather public input 
on the regulations for issuing NSOs for Phelps Dodge’s and Magma’s 
applications.
195
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 When Robinson received the notice of the upcoming hearings, she 
scrambled to get SES involved somehow.  The Tucson-area environmental 
community was so focused on urban air quality, and the proposed regulations that 
accompanied the notice from the EPA were so technical, that she feared that if 
SES did not do something about it, no one would.  She read the proposed rules, 
attempting to understand the issue as best she could, and prepared a mailing to her 
list of more than three hundred people interested in air quality, encouraging them 
to testify at the hearings or at least submit comments.  At the hearings, Robinson 
was joined by twenty-three other speakers, seventeen of whom had been 
organized to attend by SES.  She testified on the proximity of Douglas and San 
Manuel smelters to Tucson and to Saguaro National Monument, Aravaipa Canyon 
primitive area, and other wilderness areas eligible for designation as Class I air 
quality areas under the Clean Air Act, and about SES’s concerns about what 
effect granting NSOs to Phelps Dodge and Magma would have on air quality in 
the region.  After the hearings, she reported to the board that the EPA staff 
appreciated SES’s work in “helping to provide some balance at the hearings.”196 
 At the hearings, she met a man named Michael Gregory from Bisbee, 
approximately thirty miles west of the Douglas smelter.  Located in the rugged 
Mule Mountains just north of the U.S.-Mexico border, the town was one of the 
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capitals of the southwestern copper empire during the twentieth century.  When 
Phelps Dodge’s Lavender Pit closed in the 1970s the company moved its western 
region headquarters out of Bisbee.  In 1979, it was in the process of transitioning 
from a mining town to a refuge for artists and other counter-culture types and, 
increasingly, tourists.  Gregory alerted Robinson after the hearings that there was 
a group of people in Bisbee who stridently opposed Phelps Dodge being granted a 
continued NSO exemption.  He described clouds of sulfurous smog rolling 
northeast from the smelter into the mountains and asthma attacks among the 
young, elderly, and infirm.  Robinson’s interest was piqued.197    
 
This pollution pictured here, produced by smelters in Globe-Miami east of 
Phoenix, was typical of that produced by the Douglas smelter during the 1970s.  
Photograph No. 546749 (Photographer Cornelius M. Keyes); “Smoke from 
copper smelters in the Globe-Miami area drifts toward Phoenix, 03/1973,” March 
1973; Documerica Project, Records of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online version, www.archives.gov, National 
Archives and Records Administration, 5 December 2011], National Archives at 
College Park, College Park, MD.  
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 Throughout 1979, as Robinson and Reike worked on the citizens’ clean air 
handbook, smelter pollution continued to attract more of their attention.  Although 
Muriel Beroza of the Arizona Lung Association was writing a smaller publication 
funded by the EPA specifically on smelters, the women felt that because smelters 
were such large producers of air pollution—the seven smelters emitted more 
sulfur dioxide than all of the coal-fired power plants in the Southwest combined—
it was impossible to separate them from the larger air quality issues in the state.
198
  
As work on the publication and the NSO exemption progressed, the group came 
into contact with other groups interested in the smelter.  In the fall of 1979, 
Clifford Smith, a retiree in McNeal twenty miles north of Douglas, who was 
organizing his friends in that town in opposition to EPA’s approving the smelter’s 
application for an NSO, contacted the group.  Robinson shared information SES 
had collected on the issue with Clifford and began a relationship between the 
groups she hoped would prove beneficial.  As a result of SES taking an early lead 
in the NSO issue, the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) to 
contacted the group to review the EPA’s proposed regulations with regard to 
NSOs for Douglas and San Manuel for the department.
199
   
In December, SES was contacted by yet another concerned resident from 
near Douglas.  Dick Kamp, who managed an auto-wrecking yard, worked part-
time at the Bisbee post office, and described himself as living as a “quasi-hippy 
with a non-career,” approached  SES about smelter smoke problems in both 
Arizona and Sonora, Mexico.  He was concerned not only with the NSO proposal 
for the Douglas smelter, but with a proposal for a massive, 930-foot high smelter 
smokestack in Nacozari, Sonora, and the expansion of the Cananea smelter also in 
Sonora, Mexico.  Years later, he remembered, “[t]he air quality in the area was 
horrid.”  He proposed to Robinson that he take photos of the Douglas smelter 
from the ground and from the air and correlate them with emissions reported by 
the smelter and EPA to create information to use in the NSO process.  The 
prospect of having an ally on the ground who could gather empirical data to use in 
SES’s arguments against granting the NSOs immediately appealed to Robinson.  
The citizens’ air quality handbook—officially named Blue Skies: An Arizonan’s 
Guide to Clean Air—was completed and under review by the EPA by late 1979.  
It was not published and distributed for almost another year.  Although the state, 
EPA, SES and other groups found it “enormously useful,” by the time of its 
publication SES’s air quality work had decidedly turned toward reining in the 
pollution of Arizona’s dirtiest smelters.200  
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SES Fires Up Its Smelter Campaign  
 
 After SES made contact with Kamp, Robinson moved the focus of the 
group’s clean air campaign toward Bisbee and Douglas.  Using her skills in 
organizing public education events, she worked with Kamp and Gregory who 
soon organized the Cochise Smelter Study Group to organize a workshop on clean 
air, smelter pollution, and the NSO process during February of 1980 that attracted 
about seventy-five interested people.  Robinson and Kamp started working more 
closely together.  SES organized Kamp’s photographs and information gathered 
into factual summaries and mailed them out to its “air quality” mailing list of 
more than three hundred Arizonans, encouraging them to submit comments to the 
EPA regarding the NSOs.  The two travelled to Salt Lake City in July to testify on 
the EPA’s proposed visibility regulations.  During a labor strike at the smelters in 
the fall of 1980, the group worked with members of the Southern Arizona Hiking 
Club and Sierra Club to take “clean air baseline” photos of the Galiuro 
Wilderness and other areas while the smelters were idled.  Phelps Dodge had 
already informed the EPA and the state that it would close down the Douglas 
smelter rather than upgrade its facilities to comply with the law if it failed to 
obtain an extension of its exemption from the Clean Air Act under the NSO 
system.  Kamp remembers Robinson optimistically telling him that she was 
confident that by using the NSO process, the state’s most polluting smelter would 
close within three years.
201
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 The Southwest Environmental Service’s leadership on air quality and 
especially the smelter issue began to attract broader attention by mid-1981.  In 
February of 1980, Robinson was asked to take part in the Four Corners Study 
Information Group created under the National Commission on Air Quality by the 
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments.  When she attended the first meeting of the 
group on March 15 in Durango, Colorado, she found that she was “a national 
expert on smelters” as a result of her written testimony during the NSO hearings 
in Tucson.  She continued to take part in the group, which was reviewing and 
advising the National Commission as it prepared its final recommendations to 
Congress as it considered reauthorization of the Clean Air Act scheduled for 
1982.  From the meetings she gleaned technical knowledge about the Clean Air 
Act and EPA regulations and air quality in general.  “It is an excellent educational 
process for me,” she reported to the SES board in December 1980.202 
 Robinson’s education in air quality took a new direction the next year 
when SES was asked to take part in the National Clean Air Coalition.  Although 
she was familiar with the workings of county and state administration and 
government in Arizona, this new experience offered Robinson a crash course in 
the national politics surrounding clean air issues.  In March of 1981, she attended 
the Coalition’s meeting in Washington, DC, She found the meeting informative 
and useful, but discovered that smelters were woefully absent from the Coalition’s 
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agenda.  From her perspective, the Coalition was dominated by national groups 
like the Sierra Club, who were primarily interested in issues of urban air quality 
affecting the eastern United States.  When she inquired about smelters, she was 
advised by other attendees to talk to Robert Yuhnke—a Boulder, Colorado-based 
attorney working with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).  In the Coalition, 
Yuhnke was the resident expert on smelters.  The two instantly hit it off and 
agreed to keep in touch and work together on the Douglas and San Manuel NSO 
issue. 
203
 
 Robinson returned to Tucson after the meeting and continued to organize 
the local campaign with Rieke and the SES board, but she was not at home for 
long.  After a few months in the Arizona side working with groups in Phoenix, 
Bisbee, and Douglas, Robinson was recruited by the National Clean Air Coalition 
to testify about smelter pollution before the Senate Committee on Environmental 
and Public Works chaired by Republican Senator Robert Stafford of Vermont as it 
was considering revisions of the Clean Air Act.  The Coalition contacted her on 
June 1 to testify on June 5.  She quickly gathered information from her work with 
the Four Corners Study Information Group and the Coalition flew her to 
Washington, DC.  Robinson arrived to find that she was the only non-industry 
speaker on the panel presenting alongside representatives from ASARCO, Phelps-
Dodge, Kennecott, and Newmont Mining, of which the owner owned the smelter 
in San Manuel, Magma Copper, was a subsidiary.  Despite the unbalanced nature 
of the panel, Robinson reported to the SES board that “the session went well.” 
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She returned home to find that the Reagan Administration intended to, her words, 
“gut” the Act, including extending the exemption of smelters from the air quality 
standards until at least 1993.  Robinson went to work drafting a response to the 
Administration’s position.  The clean air campaign began to dominate her work 
and SES’s agenda.204   
 
SES Elevates the Smelter Issue In the Clean Air Debate 
 
 In the midst of these activities, Robinson realized that if SES hoped to do 
anything about pollution from the Douglas and San Manuel facilities, it was going 
to have to draw more attention to the smelter issue.  Over the course of 1981,  
Robinson became painfully aware that Congress and the National Clean Air 
Coalition were ignoring the smelter issue.  In Arizona, she experienced firsthand 
how little people understood about smelters and the kinds and amount of pollution 
they produced; in Washington, even committed air quality activists knew little 
about smelters which belched out many times more pollution than the power 
plants and refineries that received most of the attention.  This lack of 
understanding undermined SES’s effectiveness.  In an attempt to rectify the 
situation, Robinson contacted a few reporters she knew at the Arizona Daily Star 
and the Tucson Citizen, inaugurating what became a sustained media campaign 
surrounding smelters for the organization.  Jane Kay, with whom Robinson had 
cultivated a relationship through her work on water quality and land use, wrote 
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the first series of articles in the Daily Star.  On June 14, Kay’s two-page spread, 
“’Old Smoky’ is not all that’s fuming in Douglas,” told the story of Frank Grisby 
and Clyde McGatha who farmed land near Douglas.    “You should have been 
down here last week,” she reports Grisby saying in the vivid exposé, “You 
couldn’t even see the Mule Mountains.”  “When they start firing it [the Douglas 
smelter] at high, you can smell it at night so you can hardly breathe.  Lots of times 
you can taste it,” said McGatha.  The following week, The Arizona Daily Star 
printed another Kay piece which compared copper smelting to a recent natural 
disaster, adding a new element to the evolving discourse about air pollution in the 
region: “Arizona smelters: Mount St. Helens-size issue: Acid rains bitter story 
told by dirty air, dead lakes.”  In subsequent months, the pages of the Arizona 
Daily Star and Tucson Citizen—the two major daily newspapers in the region—
published articles tying copper mining and smelting to increased birth-defects in 
mining towns.  Kay eventually won the prestigious Edward J. Meeman Award 
from the Knight Center of Environmental Journalism at Michigan State 
University for outstanding environmental journalism for her series on the 
smelters.
205
  
 The media campaign raised public awareness among Arizonans, but its 
effects were not immediately felt on state politicians or in debates over smelter 
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exemptions and revisions of the Clean Air Act.  In September, Representative 
Morris Udall met with members of the Bisbee clean air group to hear their 
concerns about the Douglas smelter, its pending NSO application, and extending 
Clean Air Act exemptions for smelters.  If smelters were far from the limelight in 
the national air quality debate, they were more than familiar to Udall.  Known for 
his sense of humor and consensus-style of politics, the congressman was caught 
between his environmental ethics and the fact that Phelps Dodge and Magma 
were two of the biggest employers in his district.  As chair of the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Udall also held significant power to 
influence the Clean Air Act revisions in Congress. At the meeting, Udall was 
unusually rude to and dismissive of the Bisbee residents, making it clear that he 
supported the extension of the smelter exemptions until 1993.  When Robinson 
realized that Udall’s opinion was going to be difficult to turn, she concentrated 
her efforts on Governor Bruce Babbitt with whom she had a better relationship.  
Robinson had been Babbitt’s first appointment to the Arizona State Parks Board, 
and she had worked with his administration on water use and water quality issues.  
Babbitt was an easier target, but she knew that ultimately the group would have to 
gain Udall’s support to end the smelter exemptions.206 
 Robinson further realized how difficult the political aspects of SES’s 
campaign were going to be when she was again recruited in December of 1981 by 
the National Clean Air Act Coalition to testify on potential revisions to the Clean 
Air Act at another hearing in Washington, DC  When she arrived before the 
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House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by California Democratic 
Representative Henry Waxman, she found that the Coalition had failed to notify 
her that the committee room had been changed.  She arrived late for the hearing, 
but still managed to testify.  She attempted to shrug off what appeared to be an 
honest mistake on behalf of the Coalition until she realized that the national 
groups, particularly the Sierra Club represented by Carl Pope, had been meeting 
with Udall and had already agreed to the continued exemption for smelters.  The 
Sierra Club hoped that this concession would help maintain their relationship with 
the congressman, who had sponsored the Alaska Lands Act in 1980, which 
designated millions of acres of wilderness in that state—one of their top 
priorities—and secure his support for the rest of the Clean Air Act.207   
Although the trip was “fairly miserable” for Robinson, it was also 
instructive and ultimately beneficial.  Beyond providing yet another opportunity 
to meet with and lobby members of the Arizona delegation, it partially revealed 
the complex power dynamics of the clean air debate in Washington.  In addition, 
while in Washington, she found unlikely allies in SES’s work on the NSO issue—
representatives from ASARCO which operated the Inspiration smelter in Arizona, 
and Kennecott, which operated a smelter across the border in New Mexico.  
Although the companies preferred to avoid any further regulation, they had 
already implemented or were adding pollution abatement technologies to their 
smelters to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act.  Investing in this 
technology put them at a significant competitive disadvantage with Phelps Dodge 
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and Magma if the companies continued to operate under exemptions provided by 
the NSO process.  They offered Robinson the opportunity to tour their facilities 
and technical information to use in SES’s work on the NSO issue and in lobbying 
Congress to end smelter exemptions in the Clean Air Act revisions.
208
   
 Collaborating with Asarco and Kennecott was one element in what 
Robinson would later recount as SES’s strategy of building “unlikely coalitions.”  
This unlikely coalition continued to grow in 1982 to include more radical 
environmentalists.  On New Year’s day, Robinson met with Jonathon Western, a 
member of Greenpeace, an international environmental organization with a 
history of utilizing direct action tactics in their campaigns.  Western described his 
proposal to Robinson: a media event that involved activists climbing the smoke 
stack of the Douglas smelter to unfurl a publicity banner illuminating the 
relationship between the facility and acid rain.  Robinson was intrigued by the 
benefit of such publicity.  Acid rain had become a growing public concern during 
1981 and 1982 and was attracting increasing media attention.  For the most part, 
articles from the Associate Press stressed the danger of acid rain in the East, but 
newspapers in the Southwest were also beginning to cover the issue, as Jane 
Kay’s1981 series in The Arizona Daily Star on the Douglas smelter attested.  At 
the same time, Bob Yuhnke at the Environmental Defense Fund was increasingly 
linking smelters to acid rain in the West in that group’s air quality work.  
Robinson thought that the Greenpeace media event might give the issue the push 
it needed to awaken the National Clean Air Coalition and Arizona politicians to 
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the seriousness of smelter pollution, but she worried the effect of  SES’s 
involvement with a controversial action would have on its work.
209
 
 Robinson therefore worked behind the scenes with Western to plan the 
event.  Worried that the Douglas smelter was too remote from media centers and 
that law enforcement in Douglas “was pretty much still in a wild west mode,” she 
advised Greenpeace to climb the San Manuel smelter instead.  She contacted Kay 
and Tony Davis at the Tucson Citizen.  On the morning of February 8, 
Greenpeace activists David Stewart, a tree trimmer from Colorado, and Clare 
O’Brien, a rock climber from New Mexico climbed the thin metal ladder that 
clung to the side of the Magma Smelter three hundred feet off the ground and 
unfurled a 60 foot by 12-foot banner.  To reporters, workers, and protesters 
looking up from below it proclaimed “For Our Children, For Our Land, For Our 
Future—Stop Acid Rain.” They spent a night on the stack before coming down.  
Magma’s lawyers told reporters that the company considered the event an obvious 
case of trespassing and might press charges.  Greenpeace representative Alfred 
Quarto of Seattle told reporters, “We told them we thought Magma is trespassing 
on clean air.”  Quarto told the press that Greenpeace was not trying to shut down 
the smelter with the action.  “We’re doing this,” he said, “because we see the 
Reagan administration trying to weaken an already weak (environmental 
protection) act…We want to preserve at least what we have now.”  Robinson 
managed the press at the event, contacting reporters in advance of the climb and 
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directing them to Greenpeace spokespeople.  She did not appear in news coverage 
and quietly reported the event to the SES board.
210
 
 The Greenpeace smelter event at San Manuel was followed by a second 
round of hearings on Phelps Dodge and Magma’s applications for continued 
exemptions for their smelters held in San Manuel, Phoenix, and Douglas in late 
February and early March 1982.  These hearings were organized by the Arizona 
Department of Health Services (ADHS), the state agency charged with enforcing 
federal air quality law in Arizona. If the ADHS approved the smelters’ 
applications they would be sent to the EPA for review.  SES sent out mailings to 
its growing list of people interested in air quality issues notifying them about the 
hearings, providing information about smelter pollution, air quality standards, and 
enforcement, and encouraging them to testify in person or submit comments 
through the mail.  Robinson and Kamp attended all four hearings, armed with 
technical information partially gleaned from Robinson’s relationship with the 
operators of the Kennecott smelter in New Mexico and the ASARCO 
(Inspiration) smelter in Arizona.  Although he did not attend the hearings, Robert 
Yuhnke of EDF also sent Robinson and Kamp his legal interpretations of the 
Clean Air Act and EPA rules and information from his continued research on the 
relationship between smelter emissions and acid rain, and he advised the two as 
they crafted their comments.  Robinson reported that the majority of the attendees 
at the hearings—which included members of Greenpeace who remained in the 
state after the press event and “livened things up”—were opposed to the smelters 
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receiving approval of the NSOs.  But despite strong local opposition, she expected 
ADHS to grant the NSOs.  When they did, SES, EDF, and Kamp would challenge 
the decision, taking it to court if necessary.  She was convinced that with their 
technical knowledge about smelters and pollution abatement technology and 
Yuhnke’s legal ability, they could win and shut down the smelters in the next 
year.  The truth was on their side.  It was only a matter of time before it 
prevailed.
211
  
Things did not unfold exactly as Robinson predicted, or as fast.  The 
Arizona Department of Health Services did approve the NSOs for Douglas and 
San Manuel but the EPA’s Air Quality Division did not take action on the NSOs 
because Arizona’s sulfur dioxide emission limits were not scheduled to start until 
the following year, and the NSO regulations were being challenged in court by the 
companies that owned the smelters.  EPA’s delay may also have resulted from 
pressure by the Reagan Administration and mining interests that were actively 
working to weaken the Clean Air Act.  While clean air advocates waited for the 
EPA to take action, Robinson went back to work trying to influence the ongoing 
congressional review of the Clean Air Act, including lobbying Representative 
Udall on smelter exemptions.  By April of 1982, it appeared that the press 
coverage of the smelter issue and intensive lobbying by many of Udall’s 
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supporters from Tucson were starting to turn the congressman’s opinion.  He 
received dozens of letters from constituents, many prompted by SES’s mailings.  
Dr. Frank Lewis and his wife Udiko, for example, wrote that “[e]xtending the 
exemption will do nothing to aid the industry with its present financial problems.”  
“Extension would only demonstrate that those smelters which have made no 
effort to comply with the goals of the Clean Air Act will be rewarded, while the 
people who live in the surrounding areas can continue to breathe toxic air and 
contend with acid rains.”  T. A. and G. A. Korn told Udall that extending the 
exemption would give smelters like Douglas and San Manuel a ten cent a ton 
competitive advantage over Arizona’s five other smelters who complied with the 
law.  They wrote, “What this situation says to everyone is: if you don’t like the 
rules of the game, ignore them or make up your own rules, because the good guys 
always lose.”212   
After meeting with Udall, Robinson reported to the board that “Mo” was 
not committed to any position, but that it was her impression that he would 
probably not support the copper industry’s proposal to extend Clean Air Act 
exemptions until 1993.  The apparent progress Robinson observed with Udall was 
accompanied by some success in persuading the National Clean Air Coalition to 
make the smelter issue a priority.  For the duration of 1982, neither the ADHS nor 
the EPA gave any indication of movement on the NSO applications for the 
Douglas and San Manuel smelters.  Despite the seemingly stalled state of this 
aspect of SES’s work, the political component of the smelter campaign continued 
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to strengthen.  So did the working relationship among Robinson, Yuhnke, and 
Kamp.
213
 
 
 
Acid rain entered the public debate about air quality in Arizona in 1982.  Cartoons 
like these joined articles about acid rain potentially poisoning Arizona’s few lakes 
and streams and reporting on the Greenpeace protest and NSO process in The 
Arizona Daily Star in 1982 and 1983.  “Looks like more acid rain,” comic, The 
Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) 27 March 1982; “I’m singin’ in the rain…,” comic, 
The Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) 1 March 1983. 
 
 
New Coalitions and New Dynamics In The Fight For Clean Air 
 
 SES’s campaign to rein in pollution from the Douglas and San Manuel 
smelters entered a new phase in 1983.  All of the group’s work during the 
previous years at the local and national level to make smelter pollution part of the 
larger conversation about air quality culminated in new political vigor for the 
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organization’s campaign.  In August of 1982, after sustained efforts by Robinson, 
Kamp, and Yuhnke and other groups in the West, the National Clean Air 
Coalition finally identified the smelter exemptions as one of the most significant 
challenges facing clean air proponents.  When a bill supported by the Reagan 
administration that included amendments extending the exemption until 1993 was 
reported out of committee in September, the Coalition persuaded Colorado’s 
Democratic senator Gary Hart to lead the charge against it.  Supporters of 
extending the exemptions an additional five years argued that it would support the 
economies of smelter towns like Douglas and San Manuel by maintaining 
hundreds of jobs associated with the smelters.  Opponents argued that Phelps 
Dodge had no intention of staying open after its exemption expired, and that 
continuing to grant exemptions enabled the company to operate at a competitive 
advantage over companies conforming to the law and to continue to degrade the 
environment as it did so.  Environmentalists argued that Congress should not 
putoff the inevitable; Phelps Dodge workers in Douglas should be retrained that 
the town and its residents could transition away from copper smelting, allowing 
other economic activities such as tourism to flourish. With the election looming, 
Congress let the bill die in the fall of 1982 only to pick it up the next year.  The 
November 1982 elections swept a new generation of more environmentally aware 
Democratic representatives into office and tilted the makeup of key committees in 
environmentalists’ favor.  When the new Congress opened in January 1983, the 
Senate resurrected the bill as a starting point for the Clean Air Act revisions that 
were now a year overdue.  The House—now led by Democrats—started from 
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scratch.  However, neither side moved a bill that session, with or without the 
smelter exemption extension.
214
   
 Before the new congress began, however, Robinson worked to build new 
coalitions and new relationships with Arizona’s political leaders to advance the 
smelter issue.  She met with representatives of the United Steelworkers union to 
craft a compromise on the Clean Air Act exemption extension that would extend  
it only to smelters that were in the process of upgrading their facilities to comply 
with the law by a set deadline.  She then met with Arizona’s Democratic Senator 
Dennis DeConcini and a representative of the Steelworkers to lobby for this new 
alternative to the exemption extension. After the 1982 elections, she met with the 
new Democratic Representative James “Jim” McNulty, Jr., who had successfully 
won election in the new fifth district representing parts of Tucson and southeast 
Arizona, including Bisbee and Douglas.  McNulty was concerned about the 
smelter issue and especially the prospect of a new smelter being built across the 
border in Nacozari, Sonora, without air pollution controls.  This larger smelter, in 
combination with an existing smelter at Cananea, not only threatened Arizona 
jobs by undercutting production costs at a time when copper prices were painfully 
low, but also threatened to emit thousands of tons of smelter pollution that would 
drift into Arizona.  Best of all for SES, McNulty’s district was carved out of a 
portion of Udall’s former district and Udall had been an unreliable ally on the 
smelter pollution issue. After 1982 he no longer represented the Bisbee and 
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Douglas areas where hundreds of mining jobs depended on extending the smelter 
exemptions. In McNulty, clean air proponents had a new champion in 
Congress.
215
 
 As Robinson worked to cultivate new relationships with Arizona’s 
Congressional delegation, she also broadened SES’s coalition.  In early January 
1983, Robinson met with Carol Taylor, an economist at the University of Arizona 
specializing in copper mining, to discuss the economics of mining and 
modernizing smelting facilities to comply with the Clean Air Act.  She used the 
information she gained from Taylor as she continued to foster a relationship with 
the Steelworkers and the Inspiration Copper Company, a subsidiary of ASARCO 
that was in the process of modernizing its smelter at Hayden, Arizona, to comply 
with the Clean Air Act.  Inspiration agreed to support the Steelworkers’ proposal 
to limit extension of the Clean Air Act exemption for smelters that were in the 
process of upgrading to meet the law’s air quality standards.  In the meantime, 
Robinson continued to lobby within the National Clean Air Coalition to ensure its 
support for cleaning up the southern Arizona smelters.  In January of 1983 at a 
meeting of the Southwest Regional Conservation Committee of the Sierra Club in 
Oracle, she persuaded the committee to pass a resolution urging the national 
office of the Sierra Club in Washington, DC, to pressure the Coalition to take a 
strong position on western clean air issues including smelters.  In its 1983 briefing 
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book, the Coalition opposed any extension of smelter exemptions beyond the 
already legislated limits of December 1987.
216
   
Robinson continued to lobby on the smelter issue as Congress considered 
revisions to the Clean Air Act in 1983, but again no action was taken that year.  
As it was amended in 1977, the Act was stronger than anything that had been 
proposed in the 1982 and 1983 re-authorizations. The Reagan Administration and 
its allies in Congress sought assiduously to weaken environmental regulations at 
the behest of business groups, so environmentalists were playing a defensive 
game in the 1980s. For example, the 1977 Clean Air Act only provided up to ten 
years of smelter smoke exemptions, establishing a deadline of December 1987 for 
smelter emissions compliance.  The re-authorization bills in 1982 and 1983 
included additional extensions to 1993. For environmentalists concerned with 
smelters, failing to pass a re-authorization of the Act was preferable to passing a 
weaker law that extended the exemptions.  The Clean Air Act, as amended in 
1977 remained in effect.
217
 
 The smelter campaign got a boost from an unlikely source in early 1983: 
Mexico. In January, the United States and Arizona received confirmation that the 
government of Mexico had applied to the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank for a loan to finance the construction of a new, massive 
smelter in the copper mining town of Nacozari and expand the existing smelter at 
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Cananea, Sonora, southwest of Douglas.  Not only would the new smelters create 
competition for Arizona copper companies, but they would operate without the 
regulations provided by the Clean Air Act and Arizona environmental quality 
laws and without any requirements for pollution abatement technology.  The new 
and expanded smelters would more than double the air pollution that naturally 
drifted into southern Arizona, creating what critics labeled the “Gray Triangle.”  
With all three smelters running in this border region, residents of the triangle 
could expect their air to be clogged with up to 2,700 tons a day of sulfur dioxide 
and particulates—more than three times as much pollution as spewed from the 
Douglas smelter alone and roughly twenty times as much as was emitted by the 
massive coal-burning Navajo Generating Station in northern Arizona that 
produced enough electricity for roughly two million homes.
218
   
Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of tons of harmful sulfur 
dioxide and other pollutants had drifted south from the Douglas smelter, situated 
blocks from the U.S.-Mexico border,  onto Mexican farms, ranches and 
communities for decades, Arizonans cried out against the patent unfairness of 
foreigners polluting the southern part of the state.  Environmentalists, organized 
labor, the smelter corporations, and politicians of all stripes united in opposition 
to the loan to Mexico, but were largely helpless to do anything about it.  With 
aerial photographs and research provided by Kamp, the new Arizona 
congressman, Jim McNulty led the charge against the proposed new smelter in 
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Nacozari.  Robinson helped to organize a hearing and press conference for the 
congressman in May that included interested representatives from every facet of 
copper mining, smelting, and air quality.  She characterized the hearing as “a big 
love in.”  McNulty and Senator DeConcini called for congressional hearings on 
the issue.
219
 
 The “Mexican affair” advanced SES’s work on smelters on several fronts.  
To begin with, it helped the group broaden and strengthen its growing coalition.  
It bolstered the growing relationship between organized labor and 
environmentalists involved with the smelter issue.  Kamp threw much of his 
energy and the resources into fighting the “Gray Triangle” directly.  SES 
members wrote letters to the Arizona congressional delegation in opposition to 
the Mexican smelters, but Robinson mostly kept SES out of the fight.  Instead, the 
group attempted to focus the resentment of Arizona politicians, environmentalists, 
organized labor, and corporations toward the Mexican smelters on Douglas and 
San Manuel.  SES, the EDF, and Kamp’s SCEP could stand with smelter workers 
in opposition to the Mexican smelters while they advocated for the installation of 
pollution abatement technologies on the Douglas and San Manuel smelters that 
created work for unionized workers, kept the smelters open, and cleaned up the 
air in the places where workers and their families lived.  The Mexican affair 
further endeared the environmentalists to the smelter companies that were already 
making strides to comply with the Clean Air Act.  Moreover, the populist nature 
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of the issue cemented the relationship between SES, EDF, and SCEP and 
McNulty and DeConcini. The issue also added fuel to environmentalists’ 
campaign against the NSOs for Douglas and San Manuel as activists like Kamp 
and Michael Gregory raised the specter of having three, massive, unregulated, 
polluting smelters in an area of about a thousand square miles.  McNulty and 
DeConcini publicly articulated their opposition to the construction of any 
Mexican smelters.  They argued that projects in Sonora would undercut American 
business and pollute Arizona’s environment, and demanded that any new smelters 
built near the border employ the latest pollution abatement technologies.  As they 
argued against the Mexican smelters they were forced into taking the same 
position in regard to Douglas and San Manuel; why should American smelters be 
allowed to pollute Arizona’s environment while unfairly undercutting Arizona 
smelters that complied with the law?    Governor Babbitt also adopted this 
position, but, recognizing that Douglas had been polluting Sonora for decades, 
cast the issue in terms of reciprocity between Mexico and the United States.  
Babbitt argued that Arizona could not expect Mexico to act to protect American 
interests if the U.S. would not act to prevent the pollution of Mexico by 
Douglas.
220
    
 SES’s campaign was further buoyed when, just a month after the “big love 
in” of environmentalists, unions, mining companies and politicians, unionized 
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Phelps Dodge copper workers around the state went on strike.  The conflict began 
with negotiations over a three-year contract between the United Steelworkers and 
Arizona’s mining companies.  All of Arizona’s copper mining companies—
Asarco, Inspiration, Magma, and Kennecott—accepted the union’s offer except 
Phelps Dodge, which claimed that with the prolonged slump in copper prices, it 
could not afford to accede the Union’s demands.  At one minute after midnight on 
July 1, thousands of workers  in at Phelps Dodge operations in Ajo, Bisbee, 
Douglas, and Clifton-Morenci walked off the job in strike.  As Barbara 
Kingsolver so vividly described in her Holding the Line: Women in the Great 
Arizona Mine Strike of 1983, the situation quickly escalated into one of the ugliest 
conflicts between corporations and workers in the late twentieth century.  It ended 
only after Governor Bruce Babbitt, at the request of Phelps Dodge, 
controversially called in the Arizona National Guard to remove strikers who 
physically shut down the mines at Clifton and Morenci. Mother nature also 
intervened in the form of a catastrophic flood that wiped out one-third of the 
workers’ homes in Clifton.221   
The tactics employed by strikers, the callous corporate behavior of Phelps 
Dodge, and the apparent collusion of the state government with the company were 
all enormously unpopular with Arizonans and ruptured the relationship between 
Phelps Dodge and Arizonan politicians.  Since the early 1900s, the corporation 
had flexed its muscle throughout the state with campaign contributions and the 
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promise of jobs and economic development.  The strike forced politician like 
Bruce Babbitt and Morris Udall who had tried to protect and promote the copper 
industry—and Phelps Dodge in particular—as one of the economic mainstays of 
the state to go against one of the fundamental elements of their base: organized 
labor.  As the strike progressed, public sentiment mostly fell with the workers. 
Bruce Babbitt resented the position he was thrust into by the company and 
completely distanced himself from Phelps Dodge to rebuild his relationship with 
organized labor in advance of his eventual presidential campaign.  He directed the 
Arizona Department of Health Services to enforce water and air quality laws 
pertaining to the company with unprecedented vigor.  Within a year, Udall, who 
had done everything in his power to shield the copper industry from 
environmental regulations during the depression of copper prices in the early 
1980s, finally committed himself to ending the exemption for Phelps Dodge’s 
Douglas smelter.  The strike, coupled with the Mexican smelter issue, changed the 
political dynamic of the campaign against extending the Clean Air Act 
exemptions for the Douglas and San Manuel Smelters.
222
   
 SES’s work during 1982 and 1983 paid off in 1984.  “In retrospect,” 
Robinson wrote in 1988, “1984 was a turning point year…we moved from the 
defensive to the offensive.”  The year was marked by a general shift in the 
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political landscape surrounding the smelter issue against extending exemptions 
for smelters from the Clean Air Act.  The Mexican smelter issue continued to 
color the NSO debate in Arizona as did the national fervor surrounding acid rain.  
Bob Yuhnke, together with fellow EDF colleague Michael Oppenheimer, formed 
a “western acid rain road show” which they presented at various venues across the 
country and eventually used to publish a factsheet for the organization and an 
article in Science.  To Robinson’s gratification, Yuhnke made his first trips to 
Arizona that year to testify in a second round of Non-Ferrous Smelter Order 
(NSO) hearings in Tucson.  While he was in the state, Yuhnke also took the 
opportunity to give his western acid rain presentation at a meeting of Robinson, a 
representative of the United Steelworkers, and Representative Udall.  At that 
meeting, whether as a product of Yuhnke’s persuasiveness or the quiet pressure of 
the Steelworker representative—whom Robinson remembers remained silent 
during the entire meeting—Udall conceded for the first time that Phelps Dodge 
and Magma should not get extensions beyond December 1987 in revisions to the 
Clean Air Act that were still winding through Congress.  Yuhnke also showed the 
presentation to Governor Babbitt who, by mid-1984, was more than enthusiastic 
about going after Phelps Dodge over its failure to comply with air quality laws.  
All of these developments boded well for SES and clean air advocates in 1984.  
From this already strengthened position, however, SES, EDF, and Kamp’s SCEP 
initiated a new tactical move.
223
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Moving to the Offensive: Citizens Use The Courts 
 
 While attending the Western Acid Rain Conference in Gunnison, 
Colorado, in July of 1984, Robinson met with Yuhnke, a presenter at the 
conference, to discuss the smelter campaign.  Yuhnke explained to Robinson that 
he thought that after working on the smelter issue for more than five years the 
Environmental Defense Fund, Southwest Environmental Service, and Smelter 
Crisis Education Project were finally ready to file a lawsuit.  “I was delirious with 
joy,” Robinson wrote later of her reaction to the news.  When Robinson and 
Kamp first testified on at the NSO hearings for Phelps Dodge and Magma, 
Robinson predicted that the NSO process would spell the end for the smelters—if 
the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) and EPA granted the NSOs 
for the smelters, the environmentalists would challenge the decision and, she 
believed, they would win.  But the swift conclusion that Robinson envisioned was 
thwarted by the EPA, which was practically standing still on the NSO 
applications.  Phelps Dodge and Magma were allowed to continue to pollute 
beyond the specifications of the Clean Air Act while the EPA considered their 
NSO applications.  In Robinson’s view, “the whole thing was headed toward a 
vast legal tangle and it was time for us to sue to push the thing along.”224    
Yuhnke’s lawsuit indicted Phelps Dodge and Magma Copper Company 
for failing to comply with the state’s plan to implement sulfur dioxide standards 
under the Clean Air Act.  If the smelters had received final approval of their NSO 
applications from the EPA, they would have been exempt from the sulfur dioxide 
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standards until 1983 and potentially 1988.  But until the EPA acted, the smelters 
operated in a kind of legal limbo.  Citizens’ ability to review or appeal the EPA 
decision hinged on EPA action.  The lawsuit would force the EPA to act.  Once 
the agency did so, citizens could appeal the decision in the courts.  At a bare 
minimum, the smelters would be forced to cleanup or close down by January 1, 
1988, at the very latest.
225
   
On November 28, the suit was filed in federal district court in Tucson.  
The plaintiffs were the EDF, Priscilla Robinson, and Dick Kamp.  Robinson and 
Yuhnke organized a press conference about the suit.  “This is not an attack on the 
entire copper industry,” Robinson told the press.  “There are seven smelters in 
Arizona and five of them have either completed their modernization or will be 
within a matter of months,” she explained, “…these are the only two Western 
smelters that are continuing to operate and have not met the emission 
standards.”.226     
With their legal challenge slowly working its way through the federal 
court in Tucson and Phelps Dodge and Magma’s NSO applications still tied up by 
the EPA, Robinson, Yuhnke, and Kamp aimed their efforts toward continuing to 
sway the opinion of politicians and the public against the offending smelters.   
Throughout 1985, negotiations continued between the United States, Mexican, 
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and Arizona state governments and the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank concerning the new and expanded Mexican smelters.  In 
March, SES, EDF, and SCEP learned that the EPA was moving toward an 
agreement with Mexico in which the Mexican smelters would be allowed to 
operate without air pollution controls until 1987 in exchange for the Douglas 
smelter continuing to operate out of compliance with the Clean Air Act until the 
same year.  The environmentalists and Representative Dennis DeConcini opposed 
this plan because they believed that once the plants began operation without air 
pollution controls, it would be very difficult to force them later to comply with 
standards.  At the same time, the Arizona Department of Health Services began 
considering the renewal of the operating permit for Phelps Dodge’s Douglas 
smelter.  The renewal process gave the groups and concerned citizens the 
opportunity to comment on the renewal and demand that the smelter comply with 
the Clean Air Act.  The two processes happening at once provided SES and its 
allies the opportunity to elevate the issue further in the minds of the public, 
politicians, and administrators.
227
   
Kamp, who had already been working to explicate the potential dangers to 
air quality posed by three “uncontrolled” smelters operating in the “Gray 
Triangle,” jumped on this development.  For the remainder of the year, from April 
1985 into 1986, every time he discussed the Mexican smelter issue he tied the 
need for the Nacozari smelter and Cananea expansion to include pollution 
controls to the need for Douglas to comply with air quality laws or shut down.  
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The newly-elected Arizona Republican Congressman Jim Kolbe understood the 
great concern over the Mexican smelter issue amongst his constituency.  Like 
McNulty before him and DeConcini, his understanding of the Mexican smelter 
issue was tied to the Arizona smelters.  If he called on Mexico to build a modern, 
cleaner smelter, he had to condemn the Douglas smelter and support its closure if 
it did not modernize.  Robinson, Kamp and Yuhnke decided that SES, which was 
increasingly tied up in issues of water quality, could best use its talents in 
lobbying Governor Babbitt in the hope of convincing him to deny Phelps Dodge’s 
pending permit.  They reasoned that if the state denied the renewal, EPA would be 
encouraged to take a stronger stand in negotiations with Mexico about the 
Nacozari and Cananea smelters. As Robinson reflected “It was a lovely strategy 
in every way, and a truly virtuoso performance by Dick.”228 
The governor’s office did not deny Phelps Dodge’s permit renewal for the 
Douglas smelter during 1985.  Instead, the ADHS issued the permit in August 
with a list of conditions designed to force Phelps Dodge to modernize its smelter 
and move toward compliance with the law. Phelps Dodge appealed the decision to 
the Air Pollution Control Board .  SES, EDF, SCEP, and members of the Bisbee 
group which had resurrected the name GASP (Groups Against Smelter Pollution) 
from a 1970s era environmental organization based in Tucson intervened on 
behalf of the department in the appeal.  The governor’s strategy worked in 
leveraging increased political opposition to the continued exemption of the 
Douglas smelter form air quality regulations.  Babbitt directed the Arizona 
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Department of Health Services to enforce air quality laws on the state’s smelters 
more vigorously.  Equally important, after years of lobbying and volumes of 
correspondence from constituents opposing exemptions from the Clean Air Act 
for the Douglas smelter, SES finally made real progress with Representative 
Morris Udall.  Robinson met with Babbitt in September of that year and asked the 
governor to contact Udall about the Mexican smelter issue and the Douglas 
permit.  Udall agreed with Babbitt that, as part of the international agreement with 
Mexico concerning the Nacozari and Cananea smelters, the Douglas smelter 
would have to clean up or close.  Within three months, a bipartisan group of 
congressman and senators including Arizonan Representatives Jim Kolbe and 
John McCain, signed a letter encouraging the EPA to work with Mexican officials 
on a policy that would consider the Douglas smelter emissions together with the 
pollution from the Nacozari and Cananea smelters and give the agency the power 
to shut down the Douglas smelter if it failed to meet clean air standards in two 
years.  Udall and DeConcini did not sign the letter but supported the idea in letters 
of their own.
229
      
As Kamp and Robinson worked in Arizona, Yuhnke decided to shift his 
strategy.  The environmental lawyer was quickly becoming something of a 
celebrity in air quality activist circles for his work on acid rain in the West and his 
pending lawsuit to force EPA action on the Douglas and San Manuel NSOs.  In 
late 1985, he changed direction from stressing the danger of acid rain resulting 
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from smelters to emphasizing the health risks of sulfur dioxide to asthmatics.  
This added a new dimension to the campaign: beyond harm to the natural 
environment caused by the acid rain produced by sulfur dioxide in the 
atmosphere, he argued that the smelter was a tangible danger to public health.  At 
the Air Pollution Control Board Hearing concerning Phelps Dodges’ appeal of the 
ADHS’s recent decision on the operating permit for the company’s Douglas 
smelter, Yuhnke argued that EDF ought to be granted intervener status to help 
defend “the people whose lives are being crippled” by smelter pollution.  The 
message was intended to resonate with the public and politicians but it had its 
greatest effect on EPA administrators.  On December 6, he and the EDF joined 
seven states and four other environmental organizations in filing suit against the 
EPA for failing to establish standards to protect the health of asthmatics—much 
of the data used in the lawsuit which alleged that the existing standard was 
inadequate to protect the health of sensitive individuals as required by law, came 
from the Douglas area.  Yuhnke’s emphasis on asthma put further pressure on the 
EPA to take action toward closing the Douglas smelter.  Governor Babbitt also 
increased pressure on the agency when he threatened in early 1986 to sue Phelps 
Dodge or the EPA if they failed to act to protect asthmatics.
230
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The Douglas Smelter Closes, Citizens Claim Victory 
 
By the beginning of 1986, all of the pieces were in place for the final 
round between environmentalists and the Douglas and San Manuel Smelters but 
there was little for anyone other than the lawyers to do but wait.  Robinson spent 
most of her time working with the governor’s office and the Arizona legislature 
on the Arizona Environmental Quality Act.  When she could, she worked with 
Kamp writing letters or lobbying on the Mexican smelter issue.
231
   
Then, without announcement and with little fanfare, on July 10, 1986, the   
acrid yellow-brown smoke that had poured from the Douglas smelter’s six 
hundred foot stacks for seventy four years ceased.  Yuhnke’s lawsuit still sat in 
the federal district court in Tucson; although they were considering it, the ADHS 
and Babbitt had yet to deny Phelps Dodge’s 1986 operating permit; the EPA still 
had not issued its decision on the smelter’s NSO applications.  In the most 
anticlimactic of endings, the smelter closed because the extensions of the stay of 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act granted by the EPA while it considered the 
NSO application simply ran out.  However, this situation was precipitated by the 
actions of clean air advocates.  EPA either had to act on the NSO application, 
pending for the better part of six years or extend the stay.  The motion, filed by 
Yuhnke earlier that year, argued that the continued stays of the law, pending 
determination of the NSO application, were illegal.  It forced the EPA to act on 
the NSO, either grant another stay, which would require them to go into federal 
court and respond to Yuhnke’s motion, or do nothing.   EPA chose the last option.  
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Hounded by continual bad press and financial difficulties, Phelps Dodge did what 
it had promised to do for years: close the smelter and put roughly three hundred 
people out of work in a town of fifteen thousand.
232
   
Phelps Dodge justified its decision based on economics, but the closure of 
the smelter was a huge victory for advocates of clean air who prevented the 
company from continuing to profit at the expense of the environment and public 
health into the 1990s.  The company recognized that without an extended stay or 
the exemption provided by the NSO, it would have to operate at a dramatically 
reduced capacity to avoid exceeding air quality standards or accrue hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in fines from the EPA.  Operating at quarter capacity 
undermined any kind of economy of scale for “Old Reliable” and drove 
production costs above those of other smelters including the company’s Clean Air 
Act compliant smelter at Playas, New Mexico.  After the closure, the state, EPA, 
and Phelps Dodge entered a consent decree—an agreement filed in federal district 
court—on July 29 which stipulated that the company could reopen its smelter and 
operate it at a reduced rate so that it did not violate air quality standards under the 
Clean Air Act without incurring penalties before it closed permanently on January 
15, 1987.  SES, EDF, and SCEP, filed to become partners in the consent decree.  
Although the state would not settle the issue of the San Manuel NSO for another 
year, that smelter was eventually also forced to shut down and modernize to 
comply with the Clean Air Act under a similar consent decree between the state 
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and Magma Copper Company.  This battle for clean air in Arizona had been won.  
For environmentalists, all that remained was the celebration.
233
 
Bob Yuhnke flew into Tucson from Boulder, Colorado on an unusually 
snowy evening the night of January 16, 1987.  Robinson met him and the two 
waited in vain at the airport for a few other activists to arrive—the freak storm 
had grounded them elsewhere.  The friends then drove through the storm to 
Bisbee.  When they arrived after 10 p.m., the party was already well underway.  
Robinson kept the celebration—which purportedly involved the consumption of a 
good deal of alcohol and marijuana—out of her reports to the SES board.  They 
partied late.  The next morning was still overcast, the sky heavy with winter.  
Yuhnke, Robinson, and Kamp pulled themselves together and made their way 
through the windy, icy Bisbee streets and the haze of hangovers down to Douglas 
and the smelter, covered with a fresh blanket of white snow.  The smelter was 
quiet, its stack cold.  A photographer from Tucson, took pictures of the three 
embattled activists.  Robinson wrote that she thought they “looked confused but 
happy.”  Although the Magma NSO still remained to be wrapped up, Yuhnke 
took a prolonged sabbatical.  The campaign, which Robinson described as “three 
people without a net,” and “the most fun and scariest” of her life, was over.  
Kamp continued to organize on air quality and other environmental issues in the 
                                                 
233
 Wirth 135-139; Priscilla Robinson, “Smelter Chronology”; Priscilla Robinson, “Director’s 
Report,” 30 July 1986, SES Records,  MS 269, Box 1, Folder 5. 
  295 
Southwest.  Robinson returned home to Tucson.  Less than a year later, Southwest 
Environmental Service closed its doors.
234
 
 
 
Priscilla Robinson, Robert Yuhnke, and Richard Kamp, looking “confused but 
happy” standing in front of the “cold” smokestacks of the closed down Douglas 
Reduction Works smelter, January 17, 1987.  Private collection, Priscilla 
Robinson, Tucson, Arizona. 
 
 
A Bitter Consequence of Success 
 
 The closure of Southwest Environmental Service was as much a surprise 
to those involved in environmental issues in Tucson and Arizona as was the 
shutdown of the Douglas smelter.  The group had played a pivotal role in the 
writing of the Arizona Environmental Quality Act in 1986 and in shutting down 
the largest single sources of air pollution in the Southwestern United States.  
Administrators from state and federal agencies, politicians from Pima County to 
Washington, DC, and environmental activists at all levels respected Robinson and 
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her staff as an effective voice and force for environmental protection.  But what 
made the group so successful—its concentration on two of the state’s largest 
environmental issues and insistence on engaging the technical elements of those 
issues—also contributed to its closure.  Such technical work required expertise 
acquired over years of working with agencies and committees.  Other staff 
members—Barbara Tellman, Victoria Dahl, Betsy Rieke—supplemented 
Robinson’s work, but Robinson bore the brunt of it, including writing grants and 
soliciting funds.  From the early 1980s through early 1987, as Robinson became 
increasingly involved with the water quality and smelter fights, the time she could 
devote to organizational development declined.  SES did not consider what to 
work on after its two primary campaigns ended.  When the group won both in a 
relatively short amount of time, it was left without clear direction and without a 
compelling issue to pitch to funders. Although it received some financial support 
from individual benefactors, it never developed a alternative solution to its 
reliance on foundation or agency grants.  During 1987, it accelerated its grassroots 
fundraising, soliciting money from supporters through mailings, but this effort 
proved too little too late.  When its grant proposals were turned down by four 
foundations in late 1987 and early 1988, Robinson acknowledged the obvious.  
On March 31, 1988, even as Robinson continued to monitor a handful of local 
environmental issues around Tucson concerning air quality, water quality, and 
wilderness, she wrote a letter to SES’s contributors and supporters.  “We have 
come a long way together,” she began, and then she listed off the many 
accomplishments their contributions had enabled over the group’s history: in 
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addition to passage of Arizona Environmental Quality Act and achieving one-
hundred percent compliance with the Clean Air Act by Arizona copper smelters, 
she touted the creation of Catalina State Park, the implementation of Household 
Hazardous Waste Collection Days in 1987, passage of conservation easement 
legislation in 1986, Sole Source designation for the Tucson Aquifer in 1984, 
cleanup of Sabino Creek from 1977 to 1983, and a variety of public education 
campaigns having to do with land use, clean water, and clean air.  “When SES 
closes its doors on March 31, we can all feel a great deal of pride in our 
accomplishments.”  The organization then disbanded.235  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Despite dire predictions by Douglas locals and Phelps Dodge that the town 
would collapse if the company followed through on its threat to close the smelter, 
five years after the giant smokestacks went cold and were toppled, the town 
appeared to be on the rebound.  Indeed, census figures showed that only a little 
under four hundred people left the city between 1980 and 1990.  By 1992, the 
Chamber of Commerce reported that the population was actually growing, as the 
town developed into a major supplier of goods and services for its booming 
Sonoran sister-city, Agua Prieta, and a tourist destination.  Although the historic 
Gadsden Hotel and Douglas’s downtown built during the copper-mining heyday 
of the early twentieth century harkened back to the town’s beginnings, in the 
1990s it thrived as Agua Prieta, bolstered by the location of U.S. factories 
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(“maquiladoras”) in the Mexican city, grew to 80,000 residents.  With the 
region’s open desert vistas unobscured by smelter smoke, Arizona newspapers 
touted the historic town as a picturesque gateway to Mexico for tourists and the 
drive from Tucson to Douglas as scenic.  “The smoke and steam wafting from the 
company’s ore processing smelter was said to be the most scenic view around, 
because it meant jobs,” said one article.  Instead, much like its neighbor 
Tombstone that became a mecca for tourists looking to experience the Old West, 
Douglas proved “too tough to die.”236   
As for SES, Priscilla Robinson applied the skills she had acquired during 
her nearly fourteen years working on environmental issues in southern Arizona to 
other environmental campaigns, including working with mining companies to find 
more efficient and environmentally sound ways to mine in the state.  Other 
employees went on to work for progressive and environmental causes across the 
country and for the Arizona Democratic Party.  Through its staff and members 
and environmental victories, SES’s legacy rippled through Arizona environmental 
and progressive politics and its cleaner air and water into the twenty-first century.  
Additionally, its experiences offer lessons for those interested in environmental 
activism and solving environmental problems.
237
         
 The Southwest Environmental Service, from its inception in 1975 to its 
closure in 1987, demonstrates the ways in which citizen activists engaged 
environmental issues in the decade after passage of landmark environmental laws 
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at the federal and state levels.  While its story and organizational structure is 
unique, its tendency to gravitate toward the technical aspects of environmental 
decision-making and work to gain a voice in the inner-circle of that decision-
making was typical of local, community-based environmental activists during this 
era.  But, whether as a logical evolution of activists’ work in relation to an 
increasingly technical regulatory landscape or a product of Robinson’s preference 
for using science and reason to address what she viewed as threats to quality of 
life, community well-being, and good governance, it is important to note that the 
group’s successes were not scientific.  Like other local and community-based 
environmental organizations, their ability to learn how to, and then, influence 
environmental decision making was central to their success.  When science and 
reason failed to produce results, Robinson targeted politicians using traditional 
means of persuasion in a democratic society—pressure from constituents who 
framed arguments based on fairness and justice.  Robinson understood that 
environmental issues are political issues that can be addressed by democratic 
means.   
The filing of the lawsuit in 1984 represented the apex of SES’s 
involvement in the technical aspects of environmental advocacy and a progression 
in SES’s work to assert the rights of citizens to participate in environmental 
decision making.  When the organization first engaged the air quality issue, it did 
so with the aims of educating the public and encouraging citizens to take part in 
the administrative processes created by environmental laws to influence 
environmental decisions.  As the air quality campaign became more focused, not 
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only on smelters, but specifically on the legal processes by which smelters were 
regulated or exempted from regulation, SES’s work became more technical.  
Robinson, her staff, and the SES board continued to educate Arizonans about the 
issue and encourage them to testify at hearings, submit comments to agencies, and 
write their elected officials, but this part of the campaign took a back seat to the 
group’s increased involvement in the very specialized activities of affecting 
federal legislation and suing the smelters in court for failing to follow the citizens’ 
laws.  As with its work on water, this represents a logical response by Robinson 
and the organization to the nature of environmental decision making in the 
1980s—an era when citizens responded to laws that had already been passed and 
attempted to enforce or improve them.  This reflected Robinson’s view expressed 
in a 2011 interview that “organizations that formed to pass laws [were] not suited 
to enforce them because the issues are highly technical.”   Engaging the technical 
sides of environmental protection was yet another tool Robinson and SES, and 
many other environmental groups during this era, added to their repertoire.  The 
Northern Plains Resource Council also understood using the courts as part of their 
larger efforts to affect change by giving citizens an increased role in 
environmental decision making.  Citizens’ environmental groups came to view 
appealing to the judicial branch as part of the democratic process.  American 
government was made up of a system of checks and balances between three equal 
branches of government—if the other two failed to address environmental 
degradation and abuse of the public interest by private entities, then they could 
appeal to the third.  The lawsuit filed by the Environmental Defense Fund, 
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Robinson, and Dick Kamp—the first in SES’s history—opened a new chapter in 
SES’s work on environmental issues.  It complemented the group’s growth in 
public credibility and political influence during the mid 1980s.  SES used the 
courts alongside traditional citizen organizing toward that end.     
         At the same time that SES was learning how to effect environmental change 
while sustaining a non-profit organization, members of another local, community-
based group two thousand miles to the east and very different in structure and 
composition, were also learning how to adapt to a changing political and 
regulatory landscape to protect their land, water, health and quality of life. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CITIZEN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN APPALACHIA: SAVE 
OUR CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS 
 
On a cold night in January, 1972, dozens of people crowded into the desks 
of one of the classrooms in the elementary school in the small eastern Tennessee 
town of Lake City, approximately thirty miles north of Knoxville.  The 
surrounding ridges of the Cumberland Mountains stood watch as husbands and 
wives, teachers, and retired and currently-employed coal miners discussed the 
issue that brought them all together: coal mining.  Lake City, and eastern 
Tennessee in general, was more than familiar with coal mining.  Since the late 
nineteenth century, it had been the economic life-blood of the region.  Small 
hamlets made up of miners and their families were scattered throughout the 
region’s haunts and hollows.  In some cases, clusters of iconic Tiger Lilies or 
Mimosa trees—non-native ornamental plants transplanted by homesteading and 
coal-mining families in the nineteenth century—provided the only hints of their 
existence.  Old cemeteries, often overgrown in the temperate, moist climate, kept 
silent record of their descendants going back two and three generations.  
Occasionally, clusters of tombstones recorded in cold objective fashion great 
tragedies associated with mining like the Fraterville mine disaster of May 19, 
1902, in which a buildup of methane gas exploded, killing 216 miners, or the 
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Cross Mountain mine explosion of December 9, 1911 which killed eighty four 
men and boys.
238
   
Residents of the region knew well the history of coal mining in eastern 
Tennessee—the disasters, the labor struggles of the 1890s—and they were proud 
of their heritage.  The coal mining that they were meeting to discuss on this winter 
night, however, was not the underground variety with which they were intimately 
familiar.  This night, they were concerned with coal strip mining—in name, the 
same practice that was then prompting ranchers, farmers, and environmentalists in 
Montana to join together in forming the Northern Plains Resource Council.  
However, different geography, climate, and history of land use and ownership in 
the region made strip mining in Appalachia a very different animal than what it 
was in Montana.  
In the 1960s and early 1970s, changes in technology and demand of coal 
prompted a shift in coal mining in Appalachia from traditional underground 
mining with all of its various safety, health, labor, and environmental issues to 
strip mining.  By 1966, the proportion of coal produced by strip mining had risen 
to roughly one-fifth of the total in the region, and it was predicted to increase.  By 
the 1970s, Tennessee’s biggest buyer of coal, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), was mostly dependent on strip-mined coal.  Strip mining presented a 
direct challenge to underground coal mining and the workers and families that 
depended on it.  Underground mining, in which miners would find a vein of coal 
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and then follow it either down into the ground or horizontally into a mountainside 
was inherently dangerous work.  Mine shafts could collapse, methane and other 
gasses from the coal seams could cause asphyxiation or deadly explosions, and 
coal dust caused long term problems such as coalworker’s pneumoconiosis or 
“black lung,” which led to many premature deaths among miners.239  
Due to these dangers and harsh working conditions, Tennessee miners, 
who had migrated to the region in the decades after the Civil War, fought hard-
won battles against mine owners and state politicians in the 1890s and early 
twentieth century to unionize the mines, and they had continued to struggle to 
improve their working conditions into the mid-twentieth century.  Tennessee 
passed right-to-work legislation in 1947—unless a mining company had a 
contract to supply coal to a consumer who stipulated that it be mined by union 
labor, most of the new underground and strip mines after mid-century were open-
shops employing non-union labor.   Strip mining threatened underground miners’ 
work opportunities and challenged the few existing unions to maintain and 
improve safe working conditions.  The new strip mines tended to employ far 
fewer workers—maybe one-tenth of what a comparable underground operation 
employed.  Because it required fewer employees who were non-union, strip 
mining was more economical for mine owners, allowing them to undercut the 
prices of their underground competition.  Despite labor union gains made before 
the 1950s, by the early 1970s, only one underground mine still operated under a 
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union contract.  For the retired unionized underground miners, strip mining 
presented a direct threat to the jobs of their sons and to the advances in workplace 
safety, wages, and benefits unionized underground miners had made in the past 
seventy years.  It also threatened their communities.
240
 
 
Coal miner deep underground in a three-foot shaft typical of non-unionized 
underground coal mines in Tennessee.  Photograph No. 556514 (Photographer 
Jack Corn); “Miner Lee Caldwell, on a self-propelled roof bolting machine in a 
mine in the Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company near Jasper and Chattanooga, 
08/1974,” August 1974; Documerica Project, Records of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1944-1006, Record Group 412; [Online version, 
www.archives.gov, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 December 
2011], National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
240
 Ibid. 
  306 
 
 
Photograph No. 556504 (Photographer Jack Corn); “This pile of coal contains 
part of the one million tons kept on hand by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
Steam Plant at Cumberland City, Tennessee near Clarksville…It is the largest 
type steam plant and one of the most modern in the world, 07/1974,” July 1974; 
Documerica Project, Records of the Environmental Protection Agency, 1944-
1006, Record Group 412; [Online version, www.archives.gov, National Archives 
and Records Administration, 5 December 2011], National Archives at College 
Park, College Park, MD.  
 
While they fought to protect their jobs and their ability to organize for 
better wages and working conditions, many miners still lived on land that was 
owned by coal companies.  During labor struggles, coal companies were known to 
intimidate workers by threatening and, at times, carrying out evictions.  Since 
most land near the coal fields was owned by the companies, miners and their 
families were left vulnerable to such tactics.  When strip mining began, this 
history of land ownership played out in two ways.  Firstly, when a strip mine was 
proposed for land on which miners and their families lived—sometimes for 
generations—they had little legal recourse to prevent their dislocation.  Unlike 
their rancher or farmer counterparts in the West who owned their surface property 
and fought the mining companies by asserting constitutional protections of private 
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property, residents of the coal mining communities of eastern Tennessee simply 
had to get out of the way.
 241
   
The history of landownership further compromised residents’ security 
when strip mining in an adjacent area—on, for example, a steep slope directly 
above their home—spilled over onto the land on which they lived.  When mine 
tailings cascaded down through a small subsistence farm or house, occupants had 
few protections under the law; the mining company owned the property and often 
the buildings on it. Strip miners hastily deposited “overburden,” or the soil 
removed from above the coal seams, on the slopes below the mines which had 
been cleared of trees prior to mining.  These slopes often ranged in steepness from 
twenty to over forty degrees.  During prolonged periods of rain, the overburden 
became saturated, heavy and viscous and could break through the poorly built 
earthen dams intended to hold it back.  It then rushed in great mud and rock 
avalanches through county roads and other infrastructure and into the homes of 
residents below.
242
 
The most tragic of these events occurred in February 1972 in Logan 
County, West Virginia, when a Pittston Coal Company coal slurry impoundment 
dam, certified “satisfactory” by a federal mine inspector just four days prior, 
burst, unleashing a flood of 132 million gallons of waste water, mud and debris 
cresting over thirty feet high, on the residences of roughly 5,000 people in Buffalo 
Creek Hollow below.  One hundred twenty five were killed, more than 1,100 were 
injured, and over 4,000 were left homeless.  Similar smaller incidents occurred in 
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northeastern Tennessee.   In one event, a flood caused by the collapse of the walls 
of a strip-mine pit ripped through the home of Effie Birchfield in Stonyfork, 
killing five members of her family and leaving only her and her son alive.  In 
another event in Lake City in 1969, a man driving his truck across a bridge near 
town was killed as he was hurled, truck, bridge and all, into a torrent resulting 
from a breeched impoundment upstream.  In April of 1972, a flood of water, mud, 
and trees swept through Lick Fork in Campbell County, destroying the home of 
Alonzo Norman.  In the West, strip mining caused conflicts over property 
ownership, competing ideas about land use and aesthetics, and possible 
degradation of water and air quality.  In the narrow valleys of Appalachia, it was 
an imminent safety hazard.
243
  
 
 
 
Aftermath of the Buffalo Creek Hollow disaster, Saunders, West Virginia.  
Source: West Virginia Division of Culture of History, website, 
http://www.wvculture.org/history/buffcreek/buff1.html, accessed 9 December 
2011. 
 
Although strip mining was a relatively new activity in the 1960s, the 
federal government was already taking notice of its impact on Appalachia by 
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1966.  By that year, the Department of the Interior reported that eight hundred 
thousand acres had already been disturbed by strip mining coal.  These 
disturbances resulted in the pollution of streams by acid generated by exposure of 
sulfide-rich earth to the elements by mining and by sediment that washed down 
from the mines.  In addition to stream degradation, the Department described 
“massive slides along outslopes, destruction of forests, damage to watersheds, 
thousands of acres of land isolated or made hazardous by highwalls, wasted 
natural resources, health and safety hazards, and impaired aesthetic and economic 
values.”  Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall recommended that if the coal 
mining states failed to remedy this problem “within a reasonable period of time,” 
Congress should step in to “protect the public interest.” 244   Despite the 
Secretary’s urgings, however, the federal government failed to act to rein in strip 
mining for another decade.  
The January 1972 meeting in Lake City was not the first time that 
members of the communities of the coal mining region of eastern Tennessee had 
come together to discuss problems of health, safety, land ownership, and apparent 
injustices stemming from the control of the region’s land and resources by coal 
companies.  In the previous decade, residents of some of Tennessee’s poorest 
counties and medical and nursing students from the Vanderbilt University Student 
Health Coalition, led by Professor Bill Dow, organized a series of community 
health fairs and opened sorely needed health clinics to provide people living in 
isolated places basic health care and health education.  In the process, they 
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uncovered in the coal-producing counties of northeastern Tennessee a degree of 
poverty, malnutrition, and poor health unrivaled in the state.  Dow and his 
students wondered how the region that was richest in the state in mineral wealth 
could contain the poorest people.  Possibly inspired by the attempts of the anti-
strip mining group Save Our Kentucky to reform property taxes in that state to 
make coal mining companies pay taxes commensurate with the value of their 
property, the Vanderbilt students began to investigate the relationship between 
land ownership and tax assessment so as to determine who was actually paying 
taxes in this part of Tennessee.  They found that the largest landowners, a handful 
of large, out-of-state and multinational coal companies who owned roughly one-
third of all the land in Campbell, Anderson, Scott, Claiborne, and Morgan 
Counties, were paying less than four percent of the property taxes, and that the 
counties’ residents, who owned only a fraction of the land were paying the lion’s 
share of the taxes that supported not only public schools and other services, but 
also the roads and other infrastructure on which the coal companies depended.  
According to Tennessee’s state constitution, all minerals were supposed to be 
assessed in property tax assessments.  The researchers found that instead of 
paying taxes on their mineral properties, the companies had apparently been 
making generous contributions to the campaign funds of the county tax 
assessors—an elected office in Tennessee—and thus avoiding assessment of 
much of their mineral wealth.  Using a Tennessee tax law that allowed residents 
to appeal a neighbor’s property taxes, thirteen petitioners—local residents who 
had been involved in the health clinic and education program—appealed various 
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coal companies’ property tax assessments in 1971.  In November 1971, the State 
of Tennessee tax assessment board sided with the petitioners and re-assessed the 
coal companies’ taxes in eastern Tennessee.  This contrast between the poverty in 
their communities and the wealth being hauled out of the region in coal trucks 
radicalized many of the region’s residents in the 1960s.  By the time of the state 
assessment board’s decision, several hundred residents from the coal counties of 
northeastern Tennessee had signed additional petitions calling for the coal 
companies to pay their fair share of taxes.  The introduction of strip mining and its 
challenges to unionized underground coal mining and community health and 
safety thus added to an evolving critique of land ownership, poverty, social 
services and general fairness.  This was the climate in which the concerned 
residents met in Lake City on that cold January night in 1972.
245
   
The meeting included people representing a wide range of interests and 
opinions concerning coal strip mining.  There were people who had witnessed 
firsthand the dangers of strip mining when their homes, or the homes of relatives 
or neighbors, had been damaged or destroyed by floods and landslides of 
overburden.  Predictably, these attendees were ardently opposed to strip mining.  
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The meeting included retired union underground miners, some of whom had sons 
who were employed by the strip mining companies but who opposed the strippers 
because they employed few workers and because they were non-union.  Their 
rhetoric revolved around issues of jobs, wages, and benefits but their arguments 
also included implicit concerns about the deterioration of their communities.  
There were “valley people” from towns like Lake City, Caryville, or Jacksboro—
store owners or teachers or other people not directly involved in mining, but who 
feared what strip mining would mean for their communities.  And there were 
miners, some of whom worked for the strip mining companies and came to speak 
in favor of strip mining, and others who wondered about the job prospects 
associated with strip mining or worried about the threat it presented to 
underground mining.
246
   
Despite divergent interests, the meeting stayed peaceful.  J. W. Bradley of 
Petros, a charismatic character who had worked in the underground mines and 
was an outspoken critic of strip mining, emerged as a clear leader in facilitating a 
productive conversation about the concerns of the people in the meeting.  He 
welcomed the opinions of all the people in the meeting and then, as he sensed the 
sentiment of the group moving one direction or another, called for a simple vote 
of all present on what course of action to take.  In this dramatic demonstration of 
direct democracy in which all people at the meeting were allowed one vote, 
whether they opposed strip mining or supported it, the majority of those present 
decided a course of action.  Those who supported the expansion of strip mining 
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lost the simple election; the group decided that they would oppose strip mining 
and begin to work to mitigate the problems associated with existing operations.  
As Chad Montrie observes in his study of strip-mining opposition in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and West Virginia, attendees articulated 
opposition to strip mining for environmental and conservation reasons like their 
urban and suburban middle-class environmentalist counterparts—for the damage 
it would do the natural beauty and ecological integrity of the region and the waste 
of valuable minerals and timber.  But their most passionate arguments revolved 
around the threat of stripmining to homesteads and of jobs.   Once the group 
decided to oppose strip mining, twelve of the people present voted to form an 
organization and elected J. W. Bradley its first president.  According to Montrie, 
this small charter membership included “two young miners recently fired for 
signing UMW union cards, several working men employed in Oak Ridge plants, a 
former county weight inspector who quit his job in protest against the failure to 
prosecute overweight coal trucks, a local college student, a community worker, 
and several local women.”   In this way, a democratic, grassroots community 
organization was born in Lake City, Tennessee.  Bradley proposed that they hold 
a contest among the new members to choose a name of the new organization.  By 
their next meeting, they had made their decision.  As the charter members hailed 
from the five coal producing counties that accounted for eighty percent of the coal 
mined in Tennessee—Campbell, Claiborne, Morgan, Anderson, and Scott 
Counties, which either straddled or included parts of the Cumberland Mountains, 
a range in the southeastern section of the Appalachia Mountains—they called 
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their group “Save Our Cumberland Mountains.”  Within a few weeks, Bill Dow 
had found two young organizers, Vanderbilt students Heleny Cook and Jane 
Sampson, both in their early twenties, to assist the organization on a quasi-
volunteer basis.  Dow was able to provide money for about half of their expenses 
through Vanderbilt’s rural health initiative; Save Our Cumberland Mountains 
“passed the hat” at its meetings to make up the rest.247    
 
Saving the Cumberlands from Strip Mining: the 1970s  
Over the next few years, Save our Cumberland Mountains (SOCM or 
“Sock’em”), became more sophisticated in its organization and its tactics.  It grew 
quickly from its twelve charter members in January 1972 to 400 members two 
years later.  The staff remained mainly volunteer until the group obtained its first 
source of outside funding in the form of two grants from the Episcopal Church 
and the Unitarian Universalist Youth Project in 1973. Early organizational efforts 
exhausted SOCM’s first two organizers, who left the state and were replaced by 
two local young men, Johnny Burris and Charles “Boomer” Winfrey.  Winfrey 
was paid a meager $250 a month from those first grants.  With these financial 
resources, SOCM also hired their first full-time organizer, a young high school 
history and social science teacher from east St. Louis, Missouri, named Maureen 
O’Connell.  While working in Louisville, Kentucky, in the early 1970s, 
O’Connell had become familiar with the organization and its members by 
spending her summers in the Cumberland Mountains.  In May of 1972, SOCM 
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formalized and voted on a group constitution and by-laws, but it maintained its 
grassroots democratic character under the leadership of Bradley who acted as a de 
facto staff director in addition to president.  Group decision making, regarding 
everything from to tactics to hiring and paying staff people, were made by simple 
votes of the members present at the monthly meetings which were moved from 
town to town during the 1970s in an attempt to incorporate the interests of the 
group’s expanding membership in all of its geographic areas.  This form of 
decision making led to inconsistent positions.  In one instance in October of 1973, 
members sympathetic to organized labor at a meeting in Marion County voted to 
donate half of SOCM’s funds to support a Unite Mine Workers strike in 
Kentucky. The next month, when SOCM’s meeting was held in the southern part 
of their territory where members were less sympathetic to unions.  The members 
present rejected a motion to support a local strike in spirit.    During the group’s 
first five years, its dedication to democratic practice also led to a lack of turnover 
in leadership as the membership was content to continue nominating and voting 
for J.W. Bradley to serve as SOCM’s president.248   
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J. W. Bradley speaking at a “Deep Mine Benefit” in the mid-1970s.  Private 
collection, Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake City, 
Tennessee. 
 
 
During that decade, the group achieved several notable successes.  
Building on the state property tax assessment victory of late 1971, SOCM 
organized campaigns to hold coal mining companies accountable for the damages 
they caused to the rural communities of Campbell, Anderson, Scott, Morgan and 
Claiborne Counties.  The organization tended to link health and safety with 
economic and environmental issues, arguing that coal companies had an 
obligation to behave responsibly toward residents, communities, and workers.  To 
this end, they worked with the Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning to 
promote a ban on strip mining in the state in 1972.  The Tennessee General 
Assembly, had passed a strip mine regulation and reclamation law in 1967 with 
the intent of keeping track of the new strip mines and preventing unregulated 
“wild cat” mining and the devastating damage it caused to hillsides and the 
valleys, streams, and communities below, but it was largely watered down from 
  317 
its original intent by coal mining interests.  The law allowed mining on slopes 
steeper than twenty degrees, which contributed to massive and deadly landslides.  
Dependent on self-reporting by coal mining companies and enforcement by 
political appointees with very little transparency or opportunity of public 
oversight, it was largely toothless.  By 1972, the inadequacy of the 1967 law was 
obvious to anyone concerned with strip mining in Tennessee.
249
 
In the minds of SOCM’s members and the Tennessee Citizens for 
Wilderness Planning, so little of the coal country of eastern Tennessee was less 
than twenty degrees steep that strip mining was not practical.  At most, it 
represented a fraction—some estimates were as low as four percent—of the total 
coal mining possibilities in the state; the damage it caused undermined its 
relatively small positive economic impact in terms of new jobs and economic 
development compared to underground mining.  These were the basic arguments 
offered by State Senate sponsor William Bruce, a Democrat from Memphis and 
House sponsors Democrat W. J. “Willie Neese” of Paris and Democrat Keith 
Bissell, Jr. of Oak Ridge when they introduced Senate Bill 1707 and House Bill 
2038.  The ban, embodied in these pieces of complementary legislation, failed to 
make it out of committee in 1972 but the issue did not go away.  In the next two 
sessions (1973-1974 and 1975-1976), the ban was reintroduced in various forms.  
SOCM also eagerly supported attempts by Representative Ken Hechler, a 
Democrat of West Virginia, to ban strip mining at the federal level and members 
made numerous trips to Washington DC with the help of the Washington-based 
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Environmental Policy Center organized by Louise Dunlap, to testify and lobby on 
this issue after 1972.  Congressional support for Hechler’s strip mining ban 
reached unprecedented support in 1971, numbering seventy three co-sponsors 
from twenty four states in strong support.  The bill fell victim to pressure from 
coal companies and the United Mine Workers, who hoped to unionize new strip 
mines outside Tennessee .  Understanding the popular sentiment toward strip 
mining, both lobbied for some form of strip mine regulation as an alternative. 
Hechler reintroduced the ban in 1973, but although the ban remained popular, it 
failed to reach the floor for a vote.
250
   
As they had in Montana, however, the proposed bans articulated the 
extreme side of a negotiation for legislators, activists, and coal companies.  While 
SOCM and other groups advocated for a ban, they were able to effect the passage 
of other coal strip mine regulation laws, including the Tennessee Surface Rights 
Act in 1977, which required the consent of surface owners in split-estate 
situations before their surface property could be strip mined.  They also worked 
with the consortium of similar groups from Appalachia and the West directed by 
the Environmental Policy Center in Washington, DC, to help pass the 1977 
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Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act, although last minute compromises on 
wording that allowed strip mining on slopes that were steeper than what SOCM 
and other Appalachian groups sought to prohibit prompted the organization to 
retract its official support for the law just before it passed.  Reflecting the group’s 
continued linking of the social, economic, and environmental issues associated 
with strip mining, SOCM advocated for and helped pass the Tennessee’s first 
severance tax on coal which levied a 10 cent tax on each ton of coal mined and 
provided roughly a million dollars each to the coal producing counties to be used 
for road maintenance, stream improvement, and education.
251
   
Besides working to pass legislation, SOCM engaged in a number of 
strategies to hold coal companies and government accountable to the people and 
communities of the coal producing counties.  Building on the 1971 study of land 
ownership and taxation in the five coal-producing counties of northeastern 
Tennessee, the group was able to win a subsequent ruling by the state tax 
assessment board that mineral tracts had to be assessed as part of land value for 
purposes of taxation.  Their campaign to keep the coal companies and regulators 
accountable extended to prodding state agencies to enforce of Tennessee’s 1967 
strip mine law and its amendments.   As part of this effort, SOCM published a 
study of strip mine regulation enforcement and mine compliance in the late 
                                                 
251
 O’Connell and Winfrey interview, 11 June 2010; Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 
“The Era of the ‘70’s – A few Highlights,” October 2007, unpublished document, private 
collection, Statewide Organizing for Community Empowerment, Lake City, Tennessee; 
Drew Von Bergen, “Appalachian People Speak At Strip Mine Hearings,” The 
Middlesboro Daily News (Kentucky), 18 April 1973. 
  320 
1970s.
252
  They also attempted to use the courts to hold coal companies and 
government accountable to existing laws.  In the fall of 1972, the group joined 
Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning, Save Our Kentucky, the Sierra Club, 
and the Environmental Defense Fund  in filing its first lawsuit against the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, arguing that as a publicly-supported utility, the TVA 
needed to complete environmental impact statements for each of their long-term 
contracts for strip-mined coal.  In their words, the members of SOCM sought to 
use the lawsuit to remind TVA, which purchased one-half of all strip-mined coal 
in the state, “that it must be responsible to the citizenry of the Tennessee Valley,” 
and consider the social, economic, and environmental costs of its coal purchases 
to the communities of northeastern Tennessee.  This lawsuit was ultimately 
unsuccessful; first-president Bradley understood the need for the group and its 
members to have qualified legal representation but also that it was very difficult 
to find attorneys in the coal counties that did not have ties to the coal industry.
253
  
In response, SOCM formed in late 1973, the East Tennessee Research 
Corporation, a public-interest law firm funded by a grant from the Ford 
Foundation, to carry out its legal work.  Its handful of lawyers and staff remained 
busy exploring new ways to use existing laws to combat strip mining until the 
foundation funding dried up in 1978.  By the end of the 1970s, SOCM had 
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learned to use environmental laws passed earlier in the decade including the 
National Environmental Policy Act and Surface Mine Control and Reclamation 
Act to defeat several proposed mining plans, including AMAX Coal Company’s 
massive plan to mine 20,000 acres on the Cumberland Plateau roughly eighty 
miles southwest of SOCM’s original territory.254 
 
Growing Out and Growing Up: New Issues, New Strategies, and 
Organizational Development 
 
As their first decade drew to a close, SOCM had diversified 
geographically to begin organizing in the coal fields of the Cumberland Plateau.  
It had also begun to diversify its issues and was commencing work on 
environmental and health hazards associated with toxic waste dumping.  As the 
group grew, it took stock of its past and prepared for the future.  In response to 
apparent member and staff burnout—fewer members attending monthly 
membership meetings, overcommitted staffers and high turnover—members 
organized SOCM’s first leadership retreat in August 1979 which provided a day 
of structured discussions about the organization itself, how to build its strength, 
identify “winnable” issues, and recruit members and funding to maintain an 
effective and powerful organization including a paid staff.  It took another year 
until November 1980 for the retreats to began to bear fruit.  From the retreats 
came a series of grassroots fundraising events.  SOCM also increased its work 
with other similar organizations in the region and nationally.  Like Northern 
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Plains, it worked with other groups concerned with coal strip mining to advocate 
federal strip mining legislation and then became one of the founding groups in the 
national Citizens Coal Council to help coordinate the efforts of many local and 
regional grassroots groups on national coal issues. “We accidentally did a few 
things right,” Maureen O’Connell, recalled decades later about the group’s growth 
and its instinctive sense that SOCM should be a member-run organization.
255
 
 
 
Maureen O’Connell at SOCM strategy meeting, early 1980s.  Private collection, 
Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee. 
 
In the 1980s, SOCM continued its work on its bedrock issues—coal strip 
mining, reclamation and coal company tax policies.  They researched 
landownership and taxation for the state’s sixteen coal producing counties and 
published a study demonstrating that despite the tax reforms of the 1970s, coal 
companies still paid less than their share of taxes.  SOCM used the study to 
support its work in the central and south eastern part of the state in the 
Cumberland Plateau.  It won a precedent-setting court ruling that prohibited the 
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mining of coal seams laced with toxic heavy metals that would degrade water 
quality in the state unless the coal companies had a proven-effective plan for 
handling the toxic by-products of mining.  SOCM also successfully advocated for 
legislation in the State Assembly that rectified the “split estate” situation in 
certain parts of the state so that surface properties and mineral properties were 
reunited.  In addition to their mining work, they engaged with oil and gas 
development in eastern Tennessee, preventing the permitting of toxic and 
hazardous waste facilities in the rural and often economically-depressed parts of 
the state, and began to oppose the construction of giant landfills for out-of-state 
urban waste.
256
 
While SOCM cultivated new county-based chapters and sought new issues 
threatening health, the environment, and communities, the group also began to 
shift its tactics.  During their first decade, the members of SOCM, primarily from 
the five coal-producing counties north of Knoxville, tended to rely on three 
primary forms of action to address their concerns.  Firstly, they sought to research 
their present situation.  SOCM members asked, “who was mining where? Do they 
have permits?  Where will they mine next?  Who owns what land and what taxes 
do they pay?  Can we make them at least pay their fair share of taxes to 
compensate for the damage they’re doing?  Can we stop them?”  Local residents 
instinctively sensed that they needed to know as much as they could about the 
situation and so they went to work researching these questions.  Once their 
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research was complete, they advertised their results in newspaper articles and at 
the State Assembly, convinced that “the truth” would force lawmakers to resolve 
the injustices in the mountains and valleys of northeastern Tennessee.  SOCM’s 
second strategy was to seek legislative solutions to the problems associated with 
coal strip mining.  It proposed a ban in 1972 and 1973, and lobbied for 
amendments to the ineffective 1967 Tennessee strip mine reclamation law, and 
passage of a federal strip mine regulation and reclamation law.  Except for the 
ban, SOCM promoted increased citizen access to, and participation in, 
environmental decision-making as part of the solution alongside requirements for 
permits, monitoring by state and federal agencies, and specific standards for what 
lands could be strip mined and how land must be reclaimed when mining was 
finished.  Although they found that just providing “the truth” to decision makers 
did not in itself lead to change, their organizing and lobbying efforts proved 
successful with the passage of a number of laws in Tennessee and the passage of 
the federal Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.  When they could 
not stop a proposed project by passing a law or by other means, they appealed to 
the courts.     
By the 1980s, due in part to their efforts and the efforts of environmental 
organizations across the country but especially bipartisan support for 
environmental legislation by Congress and presidents Nixon and Carter during the 
previous decade, the rules of the game had changed.  Most basically, the passage 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970 gave citizens a voice 
in reviewing and contesting any development that was likely to have a significant 
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impact on the “human environment.”  This measure provided groups like SOCM 
with new means of monitoring environmental issues in Tennessee and also new 
venues for organizing public participation and events for members.  NEPA 
provided a level of disclosure that had not existed in the 1960s and by the mid-
1970s, SOCM was learning how to use the information uncovered in the NEPA 
process to challenge projects.  They could also organize their members to write 
comments critiquing a proposed development and turn out at public hearings in 
large numbers to make their opinions heard.  NEPA was not a voting process or a 
popularity contest and agency officials claimed that they made their decisions 
based on hard science and not the number of comments or passion of 
commentators.  But for people who drove from all over the state to speak their 
mind, testifying was a powerful experience; it could be cathartic and also 
incredibly empowering.  After the passage of the federal Surface Mine Control 
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) in 1977, all applications for permits to strip mine 
prompted the NEPA review process.  Any proposed strip mine ensured that the 
federal Office of Surface Mining or state Department of Environment and 
Conservation conduct a lengthy project social and environmental impact 
assessment which provided multiple opportunities for public comment.  NEPA 
also provided citizens with the ability to appeal decisions when they felt that 
government agencies had illegally granted a permit.  By 1980, SOCM was 
learning to play by these new rules, which increased access of citizens to 
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information and the decision-making process and the ability to challenge those 
decisions.  They began applying those lessons to issues other than strip mining.
257
     
 
 
SOCM members pack a hearing in the early 1980s.  Private collection, Statewide 
Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee.   
 
 
As a result, their activities looked much different in the 1980s and 1990s 
than they did in the 1970s.  Chad Montrie argues that after the passage of  
SMCRA, SOCM’s primary activities were concerned with enforcement of the 
law.  In the early 1980s, the group monitored and documented the inability of the 
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation adequately to enforce 
the amended Tennessee strip mine reclamation law and the federal Surface Mine 
Control Reclamation Act.  Their findings prompted  the federal Office of Surface 
Mining to take over jurisdiction of strip mine regulation and reclamation from the 
state agency under provisions in SMCRA in 1984.  This was an embarrassment to 
state politicians but resulted in more rigorous regulation and permitting of mining 
in the state.  When a new strip mine was proposed for an area on the Cumberland 
Plateau known as Rock Creek, SOCM creatively used the untested “Lands 
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Unsuitable for Mining” provision in the new SMCRA law that had been added to 
the legislation to prevent strip mining in Montana’s Custer National Forest.  The 
provision allowed citizens to petition the federal OSM to prohibit mining on a 
large portion of the land in the Rock Creek proposal because it had significant 
environmental, scenic, or cultural values and was “unsuitable for mining.”  In 
1987 their petition was successful.  SOCM pioneered the use of the “Lands 
Unsuitable for Mining Petition” (LUMP) and used it more extensively than any 
other group in the country in the following decades.  These strategies, which were 
heavily reliant on staff expertise rather than member involvement, challenged the 
organization’s grassroots foundation, forcing it to develop new means of 
recruiting new members, keeping them involved, and cultivating new leadership.  
Rule-making hearings are not as alluring as mass protests or marches outside the 
state capitol.  The group had to learn how to create opportunities for member 
participation in ways that furthered its campaigns.  In addition, the group’s 
holding industry and government regulators accountable—a strategy that evolved 
organically in SOCM’s early battles—had become more sophisticated and 
effective by the 1980s. Finally, SOCM applied what it had learned to challenge 
successfully air, water, and facility construction permits for toxic and hazardous 
waste facilities.
 258
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Whereas in the 1970s the group primarily advocated new laws and 
occasionally used the courts to enforce the law, in the 1980s and 1990s, their 
strategies diversified.  In addition to older tactics, they used the citizen 
participation provisions of the environmental protection laws passed in the 1970s 
to protect the environment, health and safety of their communities.  As their 
membership, issues and tactics evolved, SOCM’s leaders also made structural 
changes to the organization.  After a period of experimentation, SOCM adopted a 
new decision-making structure.  They tempered the inconsistency of making 
decisions “town meeting” style at monthly membership meetings by simple voice 
vote by creating a board made of members representing each of the organization’s 
county-based chapters and four permanent committees—finance, personnel, 
membership, and legislative.  County chapters, organized once a county contained 
twenty or more members, still organized their own monthly meetings but 
organization-wide decisions were made by bi-monthly meetings of the board 
according to strict adherence to democratic principles.  General membership 
meetings took place twice a year.  SOCM also determined that the group as a 
whole, rather than just the new chapters that joined SOCM during the decade, 
would be a multi-issue organization.  New issues could be proposed by chapters 
to become official issues of the larger organization entitled to requisite 
organizational resources including paid staff work and volunteer time.  If more 
than one chapter was working on a particular issue, the chapters could petition the 
board, which would consider the issue according to a series of criteria: did it fit 
SOCM’s mission and goals?  Was it “winnable”? Did it build the organization in 
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terms of membership, financially, or in political power?  If the issue met these 
standards, it might become an official SOCM issue.
259
   
As a result, SOCM by the 1990s was working on a number of issues by 
the 1990s ranging from coal mining to oil and gas development to the building of 
toxic and hazardous waste facilities, the clear-cutting of forests, pesticide 
spraying, protecting the health and rights of temporary workers, and “anti-racism 
campaigns” to try to build coalitions with Tennessee’s African American 
population.  This diversity of issues caused new chapters to emerge in new parts 
of the state and new standing committees, which added more people to the 
group’s board.  By 1992, the number of chapters had grown from four to twelve, 
increasing board membership from eleven to nineteen, while the number of 
standing committees jumped from four to ten.  As SOCM’s third decade got 
underway, its membership numbered roughly 1,500 families strong.   Along with 
these changes, the board developed the organization’s first five-year, long-range 
plan and its first major fundraising campaign.  Like the Northern Plains Resource 
Council, it expanded its scope beyond Tennessee and helped form the Southern 
Empowerment Project to train new organizers to work in similar groups and 
Community Shares, a federation of Tennessee-based community groups formed to 
raise funds cooperatively through voluntary payroll deductions to address social, 
economic, and environmental issues in the state.  While attempting to remain as 
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close to its democratic roots as possible, SOCM became more institutionally 
formal and professional.
260
     
 
 
The “Under 30 crowd” in the annual tug-of-war with other members and staff at a 
SOCM annual meeting in the early 1980s.  Maureen O’Connell is third in line.  
Private collection, Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake 
City, Tennessee. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At first glance, Save Our Cumberland Mountains looks like a 
representative example of a membership-based environmental or conservation 
organization that travelled the trajectory of the environmental movement from the 
1970s to the early 2000s.  In the 1970s, it formed to address dangers associated 
with an industrial activity.  To remedy the situation, SOCM sought legislative 
solutions—first to ban strip mining altogether and when that was unsuccessful, to 
regulate it to mitigate its most egregious effects.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
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group grew geographically and numerically and as it did, it expanded the kinds of 
issues it worked on.  In response to its larger membership and more expansive 
ambitions, SOCM necessarily institutionalized and professionalized aspects of its 
operation.  It moved from a potentially temporary “single-issue” grassroots group 
concerned with banning strip mining, to a more permanent “multi-issue” 
organization. SOCM integrated its environmental work with capacity-building 
efforts to increase its power in environmental decision making and to ensure its 
endurance beyond immediate issues whether they were satisfactorily resolved or 
not.     
Like most citizens’ environmental organizations, however, SOCM’s work 
was about more than just environmental concerns.   In their activities, they 
retained an almost instinctive sense that environmental issues were really issues 
of justice and democracy and that the best way to solve them involved allowing 
the citizens who would be affected to have a say in those decisions.  This sense 
was not atypical—it was shared by other citizens groups including the Northern 
Plains Resource Council and, to a degree, the Southwest Environmental Service, 
and it was both implicit and explicit in the organizing strategies of hundreds of 
local and community-based groups around the nation in the last decades of the 
twentieth century.  But whether as a result of its rural and working-class roots or 
conscious decisions of leaders within the organization, SOCM’s emphasis on 
justice, fairness, and realizing a purer ideal of democratic governance caused the 
organization more to clearly articulate an understanding of the connectedness of 
social justice, environmental protection, and democratic action. 
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In the last decade of the twentieth century, scholars identified the 
emergence of a new movement that recognized that environmental degradation 
and toxic contamination disproportionately affected people of color and the poor, 
and that a community’s success in rectifying these issues often depended on the 
race and class of those affected.  These emerging groups combined environmental 
concern with a simultaneous commitment to social justice and racial and class 
equity.  In some cases, environmental justice activists and scholars leveled 
criticisms against the mainstream environmental movement, whose memberships 
tended to be white and middle class, for ignoring or neglecting the environmental 
issues affecting the nation’s most vulnerable members in favor of protecting 
wilderness and wildlife or for advocating policies at the expense of racial 
minorities and the economically depressed.  But the divisions between the 
environmental and environmental justice movements articulated by scholars such 
as Robert Bullard and Sylvia Washington blur when examining community-
based, local environmental organizations.
261
   
Observers, reviewing SOCM’s work in the 1990s, might be quick to label 
the organization an “environmental justice” group, and, in fact, this observation is 
justified.  In the 1980s and 1990s the group fought the citing of toxic waste 
facilities in predominantly rural, economically depressed parts of Tennessee, a 
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typical environmental justice campaign, and its membership included a great 
number of working class people.  But the reality was more complicated.   
As historians such as Adam Rome and Robert Gottlieb have demonstrated, 
late twentieth-century movements for social justice and environmental protection 
share common roots.  In his 2003 article “Give Earth a Chance”: The 
Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” Rome argues that the popularity and 
explosion of environmentalism on the cultural and political scene in the 1960s 
was due to “the intersection of the revitalization of liberalism, the growing 
discontent of middle-class women, and the explosion of student radicalism and 
counterculture protest.”  Liberal intellectuals, he argues, coupled protecting and 
improving environmental quality with other goals for bettering American society. 
Middle-class women—exemplified by SOCM’s Maureen O’Connell—elevated 
the issue at the grassroots sometimes alongside their work to achieve gender 
equality.  Student activists in the youth movement bundled environmental 
problems into their critique of capitalism and the Vietnam War.  As a result, 
environmental protection became a component of “the counterculture movement.”  
Gottlieb cites the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s as providing a 
living example of the “beloved community”—a society free of racism—for a 
generation of student activists who made up the New Left.  Many of these 
activists remained committed to environmental protection and went on to work on 
environmental issues in the decades following the 1960s.  At a basic level, this 
connection was demonstrated by many of the Sierra Club’s tactics in the late 
1960s which Gottlieb describes as “protectionist equivalents of civil rights and 
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antiwar sit-ins and protests.” This is not to say that the relationship between the 
environmental movement and other social movements including feminism and 
civil rights was not strained, but it evolved within a common intellectual milieu, 
shared many progressive commitments, and used many of the same tactics.  For 
many activists, issues of social justice and environmental protection were 
complementary aspects of “the movement.”262  Likewise, working class people 
concerned about the effects of strip mining on their communities in eastern 
Tennessee in the 1970s saw environmental protection, social justice, and 
democratic participation as interconnected. 
Although SOCM’s articulation of the connectedness of social, economic, 
and environmental justice issues became more overt in the last years of the 
twentieth century, the group does not represent an outlier in the study of 
environmental groups during the postwar era.  To understand where SOCM fits in 
the history of citizens’ environmental activism—indeed to understand any 
citizens’ environmental organizations in the late twentieth century—requires an 
expanded definition of environmentalism that recognizes the close relationship 
between justice, democracy, and environmental protection in the minds of 
environmental activists in the last decades of the twentieth century.  A more 
expansive understanding of environmentalism that considers the environment as 
interrelated with society and culture holds the potential to describe the lived 
experience of citizen activists better and explain areas of consensus and 
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collaboration among diverse groups and across issues.  Most American 
environmentalists in the twentieth century were not scientists or lawyers; they 
interpreted threats to their health, their families, their land and water in ways that 
made sense to them within the social, cultural, and political contexts of their lives.  
SOCM’s members, like many other citizens concerned with environmental issues, 
understood highly technical and scientific concerns of mine reclamation, water 
quality, air quality, and toxicity in terms of rights, fairness, and their ability to 
participate in environmental decisions.  The fact that SOCM began to identify 
itself as a “social, economic, and environmental justice group” in the early 2000s 
reflects more a reaction to a larger discourse about the environmental and 
environmental justice movements that emerged in the 1990s than a change in its 
tactics or goals.  While they focused much of their attention on non-
environmental, justice issues in the 1980s and 1990s, like other citizens’ 
environmental organizations they continued to frame environmental issues in 
terms of fairness and enabling citizens to influence the decisions which affected 
their health and quality of life and that of their families and their communities.  
SOCM demonstrates the common overlap between the mainstream environmental 
movement and the environmental justice movement.  
During the 1990s, SOCM was involved with a myriad of campaigns.  Two 
of these, however—the fight to stop the construction of massive “mega-landfills” 
in economically depressed areas of rural Tennessee to house garbage from urban 
centers outside the state, and the campaign to stop the construction of a coal strip 
mine on the edges of a scenic state park on the Cumberland Plateau—demonstrate 
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how the group blended its focus on justice and public participation in 
environmental decision making to protect and improve the natural and human 
environment within the changing legal and political landscape of the era.  These 
two campaigns offer snapshots of the intricacies of grassroots environmental 
organizing and offer glimpses into the connections between traditional 
environmental issues and those considered under the purview of environmental 
justice.          
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CHAPTER 9 
 
DUMPING IN TENNESSEE 
 
 
  
Americans produced a lot of trash in the late twentieth century.  By the 
mid-1980s, Americans were producing more than 260 million tons of garbage 
annually—more than a ton per person per year and nearly ten times as much per 
capita as Canada, the world’s second highest waste producing nation.263  
Population growth, economic expansion, and the revolution in the production and 
marketing of consumer goods following World War II resulted in a very real 
problem of what to do with all of the trash.  States with large urban populations 
were vexed to find new locations to inter their solid, hazardous, and medical 
wastes.  Enterprising waste management companies offered an attractive solution 
to eastern cities like Chicago, New York, and Atlanta, and to communities in rural 
areas linked by rail or highway to the metropolises.   Their idea: to open 
enormous “state-of-the-art” landfills in the rural parts of Tennessee and other 
isolated rural places and import the waste there.  Since most of the proposed 
receiving areas were economically depressed, the landfills would create jobs and 
be a boon to local economies.  Moreover, Tennessee and its landfill counties 
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would reap tax revenues and “impact fees,” surplus money to help pay for basic 
services including roads, health clinics, and education.  At a large scale, the 
landfills seemed a logical solution to a very serious problem.  The big cities 
outside of Tennessee would have a solution to their trash problem, the 
shareholders of multinational and publicly-traded companies like Waste 
Management, Inc., and Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. would profit from 
handling the trash, and the State of Tennessee and a few fortunate counties would 
enrich their public coffers.  To many in the state in the early 1990s, landfills were 
a “win-win” proposition.        
The only problem was that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, landfill 
operators in Tennessee did a poor job keeping track of their facilities and 
regulators were lax in enforcing Tennessee’s already weak waste management 
and environmental laws.  Citizens were forced to engage directly with both to 
address serious pollution problems.   In 1990, two Save Our Cumberland 
Mountains members traced a “trail of garbage” a mile up the Tennessee River to a 
collapsing 100-foot side-wall of the county landfill in Witt, east of Knoxville, in 
Roane County.  After discovering the source of the trash, they met with the head 
of the regional division of the state Solid Waste Management Agency, Jack 
Crabtree, who acknowledged water pollution problems stemming from the landfill 
and advised people not to eat fish from the river.  To raise public awareness of the 
issue, SOCM members in Roane County posted signs along the river stating that 
the fish were unsafe to eat, which attracted coverage from local television news 
stations. They followed this action with a protest on the road to the landfill on 
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March 27.  SOCM then organized a protest at the Division of Solid Waste 
Management office in Knoxville in May.  About forty residents including 
pregnant women, great-grandmothers, and a teenager dressed as Mother Nature 
“with tire tracks smeared across her blue and white dress,” picketed in objection 
to the lack of enforcement of waste management laws at the Witt landfill, which 
had been cited for over 125 violations since 1982, and to proposals for new 
landfills in Roane County and the abandoned old strip mine pits of Anderson 
County.  After congregating with signs outside, they then walked into the building 
to present a bottle filled with polluted green water to regional manager Jack 
Crabtree.  Singing a variation of a Civil Rights-era standard, the demonstrators 
who hailed primarily from Hamblen, Roane, and Anderson Counties sang, “We 
are fighting for our rivers, we shall not be moved.”  SOCM member Gerry Bellew 
accused the state agency of failing the citizens of the state: “We have seen 
garbage left uncovered for months, black water running from landfills and trash 
scattered along county roads,” she said.  “The law is written to protect the 
citizens,” Bellew said, and insisted that the agency should stop issuing new 
permits to landfills until the issues were resolved. Guy Collins, Hamblen County 
Commissioner and chairman of the county landfill board, asked Crabtree why the 
state had failed to take action against the operators of the Witt landfill.  The 
protest elevated the issue in the press and led to local results.  The Roane County 
Commission soon adopted a zoning ordinance to stop a private commercial 
landfill in April 1990 and accelerated its efforts to rectify issues with its own 
troubled waste dump.  But at the state level, the protest resulted in little more than 
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a verbal assurance by Crabtree that the solid waste division would continue 
working with the counties to enforce the law and that new landfills would be 
“state-of-the art.”264   
 For many residents of small towns like Oliver Springs in Campbell 
County in the coal fields of northeastern Tennessee, or in Hamblen or Roane 
Counties near Knoxville, the assurances from waste management companies and 
the state that new landfills would not pollute their land, water, and communities 
were far from convincing.  The proposed construction of “mega-landfills” 
hundreds of acres in size, sometimes sited on lands previously disturbed by strip 
mining, meant much more than increased revenue for their counties and the state.  
Of course, it meant millions of tons of garbage being trucked into their 
communities, some of it hazardous—a nuisance at its most benign, and a real 
danger to the water quality and health of residents at its worst.  In addition, the 
landfills meant increased traffic;  dozens of garbage and semi-trucks a day made 
rural roads more dangerous and expedited the decay of existing roadways, 
increasing repair costs and causing traffic delays.  If that were not enough, the 
siting of the landfills and incinerators could depress property values in the 
receiving communities and permanently retard the development of other sorely 
needed economic activities.  The waste management companies chose 
impoverished and sparsely populated areas as possible sites for landfills, because 
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the land was cheap and because these areas were starved for economic activity, 
even if it was processing and storing the nation’s garbage.  Many concerned 
residents argued that the landfills were patently unfair and unjust.  Why should 
the residents of other states get to dump their waste on rural Tennesseans just 
because they were poor?  And why should a few giant waste management 
corporations be allowed to pollute rural communities for profit?   
 The out-of-state waste issue arrived in Tennessee in the midst of what 
historians of American environmentalism identify as the “toxics movement.”  
Rachel Carson first alerted Americans to the insidious nature of chemical 
contamination and its danger to the environment in her landmark Silent Spring in 
1962.  It was not until the late 1970s, however, that Americans realized the full 
threat of  industrial wastes and chemicals wastes to human health .  The 1978 
exposé of the wholesale poisoning of the  Love Canal neighborhood of Niagara 
Falls, New York  by the Hooker Chemical Company opened a new era in the 
public’s awareness of industrial pollution.  Love Canal, and revelations of other 
toxic disasters, prompted the federal government to take decisive action.  In some 
cases, the federal Environmental Protection Agency evacuated residents of 
polluted communities, bought their homes, and paid to relocate them to safer 
locales.  In 1980, the federal government enacted the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) providing 
funds through a new “super fund” and directing the Environmental Protection 
Agency to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous and toxic substances.  In 
1990, Robert Bullard revealed in Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and 
  342 
Environmental Quality that African American and poor communities in the South 
were especially likely to be exposed to toxic pollution during the postwar era.  
Further, he demonstrated that, as a consequence of the environmental movement’s 
and federal government’s recognition of the dangers of toxic waste, polluters 
increasingly, and sometimes illegally, shifted their dumping of hazardous 
materials away from white and more affluent areas to  minority and economically 
depressed communities—the people with the least economic and political power 
to defend themselves.  This revelation ushered in the environmental justice 
movement.
265
  It was within this context that citizens interpreted proposals to 
dump garbage and hazardous wastes from far away urban areas on Tennessee’s 
rural and working class communities.   
 Citizens had good reason to distrust the waste management companies and 
state regulators.  Members of Save Our Cumberland Mountains organized to fight 
the landfills using the democratic tools they had struggled to acquire in the 
previous decades.  In response, waste management companies and their allies 
worked to remove these tools, first by trying to repeal county government’s 
ability to deny new landfills and then by trying to alter provisions within 
Tennessee’s waste management laws to concentrate environmental decision 
making in the hands of the waste management industry and politically-appointed 
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government bureaucrats.   In response, SOCM found itself, once again, fighting to 
protect the environment and human health while at the same time defending and 
advancing the ability of citizens to participate in the decisions that affected their 
health, environment, and quality of life.  For the organization’s members, these 
two battles were one and the same, and they pursued them with vigilance and 
persistence.      
SOCM takes on Out-of-State Waste 
 As the decade of the 1990s opened, “out-of-state” waste quickly became a 
salient issue for thousands of residents living in rural areas of Tennessee.  In May 
of 1989, in an attempt to attract waste management companies, and supported by 
groups such as the Tennessee Association of Businesses, the Tennessee General 
Assembly repealed a part of Tennessee’s solid waste laws that required local 
approval of hazardous waste landfills, incinerators, storage and treatment facilities 
in an effort to streamline permitting and construction of new waste management 
facilities.  Supporters of the provision argued that the its repeal was necessary to 
prevent other states—specifically Alabama and South Carolina—from refusing to 
accept Tennessee waste in reprisal for Tennessee local governments using the 
local approval law, or “local veto,” to block the importation of their waste.  
Further, in April of 1989, the Tennessee Attorney General claimed that the local 
veto represented an unconstitutional delegation of power by the legislature to 
county and municipal bodies. The General Assembly reluctantly repealed the 
local veto under the stipulation that the state Solid Waste Control Board, made up 
of political appointees and administered by the state Department of Health and 
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Environment, would create new regulations for the siting of waste facilities.  
Local control was not completely lost, however.  During debate of the bill, 
Democratic Representative Doug Jackson of Dickson County led Assemblymen 
from districts confronting new landfills in successfully amending so that local 
governments in counties and unincorporated municipalities that did not already 
have zoning in place to deal with landfills—that is, most of the state’s rural 
areas—retained the final say over landfill permitting and siting decision until the 
Solid Waste Control Board established the new rules and regulations stipulated in 
the law.
266
   
In June of that year, the Solid Waste Control Board’s Division of 
Hazardous Waste held a meeting in Nashville to gather input from interested 
parties about possible new regulations.  According to the accounts of attendees, 
about half of those present were concerned citizens or representatives from 
environmental groups.  When the draft regulations were issued roughly six weeks 
later on August 9, citizens and environmentalists found few, if any, of their 
recommendations included.  As required by the Tennessee Hazardous Waste 
Management Act of 1977 and the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the 
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Department of Health and Conservation scheduled three public hearings to be 
held in September in Nashville, Knoxville, and Jackson, to gather citizen input on 
the proposed regulations before making the rules permanent.  Feeling ignored and 
outraged, members of SOCM and other groups interested in the rule-making 
process, redoubled their efforts to turn out citizens to these hearings.
267
  
In preparing for the rule-making hearings, the SOCM staff and members 
articulated arguments against the construction of massive commercial landfills on 
grounds of basic justice and fairness, and called for rules that maximized the 
involvement of local residents who would be most affected by the construction of 
waste management facilities in decisions regarding their siting and permitting.  
Dr. Michael Crist, a public school administrator from Dickson County, cited the 
dangerous nature of the wastes as a primary concern.  Crist wrote a letter to The 
Tennessean of Nashville explaining that the proposed rules permitted known 
cancer-causing agents and other hazardous materials, including substances such as 
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs), Agent Orange, and industrial wastes containing 
lead and other heavy metals, as close as 200 feet to flowing streams, within 500 
feet of scenic, cultural, and recreational areas, and within 1000 feet of private 
drinking water wells and 2000 feet of public drinking water wells.  Crist echoed a 
common sentiment of local people feeling helpless against the forces of capital: 
“Commercial waste means out-of-state waste,” he wrote, and once commercial 
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waste facilities are located within Tennessee, “waste-as-a-commodity cannot be 
regulated or prevented from coming into Tennessee anymore than the State or a 
citizen’s group could prevent a certain type of automobile from being shipped to 
Tennessee from Detroit.”  “Commercial,” he insisted, “also means for profit, and 
the operators of these facilities are certainly not going to turn away business, 
regardless of its source or life-endangering characteristics.”  In turning out 
members to testify, SOCM provided literature that echoed Crist’s concerns but 
emphasized further the injustice of the decision-making process embodied in the 
proposed rules.  “Those MOST AT RISK are CONSULTED LEAST!” insisted 
one of their informational fliers.  “This is our land,” it continued, “we have the 
right to be heard, to be in on decisions that affect how we will live, what 
environment our children will be raised in, what dangers they will be exposed to.”  
As with almost all the literature SOCM generated surrounding the issue, the flier 
emphasized the unfairness of other states dumping their garbage in Tennessee.
268
  
Citizen testimony at the hearings reiterated these themes.  In their written 
testimony for the Knoxville hearing on September 7, SOCM members Paul and 
Sylvia Morrill of Fairfield Glade emphasized the injustice of the legislative action 
which, in their opinion, “deprived local citizens in their communities throughout 
the state of the democratic veto power or control of the waste dumps.”  In 
addition, they contended that the proposed rules allowed too many loopholes for 
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managers of waste facilities to operate without accountability to the state or 
residents.  As they interpreted the draft regulations, the Morrills’ complained that 
they relied “too much on the operator’s answers to information,” and thus 
“neglect[ed] the safety of the citizenry.”  Finally, the Morrill’s called for 
increased transparency to help citizens understand what exactly was being 
proposed.  They encouraged the Solid Waste Control Board to include in their 
regulations a summary of the number of dumps already in the state in 1989, 
exactly how many new facilities were being proposed, who were to operate these 
proposed facilities, the reasons for building new facilities, and scientific 
assessments of their safety.  Longtime SOCM member Betty Anderson of 
Knoxville charged during the September 7 hearing in that city that the proposed 
specifications for how far waste facilities must be built from drinking water 
supplies were inadequate and unfair.  “Many rural people have no other source of 
water than their well or spring…Their loss would be very serious…Many of them 
do not have the resources to sue.”  In her testimony, SOCM supporter Carol J. 
Spiller, Ph.D., argued for involving local communities in the waste management 
facilities siting decisions.  She referenced to a recent report to the Massachusetts 
Hazardous Facility Site Safety Council which stressed the importance of local 
“host community” and “abutting community(ies)” influence in the siting process, 
and compensation to residents for losses.  Spiller also recommended that 
Tennessee consider adopting stronger regulations than the federal government 
with regard to waste management because the Massachusetts report found that 
such regulations inspired greater public confidence and credibility.  Lastly, she 
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cited recommendations from the Massachusetts report that “exclusionary criteria” 
prohibiting the building of facilities in certain areas “make facility siting easier 
because they remove the potential objection that a proposed project is on a 
physically inappropriate site.”269  
Supporters of the proposed rules, such as the Tennessee Association of 
Businesses which claimed to represent more than 1000 businesses in the state, 
characterized the testimony landfill opponents as subverting the intent of the 1989 
repeal of the local veto  They objected to proposals to ban the building of waste 
management facilities near scenic, cultural or recreational areas, fault areas, 
wetlands, or floodplains. The business group testified that  waste management 
proposals advocated by citizens and environmental groups went “far beyond what 
is required to provide protection to human health and the environment.”  As an 
alternative, the business community advocated “site-specific” and “case-by-case” 
review of siting criteria and “responsible management.”  Citizens chafed under 
these recommendations, fearing that proponents wanted to create a siting and 
permitting process controlled by business people with direct financial interests in 
building commercial waste facilities and government-appointed bureaucrats tied 
to those interests.  They continued to stress issues of fairness—ensuring local 
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resident participation in environmental decision making by making the process of 
siting and permitting waste management facilities transparent and accessible to 
the public.  In the end, more than 400 people attended the hearings, 100 people 
speaking on the proposed rules with the great majority opposing the draft 
regulations.  In response, the Solid Waste Control Board scrapped their draft 
regulations, substituting draft regulations from the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency without re-soliciting public input as required under Tennessee 
law. This decision not to hold hearings on the substitute regulations drew appeals 
from the Tennessee Environmental Council and SOCM.
270
    
The 1989 repeal of the “local veto” and rule-making hearings and 
proposed solid and hazardous waste facilities in various rural counties galvanized 
local populations.  Citizens organized themselves in a variety of community-level 
groups.  Organizations like “Citizens Against Pollution,” based in Humphreys 
County west of Nashville—the site of ten sanitary and industrial landfills—and 
“Stop Trashing out Premises” (STOP) in Union City in northwestern Tennessee, 
emerged in response to the threat.  In the eastern part of the state, many concerned 
residents were already members of Save Our Cumberland Mountains, which 
quickly took up the cause.  In the fall of 1989, the prospect of importing 
thousands of tons of “out-of-state” waste had emerged as a serious issue among 
SOCM’s members.  After due consideration, the board elected to make it one of 
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SOCM’s campaigns.  By January 1990 it had named a “Toxics Committee” to 
address solid, hazardous, and medical waste issues.
271
  
 The thirteen-member Toxics Committee, assisted by a paid SOCM 
organizer, first met on January 13, 1990.  Their work was infused with the 
language of citizenship, including rights, justice, and responsibility. One of the 
basic problems that they identified was that the waste management industry, 
rather than the state, was responsible for monitoring its own activities.  In 
addition, they argued that the state had as yet only offered “band-aid” solutions to 
the problems of landfills; it had failed to question whether it was in the interests 
of Tennessee to accept waste flows from outside the state; it had not addressed the 
lack of enforcement of existing waste management and water and air quality laws, 
and it had no remedy for the absence of institutions that allowed citizens a voice 
in siting and permitting decisions.  SOCM’s general solutions, far from the 
technical prescriptions that someone involved in the siting or regulation of waste 
facilities might have proposed, revolved around massive campaigns to educate the 
public and actions to hold the industry and government accountable to the 
“citizens.”272   
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The Fight for Local Control, “Environmental Justice,” and the “Right to Say 
‘No’” 
 
 When it appeared that federal and state authorities were not inclined to act 
quickly enough to stop the importation of garbage, SOCM pursued local 
solutions.  They pressured county commissioners to set fees on imported waste to 
discourage dumping in those counties, employing “people power” by organizing 
dozens and sometimes hundreds of citizens to turn out for county commission and 
town council meetings to testify and lobby.  SOCM based this local aspect of their 
campaign—fighting landfills county by county by promoting greater authority for 
town councils and county commissions to regulate activities within their 
jurisdictions—on what became known as the “Jackson law.”  Because the 
Department of Health and Environment’s Solid Waste Control Board failed to 
enact new rules fulfilling the requirements of the 1989 solid waste management 
law, local governments representing counties and unincorporated municipalities 
retained their power to approve or deny proposed new landfills and landfill 
expansions .  To SOCM members, county commissioners, and legislators 
debating the issue in Nashville, this law became simply known as the “Jackson 
law” after its 1989 legislative sponsor Doug Jackson. As the law was written, 
local governments did not automatically gain the authority  granted by the 
legislation; they had to vote to “opt in” to enjoy the local control it provided.  The 
law also included an expiration date of July 1, 1991.  SOCM saw great potential 
in the “Jackson law,” but also worried about its limitations.273   
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In Campbell County, concern over a landfill proposed for an abandoned 
coal strip mine near the community of Wooldridge prompted dozens of residents 
to join SOCM in mid-1990.  This provided the group its first opportunity to test 
the law’s utility.  In August, after learning about the possibilities of the “Jackson 
law” at one of their first meetings, the local chapter commenced a campaign 
gathering 800 signatures on petitions asking the Campbell County Commission to 
adopt or “opt in” to the law. SOCM also lobbied individual commissioners, 
providing each with a copy and summary of the law, and ran public service 
announcements on local radio stations. About thirty SOCM members attended the 
county commission meeting in August.  Led by local resident Connie McNealy, 
they testified about the dangers of massive landfills for water quality and about 
the inadequacy of government regulation of such facilities.  They insisted that it 
was incumbent upon counties to protect themselves because the state and federal 
governments, unduly influenced by urban areas and corporate lobbyists, failed to 
do so.  The commission voted unanimously to opt into the “Jackson law” at its 
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September meeting.  Soon after, Campbell County refused to allow the 
construction of the contentious landfill.
274
   
Following its success in Campbell County, the group went on to organize 
members in other counties to persuade their local governments to opt to be 
covered by the “Jackson law.”  Members in Oliver Springs at the intersection of 
Anderson, Roane and Morgan counties northeast of Knoxville, opposed a new 
landfill proposed by Remote Landfill Services, Inc., and successfully convinced 
the commission of Anderson County to adopt the law and then sue to enjoin 
Remote from commencing construction of the landfill without county approval—
a suit they won on January 29, 1990, resulting in the permanent halting of 
construction of the landfill until it obtained the approval of the Anderson County 
Commission.  SOCM then successfully convinced the Morgan County 
Commission to also opt into the law.
275
  This was yet one more local 
manifestation of the group’s dedication to ensuring that citizens had a say in 
decisions that would affect their communities, the health of their families, and the 
quality of their environment.  In their efforts to address the mega-landfill issue at 
the statewide level, they would operate onthe same philosophical basis. 
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 In tandem with their county-by-county campaign SOCM crafted 
legislative solutions to the problem of solid and hazardous waste management.  At 
a meeting of the State Senate Energy and Environment Committee at Cove Lake 
State Park in Caryville approximately thirty miles north Knoxville in October of 
1990, SOCM members from the Morristown, Campbell County, Roane County, 
and Oliver Springs chapters called on the legislature to “give us local control of 
our own counties and what comes in, stop out-of-state waste from coming into 
Tennessee, improve enforcement of current laws and regulations, and impose 
stiffer fines on violators.”  Attendees offered the committee possible ways to 
achieve these objectives.  Those testifying included a University of Tennessee 
professor who worked with the university’s Waste Management Institute, and 
Peggy Douglas, a representative of the Tennessee Environmental Council, who 
described options available for Tennessee to restrict out-of-state waste without 
violating the U.S. Constitution’s interstate commerce clause.  Speakers also 
included Ruth Neff from the State Planning Office who spoke about possible new 
laws that would allow the Division of Solid Waste to have access to a waste 
facility operator’s past history and compliance reports as part of permitting 
decisions.  Assistant Commissioner of Health and Environment Wayne Scharber 
testified about the importance of citizen participation in solid waste management 
processes.
276
  The prescriptions they offered at this October meeting—the ability 
of Tennessee to restrict out-of-state waste and to review a permit applicant’s past 
compliance with the laws of Tennessee or other states, and ensuring that citizens 
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played a vital role in decisions regarding the siting and permitting of waste 
facilities—became the basic themes for SOCM’s legislative work on the issue.   
Publicity surrounding and public opposition to proposals for new landfills 
and the General Assembly’s attempts to deal with the waste issue catapulted out-
of-state waste to such an enormous issue that in 1991 Tennessee’s Governor, Ned 
McWherter, made it a top priority for his administration.  In advance of the 1991 
Assembly, SOCM drafted language for a waste management bill, solicited 
Assemblymen from the most affected areas to introduce it, and cultivated 
relationships with a variety of allies including the Tennessee Environmental 
Council, the Sierra Club, and other citizens’ organizations and local governments.  
SOCM also attempted to influence McWherter as the governor’s office wrote its 
own waste management bill.  SOCM advocated legislation that would: provide 
citizen’s a right to appeal permitting decisions; extend the expiration date of the 
“Jackson law” from July 1, 1991, to July 1, 1995;  expand the “Jackson law” to 
include all counties regardless of whether they had adopted landfill zoning 
regulations or not; and provide the authority of the “Jackson law” to local 
governments immediately without each county having to “opt in.”  In addition, 
SOCM supported new fees on waste facility permit applicants to pay for 
enforcement, requiring applicants to provide public notice fourteen days before 
applying, changing the Solid Waste Board to include citizen members, and 
restricting the role of Board members who had significant economic interests in 
the permits being considered.  The Administration agreed to consider these 
proposals if SOCM could gain the support of county governments for the 
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provisions.  SOCM then embarked on a successful campaign to drum up the 
endorsements of the state’s county commissioners.  But the Administration 
balked.   SOCM members lobbied assemblymen fervently in Nashville to amend 
the bill to include their provisions—in some instances they had face to face 
contact six or seven times with the same senator or representative.  In the end, 
McWherter’s “Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Plan” included little that 
SOCM proposed.  It did, however, extend the termination date of the “Jackson 
law.”  The only other proactive SOCM-supported legislation that passed in 1991 
was the so-called “bad boy” law drafted by the Tennessee Environmental Council.  
The “bad boy” law prohibited any waste management company from obtaining a 
permit to open and operate a landfill under the governor’s comprehensive plan if 
it had a record of environmental violations in Tennessee or another state.  In their 
lobbying and testimony before subcommittees of the Assembly, SOCM members 
talked about such “bad boys” as “corporate criminals,” and framed their 
arguments in the language of justice and responsibility.  SOCM members were 
also successful in opposing a series of bills introduced by Senator James Kyle, a 
Democrat and attorney from Memphis, that sought to restrict the rights of local 
governments to set fees for imported solid wastes and to terminate the “Jackson 
law.”277   
SOCM’s legislative agenda, although it did not ban out-of-state waste or 
impose any new environmental regulations, was vigorously opposed by the waste 
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management industry and legislators who saw economic opportunity in the 
proposed landfills.  In hearings before the Tennessee Senate Natural Resources 
Committee which was considering both the SOCM and governor’s bills in March 
of 1991, Sandy Johnson of the Tennessee Association of Businesses, insisted that 
any new laws “create mechanisms for scientific and technical reasoning to be the 
major source of authority in siting landfills” rather than the concerns or opinions 
of residents.  Johnson, which claimed that her organization represented more than 
100 manufacturers in the state comprising slightly more than half of all the waste 
that made its way into non-industrial landfills, argued that the creation of regional 
“solid waste authorities” which would coordinate waste management decisions 
among a variety of local governments, would provide yet another hoop to jump 
through in what was an “already near-impossible task.”  Further, she argued that 
because manufacturers represented more than half of the waste produced, the 
solid waste board ought to represent manufacturers proportionally by including 
more representatives from industry in its membership, even though those 
representatives might not live anywhere near the site of a proposed landfill.
278
  
SOCM achieved few of its legislative goals in 1991.  Other than the 
extension of the expiration date of the “Jackson law” to June 30, 1994, and 
passage of the “bad boy” law, SOCM was unable to expand the ability of citizens 
to participate in or appeal permitting decisions for solid waste facilities and the 
membership of the Solid Waste Board remained unchanged.  Two decades of 
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lobbying the General Assembly, however, had taught them the sometimes 
frustrating lesson that passing legislation often took multiple sessions and to be 
patient.  Through a series of articles in the SOCM newsletter and workshops, the 
Toxics Committee and county-level chapters spent the months leading up to the 
next legislative session educating themselves on what the Administration’s bill, 
passed in mid-1991, actually did and how they might use it in their continued 
work on the issue.  Although their pro-active solid waste management bills had 
died in 1991, in the second part of the 97
th
 General Assembly during 1992, they 
successfully helped to kill attempts by Browning Ferris Industries to weaken parts 
of the comprehensive solid waste law that had passed the previous year including 
provisions designed to further reduce local controls for counties.   As they did 
this, they evaluated their legislative efforts during the General Assembly in 1991, 
worked to build momentum for the next session, and continued their efforts to 
advance the power of residents to influence landfill permitting decisions in their 
communities.
279
 
 By the eve of the 93
rd
 session of the General Assembly, the Toxics 
Committee had refined the language of its proposed legislation.  For the 1993-
1994 session, SOCM combined its demands for local control and citizen approval 
of landfills and importation of garbage from out of state into a single flagship bill 
with three main provisions.  First, it sought to strengthen the “bad boy” law 
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Tennessee passed in 1991 by leaving less discretion to the state Commissioner of 
Environment and Conservation to decide what constituted a bad “pattern of 
performance” on the part of a landfill operator seeking a permit.  The proposed 
bill would define specifically what constituted bad behavior.  Second, the bill 
authorized a citizen referendum by which citizens could decide whether to allow a 
landfill in their community or to allow an existing landfill to expand if the 
proposed landfill accepted more than 10,000 tons of waste a month, changed the 
kinds of waste it received, or expanded by more than ten percent. Finally, the bill 
provided citizens the right to appeal solid waste permits just as they could other 
permitting decisions regarding air and water quality and strip mining.
280
   
SOCM’s work on this bill in the 93rd General Assembly marked a turning 
point in how the organization understood and publicly explained its work.  In 
introducing their bill, SOCM utilized a term that was becoming increasingly 
popular in the world of environmental and social activism in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s to describe how they understood the solid and hazardous waste issue 
in the state: “environmental justice.”  Maureen O’Connell, who served as 
executive director of the organization during the period, remembers that the 
organization may have first come into direct contact with the term while working 
with a predominantly African-American group on toxic waste issues in western 
Tennessee in 1991.  She recounts that “environmental justice” seemed to 
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permeate conversations regarding waste issues in the early 1990s.  In introducing 
and explaining the proposed legislation to SOCM members, the January 1993 
issue of The SOCM Sentinel described the issue in terms of justice.  It asked 
readers whether a company that contaminated a community’s water supply, or had 
been repeatedly convicted of federal crimes, or had been repeatedly found to have 
illegally dumped hazardous waste into a landfill should be allowed to operate a 
waste facility in the state.  Justice had always been at least implicitly wrapped up 
in how SOCM members understood and described environmental issues, but the 
explicit use of the phrase “environmental justice” with regard to the waste issue 
indicated a transition in how the organization understood itself and its work.  Its 
1993 waste management bill would be known as the “Environmental Justice Bill” 
and subsequent legislative proposals in later sessions to address out-of-state waste 
would carry the same moniker.  By the end of the decade, SOCM had clarified its 
mission to reflect its dedication to advocating social, economic, and 
environmental justice.
281
    
The “Environmental Justice Bill of 1993” was the embodiment of an 
organizational philosophy that insisted that the best natural resource decisions 
should involve all interested parties and that citizens should have a right to 
participate in those decisions.  But, by July of 1993, the bill had met the same fate 
as its predecessors.  A 3-3-1 vote in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
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Committee kept it from advancing any further, and SOCM’s Toxics Committee 
was already preparing to try again in the next session, strategizing how to 
influence the rule-making process that was being promulgated for the 1991 “bad 
boy” law which had yet to be enforced by the Tennessee Department of 
Environment and Conservation.  With the legislative defeat barely over, the 
Toxics Committee was brainstorming how to turn people out for the public rule-
making hearings.
282
  
 While they were navigating the legislative maze in Nashville, SOCM 
members were also working with similar groups in other rural states to introduce 
and pass a federal bill that would enable states to prohibit the importation of waste 
from outside their borders.  In September of 1991, the SOCM Board endorsed 
federal legislation written by the Western Organization of Resource Councils 
(WORC), a consortium of similar citizens’ conservation organizations in the 
Plains and Rocky Mountain states (that grew, coincidentally, out of Montana’s 
Northern Plains Resource Council).  In a 1991 edition of The SOCM Sentinel, the 
bill was described by one of its authors, Will Collette of WORC, in patriotic terms 
as advancing freedom.  “Some people call it a nimby [not in my backyard] thing 
to say ‘no’ to waste from outside your community,” Collette wrote.  “Instead, we 
consider Not In My Backyard to be another term for democracy…The right to say 
no is a bedrock grass-roots principle.”283   
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For the next four years, SOCM incorporated the federal “Right To Say 
NO” bill into its campaign to prevent the importation of solid, hazardous and 
biomedical wastes from out-of-state through an assertion of the rights of citizens 
to participate in the decisions that affect their communities.  In 1994, WORC and 
the groups supporting the legislation were able to pass what they considered a 
strong bill out of the Energy and Commerce Committee in the House of 
Representatives.  The “State and Local Government Interstate Waste Control Act 
of 1994,” H.R. 4779, sponsored by Representative Rick Boucher, Democrat of 
West Virginia, maintained the ability of states to prohibit out-of-state garbage and 
preserved local, community-level approval for new landfills.  The Senate bill, 
sponsored by Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana, was weaker, but still 
included much of what the groups wanted, including provisions that enabled 
states to control the flows of trash across their borders.  Both bills required public 
hearings or public comment before local governments could approve the building 
of a landfill.  In varying degrees, both defined a role of local governments in 
determining whether they would allow the importation of waste, and both 
expanded the ability of state governors to ban the importation of waste, but only 
with the approval of local governments.  The House bill included a bad actor 
provision similar to what Tennessee passed in 1991; the Senate bill did not.  
When the Senate bill stalled, SOCM and the other groups flooded the mailboxes 
and voicemails of senators with letters, faxes, and phone calls asking to move the 
bill.  Both bills made it through both houses before dying in the last hours of the 
1994 Congressional session.  The next year, the groups got an earlier start, “flying 
  363 
in” citizen lobbyists to Washington, DC This time they were a bit more successful 
as the Senate passed a limited bill by a vote of 94-6 on May 18. SOCM and 
WORC then tried to push a stronger bill through the House.  They relied on 
“action alerts” to keep members informed on the progress of legislation and call 
them to action. Ultimately, opponents’ arguments against the bill—that it violated 
the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and that it imposed 
unnecessary and onerous regulations on the industry—led to the same fate as 
SOCM’s legislative proposals in Tennessee.284 
 
A Seat at the Table 
  
   When their efforts failed to produce strong laws at either the state or 
federal level, SOCM members pursued yet another course grounded in the 
grassroots philosophy of the organization.  After the passage of the “bad boy” law 
in 1991 and extension of the Jackson law, members worked to monitor existing 
landfills, monitor the enforcement activities of the Tennessee Department of 
Conservation and Environment, and participate in the state rule-making processes 
to make sure the new laws were enforced.   
In 1992, SOCM employed a practice they had learned in their battles 
against the coal strip mining companies in the previous decades: it commissioned 
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and published its own independent studies of solid waste, landfills, and 
enforcement (“or lack thereof,” in their words) in the state.  During the 1970s and 
1980s they had developed this tactic as a way to understand what was actually 
happening in the coal mining counties—how much land coal companies owned, 
how much they paid in property taxes and the proportion of their taxes compared 
to that paid by residents who did not own mining companies or mines, which 
mines had permits, and how effectively the state was enforcing its laws.  They 
then used the study to rally public opposition to strip mining or support for 
regulation and to prompt state action.  As they had with the coal mining taxation 
and enforcement studies, SOCM utilized the skills and labor of its members and 
staff.
285
   
While they conducted the study, they continued to elevate the issue 
through creative direct actions.  To illuminate what they considered a lack of 
enforcement of the “bad boy” law by the Department of Environment and 
Conservation and its commissioner J. W. Luna, they held a “mock trial” at 
Legislative Plaza in Nashville on March 1, 1994.  About forty SOCM members 
participated in the event.  Standing in front of an easel that included a state map 
with 24 dump trucks scattered across it representing a proposed landfill or landfill 
expansion, Janice Morrissey of Roane County articulated the group’s position: 
“the citizens of this state are under siege from the waste industry, and the 
Department of Environment and Conservation has done nothing to protect us 
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from this siege.” State officials cited revisions to Tennessee’s waste management 
laws made in the last three General Assembly sessions to assure citizens that they 
were more protected than they had ever been from the dangers associated with 
landfills. Rose Ingram of Oliver Springs was not convinced.  “We have been 
fighting an unneeded private megadump for more than four years,” she told 
reporters.  She pointed to repeated violations by the company that had taken over 
the proposed landfill from Remote Landfill Incorporated, Chambers Development 
Corporation in West Virginia and Pennsylvania and called on Commissioner Luna 
to intervene to enforce the “bad boy” law.  Chambers, which operated landfills in 
thirteen states and was under investigation by the federal Security and Exchange 
Commission, dismissed the event as just another example of “NIMBYism,” but 
SOCM kept up the pressure.
286
   
 
 
“Oliver Spring Chapter members meet with governor’s representatives urging the 
‘bad boys’ law should be enforced.”  Private collection, Statewide Organizing for 
Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee. 
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“Action and press conference highlighting problems of illegally dumped waste in 
Greene Co., 1993.”  Private collection, Statewide Organizing for Community 
eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee. 
 
After three years, the group released a report of its findings.  According to 
the SOCM’s newsletter, the study was conducted by the members of the Toxics 
Committee because of the “[h]undreds of complaints from citizens about 
problems at landfills in their communities, and countless horror stories of the 
state’s refusal to take any action against the operators.”  The report—fifty five 
pages long without appendices—reflected the group’s dedication to holding 
government and industry accountable to residents.  Alvin Miller, member from 
Greene County in the far eastern part of the state, wrote in the introduction of the 
report, “They [the state] have good guidelines…If they went by the rules, there 
wouldn’t be much problem…Restrictions are no good unless somebody enforces 
them.”  The study found that the existing laws were basically sound but that they 
were not being adequately enforced.  It identified four problem areas: inconsistent 
or only partial enforcement of state regulations, poor agency record keeping that 
was often inaccessible to enforcement staff and citizens, enforcement policies that 
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were unclear for industry, agency officials and citizens, and a lack of effective 
fines to act as deterrents to breaking the law.
287
   
Prompted by the findings and allegations of lax state enforcement in 
SOCM’s publicized study, the Tennessee Department of Environment and 
Conservation agreed to meet with SOCM members on February 9, 1996.  
According to SOCM Toxics Committee members Janice Morrissey, Todd 
Shelton, and Ethel and Clyde Spiller, the state officials listened attentively and 
conceded that many of SOCM’s findings were correct including inconsistent 
enforcement practices, poor communication among the offices, lack of public 
accessibility to information, and inadequate record keeping.  The department staff 
agreed with the SOCM members that there was a need to formalize policy, but 
maintained that the department did a better job than the SOCM study indicated.  
But because record keeping was so bad, there was no way for the citizen-
researchers to know this.  By the end of the meeting, the Department and SOCM 
had agreed to a detailed list of commitments for progress, a timeline for 
accomplishing them with specific dates and benchmarks, and scheduled a follow-
up meeting later that year to assess progress.
288
   
The state agreed to direct its inspectors to document the reasons why they 
deemed violations minor or serious enough to warrant some type of enforcement 
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activity and to require that they indicate a date when the violation would be 
corrected.  SOCM agreed to providing the state with information on which field 
offices it found the most “citizen-friendly” in their accessibility and record-
keeping so the state could begin to make all of their field offices more accessible.  
In addition, the Director of the Solid Waste Division agreed to meet with field 
office managers to address inconsistencies in record keeping and enforcement at 
the office, but also at the level of individual inspectors and to create a certification 
process for landfill operators and educational program for inspectors.  Finally, the 
state agreed to begin implementing a comprehensive inspection records program 
by July of 1996 that would summarize inspection and enforcement information 
and the resolution of violations in an accessible computer database.
289
  All of 
these agreements served to make information more accessible to citizens so that 
they could more easily hold the state and waste management companies 
accountable and prevent pollution from landfills.   As pleasantly surprised as 
SOCM members were with the outcome, they understood that these agreements 
were only the beginning.  Over the next several months, the organization 
expanded the size of its enforcement campaign, disseminating the findings of its 
solid waste study and monitoring the Department of Environment and 
Conservation to make sure it followed through on its promises.
290
  
In August of 1996, members of SOCM’s Toxic Committee again met with 
the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation to review progress 
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in the implementing of the commitments that it made earlier that year.  SOCM 
found that some of the commitments were indeed in the works, while others were 
moving along more slowly.  The state had begun creating its certification process 
for landfill operators and was close to implementing its inspector training 
program to standardize enforcement procedures.  When SOCM members 
complained that citizens were still having trouble gaining access to information 
despite promises by the department that it would information more available, the 
director of the Department committed to fixing the problem.  Disappointingly, the 
inspection record database was far from complete.  The meeting ended with 
renewed commitments by the state to complete what it had agreed to in February 
and an invitation for SOCM members to present their concerns about citizen 
access to information to a field office managers meeting.  The Toxics Committee 
members were pleased with the tenor of the meeting but feared that all of the 
changes they had worked to achieve might simply be cosmetic.  “I think it’s a 
really good first step that we’re having these conversations,” said Janice 
Morrissey and she added, “It’s something that we’re not in the habit of doing, and 
something they’re not in the habit of doing either.”  Morrissey worried, though, “I 
hope it makes a difference to the whole enforcement effort, that it’s not just 
fiddling around with paperwork.”  The only way to ensure that these changes had 
real effects on enforcement of landfills and made tangible improvements to the 
environment depended on whether SOCM members and other citizens remained 
involved in monitoring the agency and ensuring progress occurred at the local 
level.  The Toxics Committee, according to the organization’s newsletter, had 
  370 
“forced important changes and given local people the tools to achieve better 
enforcement at landfills in their area,” but it was up to citizens to “make it 
happen.”291   
 
Conclusion 
 
By the end of 1996, SOCM’s campaign to prevent the importation of out-
of-state waste and the construction of mega-landfills had transitioned from an 
intense, multi-front battle into a cooler scenario in which citizens took an active 
role in monitoring and supporting state regulation and holding landfill operators 
accountable to the people and existing laws.  Other, more pressing, issues—the 
prospect of housing radioactive waste in Roane County west of Knoxville, clear 
cutting forests, the organization’s new campaigns to “dismantle racism,” and a 
proposed major strip mine on the Cumberland Plateau—soon overtook the threat 
of out-of-state waste, and the organization’s energies were directed elsewhere.  
Without passing any of their flagship legislation that would have given citizens an 
expanded and decisive role in permitting decisions for landfills or the state or 
local governments the “right to say NO” to out-of-state garbage, it is difficult to 
declare their campaign a clear-cut victory for the organization.  If their goal was a 
revolution in solid waste management and democratic participation, then they 
enjoyed at best only minor success.  But if their goal was simply to stop the mega-
landfills that threatened their communities and maintain or expand the ability of 
citizens to participate in landfill siting decisions, then the campaign was a 
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substantial success.  In the legislature, their preservation and extension of the 
ability of local governments to veto landfill permits proved vital in allowing 
citizens to determine what happened in their communities.  In addition, the 
passage of the “bad boy” law and its enforcement by SOCM members kept the 
most irresponsible landfill operators out of the state.  Opponents of SOCM’s 
proposed legislation argued that the kinds of public notice and citizens’ appeal 
provisions the group proposed in the legislature would “shut down the industry” 
in Tennessee.  It appears that it took even less than that—by the end of the 1990s, 
few of the mega-landfills had materialized and the multinational waste 
management corporations had abandoned their grandiose proposals.  Citizen 
monitoring of industry and government agencies, which increased enforcement of 
existing laws at the local level and use of the “Jackson law,” had proved effective.  
SOCM members, through a vigorous commitment to grassroots democracy, had 
formalized their roles as citizen-guardians of the “people’s” interest in solid waste 
management.  After using every strategy they could dream up to influence landfill 
permitting at every level, citizens had succeeded at achieving increased power in 
the decision-making process.
292
 
  Part of reason for the outcome of SOCM’s campaign to stop out-of-state 
waste might be attributed to the diffuse nature of the issue.  Environmental 
decision making regarding waste issues, with its multiple venues including the 
legislature, state agencies and county commissions and multiple and confusing 
laws and regulations made the issue, like the refuse it concerned, messy.  When 
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SOCM was forced to consider the threat of a major coal strip mine proposed for 
the Cumberland Plateau which mined through the most toxic and acid-producing 
coal seam in the state with dire consequences for the region’s water quality and a 
beloved and scenic state park, the outcome was very different.   
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CHAPTER 10 
SAVING FALL CREEK FALLS:A CASE STUDY IN ADAPTATION AND 
INNOVATION    
 
 
 The campaign to stop out-of-state waste in Tennessee required Save Our 
Cumberland Mountains to creatively draw from its two decades of experience to 
pressure local, state, and federal decision makers.  Imagining a solution to the 
threat imported waste and mega-landfills posed to the land, water, and quality of 
life in rural and working-class communities challenged SOCM members and 
leaders to navigate a complex web of local ordinance and state and federal laws 
and to identify key players in waste management decisions and then employ a 
variety of tactics in influencing them.  In the process, SOCM advanced its 
organizational philosophy that citizens ought to have a say in environmental 
decisions.  In the end, however, the group did not achieve a decisive victory it 
sought.  Instead, its efforts raised the issue in the minds of the public, policy 
makers and regulators, and elevated the credibility of the organization until 
SOCM gained new power to evaluate waste management proposals and hold state 
regulators accountable to protect citizens’ water, land, air, and communities.   
As SOCM members fought this decade-long battle, other issues came to 
the fore.  When new coal strip mines were proposed for the Cumberland Plateau, 
SOCM reflected on its campaign to stop out-of-state waste.  Its leadership 
recognized the potential of local organizing but realized that it was going to have 
to do more much more than monitor the Tennessee Department of Environment 
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and Conservation and the federal Office of Surface Mining and hold the agencies 
accountable to state and federal mining laws.   Even with increased public 
oversight and citizen participation, federal and state coal mining and reclamation 
laws had largely failed to prevent the degradation of streams on the Cumberland 
Plateau during the 1980s.  If they wanted to prevent long-term damage to streams, 
public and private lands and wells, the new strip mines had to be stopped.  Halting 
the construction of a massive 18,000 acre coal mine that threatened Fall Creek 
Falls State Park on the Cumberland Plateau depended on SOCM’s ability to blend  
many of the organizing techniques and strategies it had cultivated in its previous 
twenty years with new strategies and new energy.  The campaign to persuade the 
federal government to save Fall Creek Falls by designating it unsuitable for coal 
mining marks a turning point in SOCM’s larger project to increase citizen 
involvement in the decisions that affected their environment and communities and 
a case study in how citizens’ groups adapted to the regulatory and political 
landscape of the 1990s.   
 
 
Post-SMCRA Opposition to Strip-mining on the Cumberland Plateau 
 
In many ways, SOCM members were better prepared to fight coal strip 
mines than to fight out-of-state waste, which was a good thing because proposals 
for new strip mines in Tennessee returned with a vengeance in the 1990s.  
SOCM’s experience with strip-mining in the 1970s prepared them well to take on 
new coal mine challenges in the 1990s.   By that decade, strip-mining had become 
somewhat old hat for the organization.  During the 1970s, this makeshift 
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conglomeration of retired coal miners, wives of coal miners, teachers, and other 
local residents in the Tennessee coal fields tread unfamiliar ground to rein in the 
abuses of largely unregulated strip mining and its associated dangers to the health 
and livability in the region.  During the transition period from underground 
mining of coal seams to large-scale surface strip-mining, SOCM became the 
citizen group most involved in pushing both the State of Tennessee and, more 
successfully, the federal government to regulate the practice and post-mining land 
reclamation.  But getting stronger Tennessee surface mining laws and the federal 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMRCA) did not end the threat, 
and many SOCM members felt that the federal law was not stringent enough to 
prevent the kind of landslides and degradation that characterized strip mining 
before 1977, and that the State of Tennessee was ineffectual in enforcing the law.  
SOCM maintained that it was not opposed to all strip mining, but to strip mining 
where consequences were environmentally and socially damaging—on slopes 
steeper than twenty degrees that were prone to landslides, or in areas that would 
likely result in acid-mine drainage, for instance.  As an alternative, the group 
advocated increased underground coal mining which still produced the majority 
of coal in the state.  SOCM insisted that it considered new strip mining proposals 
on a case by case basis.  But because most of the coal mining regions of the state 
were either steeper than twenty degrees or included acid-producing ore bodies,  
SOCM tended to oppose the majority of new strip mining proposals in the state 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  
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In 1974, AMAX Coal , Incorporated applied for a permit to build one of 
the largest coal strip mines ever proposed for the region on the Cumberland 
Plateau—a  four hundred foot thrust of earth running north to south between 
Nashville and Knoxville.  The proposed 20,000 acre mine would cut across 
multiple watersheds and through three streams and was adjacent to the state park, 
a natural scenic area beloved by Tennesseans for its lakes, streams, and waterfalls 
including Fall Creek Falls, the tallest waterfall east of the Rocky Mountains.  
SOCM had little presence in this part of the state, but organizers Maureen 
O’Connell and Charles “Boomer” Winfrey found local residents looking for help 
and eager to organize.  With the help of O’Connell and Winfrey, residents like 
Linda and Larry Smotherman, James and Lucille Shockley, Joel Chandler, and 
Alta Moffitt of Piney, and Lewis McDowell and his family in Cagle, who had 
lived and worked on farms and in the mines in the region for generations, formed 
the Concerned Citizens of Piney.  They sought help from allies in the Hamilton 
County chapter of the Sierra Club and the local chapter of the League of Women 
Voters to oppose the mine and eventually became an official chapter of SOCM.  
SOCM was successful in using the National Environmental Policy Act and new 
water quality laws in Tennessee to thwart AMAX’s plans arguing that the 
proposed mine, which would cut through the Sewanee coal seam—an iron pyrite-
rich ore body that was prone to significant acid-mine drainage problems—would 
permanently damage the region’s water quality with unacceptable consequences 
for both residents and the environment.
293
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In the mid-1980s, RITH Energy Incorporated proposed yet another mine 
on the plateau.  Though smaller than AMAX’s, RITH’s proposal also relied on 
mining through the acid-producing Sewanee coal seam.  The threat of polluting 
the Plateau’s streams combined with RITH’s irresponsible blasting and mining 
practices which damaged the homes and wells of adjacent landowners, and their 
alleged use of intimidation against local landowners, attracted new opposition 
from people like David Hardeman and Wanda and Mike Hodge of the Graysville-
area who joined SOCM.  Their complaints finally resulted in RITH being shut 
down by court-order for repeatedly violating water quality standards and 
prohibitions against blasting after dark.  Galvanized by the fight with RITH, 
Hardeman, the Hodges and their neighbors were ready when General Minerals 
applied for a permit to mine on Rock Creek on the Plateau in 1988.   
Although any new coal strip mine was subject to the federal Surface Mine 
Control and Reclamation Act and Tennessee mining and reclamation laws and 
would be regulated to a degree unprecedented before 1977, citizens argued that 
the geology of the Cumberland Plateau made water quality degradation a certainty 
and reclamation extremely difficult.  They contended that the benefits of strip 
mining on the Plateau were not worth the costs, and that new strip mines should 
not be allowed.  To this end, SOCM and its local chapter in the region proposed 
using a provision in the federal SMCRA law as yet untested in Tennessee.  
During the passage of SMCRA, western anti-strip mining interests were able to 
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get a provision attached to the law that allowed the federal Office of Surface 
Mining (OSM) to declare certain lands unsuitable for mining.  Montana ranchers 
and environmentalists had originally advocated the inclusion of the “lands 
unsuitable for mining petition”  (LUMP) provision in SMCRA to allow the OSM 
to declare the Custer National Forest off limits to mining.  They argued that its 
value as grazing land, a source of reliable, clean surface water, and its scenic and 
recreational qualities as wilderness  far surpassed any mineral wealth that could 
be mined from this national forest in the southeastern part of Montana .  The 
LUMP had not been considered for Appalachia, yet the first successful petition to 
declare lands off-limits to mining was in Mississippi—not Montana. SOCM 
organizer Don Barger hypothesized that it could be used on the Cumberland 
Plateau.  SOCM’s “Strip Mine Committee” argued that the beauty of the region 
and its high value for agriculture and recreation, and the apparent impossibility of 
mining through the Sewanee coal seam without permanently damaging these 
values, surely made the Rock Creek watershed a “land unsuitable for mining.”  In 
the end, SOCM’s petition, bolstered by a prolonged campaign by the organization 
to build local and congressional support for the designation and by sightings of 
Golden Eagles—a recovering endangered species—in Rock Creek Gorge, proved 
at least partially convincing.  In 1987, the federal Office of Surface Mining 
(OSM) decided on a “partial designation” of the Rock Creek Gorge area as 
“unsuitable for mining” with the other half of the petition area being temporarily 
withheld from mining pending further water quality studies.  The group also 
succeeded in applying the same strategy to a proposed mining area in Campbell 
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County north of Knoxville.  By the end of the 1980s, the LUMP process seemed 
to provide a valuable strategic option for SOCM and its chapters when confronted 
by the threat of new strip mines.
294
 
By the early 1990s, the residents of the Cumberland Plateau and SOCM 
were harried by repeated proposals by coal companies to mine on the Cumberland 
Plateau.  Until then, SOCM’s work fighting individual proposals on the Plateau 
had proved to be resource- and time- intensive and failed to stop strip mining 
through the acid-producing Sewannee coal seam. As new mines were proposed, 
acid mine drainage seeped from mines deemed “reclaimed” by OSM and state 
officials coloring the water rusty-red and killing aquatic life in streams on the 
Plateau.  Acid mine drainage proved to be pernicious problem and a poignant 
reminder of the dangers of stripping in the region.  Building on the successful 
RITH ruling, SOCM pressured the Knoxville Field Office of the federal Office of 
Surface Mining to investigate water quality issues associated with Skyline’s 
Gladys Fork mine.  In 1990, OSM found Skyline to be producing acid mine 
drainage and required the company to submit a toxic materials handling plan 
explaining how they intended to rectify the issue.  Over the next two years, 
Skyline failed to submit the required plan and, after receiving multiple “Notice[s] 
of Violations” from OSM, was issued a “Cease Order” by the agency effectively 
shutting down the mine.  In July 1992, however, the Washington, DC, office of 
OSM ordered the Knoxville Field Office to approve Skyline’s experimental toxic 
                                                 
294
 David Hardeman, interview by author, Graysville, Tennessee, 23 June 2010; Wanda Hodge, 
interview by author, Graysville, Tennessee, 1 July 2010; Mauren O’Connell, interview by author, 
Lake City, Tennessee, 25 June 2010. 
  380 
material handling plan and enter into “Interim Temporary Relief” with the 
company that would allow it to continue operation so long as a public hearing was 
held on the issue and the operation did not present a significant and imminent 
threat to human health or the environment.  The “Interim Temporary Relief” order 
from the Washington office was predicated on the assumption that the OSM 
director Harry Snyder appointed under the administration President George H.W. 
Bush, would approve Skyline’s toxic materials plan.295   
When environmental reporter Keith Schneider of The New York Times 
visited the Cumberland Plateau in late fall of that year to investigate enforcement 
of SMCRA by OSM he was appalled.  After viewing acid mine drainage from 
mined lands certified “reclaimed” by the agency and water pollution below coal 
mines in the region, he declared to David Hardeman and other SOCM members 
who accompanied him on the tour,  “I’ve travelled all over the country doing 
environmental stories, and this is the worst I’ve seen.”  Schneider’s investigation 
revealed that OSM Director Snyder had systematically interfered with the 
enforcement efforts of the regional OSM staff.  A Bush administration political 
appointee, Snyder appeared more committed to facilitating coal mining than to 
meeting the OSM’s mandate to ensure that mining did not unduly damage the 
environment or public health. In June of the next year, under guidance of a new 
administration, OSM finally decided to simply give up on forcing Skyline to 
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rectify its acid mine drainage problems.  Being allowed to continue mining 
throughout the controversy, Skyline’s mining at Gladys Fork was nearly 
complete.  Clearly, the best work and dedication of citizens to ensure enforcement 
of surface mining and water quality laws was only as effective as the political 
climate allowed; it did not guarantee the protection of the land and water.  If 
SOCM were to prevent the Cumberland Plateau from being incrementally strip 
mined, its streams destroyed and natural and scenic qualities degraded, the group 
would have to employ a different strategy.
296
 
 
 
Two tailings ponds at the Gladys Fork mine, July 1992.  The red/brown pond is 
full of acid-mine drainage which threatened to seep into area streams and water 
supplies.  Private collection, Statewide Organizing for Community 
eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee. 
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Big Brush Creek runs red with acid-mine drainage from the Gladys Fork Mine, 
July 1992.  Private collection, Statewide Organizing for Community 
eMpowerment, Lake City Tennessee. 
 
As the slow regulatory drama of Gladys Fork played out, the South 
Cumberland Chapter of SOCM and the organization’s Strip Mine Committee 
realized the need to move their campaign in a new direction.  Maureen O’Connell 
remembers that at a meeting of the Chapter and the Strip Mine Committee at the 
Cagle home of member Laura Dees in Sequatchie County in early 1992, the group 
decided to change course in their strategy against Skyline and proactively petition 
OSM to declare the watersheds feeding Fall Creek Falls State Park as “lands 
unsuitable for mining.”  It had partially worked for Rock Creek, and SOCM 
hoped it could make it work for Falls Creek. This strategy held certain advantages 
for the organization over its conventional tactics.  Unlike successfully appealing a 
mining permit or persuading OSM to enforce water quality and reclamation laws, 
having a place designated “unsuitable for surface coal mining” had a degree of 
permanence—mining companies could not simply amend their plans of 
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operations to correct deficiencies as they could with mining permits.  After 
months of gathering scientific information about the risk of water quality 
degradation from acid mine drainage caused by strip mining on the Cumberland 
Plateau, reviewing state and federal environmental laws and their enforcement, 
and having the petition vetted by legal and mining experts, the group submitted 
the LUMP to OSM on July 8.  According to OSM rules concerning lands 
unsuitable petitions, the agency was required to respond within thirty days.  After 
several delays, the agency finally responded to SOCM on October 22, 106 days 
after the petition was submitted.  Under normal circumstances, OSM would write 
the petitioners and indicate whether the petition was complete and that the agency 
was beginning to fully consider its merits, or that it was incomplete and that the 
petitioners needed to provide more information.  Instead, OSM rejected the 
petition as “frivolous,” explaining that it disagreed with the petitioners’ 
allegations.  SOCM’s petition was quashed, possibly victim of the same political 
forces that had undermined SMCRA enforcement in the Gladys Fork controversy.  
SOCM was not to be stopped, however.  Instead, the group revised its petition and 
waited to resubmit it until after the inauguration of newly elected president Bill 
Clinton in January 1993.  With a new Clinton-appointed director of OSM, SOCM 
hoped to receive a more favorable response.
297
 
The petition sought to protect roughly 30,000 acres of the Cumberland 
Plateau and the Fall Creek watershed. But petitioning for a “lands unsuitable” 
designation did not, in and of itself, make the Fall Creek LUMP campaign unique. 
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Except for the change of  administration, there was little reason to believe that the 
Fall Creek Falls petition would be any more successful than previous petitions. If 
they were lucky, SOCM members might achieve a partial designation as they had 
for Rock Creek. What made the campaign significant was that it began in the 
midst of a transition within SOCM itself.  The group’s decision to re-submit the 
Fall Creek Falls petition to the new Clinton administration in 1993 came during a 
time in which SOCM was re-evaluating its environmental and organizational 
strategies.  Both developments profoundly shaped the campaign and its prospects 
for success.  The campaign to designate the 30,000 acres surrounding Fall Creek 
Falls as lands unsuitable for mining built on all of the knowledge and experience 
the organization and its membership had accrued since its inception and marked 
yet another evolutionary step in how SOCM and its members affected 
environmental decision making in Tennessee by promoting citizen participation.   
 
SOCM Adapts and Innovates: The Major Media Campaign 
Before the South Cumberland Chapter and Strip Mine Committee had 
decided to pursue a lands unsuitable petition for the Fall Creek Falls area, SOCM 
members and staff had already begun to notice a change in how the media and 
public perceived the organization.  SOCM had grown since the early 1970s in a 
variety of ways, including an increase in members, the kind and number of issues 
it worked on, and the geographic area it covered.  By the early 1990s, it had more 
members working on more issues than ever before.  In addition to coal strip 
mining and reclamation and solid and hazardous waste, SOCM worked on 
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pesticide use, clear-cutting of Tennessee’s remaining old-growth timber, fair 
taxation, the rights of temporary workers, and an ambitious campaign to combat 
racism within the state.  Yet despite all of their work and their presence in the 
legislature, it seemed increasingly difficult for the group to attract media 
attention.  Early organizer Boomer Winfrey, who left the group to pursue a 
journalism career in 1983, remembers that during the 1970s, SOCM did not have 
to work very hard to attract media coverage: “Strip mining was sexy, we were the 
only game in town, we were the go-to-group the news media was always looking 
to talk to.”  But by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the group’s media attention 
seemed to stagnate.  According to Winfrey, who was then working as a 
newspaper editor in LaFollette County in eastern Tennessee, strip mining had 
become old news, and the group was not working on as many high-profile issues 
as it had been during its first decade.
298
   
SOCM’s board hypothesized that their inability to attract media attention 
had a direct bearing on their ability to pass legislation or affect decision makers.  
Additionally, they correlated their lack of a positive media presence and relatively 
few high-profile “wins” in the late 1980s and early 1990s with a lack of growth in 
new members.  In response, they started planning media training events in the 
hope of bolstering the group’s political clout and attracting more members.  They 
utilized the knowledge and experience of Winfrey who, by the 1980s, was 
something of an expert on SOCM and journalism in the region.  In October of 
1993, the Roane County Chapter, which had been active opposing a series of 
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proposed toxic waste incinerators in their region, hosted Winfrey for a training 
session on how to attract better media attention and promote SOCM’s message 
and campaigns through the newspapers.  At the meeting, the members learned tips 
for writing effective letters to the editor, for meeting with editors to court media 
attention, to develop relationships with reporters, and to promote the credibility of 
the organization.
299
     
The next month, SOCM’s dedication to cultivating the media moved one 
step further.  On November 6, the SOCM “Growth Committee”—formed in 1990 
to research and implement plans to increase the group’s membership by the year 
2000—hosted media consultant Jane Wholey to teach members about how to 
engage the media effectively as part of their campaigns.  Wholey, a journalist 
working with the Piedmont Peace Project based in Kannapolis, North Carolina, 
devoted time to teaching the group about attracting positive media attention and 
identifying which parts of their campaigns were newsworthy.  She devoted the 
bulk of her seminar, however, to a ground-breaking idea for the organization—
how to plan and embark on a “media campaign.”  To borrow Maureen 
O’Connell’s description, SOCM had “accidentally done some things right” in 
their first decades and benefitted from positive media exposure.  But Wholey 
encouraged the group to view the group’s relationship to the media differently. 
Instead of viewing the media as responding to what the group was doing and 
hoping to obtain adequate coverage—that is, inviting reporters to press 
conferences, informing media outlets of their work through press releases, and 
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submitting letters to the editor—Wholey’s media campaigns were sophisticated, 
strategic endeavors, which conceived of media attention as a powerful component 
of influencing decision makers.  As she described it, “A major media campaign is 
using a lot of media opportunities in an orchestrated way to call attention to one 
campaign; it is thinking through all the ‘windows of opportunity’ for media to 
advance the issue and culminate in one big event with supporting activities.”  In 
Wholey’s media campaigns, every aspect of an issue campaign had to be 
considered in terms of what kind of media attention it might receive.  She 
therefore prodded the group to think beyond simple press conferences or press 
releases and lining up quality testimony at public hearings and instead toward 
planning coordinated activities that attracted media attention.  She encouraged 
SOCM to choose one of their issues and develop a major media campaign to 
support it. If members committed themselves to this, she would return and help 
SOCM strategize and plan the campaign. SOCM thereafter agreed to commence 
one “major media campaign” every year until the end of the decade.300    
Enthusiasm for a media campaign grew within the organization over the 
next few months.  In April 1994, SOCM members Betty Anderson and Mary 
Dennis Letsch and staff person Shelley Wascom joined members of seven other 
social change and environmental organizations from the South at a three-day 
training held at the Highlander Center in New Market, Tennessee, and run by the 
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New World Foundation.  Taught by Denise Mitchell and Gwen McKinney, 
Washington, DC-based media consultants who specialized in working with social 
change groups, the workshop focused on planning and conducting strategic 
communications campaigns, including how to plan media actions and how to 
frame the group’s issue in interviews and during debates.  The workshop was 
scheduled to be the first in a series sponsored by the foundation.  Anderson, 
Letsch and Wascom brought back lessons from the workshop to SOCM, which 
was about to choose that year’s media campaign.  When Jane Wholey returned to 
Tennessee in October of 1994 to help SOCM with its media strategy, the 
organization chose the Fall Creek Falls “lands unsuitable” petition as its first 
major media campaign. The South Cumberland Chapter’s Fall Creek Falls 
petition, which had languished for the better part of 1993 and 1994, now became 
SOCM’s primary campaign and part of the organization’s experimental new 
strategy.
301
      
Once the group declared the Fall Creek Falls LUMP campaign its main 
organization-wide issue for 1995, the Cumberland Plateau Chapters (South 
Cumberland, Bledsoe, Sewanee, Rhea, and White/Cumberland) and the Strip 
Mine Committee and members of the board and staff went to work brainstorming 
different elements of the campaign and activities.  As they had in the past, they 
identified who made the decisions that affected the outcome of their campaign—
the “targets” with capacity to deliver on the group’s goals—and the people who 
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had access to these targets or could apply political pressure to them.  Using 
techniques SOCM had developed since the early 1970s and those it learned and 
borrowed from other grassroots environmental and civil rights organizations over 
the years, organizers methodically guided members through a series of meetings 
in which they identified their goals and objectives and came up with an evolving 
“map” of power brokers.  At the center of the map, which resembled a spider web 
or bicycle wheel with a center hub and spokes radiating outward, they placed the 
entity that would ultimately decide the fate of their LUMP: the Office of Surface 
Mining within the federal Department of the Interior.  But, because agencies are 
made of human beings who can be influenced and held accountable, they attached 
specific names to these targets—in the OSM in 1995, that person was Robert 
Uram.  Uram’s boss was the Secretary of the Interior appointed by President Bill 
Clinton, former Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt.  Although Uram made the 
decision for the agency, Babbitt could make the ultimate decision, and as a 
political appointee he was vulnerable to political pressure from a variety of 
directions including directly from President Clinton and his Vice President, Albert 
Gore, Jr., a native Tennessean.  To Babbitt in the center of their map, they drew 
lines from Clinton and Gore and from members of Tennessee’s congressional 
delegation.  From members of Tennessee’s congressional delegation, the spokes 
radiated out to various county commissions, chambers of commerce and from 
those entities to individuals or groups that could influence those bodies.  SOCM 
strategists then brainstormed a list of allies—other environmental and social 
change groups within the state and region and nationally but also community 
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groups.  This was a diverse list that included groups like the Alliance for Native 
American Indian Rights in Tennessee, the Tennessee office of the Nature 
Conservancy, and League of Women Voters chapters across the state.
302
   
Once they had identified their “targets,”, the group then created a multi-
level plan for influencing each.  This included a sustained local campaign to 
generate thousands of signatures from across the state in support of the  “lands 
unsuitable” petition, to influence chambers of commerce and county commissions 
in the towns and counties near the petition area to endorse the campaign.  They 
hoped to use these endorsements to influence Tennessee’s congressional 
delegation and Vice President Gore to support the petition and then pressure the 
director of OSM and Secretary Babbitt directly to decide in favor of the 
organization.  Complementing this campaign was a series of planned meetings 
between SOCM members and Tennessee’s congressional representatives and 
Senators Bill Frist and Fred Thompson. SOCM members also met with 
representatives of OSM at the Knoxville field office.  To bolster their arguments, 
the group employed an economist at the University of Tennessee to calculate the 
economic impact of tourism and recreation in the Fall Creek Falls State Park area 
to underscore the potential losses should the streams feeding the falls and the 
lands adjacent to the park become degraded from mining.  Lastly, SOCM leaders 
crafted individual plans for turning out people to testify at the various hearings 
associated with the LUMP process and its requisite environmental impact 
statement (EIS) should the OSM find the petition complete and begin its 
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consideration.  They considered each element in terms of how it helped them 
achieve not only their short-term goal of protecting the Fall Creek Falls 
watersheds but how it grew the organization’s strength to affect decision making 
in the state.
303
 
Incorporating the lessons SOCM leaders had learned from consultant 
Wholey and from the New World Foundation media training, they considered 
each element of the campaign in terms of opportunities to achieve positive media 
attention that might be used to spread their message about the issue, attract 
support, and leverage influence with decision makers.  To this end, they assigned 
a “media subcommittee” to work specifically on this part of the campaign 
including visible media events in Knoxville and other cities, proactive meetings 
with editorial boards, appearances on local talk shows, attracting investigative 
news stories from local television channels and national outlets including the 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), and turning public hearings into orchestrated 
media events.  By the middle of 1995, they were ready to put the plan into 
action.
304
      
 
 
“Bruce Babbitt: Don’t Let The Falls Down”: the Fall Creek Falls 
LUMP Campaign  
 
On July 14,1995, together with the group Tennessee Citizens for 
Wilderness Planning (TWCP) and forty-nine individual citizens, SOCM filed 
their revised 1992 Fall Creek Falls State Park LUMP with the OSM.  They 
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coordinated press releases to accompany the filing that framed the petition as yet 
one more attempt in a twenty-year struggle to save Fall Creek Falls from strip 
mining and other industrial development and succeeded in getting some coverage 
in local newspapers.  Once the LUMP was accepted on October 5 as complete 
after some minor technical corrections, OSM began plans for a public “scoping” 
period including a hearing to listen to what issues the public felt the OSM ought 
to consider in its deliberations.
305
   
Following the guidance of Wholey, SOCM initiated plans to get the media 
interested in the scoping process and OSM hearings to elevate the campaign in 
public discourse.  The Strip Mine Committee and Plateau chapters began work on 
turning out as many people at the hearings as possible.  To that end, they held 
press conferences in Knoxville and Chattanooga to educate the public about the 
issue and the LUMP and to encourage them to attend the scoping hearing 
scheduled for November 16 at the park or to submit comments. They cast their 
message in simple terms: Tennesseans’ beloved Fall Creek Falls State Park, the 
most visited state park in Tennessee, was under assault from strip mining 
companies, and SOCM, Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning (TCWP), 
and forty-nine other concerned citizens had petitioned the federal government to 
save it.  At the press conferences held the week before the scheduled hearing, 
members of SOCM and TCWP gave presentations on the park, including pictures 
of the Falls, strip mines near the petition area, and polluted streams resulting from 
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acid mine drainage, maps, and charts illustrating the possible economic effects to 
park revenues if the Fall Creek Falls watershed was mined.  When the 
Republican-controlled Congress and the Democratic President failed to come to 
an agreement on the federal budget that fall and the government “shut down” 
furloughed the OSM staff, the hearing was delayed until December 5.  The 
petitioners took the postponement in stride.  SOCM achieved encouraging 
coverage of the press conferences on local television stations and in local 
newspapers, which they attributed to generating many calls from people interested 
in the issue in the weeks that followed.  The extra three weeks gave the group 
even more time to organize for the hearing.
306
    
When the hearing was finally held, more than 150 people attended.  Of 
those, SOCM reported that at least 110 were SOCM members or supporters of the 
petition and roughly forty-five opposed the petition.  SOCM reportedly “made the 
hearing room into ‘our’ space,” showing up early enough to take the first ten to 
fifteen rows of seats and wearing SOCM T-shirts and bright green buttons reading 
“Save the Park: SOCM.”  Of the people who actually had a chance to speak, 
twenty-two supported the LUMP; six opposed it.  Prior to the hearing, SOCM’s 
Strip Mine Committee and staff had compiled a series of talking point for 
members to use in preparing their statements.  They emphasized that scoping 
comments should be directed toward the economic impact of Fall Creek Falls 
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State Park and Natural Area, including the amount of money invested by the 
State, counties and businesses in making the area “Tennessee’s Premier State 
Park”; the economic impact of tourism on the State and the Plateau region and 
how this important sector of the economy depended on “clear acid-free streams”; 
the importance of both the watershed and the “viewshed” to the continued 
viability of the state park; and the effect of mining on property values and 
drinking water systems.  Second, they advised supporters to stress that the OSM 
examine whether strip mines that cut through the acid-producing Sewannee coal 
seam could ever truly be reclaimed, and that a study conducted by SOCM in the 
presence of OSM officials found that eighty-three percent of “reclaimed” sites 
were generating acid mine drainage at the time of the hearing.  Third, they 
encouraged supporters to query what the impact of strip mining was on the 
hydrologic balance of the region—specifically, whether mining and blasting 
would disrupt the quantity and quality of underground water sources and if acid 
mine drainage would make its way directly into the Fall Creek watershed and the 
streams that feed the Falls.  Other lesser issues included the potential impact of 
mining noise on park visitors and the importance of the Park and Natural Area as 
a biological refuge as the surrounding areas became developed.
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SOCM members filled the LUMP scoping hearing donning buttons expressing 
their support for protecting Fall Creek Falls State Park from strip mining.  Private 
collection, Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake City, 
Tennessee. 
 
 
SOCM’s turnout and preparation worked.  While coloring their 
testimonies with descriptions of their personal connections to the Park, members 
remained “on message” throughout the hearing.  Emphasizing the importance of 
the petition area as a special place, Brian Paddock of Cookville explained, “It’s 
where I had my first date with my wife.”  The testimony of fellow Cookeville 
resident Mary Mastin echoed Paddock’s.  She told the hearing, “Fall Creek Falls 
is truly one of the most beautiful places I’ve seen in probably forty to forty-five 
states I’ve been in…Fall Creek Falls can rival any of the national parks I’ve been 
too.”  Member and Cumberland County Commissioner Dr. Donathan Ivey, 
expanded on the importance of the park as an attraction for tourists and its 
significance to the region’s economy.  He testified, “In the last few years our 
motels have increased, our restaurants are increasing…I think the reason we have 
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been successful is because we have been very careful to protect our environment.”  
Mike Hodge of Bledsoe County acknowledged opposition to the petition—“We 
recognize the immediate impact of the local mine workers and sympathize with 
them.”  But he stressed the how important protecting the park was to the region’s 
economy and the transitory nature of coal mining.  He told the packed hearing 
room, “Paychecks are spent, coal is burned, natural resources are exhausted, the 
electricity will be used, the acid mine drainage cannot be prevented…But the 
beauty of Fall Creek Falls State Park will be forever if we protect it by granting 
this Lands Unsuitable Petition.”  As the hearing ended, it was clear that SOCM 
and the other petitioners had succeeded in making an otherwise mundane, 
regulatory process into a rally for their cause and a media event.  Newspapers and 
local television crews from across the state reported on the hearing and on the 
enthusiasm of the LUMP supporters in a way that was difficult for OSM officials 
or elected officials in the state to ignore.
308
  
Publicity for the LUMP in late 1995 generated some opposition to the 
petition.  Opponents, including landowners within and near the petition area, 
commented during the scoping period about their fears that designating the land 
unsuitable for mining would affect their ability to sell or use their lands for coal 
mining.  Robert and Marlin Haston who owned and farmed about 1,000 acres in 
the proposed petition area wrote OSM that they supported protecting the park but 
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felt that the petition would unfairly dictate what landowners could do and could 
not do on their property.  Cumberland Plateau resident Gail Hicks echoed the 
Hastons’ sentiments and added that he “did not believe any extremist group 
should have the right to oppose any property owner’s decision on deciding what 
they cannot do with their land.”  Hicks also stressed the economic importance of 
coal mining to the region and believed it could be done in an environmentally-
safe manner as regulated by OSM.  Bowater Newsprint, which owned several 
hundred acres within the petition area, and the J. M. Huber Corporation, which 
owned 38,000 acres that could be designated unsuitable for mining, opposed the 
LUMP as a violation of private property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution.  Though both companies used their property primarily 
for timber harvesting, Huber argued that it had purchased the land with the 
intention of mining coal and drilling for oil or gas on the property.  The 
Sequatchie County Commission lent its voice to the debate when in November of 
1995, it passed a resolution officially opposing the LUMP.  The resolution 
underscored the importance of coal mining to the county’s economy, explaining 
that the Skyline Coal Company produced approximately 500,000 tons of coal 
annually, generated about sixty jobs in the region, paid $1.9 million in salaries, 
$620,000 in taxes, $588,000 in third party payments, and $11 million for supplies 
to local vendors.  The Sequatchie Valley Planning and Development Agency 
echoed the commission’s opposition and reiterated the economic effects of 
designating the watershed unsuitable for mining.
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All of the opponents’ comments reflected a confidence that federal strip 
mining regulations would prevent any significant environmental damage resulting 
from mining in the region.  Bledsoe County Executive Bill Wheeler was so 
opposed to the LUMP that he refused to allow SOCM members to meet with 
Tennessee Congressman Zach Wamp in the Bledsoe County Court House—a 
publicly owned building—to discuss the petition.  He told the SOCM staff 
member organizing the meeting, “You can’t meet in my Court House, you can’t 
meet in Pikeville and you can’t meet in Bledsoe County…If you want to talk to 
Zach Wamp, you can do it in Van Buren County.”  Ultimately, Wamp’s staff was 
able to secure the Court House as a meeting place, but the incident indicates the 
depth of local opposition to the LUMP.
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The most directly-affected stakeholder, the Skyline Coal Company which 
operated mines on the Plateau and proposed to mine 18,000 acres in the Fall 
Creek Falls watershed, realized that it could no longer rely on an industry-friendly 
Office of Surface Mining under the Republican administration to reject the 
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petition as the agency had done in 1992.  Following the December 1995 scoping 
hearing, it intervened officially with the OSM against the LUMP on January 26, 
1996.  In addition, Skyline, Huber and other industrial stakeholders worked with 
Republican Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Paul Coverdell of Georgia to 
introduce two bills that would guarantee that companies like Skyline and Huber 
could sue states or federal agencies in federal court for hundreds of millions of 
dollars in “takings” when their businesses were negatively affected by the passage 
of new environmental regulations or standards.  If passed, the laws would greatly 
complicate the ability of states or the federal government to pass and enforce 
regulations meant to protect the environment.  SOCM realized the dangers of 
Skyline’s intervention and the “takings” issue.  Their solution was to undermine 
Skyline’s support by winning over as many decision makers within the state, 
congress, and federal agencies as possible so that the opposition was effectively 
neutralized by the sheer popularity of the LUMP.
311
        
To this end, SOCM kept up the pressure throughout early 1996, putting 
into action its local campaigns to persuade the various Cumberland Plateau 
county commissions to endorse the LUMP.  This involved each county-level 
chapter identifying which members of the commissions were supportive of the 
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petition, which were steadfastly opposed, and, most importantly, which they 
thought they could lobby to their side.  At each chapter meeting, members would 
report on their reconnaissance since the last meeting—the results of their 
meetings with various commissioners—and the chapters would come up with 
plans for further persuading the needed swing votes.  The goal of this part of the 
local campaign was to have a commission member introduce a resolution 
endorsing the LUMP and then have the commission adopt the resolution so that 
the petitioners could use the resolutions to convince Tennessee’s congressional 
delegation of overwhelming local support for the petition in order to leverage 
their support in applying pressure to OSM and Babbitt.
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SOCM coupled this part of their campaign, with a concerted media blitz 
directed by the Media Subcommittee.  Between the spring of 1996 and late 
summer, petition-supporters maintained near-constant presence in the small 
newspapers that served the counties in the petition area.  Articles appeared in the 
Crossville Chronicle detailing the Cumberland County Commission’s vote to 
endorse the Fall Creek Falls LUMP.  The Cookeville Herald Citizen reported 
“Fight on to protect Fall Creek Falls,” and similar articles appeared in the Monroe 
County Advocate/Democrat, Sparta’s The Expositor, Livington’s Overton County 
News, Jamestown’s Fentress Courier, and the Dunlap Tribune.  The petitioners 
also attracted attention from the state’s larger daily newspapers.  In August, The 
Tennessean from Nashville headlined an article with the question, “Is plateau’s 
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beauty suitable for mining?” Knoxville’s News-Sentinel described the issue in the 
petitioners’ terms that same month: “Fall Creek falls watershed at risk from strip-
mining,” while the Chattanooga Free Press reported that “Two Heritages Clash 
in Strip Mining Dispute.”  In addition to obtaining press targeting readers and 
elected officials in the Cumberland Plateau, the group focused on the news outlets 
in its traditional area of support. They cultivated relationships with reporters and 
editors in the coal producing counties of northeastern Tennessee in the hopes of 
achieving positive press to inform their base, attract new members, and possibly 
generate additional letters to the newspaper editors, Cumberland-area county 
commissioners and other elected officials, OSM, and Tennessee’s congressional 
delegation.
313
 
In addition to its sustained media campaign, SOCM went to work 
recruiting the assistance of other organizations that might be able to help pressure 
local, county, and state elected officials on behalf of the LUMP.  They 
reconnected with their traditional allies including other environmental 
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organizations like the state and local chapters of the Sierra Club and the 
Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency, and  social change groups with whom they 
had worked in the past like the Just Organized Neighborhood Area Headquarters 
(JONAH), a predominantly African American citizens group working in western 
Tennessee.  They also focused on groups operating near the petition area like the 
Cumberland Recycling Partners based in Crossville.  They attributed these 
partnerships to leveraging enough votes within the Cumberland County 
Commission to persuade that body to pass a county-level resolution opposing 
strip mining in the Fall Creek Falls watershed on May 20, 1996 and join White 
County, which had passed a resolution the previous September, supporting the 
LUMP. The Cumberland County Commission decision provided SOCM with 
momentum in their local campaign.  By August, the group had succeeded in 
persuading the Sparta-White County Chamber of Commerce to endorse the 
petition, and they were actively lobbying all of the county commissions in the 
region.
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SOCM member attending and testifying before the Putnam Country Commission 
in support of the LUMP, 1996.  Private collection, Statewide Organizing for 
Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee. 
 
All aspects of the campaign—attracting allies, gaining the support of local 
elected officials and bodies, achieving positive media coverage—received a boost 
at the end of August when SOCM conducted its most daring and high profile 
media event of the campaign.  According to the detailed media campaign plan the 
group’s Media Subcommittee had constructed, their three-month media blitz that 
began in earnest in May of 1996 was to culminate in a major press event—a 
gathering of petition supporters and a press conference at Fall Creek Falls State 
Park to be held on a landing overlooking the scenic and threatened falls.  Leading 
into the last week in August, SOCM members and staff focused on turning out 
members, prepping speakers and contacting the press about the event and turning 
out more letters to the editor.  In their dealings with the press, they promoted a 
recently released study of the economic impacts of strip mining on the Fall Creek 
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Falls region completed by  member Anne Mayhew, Professor of Economics and 
History at the University of Tennessee, at the request of SOCM.
315
 
All of the organizing paid off.  On the day of the event, August 31, Labor 
Day, dozens of supporters showed up to the Falls overlook.  The podium was set 
up to allow the media to capture the planned speakers—leaders of SOCM and its 
chapters, local residents, members of local chambers of commerce, county 
commissioners and other community leaders—and a view of the 256-foot Falls 
that they sought to save from running red with mining pollution.  SOCM staff and 
members had worked hectically the week leading up to the event to attract as 
many reporters as possible. The day of the rally, reporters from multiple 
newspapers, television and radio stations including those in Chattanooga, 
Nashville, Knoxville and many smaller communities showed up to cover the 
event.
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SOCM president Wanda Hodge speaking at the press conference at Fall Creek 
Falls State Park, August 31, 1996.  Private collection, Statewide Organizing for 
Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee. 
 
 
Although the media components of the event had been well orchestrated 
by the staff, the speeches reflected the citizen leadership of SOCM and the 
campaign.  SOCM President and local resident Wanda Hodge welcomed 
everyone to the press conference then was followed  by Strip Mine Committee 
member Annetta Watson who described the need for the petition.  Watson 
described in colloquial terms the toxic nature of the Whitwell shale associated 
with the Sewannee coal seam, how it could color Fall Creek and its tributaries red 
and kill aquatic life.  She was followed by Landon Medley, past-SOCM president 
and life-long resident and former commissioner of Van Buren County where most 
of the park is located.  Medley explained the LUMP in terms of citizens 
protecting their public lands, environment, and quality of life.  He told the crowd 
“Over the years, the Park has faced many dangers: from local forest fires, 
flooding from timber cutting outside the park’s boundaries, poor rainfall, land 
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development, and strip mining.”  “Each time” he continued, “citizens in the area 
have stood up to these dangers…I am proud of being part of the people who have 
petitioned to declare the watershed unsuitable for mining.”  Medley was followed 
by speakers from three of the county commissions in the region who supported 
the LUMP, Rita Pruitt, owner of a local bed and breakfast and President of the 
Van Buren County Chamber of Commerce who announced that the Chamber had 
endorsed the petition, and Yvonne Seperich of Fairfiled Glade, who reported that 
the Cumberland Chamber of Commerce had recently voted to support the petition.  
Jean Cheney (also a SOCM member) spoke on behalf of Tennessee Citizens for 
Wilderness Planning and Marcus Keyes, Co-coordinator of the Justice, Peace, 
Integrity of Creation office of the Catholic Diocese of Knoxville finished up the 
presentation by speaking on behalf of Bishop Anthony O’Connell of Knoxville, 
who had sent a letter to OSM in support of the LUMP.
317
   
After the last speaker left the podium, the crowd and journalists gasped as 
volunteers across the canyon unfurled a one hundred by fourteen foot red and 
white vinyl banner down next to the falls reading “BRUCE BABBITT, DON’T 
LET THE FALLS DOWN.”  This powerful visual component of the event was 
the culmination of this stage of the campaign’s media strategy.  It had been 
planned with media consultant Jane Wholey, and took the combined efforts of 
more than twenty volunteers to execute, including members of the East Tennessee 
Cave Rescue Team. While many within SOCM were aware that it was planned, 
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the banner drop carried an element of surprise for journalists and park officials.  
Maureen O’Connell remembered that the park superintendant supported the 
LUMP and had approved of SOCM’s proposal for the press event but that, fearing 
that the park would not allow them to drape a banner down next to the falls, the 
group had remained purposely ambiguous about the details of the rally.  It 
worked.  Pictures of the banner accompanied articles and news stories across the 
state.  SOCM produced postcards with a picture of the banner next to the falls pre-
addressed to the Secretary of Interior’s office in Washington, DC, and then 
organized members and other supporters to mail hundreds of the postcards with 
personal messages supporting the LUMP to Babbitt.  As the campaign progressed, 
the banner carried significant popular appeal and political capital—so much so, 
that they successfully super-imposed Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist’s name 
in place of Babbitt’s and used it to influence the Governor.318 
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Private collection, Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake 
City, Tennessee. 
 
 
The media campaign in the spring and summer of 1996 and the rally at the 
Falls catapulted the Fall Creek Falls LUMP campaign into a new stage.  The 
banner drop caused a media buzz that resulted in a series of articles and editorials 
in papers across the state describing the event and detailing the issue and the 
LUMP.  In addition, SOCM members were interviewed on various radio and 
television shows about the campaign to “Save Fall Creek Falls” for the next two 
weeks.  On September 17, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt met with 
members of SOCM’s Strip Mine Committee and Karen Peterson, executive 
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director of Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning, at Cumberland Gap 
National Historical Park near Middlesboro, Kentucky.  Babbitt was in Kentucky 
to announce his signing of an order designating the six square-mile Fern Lake 
watershed in the north central portion of Claiborne County in northeastern 
Tennessee as unsuitable for coal strip mining.  The City of Middlesboro and the 
National Parks Conservation Association had filed the petition to designate the 
watershed because of Fern Lake’s importance as the primary drinking water 
supply for the town of Middlesboro, Kentucky, and for its Coca-Cola bottling 
plant.  To Babbitt, SOCM member Annetta Watson described the similarities 
between the issues associated with the Fern Lake area and the Fall Creek Falls 
area and explained the further complexities of their LUMP having to do with acid 
mine drainage, sedimentation, loss of fisheries, and loss of revenue generated by 
the park.  She requested that the Secretary ensure that OSM undertook a quality 
environmental impact analysis for Fall Creek Falls as it had for Fern Lake.  While 
she was talking to Babbitt, she gave him a press packet from the August 31 event 
at the state park and showed him a picture of the banner carrying his name.  The 
group’s newsletter reported that the Secretary seemed to listen and exhibited 
concern.  The next month, members of the Strip Mine Committee managed to 
schedule a meeting with the new director of OSM, Kay Henry, when she visited 
Chattanooga to kick off OSM’s “Clean Streams Initiative”—a multi-state 
endeavor aimed at preventing, and correcting the problems of mine-created water 
pollution including acid mine drainage.  As they did during the meeting with 
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Babbitt, the SOCM members emphasized the need for a quality environmental 
impact statement.
319
 
Between the closing of the scoping period in spring of 1996 and the 
completion after much delay of the draft EIS in May of 1998, SOCM maintained 
a multi-tiered campaign to keep the issue in the news, win allies who might 
influence decision makers, and defuse opponents.  With all of their new found 
political capital, SOCM continued its local campaigns to persuade the remaining 
county commissions of the Cumberland Plateau area to endorse the petition, but 
they also initiated their campaign to grow political support within the state’s 
congressional delegation.  At a meeting in August of 1996 with Democratic 
Congressman Bart Gordon of the state’s 6th district  in north central Tennessee, 
SOCM members from the district found the congressman generally supportive of 
protecting the Fall Creek Falls watershed, but tepid on supporting the LUMP.  
After the publicity surrounding the Fall Creek Falls press event, the continued 
presence of the issue in the media, and support of Cumberland Plateau-area local 
governments, Gordon became a steadfast champion of the Fall Creek Falls 
petition.  By the beginning of the next year, Gordon was explicitly opposed to 
Skyline’s proposals to mine on the plateau and wrote letters to Babbitt 
encouraging OSM to designate the land unsuitable for mining.  Democratic 
congressmen Bob Clement of the state’s 5th congressional district serving 
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Nashville and middle Tennessee also took up the fight on behalf of saving Fall 
Creek Falls.
320
 
In Gordon and Clement, the petitioners found champions within 
Tennessee’s congressional delegation.  In addition, they also successfully 
attracted the support, or at least neutralized the opposition, of most of the state’s 
congressmen and senators, regardless of their political party.  As Democrats, 
Gordon and Clement were more ideologically aligned with SOCM and its allies in 
the LUMP campaign but SOCM members did not rule out the possibility of 
attracting the support of Republicans whom they did not normally consider allies.  
Their local campaign to gain the endorsement of county commissions and 
chambers of commerce convinced Republican Senators Fred Thompson and Bill 
Frist that the petitioners could not be written off as environmental extremists and 
that the Fall Creek Falls issue deserved some attention.  Both agreed to have at 
least members of their staff meet with representatives from SOCM and TCWP in 
Tennessee.  Thompson was initially lukewarm to the idea of the petition but did 
contact OSM on behalf of petitioners in February of 1997 to encourage the 
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agency to give the LUMP its full consideration.  The senator followed up on the 
process a year later.
321
   
SOCM’s campaign to attract political support accelerated in 1998 when it 
succeeded in persuading Republican Governor Don Sundquist and the State of 
Tennessee to endorse the petition.  As 1997 was coming to a close, SOCM’s Strip 
Mine Committee met to brainstorm possible strategies and activities to advance 
the LUMP campaign in the next year.  Through a series of small-group sessions, 
they contemplated how to gain the governor’s support.  They planned additional 
media events about the petition and ways to keep it in the press and a postcard 
mailing campaign to flood the Governor’s office with postcards from supporters 
that included the picture of Fall Creek Falls with their “Don’t Let the Falls Down” 
banner.  They sent Sundquist a copy of the economic impact study completed by 
Anne Mayhew, Professor of Economics and History at the University of 
Tennessee and asked him for a face-to-face meeting with members of the Strip 
Mining committee.  To accompany this, they met with and lobbied the director of 
the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation in the hope of 
gaining the agency’s support and enlisting it to influence the governor.   They also 
commenced a “faxathon” inundating Sundquist’s office with faxes from petition 
supporters, a “canoeathon”—a seventy-two-hour canoe relay fundraising event 
which attracted local press—and, on June 11, a rally in Knoxville’s Market 
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Square at which they dropped another 100-foot banner down the side of a 
building, imploring the Governor to save Fall Creek Falls.   As publicity 
surrounding the draft EIS increased in the summer of 1998 including the state’s 
major newspapers endorsing the petition, the Governor’s office announced its 
support for protecting the Fall Creek Falls State Park and watershed from strip 
mining.  In its official comments to the draft EIS in July, the Governor’s office 
stressed that OSM make its decision regarding the LUMP “based upon sound 
science and technical merit, recognizing that actions affecting private property 
rights must be made using due process and fundamental fairness,” but the 
comments detailed the State’s understanding of the economic impact of tourism 
from the petition area and emphasized its preference for prohibiting strip mining 
in the Fall Creek Falls watershed.  After Sundquist made his support official, Frist 
agreed to support the LUMP and made the non-committal promise to “do 
something if the issue came to the Senate floor,” an unlikely event since the 
LUMP decision-making process lay completely within the OSM and Department 
of the Interior.  At a minimum, however, Frist did not actively oppose the petition.  
The petitioners were more successful with Republican congressman Zach Wamp 
of Tennessee’s third district who represented much of the coal-mining region of 
eastern Tennessee and SOCM’s traditional base of support.  After multiple 
meetings and heavy lobbying, Wamp agreed to contact OSM and relay pertinent 
information about the progress of the Fall Creek Falls LUMP to SOCM and 
TCWP in 1997.  Like Frist, he was influenced by the endorsement of Governor 
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Sundquist—Wamp came out in absolute opposition to mining in the Fall Creek 
Fall watershed in 1998.
322
  
SOCM’s final political “target,” a committed environmentalist many 
assumed would be an easy ally to attract to their cause, was Tennessee’s former 
congressman and senator serving as Vice President, Albert Gore, Jr.  SOCM 
contemplated that the Vice President was in an ultimate position of power to 
influence the Secretary of the Interior and OSM—his support was crucial to their 
campaign. Enlisting Gore’s assistance, however, proved to be more difficult than 
they originally imagined.  SOCM had little success gaining access to the Vice 
President.  During the summer of 1998, as OSM was taking comments on the 
draft EIS which, despite SOCM’s campaign and widespread support for 
protecting the petition area from strip mining, rejected the LUMP in favor of 
mining as its preferred alternative, members of the Strip Mine Committee met 
with members of Gore’s staff in Washington but the meeting seemed to 
accomplish nothing.  After the comment period on the draft EIS had ended and 
the OSM was weighing all of the comments they received at hearings and through 
                                                 
322
 “SOCM Members Meet with Federal and State Officials,” The SOCM Sentinel, Anniversary 
Edition (July) 1997, 11; “Fall Creek Falls media event is held in Knoxville,” The SOCM Sentinel, 
July/August 1998, 5; “Save Fall Creek Falls from mining damage,” The Tennessean (Nashville), 5 
June 1998; Justin P. Wilson, Deputy to the Governor for Policy, to Ms. Beverly Brock, Supevisor, 
Technical Group, Knoxville Field Office, Office of Surface Mining, 28 July 1998, private 
collection, Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee; Senator 
Bill Frist, to Ms. Beverly Brock, Supevisor, Technical Group, Knoxville Field Office, Office of 
Surface Mining, 29 July 1998, private collection, Statewide Organizing for Community 
eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee; Senator Bill Frist, to Ms. Amy S. Mondloch, Save Our 
Cumberland Mountains, 5 November 1998, private collection, Statewide Organizing for 
Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee; Representative Zach Wamp, 3rd District, 
Tennessee, to Gil Hough, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 17 February 1997, private collection, 
Statewide Organizing for Community eMpowerment, Lake City, Tennessee; Representative Zach 
Wamp, 3
rd
 District, Tennessee, to Glen Barton, President, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 26 
October 1998. 
  415 
the mail, SOCM attempted to contact Gore again.  The great majority of EIS 
comments staunchly opposed to OSM’s preferred alternative of allowing strip 
mining in the petition.  Many, including those from the Tennessee Department of 
Environment and Conservation, many from Tennessee’s congressional delegation, 
and the comments from Governor Sundquist, alleged that the EIS had been 
inadequately prepared and suggested possible legal action if the agency decided to 
allow strip mining.  In response, OSM’s Knoxville field office director Beverly 
Brock promised to commence a new EIS with a final decision by January 2000.   
SOCM and the other petitioners continued their wait and intensified their 
campaign to attract Gore’s help in influencing OSM’s decision.323 
By April of 1999, as OSM worked to complete its revised EIS, SOCM 
attempted again to schedule a meeting with Gore to ask him to support protection 
of the petition area to OSM and possibly accelerate the review process.  They 
thanked the Vice President for his service to the state of Tennessee and the nation 
and his commitment to environmental protection.  “We are confident that you, as 
a native Tennessean, appreciate this beautiful park which is home to the tallest 
waterfall east of the Rocky Mountains,” their letter dated April 17 stated.  The 
Vice President’s office informed SOCM that, unfortunately, Gore could not make 
space in his schedule to meet with the group.  In August, they requested the help 
of ally Representative Bart Gordon, who represented Gore’s former district in 
lobbying the Vice President, but to no avail.  Finally, in September of 1999, 
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frustrated by what seemed to be bureaucratic foot-dragging on behalf of OSM and 
desperate to leverage some kind of movement, members of the Strip Mine 
Committee decided to give Gore, who was actively mobilizing his campaign for 
the Democratic Presidential nomination for the 2000 election, a push.  On 
September 17, they sent a press release to the state’s major news outlets entitled 
“Group Questions Gore’s Commitment to the Environment.”  In the press release, 
SOCM member Katherine Osburn is quoted saying “Mr. Gore has expressed 
concern about environmental issues world wide…This is his home…We’ve just 
been left to wonder why doesn’t he help us here at home?”  SOCM coupled the 
press release with a postcard campaign that lasted into early 2000 and resulted in 
the Vice President’s office receiving more than 3,000 postcards from SOCM 
members and other concerned citizens urging his support for the Fall Creek Falls 
LUMP.
324
    
SOCM and the petitioners were vindicated in February of 2000 when 
OSM’s final revised EIS reversed the agency’s position from two years prior and 
recommended the protection of 62,000 acres from mining within the Fall Creek 
Falls watershed—24,000 acres short of the petitioners requested 86,000 acres but 
more land than the petitioners had originally requested to be declared unsuitable 
for mining in 1992. It was the largest amount of land ever protected by a LUMP 
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in the United States up to that time.  The release of the final EIS opened a ninety-
day public comment period in which citizens and stakeholders could attempt to 
influence the agency before its final decision, but the petitioners declared the new 
EIS a victory.  SOCM and the other petitioners quickly organized citizens to 
submit comments supporting the preferred alternative and its protection of the 
entire 86,000 acres and began to organize a press event at Fall Creek Falls State 
Park to coincide with Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt’s announcement of 
his decision tentatively scheduled for May 25.  They did not hear directly from 
Vice President Gore, but when Babbitt announced his decision to declare all 
86,000 acres proposed in the EIS’s preferred alternative as “lands unsuitable for 
the strip mining of coal” to a jubilant crowd of more than 120 petition supporters 
on June 17, he relayed to SOCM president and Cumberland Plateau resident 
Wanda Hodge that the Vice President had called him personally before he made 
his decision that Spring.  According to Hodge, Babbitt said that Gore called his 
office and told the Secretary that he had grown up playing in the streams that fed 
Fall Creek Falls and that he wanted the Secretary to protect it.  Possibly reluctant 
to publicly support the Fall Creek Falls LUMP during his presidential bid, Gore’s 
last minute support was possibly decisive.  The intense pressure SOCM placed on 
their usual ally no doubt moved the Vice President in its direction.
325
  Fall Creek 
Falls was saved. 
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Source: “Strip-mining Ban Signed,” Chattanooga Times, 18 June, 2000. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the SOCM Strip Mine Committee vowed to continue to protect the 
remaining 24,000 acres within the Fall Creek Fall Watershed not included in 
Babbitt’s decision, his visit to Fall Creek Falls State Park and the associated press 
conference at the same overlook in which the group almost four years prior 
dramatically kicked off their campaign, marked an end to their efforts.  
Depending on how one measured it, the struggle to save Fall Creek Falls had 
lasted between ten and twenty five years.  The LUMP decision effectively ended 
the possibility of coal mining through the acid-producing Sewannee coal-seam 
and with it the possibility of mining on most of the Cumberland Plateau 
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protecting the watershed of Fall Creek Falls and the rural landscape of the region.  
With the decision, SOCM achieved what it had been working toward since the 
late 1970s when it began fighting the proposed AMAX mine.  The Fall Creek 
Falls campaign also served its purpose of building the organization’s power to 
affect change by attracting new members and elevating the credibility of the 
group in the popular mind of Tennessee.  Between 1995 and 2000, roughly 1000 
new members joined the organization increasing the membership from about 3000 
to 4000 individuals—an average net growth of ten percent a year.  But the 
successful campaign to save Fall Creek falls from strip mining was more than just 
another victory in the group’s long list of achievements over its thirty-year 
history.
 326
    
The Fall Creek Falls major media campaign reflected the ability of the 
organization to adapt to the changing political and regulatory landscape at the end 
of the twentieth century.  Beyond anecdotes from SOCM veterans like Boomer 
Winfrey that it was harder to get media attention in the 1990s than it was in 
previous decades, real changes in the environmental regulatory framework and 
environmental politics made it difficult for citizens’ organizations to achieve the 
same kinds of success they had experienced in the 1970s.  From the mid-1960s 
and into the late 1970s, environmental activists rode the national popularity of 
environmental issues to influence the passage of new environmental reforms at 
the state and federal level that protected human health, air, water, and land.  Many 
of these laws required citizens’ input in environmental decisions which gave 
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citizen activists public venues in which to make their voices heard.  Newspaper 
reporters devoured stories of citizens protesting strip mines or the contamination 
of their neighborhoods by industrial pollution or testifying at congressional 
hearings.  Over the next decade, environmental groups tended to professionalize 
in response to the new regulatory landscape created by these laws and attempts to 
subvert or weaken them during the Reagan administration.  The new laws of the 
1970s spawned volumes of new agency rules and a growing collection of court 
precedents which required dedication, and often a law degree, to untangle.
327
  
Citizens groups like SOCM had to learn how to navigate this new playing field.  
The media continued to follow environmental issues but tended to be increasingly 
attracted to the showy responses of activists to the anti-environmental initiatives 
of the era.  They covered important legal cases involving interpretation and 
enforcement of environmental laws but rarely reported on the technical 
happenings of agency rule-making where much of the work to make tangible 
improvements to the environment took place.  Partly because it was in these 
venues that SOCM and other environmental organizations increasingly focused 
their efforts by the 1990s, the groups did not receive the kind of media attention 
they took for granted in previous decades.  Declining media exposure translated 
into less public recognition and membership recruitment and consequently less 
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political power.  When SOCM’s leadership sat down to evaluate the organization 
and craft its first long-range plan in 1990, they recognized this stagnation. The 
ability to innovate and adapt would prove to be one of SOCM’s great strengths as 
it entered its fourth decade and the twenty first century.  
As it had with various strategies over three decades of organizing trial and 
error, SOCM added the “major media campaign” to its organizing repertoire, but 
the media campaign was not just another strategy.  It represented a very well-
orchestrated part of their broader project to reallocate power in American society 
by expanding citizen participation in the decisions that affected their lives, health, 
and communities.  Although the media had been used to influence political 
decisions since at least the invention of the printing press, and was a vital 
component of environmental campaigns throughout the history of the movement, 
SOCM’s incorporation of the media campaign in its work represented an 
evolution for the organization.  It reflected recognition by SOCM’s leadership and 
staff that the political and regulatory landscapes had changed.  They realized that 
if citizens were going to maintain and increase their influence in the decisions 
regarding their environment, they had to imagine new forms and venues of citizen 
participation.  The qualified victory of their campaign to stop out-of-state waste 
had shown that the traditional means of achieving their goals—passing legislation 
at the state or federal level—no longer seemed to work.  Citizens could organize 
to enforce existing laws through monitoring and holding regulators accountable—
and SOCM continued this activity—but this could not be their primary tactic if 
their goal was increasing citizens’ ability to affect political decisions about the 
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environment.  They had to imagine new ways to influence those decisions and to 
expand their people power in the process.  The media campaign provided one 
important new way.  
The way in which SOCM adopted the media campaign and applied it to 
their organization reveals how the organization understood the strategy in relation 
to its philosophy and long range goals of empowering citizens to influence the 
decisions that affected their health, environment, and quality of life.  The media 
campaign required SOCM’s leaders and members to think differently about 
attracting media attention, how media attention related to their ability to influence 
decision makers, and how it translated into political power.  But SOCM began its 
consideration of the media campaign strategy in relation to organizational 
development, including membership recruitment and leadership cultivation.  
Thus, they continued an evolving tradition begun in the 1970s of members acting 
as spokespeople for the organization and creating campaign elements that relied 
on volunteer work rather than professional expertise.  The staff helped guide the 
campaign, but evincing the ideals of participatory democracy which grounded the 
organization from the beginning, all decisions were made by the members.  The 
proposal to strip mine 18,000 acres adjacent to Fall Creek Falls State Park and 
citizens reactions to it in the 1990s were not in and of themselves much different 
than they might have been in the 1970s.  Citizens demanded that they have a say 
in the decisions that would affect their environment, health, and quality of life and 
that industry and government be accountable to the people.  But whereas, in the 
1970s they organized to press lawmakers to pass reforms to protect their 
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environment and communities, in the 1990s, they organized to use the media to 
pressure bureaucrats and elected officials to use existing laws to do the same. 
SOCM realized the value of the media campaign to its organization and 
larger goals before the Fall Creek Falls issue was even settled. Already by the late 
1990s, it was  applying the media strategy to its other campaigns to prevent the 
clear cutting of Tennessee’s forests, the siting of toxic waste incinerators in rural 
communities, and their work to effect a more progressive tax structure and 
improve working conditions for temporary workers.  SOCM became a founding 
member of the Community Media Organizing Project with six other similar 
organizations in the South, and Boomer Winfrey began to serve as a consultant 
for other social change and environmental groups on how to use media effectively 
to win their campaigns.  As SOCM entered its next decade, it applied what it 
learned from Fall Creek Falls to its new campaigns to address social—including 
racial—economic, and environmental injustice.  For a group that always viewed 
democratic and environmental reforms as part as the same movement toward the 
realization of participatory democracy, the media strategy, like lobbying for 
citizen participation provisions in the landmark environmental laws of the 1970s 
and then expanding that participation through persistently monitory decision 
makers and holding them accountable during the following decades, was the next 
step toward that goal.  As the new century opens and citizens’ access to global 
networks of people and information becomes increasingly ubiquitous, one can 
only guess where citizens groups like SOCM will find their next innovations.
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CHAPTER 11 
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
 
Save Our Cumberland Mountain’s victory in the Save Fall Creek Falls 
campaign brought tangible environmental protection to a beloved state park and 
the watershed that fed it.  The success did more, however, than protect water 
quality, habitat for rare and threatened species of fish, birds, and other animals, 
recreational opportunities for Tennesseans and the rural character of the 
Cumberland Plateau.  In many ways, it was a turning point for an organization 
that had travelled the course from a radically democratic grassroots volunteer 
group to a more sophisticated and professional advocate and organizer of citizen 
participation in decisions in the public’s interest.  In achieving the Lands 
Unsuitable for Mining decision for Fall Creek Falls State Park, SOCM 
demonstrated to decision-makers and to itself that it could still make substantive 
and important gains in the ability of citizens to protect the environment and their 
communities.  SOCM applied the lessons and momentum from its successful Fall 
Creek Falls campaign to its other initiatives.  In the 2000s, it tackled mountain-top 
removal coal strip mining and in 2010 took part in another Lands Unsuitable 
Petition, supported by the State of Tennessee, that proposed to protect 67,000 
acres of ridgelines in the Cumberland Mountains, SOCM’s original homeland.329   
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Southwest Environmental Service advanced the ability of citizens to 
participate in environmental decision-making to protect and improve water and air 
quality in southern Arizona during the 1980s using different tactics than SOCM.  
But it similarly demonstrated the continued pertinence and potency of citizen 
environmental activism.  The group dissolved after its victories in 1988, but its 
legacy remained in Arizona’s clean water and cleaner air and the continued 
activism of its staff and board members who went on to work on different causes 
with other citizens groups.  Priscilla Robinson, who was admittedly never “anti-
mining,” used her expertise and connections from her work on water and air 
quality issues to work as an environmental consultant to mining companies 
seeking more environmentally-sound mining practices.  Others remained active in 
environmental and other progressive advocacy in southern Arizona into the 
twenty first century.
330
   
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Northern Plains Resource Council grew 
in every direction—geographically, in terms of members and issues, and in 
organizational sophistication.  As it did, it confronted the difficulties inherent in 
organizing diverse groups of people with sometimes divergent interests to fight 
new gold mines or prevent the foreclosures of family farms but it also had to learn 
how to continue to effect change in the regulatory and political environments of 
the 1980s and 1990s.  By the 2000s, Northern Plains had refined an organizing 
model that combined volunteer citizen activism with professional expertise and 
                                                 
330
 Priscilla Robinson, interview by author, 1 September 2011, Tucson, Arizona; John D. Wirth, 
Smelter Smoke in North America: The Politics of Transborder Pollution (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 2000),158. 
  426 
orchestrated campaigns employing interconnected legal, media, legislative, and 
direct action components.  Coal strip mining remained a core issue for the 
organization at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  Continued proposals for 
new strip mines and new coal-fired power plants and synthetic fuel plants 
designed to turn coal into diesel or jet fuel prompted NPRC veterans like Ellen 
Pfister and Wally McRae to lament that even if the North Central Power Study 
was shelved in the 1970s, it was slowly becoming a reality in the early 2000s.  
Despite these dire observations, the reality is much different.  Only one of the 
proposed coal-fired plants imagined by the Study was ever built.  New strip mines 
were proposed in the 2000s but the bulk of NPRC’s coal work concerned 
protecting existing coal mine reclamation laws and regulations from being 
weakened at the request of coal companies and ensuring that coal companies 
reclaimed mined lands according to state and federal laws.  The group’s most 
daunting challenge in the 2000s came from proposals to drill tens of thousands of 
wells in eastern Montana to mine methane gas from the coal seams—a proposal 
that simultaneously threatens to drain precious aquifers used for cattle and human 
consumption while flooding rare streams with millions of gallons of water too full 
of sodium and other salts to use for irrigation.  As the climate change advocacy 
organization “350.org” organized rallies at the nation’s capitol in 2011 to protest 
the mining of Canadian tar sands for oil and the building of the Keystone XL 
pipeline from Alberta to the Gulf Coast in Texas to transport the product, NPRC 
organized landowners in northeastern Montana to protect their property from the 
pipeline and oppose the development.  After almost forty years, Northern Plains 
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remains an organized defender of the environment and citizens rights to affect 
decisions regarding the land, water, air, and quality of life in Montana.
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Despite the continuing challenges citizen activists faced, community-
based environmental organizations proved they could adapt and remain effective 
at addressing environmental threats and keep government somewhat accountable 
to the public’s interest.  As the modern environmental movement matured and 
became more mainstream, citizens groups like SOCM, SES, and NPRC 
confronted the difficulties of attracting media attention, navigating increasingly 
technical regulatory and administrative systems of resource management, and a 
prolonged political backlash against the environmental initiatives of the 1960s and 
1970s.  The tactics that they pursued to address environmental threats in the 
1970s—primarily proposing and influencing the passage of protective laws—
produced fewer results in the decades that followed.  Citizens found themselves 
instead defending the laws that had already passed and learning how to use them 
to protect their land, air, water, and health.  They asserted the rights of citizens to 
take part in environmental decisions using citizen participation provisions written 
into the bedrock environmental laws of the 1970s; through professionalization, 
the courts, or creative use of the law and people power, they expanded citizens’ 
abilities to affect environmental decisions.  By the beginning of the twenty first 
century, their strategies and tactics may have looked different than they did in the 
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1970s, but they were underlaid by the same basic assumptions about proper 
governance and citizens’ rights and responsibilities.  
 
Interpretation of Findings 
This study set out to examine how everyday Americans understood and 
addressed environmental issues in the last decades of the twentieth century.  I 
built it around observations that despite the scientific nature of environmental 
issues, citizens tended to understand threats to land, air and water quality, health 
and quality of life in non-scientific terms.  Indeed, they interpreted environmental 
issues as matters of governance and pollution or degradation as a failure of 
government to protect people and their environment.  This tendency seemed most 
apparent at the local level.  Citizen activists explained coal company proposals to 
strip mine through private and public land and disrupt the hydrologic balance that 
supported vital springs and streams as patently unfair.  They argued that 
companies should not profit at the expense of the public interest.  Rather than 
recruiting waste management companies to dump the garbage from the nation’s 
cities in impoverished, rural communities, government should protect those areas 
and their residents.  To address these concerns, citizens formed groups that 
advocated laws to direct government to protect the public interest.  In an attempt 
to keep government agencies accountable to the people and allow citizens to 
influence environmental decision making, those laws included provisions 
requiring transparency in decision making, citizen participation, and providing 
Americans the right to appeal government decisions and sue.  The laws were built 
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around the assumption that informed citizens were the people best able to make 
decisions affecting the public’s interest.   
Activists soon realized, however, that their struggles to protect or improve 
the environment did not end with the passage of laws; meaningful change 
required citizens’ persistent attention to the actions of government and industry to 
make sure that the laws were enforced.  In addition, citizen activists were forced 
to learn how to use the laws that had been passed to influence environmental 
decisions.  Although some embraced the technical and scientific aspects of 
environmental issues, most citizens understood threats to land, air, water, health 
and quality of life in democratic terms.  Maximizing citizen participation in 
environmental decision making appeared to be the best tactic for protecting the 
public interest and the environment.  Activists’ emphasis on democratic 
participation in environmental decision making was specific to the second half of 
the twentieth century and was bolstered by the reform movements that sought to 
open up government, expose secrets, ensure transparency and accountability, and 
give more “power to the people,”  during the 1960s and the popularity of 
environmental concern after that decade.  If, as Riley Dunlap and Angela Mertig 
argue, environmental protection was so widespread in the 1970s, defending and 
advancing public participation and citizen influence in decision making proved a 
more viable and effective strategy than it may have in earlier decades when 
government policy and corporate behavior focused on maximizing economic 
productivity and raising American’s consumption-based standard of living.  
Environmentally concerned Americans recognized that, as Bob Dylan sang in 
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1964, “the times they are a changin.”  Americans perceived the limits of 
industrialization, economic growth, and consumption of the postwar era and 
demanded change.  They realized that to affect that change they need to reform 
American society and its relationship to the environment.  Activists familiar with 
the other social movements of the era saw empowering the voices and concerns of 
environmentally aware Americans as the best way to accomplish this.  As 
environmental activist and author Edward Abbey wrote in the late 1970s, “the 
best cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy.”332  
The members of the Northern Plains Resource Council, Southwest 
Environmental Service, and Save Our Cumberland Mountains followed this 
pattern of thought and behavior.  Some, like SES, realized the need to engage the 
technical and scientific aspects of environmental protection sooner than others 
and bolstered their arguments about citizens participating in environmental 
decisions by becoming self-trained experts on land use and water and air quality.  
At the other end of the spectrum, SOCM relied more on the appeal to the “local 
knowledge” of its members and arguments for fairness and democratic 
participation in environmental decision making.  Whereas Priscilla Robinson 
endeavored to understand the Clean Air Act and air pollution and worked her way 
into leadership positions on boards and coalitions considering the issue, SOCM 
continued to organize protests against out-of-state waste outside (and sometimes 
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inside) the offices of the Tennessee Department of Conservation.  NPRC trod a 
kind of middle ground weaving together the experience and expertise of members 
and staff into campaigns that employed both citizen experts, lawyers, staff and 
participation in government boards and commissions and organizing direct 
actions.  Like SOCM, Northern Plains remained highly democratic in its internal 
organizational structures, but, like SES, it tended to rely more on staff expertise in 
its campaigns.   
The degree to which each group employed “people power” versus 
technical expertise correlated closely with the internal structures of each group.  
SES was guided by the goal of educating citizens to take part in environmental 
decisions, but it was organized from the beginning with a strong executive 
director who guided the decisions of a volunteer board that was made up of 
mostly well-educated professionals.  Although Robinson and members of the 
board referred to the groups’ supporters as “members,” the group had no official 
system of membership.  Decisions about the organization and its work were made 
by the board and were heavily influenced by Robinson.  The centralized decision-
making structure enabled the group to respond quickly as issues arose and 
required the staff, which served as lobbyists and spokespeople for SES, to learn 
the science and law of environmental protection and to professionalize.  Thus, 
SES came to be viewed by agency officials and elected officials as a valuable 
source of information on environmental issues and obtained seats at decision-
making tables.  SES continued to organize citizens to influence environmental 
decisions but by the 1980s, it understood itself as something of an expert advocate 
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for the public interest.  NPRC and SOCM organized from a more grassroots base 
of farmers, ranchers, and working-class people, who understood little about the 
workings of politics or the science of environmental issues, but felt intuitively that 
there was strength in numbers—if enough people yelled loud enough, someone in 
government would listen.  Although they sought help from anywhere they could 
find it, they organized their groups according to the ideal that the local residents 
who were threatened by industrial developments were the best spokespeople for 
the organization and that these people, who had the most at stake, ought to direct 
the actions, and tactics of the groups.  Members of Northern Plains and Save Our 
Cumberland Mountain viewed democracy as broken and their groups as small-
scale experiments in participatory democracy that could serve as surrogates for 
the failing state and vehicles for resurrecting and realizing democratic ideals.
333
  
Each group’s privileging of local knowledge and evolving understandings of the 
relationship between member participation, recruitment, and retention translated 
into tactics that emphasized citizen leadership and participation.  Their rallying 
cry was “they have money,” referring to their polluting adversaries, and “we have 
people.”  In the end, each configuration of organizational structure and strategy 
yielded results and proved effective in inserting the public interest in to 
environmental decision making.   
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Both citizen expertise and people power appeared to have their advantages 
and disadvantages.  Acting as citizen experts proved to be an efficient means of 
effecting change in the short-term for groups like SES but detracted from building 
sustainable community-based organizations that could continue to prosper after 
their key campaigns ended.  Effectively employing people power took a 
tremendous amount of time and energy from volunteer and paid organizers and, 
because of the radically democratic decision-making structure of groups like 
NPRC and SOCM, they could be slow to respond to new threats or opportunities.  
But, their structures, which required the recruitment of new members and 
cultivation of new leaders also contributed to their long-term sustainability. Their 
success on individual campaigns, however, appeared to depend less on their 
structures and more on their ability to adapt their strategies to the political, 
regulatory and social conditions as they changed between the 1970s and 2000.   
What the histories of all three of these groups demonstrate is the 
persistence of the democratic argument in how citizens understood and sought to 
solve environmental issues.  Even when SES was at its apogee as an expert 
representative of the public interest in suing the Phelps Dodge and Magma 
Copper for failing to meet the sulfur dioxide requirements of the Clean Air Act, 
Robinson still understood her activities as part of SES’s goal of advancing citizen 
participation in decisions concerning air quality, public health, and the rule of 
law.  NPRC and SOCM institutionalized interpretations of environmental issues 
in which participation became a long term goal on par with environmental 
protection—even if they failed to achieve their immediate environmental 
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objective, they were not defeated if they upheld the ability of citizens to affect 
decisions regarding land, air, water, health and their communities in the future.  
SOCM expanded this vision of civil society to other issues of concern to 
Tennesseans including equitable taxation, fair working conditions for temporary 
workers, and combating racism.  This has important implications for several areas 
of American history, environmental history, and studies of sustainability.   
 In terms of the history of the American environmental movement and 
environmentalism, this study complicates and extends the observations of Samuel 
Hays, Adam Rome, and Robert Gottlieb.  It supports Hays’s findings about the 
shift that occurred in the 1970s in the way government agencies made 
environmental decisions, the proliferation of local community-based 
organizations formed to address local problems, how citizens groups learned that 
government agencies often had to be nudged and cajoled to enforce the law, and 
how citizens confronted the technical and scientific aspects of environmental 
issues.
 334
  It adds to these revelations about citizens’ groups by showing the 
processes by which they developed citizen expertise and the many tactics they 
pursued to address environmental issues and how those tactics differed over time 
and between groups.   
This study complicates the work of both Hays and Rome who cite the 
beginnings of the American environmental movement with the affluence and 
change in consumption of the urban and suburban middle class in the decades 
after World War II.  Hays does recognize that acceptance of environmental values 
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varied, with Americans in the coastal cities expressing a concern for the 
environment before those in the interior, Midwest, and South.
335
  The emergence 
of the local environmental movement in southern Arizona and the Southwest 
Environmental Service very much follows this model.  Northern Plains and Save 
Our Cumberland Mountains, however, challenge it.  While what were becoming 
mainstream popular environmental values influenced the cultural conversations in 
which ranchers and retired coal miners considered the threats of strip mining to 
their homes and environments, they became polarized by threats to their private 
property and, in some cases, their lives or those of their families.  Samuel Hays 
argues  that Americans became more concerned with “quality of life” in the 
postwar decades and that a clean and healthful environment and scenic places in 
which to recreate were essential to that quality of life;  the people who formed 
NPRC and SOCM did not understand their concerns in these terms.  Strip mining 
represented real threats to their ability to make a living, way of life, and safety.  In 
this way, members of NPRC and SOCM more resemble the working class people 
of Love Canal in 1978 or Memphis, Tennessee, in the 2000s who organized to 
protect themselves from toxic contamination.  They are more similar to what 
scholars label “environmental justice” groups in the 1990s (as has already been 
mentioned, SOCM began to officially describe itself as a “social, economic, and 
environmental justice” organization in 2008).  It would be easy simply to label 
Northern Plains and Save Our Cumberland Mountains as such, but to do so would 
miss the point.  Because they did not form in the same fashion as Southwest 
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Environmental Service, or countless other citizens environmental organizations 
that followed the pattern observed by Hays and Rome, and because they resemble 
in some respects groups commonly understood as environmental justice 
organizations, does not make them wholly different from other environmental 
groups.  NPRC and SOCM—and potentially many environmental justice 
organizations—are united with SES and other citizens groups by their tendency to 
interpret environmental issues as matters of fairness and justice and their 
preference for seeking democratic means to solve them.   
To again quote Robert Gottlieb, “environmentalism is a complex set of 
movements with diverse roots, with the capacity to help facilitate profound social 
change.”  To understand how citizens’ groups relate to the mainstream 
environmental movement and the American democratic tradition, and to begin to 
build bridges across the racial and class divides that have separated the 
environmental justice movement from the mainstream movement requires this 
expanded definition of environmentalism.  In his 2003 article “’Give Earth a 
Chance:’ The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” Rome reveals the 
common roots of the environmental movement in the social movements of the 
1960s tied to the Civil Rights, Anti-war, New Left, and Feminist movements.   As 
it mainstreamed—in fact as all of these movements mainstreamed—the 
environmental movement moved farther from the progressive roots it shared with 
these other movements.  Calls for justice and participatory democracy united 
activists on the left during the 1960s.  By the 1980s and 1990s, these demands 
were tempered in the activities of professionalized, mainstream environmental 
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groups.  Where it remained potent was with citizen activists who drew on ideals 
of good government and democracy to address threats to their land, water, air, 
health, and communities.
336
   
The experiences of citizens’ environmental organizations, represented here 
in case studies of NPRC, SES, and SOCM, demonstrate the close connections 
Gottlieb and Rome observe between environmentalism and other social 
movements and the complexity of environmentalism itself as it was embraced by 
everyday people.  Perhaps the clearest examples of these connections and 
complexity was exhibited in the experiences of women in all three groups. In all 
three cases, women rarely explicitly connected their activism with a larger goal of 
obtaining equality for women, but SES’s Priscilla Robinson, SOCM’s Maureen 
O’Connell, and many of the women of NPRC understood their work on 
environmental issues as directly connected to efforts to advance equality for 
women and democratic governance.  O’Connell quietly advanced these goals in 
her activism by seeking out women to join and become leaders in SOCM.  Her 
actions, and those of volunteer activists like Bettie Anderson and Connie White 
and others, subtly challenged the patriarchy of small-town Appalachian society.  
Robinson came by political activism as an advocate for women’s reproductive 
rights.  At SES, she exclusively hired women and supported them as they 
developed into experts in environmental policy and organizing citizens for 
change.  The women of Northern Plains, like Anne Charter, Ellen Pfister, Carolyn 
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Alderson, Anne McKinney, Charter’s eventual daughter in law Jeanne Hjermstad, 
and others often shrugged off suggestions that they were advancing women’s 
issues and explained their activism as an extension of their work on their ranches 
and farms.  Although not the subject of this study, many of these women were 
also involved with the League of Women Voters and participated in the campaign 
to pass the Equal Rights Amendment and other women’s issues during the last 
decades of the twentieth century.   
These women’s activism generally supports the observations of historians 
Glenda Riley, Vera Norwood, and others who argue that women had a different 
relationship with environmental issues than men and that women involved in 
environmental work mixed the gender ideology of the twentieth century with their 
work in the public arena to protect their home, widely conceived.  Even Robinson, 
who seemed consciously to reject the gendered language of “protecting home” or 
appeals to sentimentality in her work, acknowledged the presence of gender 
considerations in her activities.  Recognizing that she was often the only woman 
in meetings concerning land use planning, water or air quality issues, she 
purposely wore clothes that would not attract attention and admitted to purposely 
hiring women in hopes of molding them into experts and community leaders.  She 
tended to view environmental issues affecting southern Arizona possessively and 
felt obligated to take part in every decision regarding air, water, and quality of life 
in the region and to assist others in their efforts to protect their southern Arizona 
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“home.”  Perhaps this is why Governor Bruce Babbitt referred to Robinson in 
1988 as “the Den Mother of Arizona environmentalists.”337   
All of this provides an example of the complex ways in which Americans 
understood and addressed environmental issues.  It illuminates how citizens 
understood environmental issues as issues of fairness, justice, and governance.  
Though threats to and degradation of water, air, land, and quality of life filled a 
distinct niche in the spectrum of public goods problems—health care, social 
welfare, poverty, etc.—Americans approached problem-solving of all of these in a 
similar way.  This realization can contribute to efforts to solve global 
environmental problems and achieve sustainability—local, regional, national, and 
world systems that provide the necessities for human life without sacrificing the 
ability of the planet to continue to provide essential resources for the future and 
social justice.  It changes the frame of the conversation about environmental 
issues.   
At their core, environmental problems are issues of human behavior and 
governance. The democratic argument cannot be ignored in the twenty-first 
century as the global population grows beyond seven billion raising issues of 
natural resource depletion and climate change to the top of the international 
environmental agenda.  Scholars and managers concerned with sustainability 
acknowledge that ecological and social systems are inextricably linked and must 
be managed jointly by effective democratic governance supported by meaningful 
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public participation.  There are no technological fixes that will ensure sustainable, 
environmentally responsible, and socially just communities and nations. On a 
daily basis, humans manage a complex socio-ecological system and only strive 
for “sustainability” as a work in progress. We develop human institutions to 
manage our world and ourselves. Citizens in democratic societies therefore play a 
particularly critical role in making sustainability regimes work.  NPRC, SES, and 
SOCM provide examples of citizens engaging democratic institutions to solve 
environmental problems that can inform future sustainability initiatives.      
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
As with any study that extrapolates general findings from a few representative 
case studies, this one has its limitations.  The most obvious of which is the 
question of just how representative NPRC, SES, and SOCM are of community-
based or citizens environmental organizations in the United States between the 
early 1970s and 2000.  Even though great attention was paid to choosing 
representative groups to profile—one rural, one urban and middle-class, one 
small-town and working class, one in the Rocky Mountain West, one in the 
Southeast, and one in the Southwest, one radically democratic in structure, one 
more professional, and one that reflects aspects of both—they are only three 
organizations.  Thousands of community-based and grassroots environmental 
organizations formed across the country during this period.  Obviously, a study 
that incorporated more examples—perhaps one from the urban working class, one 
from the Northeast and Northwest, one representing predominantly people of 
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color—would further illuminate these processes and either bolster or revise my 
findings extrapolated from these three cases.  Theorists of community organizing 
like Wade Rathke, who organized the Association of Community Organizations 
for Reform Now (ACORN) would likely find the absence of an urban working 
class group in the study a notable shortcoming.   
What tied the Northern Plains Resource Council, Southwest Environmental 
Service, and Save Our Cumberland Mountains and their work together, across 
geography, class, tactics, and time, was a commitment to advancing citizens’ 
ability to take part in the decisions that affected their environments, health, and 
lives.  Regardless of the limitations inherent in comparing three case studies, the 
experiences of the three groups revealed here illustrate the potency of the 
democratic impulse in understanding and addressing environmental issues. This 
impulse is widespread and deserves more attention from scholars than it has 
received to date.  Much detail and insight remains to be revealed regarding the 
depth, pervasiveness, and character of this current in other organizations, in other 
places, and at other times.  
A second limitation of this study is my heavy reliance on primary sources 
produced by the groups themselves and oral histories from the activists involved.  
I favored these sources because they gave an indication of how the activists 
themselves viewed environmental issues and what they themselves thought they 
were doing.  But relying too heavily on sources from the activists risks limiting 
the perspective of the study.  One of my primary concerns was to investigate how 
citizens understood environmental issues and how they sought to solve them and 
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their tendency to promote citizen participation as a primary means for addressing 
threats to land, air, water, health and quality of life.  Thus, investigating the 
materials that activists produced and recounting their stories was logical.  An 
evaluation of the potency of citizen participation in affecting tangible 
environmental change would require a more in-depth examination of the records 
of government regulators and polluters.  The abilities of citizen environmental 
organizations to achieve tangible environmental change seem apparent in the case 
studies presented here—only one major coal-fired power plant was built in 
Montana instead of forty, the closure of the Phelps Dodge smelter in Douglas, the 
preserving of the Fall Creek watershed from strip mining. Certainly other forces 
at play deserve additional examination before a strong causal argument can be 
made. However, I primarily sought in this study to make sense of how Americans 
understood and addressed environmental issues rather than evaluate the 
effectiveness of citizen activism in rectifying threats to air, water, land, and 
quality of life.  An investigation into the effectiveness of the strategies and tactics 
of citizens groups in addressing environmental issues would be a logical and 
complementary corollary to this study.    
 In closing, the experiences of citizen activists and the organizations they 
formed to address threats to air and water quality, land, public health, and quality 
of life in the late twentieth century requires us to refocus our ideas about 
environmentalism and the environmental movement and its relationship to 
American history and civil society in general.  Citizen activists aligned their 
environmental work with concerns about their communities, the health of their 
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families, their ability to make a living, and also abstract ideas about nation, 
citizenship, the proper function of government, fairness and justice.  In this, they 
were not unlike activists concerned with other issues—civil rights, feminist, and 
social justice activists of the postwar era, and environmental justice advocates of 
the 1980s and 1990s.  As they engaged the environmental decision making 
processes provided by law, many began to view their work in relation to the 
struggles of others fighting similar battles and understand threats to their homes as 
part of global systems of environmental, economic, and social injustice.  In this, 
environmental activism was often transformative.  As it transformed citizen 
activists, those activists sought to transform environmental decision making by 
asserting their right to know about pollution, to be protected from it, and to take 
part in the decisions affecting their lives and communities.  Environmental reform 
at the local level became one of the leading edges of an increasing 
democratization of American society.  As we enter a new century and millennium 
fraught with the daunting prospects of growing global population, finite resources, 
and a warming planet, the relationship between democratic participation and 
environmental management will be tested.  But community-based, citizen 
activists will likely remain, standing in the middle, holding both together in the 
name of justice.  It is their land; they have the right to be heard.  
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